White Sox general manager Kenny Williams does not get enough credit for what he has done this season. His team is currently in first place, 3 games ahead of the pre-season favorite Detroit Tigers. Williams has a reputation as a gambling trader. But it appears that he has gathered a better farm system than most pundits realized; let us compare the rookie pitchers that have been promoted to the big leagues this year.
The Chicago Cubs spent the last several seasons under former GM Jim Hendry on signing pitchers. When it came to crunch time this season by injury or otherwise, the Cubs promoted the following:
Parker 4 G 0-0 record, 0.00 ERA, 4.1 IP 1.63 WHIP
Rusin 1 G, 0-1 record, 1.80 ERA, 5.0 IP, 0.60 WHIP
Ascencio 12 G, 0-0 record, 3.07 ERA, 14. 2 IP, 1.57 WHIP
Beliveau, 11 G, 0-0 record, 3.18 ERA, 11.1 IP, 1.59 WHIP
Bowden 15 G, 0-0 record, 4.67 ERA, 17.1 IP, 1.50 WHIP
Raley 4 G, 1-2 record, 6.64 ERA, 20.1 IP, 1.57 WHIP
Cabrera 13 G 0-0 record, 8.38 ERA, 1.86 WHIP
Castillo, 10 G, 0-1 record, 10.64 ERA, 11 IP 2.55 WHIP
The two spot starters and bullpen fodder combined for a 1-4 record. It is glaring that these young pitchers have series control problems with their high WHIPs.
The White Sox used the following young pitchers to solidify its staff:
Veal 8 G 0-0 record, 1.42 ERA, 6.1 IP, 0.63 WHIP
Sale 24 G, 15-5 record, 2.81 ERA, 157 IP, 1.06 WHIP
Quintana 18 G, 5-2 record, 2.86 ERA, 110 IP, 1.19 WHIP
Jones 49 G, 7-0 record, 3.20 ERA, 50.2 IP, 1.52 WHIP
Santiago 35 G, 2-1 record, 3.99 ERA, 47.1 IP, 1.37 WHIP, 4 saves
Reed 50 G, 3-1 record, 4.11 ERA, 46 IP, 1.30 WHIP, 24 saves
Omogrosso 5 G 0-0 record, 4.26 ERA, 6.1 IP 1.58 WHIP
Axelrod 11 G, 2-2 record, 4.93 ERA, 45.2 IP, 1.38 WHIP
One could argue that Sale was with the club last season, but only in a limited bullpen role. This is his first year as a big league starter. Overall, this group of young pitchers have an impressive 34-11 record. That is outstanding production from the White Sox minor league system.
Clearly, the White Sox are in a better position going into next season with all the quality arms they have promoted this season. The system really stepped up when ace John Danks was sidelined with a shoulder injury and the struggles of Gavin Floyd.
August 31, 2012
August 30, 2012
FAN PERSPECTIVE
The 2013 Cubs media guide will probably herald Darwin Barney's NL consecutive errorless streak at second base as the accomplishment of the season. It is a stretch. Everything is a stretch with the Cubs this season. Barney's errorless streak is tainted by the fact that during his "streak" he committed an error this season at shortstop. Is it a meaningless stat? Of course. Is it something the Cubs PR department dug up to try to flicker any waning interest in this season? Of course. The Cubs continue to announce crowds of more than 31,000 at home games when the pictures of the stands show less than half show up to actually watch the game. Many fans have abandoned ship.
So what do average Cub fans perceive of their team as it muddles its way to the end of the season?
What does the "C" on the Cubs cap represent today?
CHICAGO. There is an institutionalized feeling that the Second City is somehow inferior to its large metropolitan rivals. There is a historical sense that one has to literally burn down the town in order to rebuild it into a World Class city. In one sense, second place is not deemed a total failure when the goal is first.
CALAMITY. Long time Cub fans expect the worst of their team at any given moment. They are continually amazed by the new ways the team finds to lose. They are trained to expect the worst, like an ace pitcher who can't field a bunt and throw it within 30 feet of first base. It is like the inner desire to watch a car crash unfold in front of your eyes.
CURSED. Long time Cub fans seek comfort in blaming nonsensical things as a reason for their team's losing ways: the goat, the black cat, the Bartman foul ball. But objectively, none of those alleged curses affected the result of any ball game or series. It was the players inability to perform under pressure and not excuses from the grandstands that has led to a permanent legacy of following the Loveable Losers due to supernatural events beyond anyone's control.
CRAP. In a cost-benefit analysis, the Cubs as a form of entertainment is a crappy deal. "Dynamic" high ticket prices for a AAA caliber roster is not a value deal like the bad teams in the late 1970s and early 1980s when fans could just show up to the park for a few bucks and watch a game from the front row of the empty bleachers. Under Tribune ownership, the Cubs became an entertainment venue; the largest open air tavern with a baseball floor show. As a television show, it made money. As a baseball franchise, it was a death knell. A budget philosophy of collecting just enough talent to be "competitive" to draw ratings was more important than winning championships. That leaves the development organization the poor step-sister to the main stage scene stealers. In addition, a loyal fