New Cubs management sort of let their strategy out of the bag. Epstein and Hoyer have identified a list of players who they believe will have "bounce back seasons" to target for acquisition. The latest comeback player candidate is lefty starter, Paul Maholm, who signed a $4.25 million contract with a $500k buyout with a club option in 2013. Maholm's season ended early with a shoulder strain issue. This move is similar to the Jim Hendry pick up Tom Gorzelanny from the Pirates a few years earlier. Pirate left hand starters seem to pitch quite well at Wrigley the last few years, and Maholm fits the bill as a ground ball out pitcher in a HR alley friendly ball yard.
Maholm, 29, went 6-14, 3.66 ERA, 1.294 WHIP in 26 games for the improved Pirates in 2011. Gorzelanny came to the Cubs after a weak 2008 season of 6-9, 6.66 ERA, 1.804 WHIP in 21 games. The Cubs picked him up and made him a swing starter/long reliever and in 2009 he had a 4-2 record, 5.63 ERA, 1.357 WHIP in 13 games. There was some improvement, but not substantial.
In the financial world, after a stock quickly falls in price, there are times buyers pick it up cheaply and the stock begins to rise from the bottom of the chart. But usually, it is a short term "dead cat bounce" before the stock falls back to the bottom. Epstein and Hoyer have a lot of bouncing fur so far this off-season, including pitchers Volstad, Sonnastine, and Weathers.
The signing of Maholm also puts into play the strong probability that Matt Garza will be traded soon. David Kaplan of WGN Chicago stated that the Cubs and Tigers are in advanced talks on a Garza deal. The Cubs apparently want two Tiger top prospects, 19 year old third baseman Nick Castellanos, who hit .313, 7 HR 76 RBI in A ball, but is a defensive project, and 20 year old starter Jacob Turner, who bolted up from AA to 3 appearances in the majors late last season. Turner is the Tigers #1 system prospect. In AA-AAA last season, Turner was 4-5, 3.44 ERA, 1.160 WHIP, 110 K/35 BB which is quite good. Both of these Tiger prospects are years away from major league duty.
If Maholm is the replacement for Garza in the rotation, it is another downgrade by the new administration for the sake of roster turnover and acquisition of low prospects to re-fill the minor league ranks. The Cubs have the 6th and 41st picks in this year's draft which could lead to 2 impact players in 2014. It would also be another move to pare back payroll, as Garza is expected to make $9 million in arbitration for 2012, or about double what Maholm will make. Do not discount the fact that the Cubs have no real money to spend on free agents or veterans without dumping a corresponding amount in existing payroll. So the plan is to throw on a quick patch of new stucco on the major league roster to get some fan interest, but really pray for the new minor league system to produce a dozen quality players by 2014.
January 10, 2012
January 9, 2012
OLD SCHOOL BLUEPRINT
There is an old adage that states a good baseball team has defense up the middle and powers on the corners. It is another way of describing a balanced team in a non-sabermetric way.
On the power side, one's best home run hitters are usually RF and 1B. Next would be 3B. Then LF, and if you have one, a catcher. Four of one's regular fielders should have consistent home run power.
On the defensive side, your best defenders should be your C, SS, CF (for all the ground to cover) and 2B (to turn the double play). Your shortstop, center fielder and/or second basemen would be the fastest guys in the starting lineup, with the most "steal" potential. You want your best base stealer to lead off, which usually is a SS, CF or 2B.
You have the speedy defender lead off, and the best contact, average hitter second. Then you go through your RBI man, then all the power hitters in a row until whoever is left over at the end.
So how do the current Cubs roster (still under construction) stack up under the old school blue print?
Power:
RF, DeJesus NO.
1B, LaHair MAYBE
3B, Stewart NO
LF, Soriano, YES.
Defense:
C, Soto, AVERAGE
SS, Castro, INCONSISTENT TO BELOW AVG.
CF, Byrd, AVERAGE
2B, Barney, BELOW AVERAGE
The old school line up would be:
1. Castro, ss
2. Byrd, cf
3. LaHair, 1b
4. Soriano, lf
5. Soto, c
6. DeJesus, rf
7. Stewart, 3b
8. Barney, 2b
On the power side, one's best home run hitters are usually RF and 1B. Next would be 3B. Then LF, and if you have one, a catcher. Four of one's regular fielders should have consistent home run power.
On the defensive side, your best defenders should be your C, SS, CF (for all the ground to cover) and 2B (to turn the double play). Your shortstop, center fielder and/or second basemen would be the fastest guys in the starting lineup, with the most "steal" potential. You want your best base stealer to lead off, which usually is a SS, CF or 2B.
You have the speedy defender lead off, and the best contact, average hitter second. Then you go through your RBI man, then all the power hitters in a row until whoever is left over at the end.
So how do the current Cubs roster (still under construction) stack up under the old school blue print?
Power:
RF, DeJesus NO.
1B, LaHair MAYBE
3B, Stewart NO
LF, Soriano, YES.
Defense:
C, Soto, AVERAGE
SS, Castro, INCONSISTENT TO BELOW AVG.
CF, Byrd, AVERAGE
2B, Barney, BELOW AVERAGE
The old school line up would be:
1. Castro, ss
2. Byrd, cf
3. LaHair, 1b
4. Soriano, lf
5. Soto, c
6. DeJesus, rf
7. Stewart, 3b
8. Barney, 2b
January 7, 2012
RIZZO TRADE
The reaction to the Cubs trade for Padre prospect Anthony Rizzo has been mixed; the fan base has been underwhelmed by the moves of Epstein and Hoyer this off-season.
Rizzo was one of the players San Diego received from Theo's Red Sox in the Adrian Gonzalez deal. But once new Pads GM Josh Byrnes took over for Hoyer, he traded to young starter Matt Latos to the Reds for prospect Alonso, thereby creating a jam at first base with Rizzo.
So it is apparent that the scouts and GM in San Diego thought better of Alonso than Rizzo as the first baseman of the future. Rizzo fizzled in his time in the majors last season, batting a mere .141. However, in Triple A, he had good power numbers (but LaHair had slightly better overall numbers at Iowa, and better numbers with lesser at bats with the Cubs.)
Fans were upbeat about the new Cub management team finding a solution at first base, then paused when Hoyer said that Rizzo needed "more time to develop." That leaves LaHair as the placeholder at first base in 2012. Most project a sophomore slump a la Micah Hoffpauir for LaHair.
But some fans are weary of the trade of Andrew Cashner, a known commodity, for a "prospect." Cashner, who was misused last season which contributed to his shoulder injury, will return to the bullpen in San Diego. In a pitcher friendly park, he is projected to be the set-up man with about 10 wins, 35 holds and an ERA under 3.00 (a right handed Sean Marshall). Then, he is in line to be promoted to replace Health Bell as the Padre closer, a role he had in college.
There is no guarantee that LaHair is a late bloomer, or that Rizzo is a AAAA player like Hoffpauir.
But one thing is clear, Epstein and Hoyer are discounting the Hendry prospects and signees like week old tuna at the fish market. Gone are Colvin, LeMathieu, Cashner, and Marshall. It puts a bull's eye on the back of Cubs #1 prospect, Brett Jackson, on whether he will be in the Cubs 2012 plans.
Rizzo was one of the players San Diego received from Theo's Red Sox in the Adrian Gonzalez deal. But once new Pads GM Josh Byrnes took over for Hoyer, he traded to young starter Matt Latos to the Reds for prospect Alonso, thereby creating a jam at first base with Rizzo.
So it is apparent that the scouts and GM in San Diego thought better of Alonso than Rizzo as the first baseman of the future. Rizzo fizzled in his time in the majors last season, batting a mere .141. However, in Triple A, he had good power numbers (but LaHair had slightly better overall numbers at Iowa, and better numbers with lesser at bats with the Cubs.)
Fans were upbeat about the new Cub management team finding a solution at first base, then paused when Hoyer said that Rizzo needed "more time to develop." That leaves LaHair as the placeholder at first base in 2012. Most project a sophomore slump a la Micah Hoffpauir for LaHair.
But some fans are weary of the trade of Andrew Cashner, a known commodity, for a "prospect." Cashner, who was misused last season which contributed to his shoulder injury, will return to the bullpen in San Diego. In a pitcher friendly park, he is projected to be the set-up man with about 10 wins, 35 holds and an ERA under 3.00 (a right handed Sean Marshall). Then, he is in line to be promoted to replace Health Bell as the Padre closer, a role he had in college.
There is no guarantee that LaHair is a late bloomer, or that Rizzo is a AAAA player like Hoffpauir.
But one thing is clear, Epstein and Hoyer are discounting the Hendry prospects and signees like week old tuna at the fish market. Gone are Colvin, LeMathieu, Cashner, and Marshall. It puts a bull's eye on the back of Cubs #1 prospect, Brett Jackson, on whether he will be in the Cubs 2012 plans.
January 5, 2012
ZAMBRANO TRADE
Cubs problem child, Carlos Zambrano, was rewarded for his bad behavior because he got his wish, to join fellow off-center manager Ozzie Guillen in Miami. The Cubs have traded Zambrano and $15 million in cash (to offset the $18 million owed Z in 2012) in exchange for Marlins starter Chris Volstad. The deal is still subject to league approval.
Volstad is a marginal fifth starter. Zambrano was traded at his low value point, to the only team with any tangible interest in him. Jim Hendry suspended Z after he bolted the locker room last year (and that matter is still pending with the league). Of the three "can't miss" starters the Cubs had (Wood, Prior and Zambrano), only Z made it consistently to the mound to actually pitch. He won 125 games (1 no hitter) and a career ERA of 3.60.
Volstad, a first-round draft pick in 2005, finished 5-13 with a 4.89 ERA last season after a 12-9 showing the year before. The 230-pounder made $445,000 last season. Tribune writer Dave Van Dyke states he could get up to $2 million this year in arbitration. That figure seems high for a player with bad stats in 2011 (and in essence the player's first "contract" season - - - where performance could land a big payday in arbitration. ) However, Volstad is really costing the Cubs $15 million plus his salary, or the highest paid 5th starter in the majors). The Cubs control his rights through 2014 which is the key element in most of Epstein and Hoyer's roster moves so far this off-season.
Zambrano was just 9-7 with a 4.82 ERA in 24 games last season, missing the last two months when the Cubs placed him on the restricted list for bad behavior. He goes to a team that has suddenly spent money on big free agents (Reyes, Buerhle) and now expect to contend in the NL East.
The trade gets rid of a trouble maker, but leaves the Cubs starting rotation in shambles. As it stands now, the Cubs starting rotation is (2011 stats):
1. Garza, 10-10, 3.32 ERA, 1.258 WHIP, 198 IP
2. Dempster, 10-14, 4.41 ERA, 1.450 WHIP, 202.1 IP
3. T. Wood, 6-6, 4.84 ERA, 1.289 WHIP, 106 IP
4. Sonnanstine, 0-2, 5.55 ERA, 1.458 WHIP, 35.2 IP (minors 3-6, 4.82 ERA, 1.411 WHIP, 56 IP)
5. Volstad, 5-13, 4.89 ERA, 1.425 WHIP, 165.2 IP
A staff that has a combined 31-45 record (.408 winning percentage). If your starting rotation is the precursor of your final team record, this projects to a woeful 66 win season. But Epstein and Hoyer are looking for "bounce back" seasons from every player they have signed or traded for this off-season. That is going to be a really hard sell, especially if Garza is traded next.
Volstad is a marginal fifth starter. Zambrano was traded at his low value point, to the only team with any tangible interest in him. Jim Hendry suspended Z after he bolted the locker room last year (and that matter is still pending with the league). Of the three "can't miss" starters the Cubs had (Wood, Prior and Zambrano), only Z made it consistently to the mound to actually pitch. He won 125 games (1 no hitter) and a career ERA of 3.60.
Volstad, a first-round draft pick in 2005, finished 5-13 with a 4.89 ERA last season after a 12-9 showing the year before. The 230-pounder made $445,000 last season. Tribune writer Dave Van Dyke states he could get up to $2 million this year in arbitration. That figure seems high for a player with bad stats in 2011 (and in essence the player's first "contract" season - - - where performance could land a big payday in arbitration. ) However, Volstad is really costing the Cubs $15 million plus his salary, or the highest paid 5th starter in the majors). The Cubs control his rights through 2014 which is the key element in most of Epstein and Hoyer's roster moves so far this off-season.
Zambrano was just 9-7 with a 4.82 ERA in 24 games last season, missing the last two months when the Cubs placed him on the restricted list for bad behavior. He goes to a team that has suddenly spent money on big free agents (Reyes, Buerhle) and now expect to contend in the NL East.
The trade gets rid of a trouble maker, but leaves the Cubs starting rotation in shambles. As it stands now, the Cubs starting rotation is (2011 stats):
1. Garza, 10-10, 3.32 ERA, 1.258 WHIP, 198 IP
2. Dempster, 10-14, 4.41 ERA, 1.450 WHIP, 202.1 IP
3. T. Wood, 6-6, 4.84 ERA, 1.289 WHIP, 106 IP
4. Sonnanstine, 0-2, 5.55 ERA, 1.458 WHIP, 35.2 IP (minors 3-6, 4.82 ERA, 1.411 WHIP, 56 IP)
5. Volstad, 5-13, 4.89 ERA, 1.425 WHIP, 165.2 IP
A staff that has a combined 31-45 record (.408 winning percentage). If your starting rotation is the precursor of your final team record, this projects to a woeful 66 win season. But Epstein and Hoyer are looking for "bounce back" seasons from every player they have signed or traded for this off-season. That is going to be a really hard sell, especially if Garza is traded next.
January 4, 2012
THE ART OF THE MANUFACTURED RUN
Managers dwell on the concept of turning over their batting order as quick as possible to get more scoring chances. But many are welded to the Earl Weaver philosophy of waiting for the 3 run HR to score. You put your best hitters at the top and power hitters in the middle and let them swing for the fences.
"Small ball" is the opposite. It tries to use different baseball skills to move runners from station to station. It is not practiced by many teams because it goes against what the modern baseball player is all about: personal stats.
The art of manufacturing a run is based upon the elements of patience, speed and "productive outs." A productive out is one which advances a base runner into scoring position. A strike out is never a productive out, but in the home run era, strikeouts were no longer badges of shame for hitters. The Golden Sombrero of three strike outs in a game is no longer a symbol of failure. The lone strike out exception would be "the long at-bat," in which the batter fouls off so many pitches that it works the opponent pitcher's game pitch count higher than normal (which means the starter would get out of the game sooner).
If a team lacks power hitters to score runs, it needs to set up its batting order to manufacture runs.
(1) The lead off hitter must have a high OBP (average plus walks). The league leaders last year only had an OBP of .416. The lead off hitter must not just have speed, but base running skills (stolen bases and taking the extra base).
(2) The number 2 hitter must be a very disciplined contact hitter. His objective is to get the lead off man to third base with one out or less (stolen base + sacrifice/fielder choice or hit and run). This hitter must be able to hit to the opposite field, work a pitch count, have excellent bunting skills and protect the runner on first.
(3) The number 3 hitter must be a high contact, fly ball batter. For if the two players in front of him have done their jobs correctly, there would be a runner on third with one out. He is not the team's home run power, but someone who can get a runner home from third by any means (sac fly, suicide squeeze, ground out to right side, base hit).
(4) The clean up hitter is the last insurance policy to get a run home with 2 outs. He must be a high average hitter with good clean, line drive contact (hopefully gap power) that can get a solid base hit to score a runner from second or third.
(5) The 5th hitter is the final batter in the scoring zone. This should be the team's best power hitter. If it gets to this point, there would be two outs and at least one runner on base (2 if no one scored). This is your Earl Weaver scoring chance.
The bottom of your order can also manufacture a run:
(6) The 6th hitter would be the team's second best lead off man.
(7) The 7th hitter would be the team's second best disciplined contact hitter.
(8) The 8th hitter would be a player that could get the ball in play to score a runner from third with one out.
Under this system, manufacturing a run costs two productive outs. With 27 outs in a game, a team has 18 productive out chances. If a team can convert on 50% of those opportunities, that would be 9 runs per game (RPG). 40% success rate would be approximately 7 RPG.
It is more likely that the top of the order would have the best scoring chances. The top 4 in the order would get 4 to 5 chances to bat per game. So they have an opportunity to manufacture 4 or 5 runs per game. In 2011, MLB teams averaged 4.28 RPG. A team built to manufacture 4.5 RPG would be highly likely to be over .500.
The top of the order in a manufactured run line-up would put more pressure on the opponent's pitcher and defense. Pitchers pitch differently when there is a runner on first, especially one that can steal bases. A runner in motion puts the defense in motion, which creates gaps in a defense that a good contact hitter can exploit.
A team built to manufacture runs is a contradiction to present pro baseball theory. It requires skills that are not used very often in major league games: looking to walk, stealing bases, giving yourself up to advance a runner, plate discipline, contact hitting to appropriate field, bunting, and base running skills. All those skills were called "fundamentals" when children first learned the game at an early age. By the time prospects reach the majors, most of these fundamentals are rusty or lost. And veterans don't practice them because they are professionals who have made it to the Big Show. And managers would meet huge resistance from players who want personal stats as much as team victories.
"Small ball" is the opposite. It tries to use different baseball skills to move runners from station to station. It is not practiced by many teams because it goes against what the modern baseball player is all about: personal stats.
The art of manufacturing a run is based upon the elements of patience, speed and "productive outs." A productive out is one which advances a base runner into scoring position. A strike out is never a productive out, but in the home run era, strikeouts were no longer badges of shame for hitters. The Golden Sombrero of three strike outs in a game is no longer a symbol of failure. The lone strike out exception would be "the long at-bat," in which the batter fouls off so many pitches that it works the opponent pitcher's game pitch count higher than normal (which means the starter would get out of the game sooner).
If a team lacks power hitters to score runs, it needs to set up its batting order to manufacture runs.
(1) The lead off hitter must have a high OBP (average plus walks). The league leaders last year only had an OBP of .416. The lead off hitter must not just have speed, but base running skills (stolen bases and taking the extra base).
(2) The number 2 hitter must be a very disciplined contact hitter. His objective is to get the lead off man to third base with one out or less (stolen base + sacrifice/fielder choice or hit and run). This hitter must be able to hit to the opposite field, work a pitch count, have excellent bunting skills and protect the runner on first.
(3) The number 3 hitter must be a high contact, fly ball batter. For if the two players in front of him have done their jobs correctly, there would be a runner on third with one out. He is not the team's home run power, but someone who can get a runner home from third by any means (sac fly, suicide squeeze, ground out to right side, base hit).
(4) The clean up hitter is the last insurance policy to get a run home with 2 outs. He must be a high average hitter with good clean, line drive contact (hopefully gap power) that can get a solid base hit to score a runner from second or third.
(5) The 5th hitter is the final batter in the scoring zone. This should be the team's best power hitter. If it gets to this point, there would be two outs and at least one runner on base (2 if no one scored). This is your Earl Weaver scoring chance.
The bottom of your order can also manufacture a run:
(6) The 6th hitter would be the team's second best lead off man.
(7) The 7th hitter would be the team's second best disciplined contact hitter.
(8) The 8th hitter would be a player that could get the ball in play to score a runner from third with one out.
Under this system, manufacturing a run costs two productive outs. With 27 outs in a game, a team has 18 productive out chances. If a team can convert on 50% of those opportunities, that would be 9 runs per game (RPG). 40% success rate would be approximately 7 RPG.
It is more likely that the top of the order would have the best scoring chances. The top 4 in the order would get 4 to 5 chances to bat per game. So they have an opportunity to manufacture 4 or 5 runs per game. In 2011, MLB teams averaged 4.28 RPG. A team built to manufacture 4.5 RPG would be highly likely to be over .500.
The top of the order in a manufactured run line-up would put more pressure on the opponent's pitcher and defense. Pitchers pitch differently when there is a runner on first, especially one that can steal bases. A runner in motion puts the defense in motion, which creates gaps in a defense that a good contact hitter can exploit.
A team built to manufacture runs is a contradiction to present pro baseball theory. It requires skills that are not used very often in major league games: looking to walk, stealing bases, giving yourself up to advance a runner, plate discipline, contact hitting to appropriate field, bunting, and base running skills. All those skills were called "fundamentals" when children first learned the game at an early age. By the time prospects reach the majors, most of these fundamentals are rusty or lost. And veterans don't practice them because they are professionals who have made it to the Big Show. And managers would meet huge resistance from players who want personal stats as much as team victories.
January 3, 2012
JAI MILLER ON THE MOVE
MLBTR reports that the Baltimore Orioles acquired outfielder Jai Miller from the Athletics for cash considerations. Orioles executive Dan Duquette said in a press release, "Jai Miller has the power, speed, base stealing skills and good athletic ability to be an asset in our outfield as he competes for a spot on our ballclub this spring." The San Francisco Chronicle reports that Orioles paid only $45,000.
Miller, 26, hit .276/.368/.588 with 32 home runs, 88 RBI and 16 SB in AAA in 2011. He spent most of his time in center and right field.
We highlighted Jai Miller as a cheap, risk free option for the Cubs in this blog's first post. At the time, the A's had put the AAA OF on waivers hoping to reclaim him, which they did. Now, with later roster move considerations, the A's trade Miller to the O's for cash. So, in essence, the Cubs had two inexpensive ways to bolster their roster with a power hitter, but passed.
With the Cubs devoid of power hitters on the roster, and reserve outfielders of only Reed Johnson and Dave Sappelt, Miller would have been at least a spring training option to be a fourth outfielder and insurance if David DeJesus' performance downfall in 2011 was not an anomaly but a serious trend.
Miller, 26, hit .276/.368/.588 with 32 home runs, 88 RBI and 16 SB in AAA in 2011. He spent most of his time in center and right field.
We highlighted Jai Miller as a cheap, risk free option for the Cubs in this blog's first post. At the time, the A's had put the AAA OF on waivers hoping to reclaim him, which they did. Now, with later roster move considerations, the A's trade Miller to the O's for cash. So, in essence, the Cubs had two inexpensive ways to bolster their roster with a power hitter, but passed.
With the Cubs devoid of power hitters on the roster, and reserve outfielders of only Reed Johnson and Dave Sappelt, Miller would have been at least a spring training option to be a fourth outfielder and insurance if David DeJesus' performance downfall in 2011 was not an anomaly but a serious trend.
WHITE SOX LAUNDRY
GM Kenny Williams is in the process of cleaning house. Ozzie Guillen has been spun out of town to the Marlins, and replaced by a manager who will listen to the GM, Robin Ventura, who has zero managerial experience.
Williams surprised many by trading his closer, Santos, to the Blue Jays for a good, 22 year old pitching prospect. Williams further surprised when he sent back reliever Jason Frasor back to the Jays for two low minor pitching prospects (one good, one not so good). Then feeling good about that, Williams finally traded RF Carlos Quentin to the Padres for two low minor league pitching prospects (one good, one not so good). Clearly, a pattern is developing here: trade for low level prospects and cut the payroll for 2012. Williams has pared $34 million off the 2011 payroll, which in a long recession and announced ticket price reductions, is a prudent course. But the cleaning of payroll is not over; rumors have it Williams wants to dump reliever Thorton ($12 million owed for 2 years) and starter Floyd ($16 million/2 years). Since 4th starter free agents are commanding $10 million, Floyd could be moved to a contender by the trade deadline.
But the real trading chip for Williams was power hitting RF Quentin. As the off-season began, a good match for a trade partner would have been the Atlanta Braves, who were looking for a power hitting right handed outfielder. And the Braves put it out there that starting pitcher Jair Jurrjens and second baseman Martin Prado were available. It would have been a good match to send Quentin (and Gordon Beckman and prospect/cash) to Atlanta for the Jurrjens and Prado, who would be two position upgrades for the Sox. But the teams were never linked in any trade discussions. (The Rockies were looking for a package deal with the Braves, but it stalled.)
Even the Cubs were not in the discussion, which can only be explained by the fact that the team cannot take on the salaries of Jurrjens and/or Prado, who would be huge upgrades for the Cubs. At the time, the Cubs had Colvin, LeMathieu and could toss in pitching prospects such as Carpenter or McNutt, to make the deal. The Braves have a surplus of young pitching so Jurrjens, who had an injury last season but is still has All Star potential, was available. The Braves price may be too high for any team.
Williams surprised many by trading his closer, Santos, to the Blue Jays for a good, 22 year old pitching prospect. Williams further surprised when he sent back reliever Jason Frasor back to the Jays for two low minor pitching prospects (one good, one not so good). Then feeling good about that, Williams finally traded RF Carlos Quentin to the Padres for two low minor league pitching prospects (one good, one not so good). Clearly, a pattern is developing here: trade for low level prospects and cut the payroll for 2012. Williams has pared $34 million off the 2011 payroll, which in a long recession and announced ticket price reductions, is a prudent course. But the cleaning of payroll is not over; rumors have it Williams wants to dump reliever Thorton ($12 million owed for 2 years) and starter Floyd ($16 million/2 years). Since 4th starter free agents are commanding $10 million, Floyd could be moved to a contender by the trade deadline.
But the real trading chip for Williams was power hitting RF Quentin. As the off-season began, a good match for a trade partner would have been the Atlanta Braves, who were looking for a power hitting right handed outfielder. And the Braves put it out there that starting pitcher Jair Jurrjens and second baseman Martin Prado were available. It would have been a good match to send Quentin (and Gordon Beckman and prospect/cash) to Atlanta for the Jurrjens and Prado, who would be two position upgrades for the Sox. But the teams were never linked in any trade discussions. (The Rockies were looking for a package deal with the Braves, but it stalled.)
Even the Cubs were not in the discussion, which can only be explained by the fact that the team cannot take on the salaries of Jurrjens and/or Prado, who would be huge upgrades for the Cubs. At the time, the Cubs had Colvin, LeMathieu and could toss in pitching prospects such as Carpenter or McNutt, to make the deal. The Braves have a surplus of young pitching so Jurrjens, who had an injury last season but is still has All Star potential, was available. The Braves price may be too high for any team.
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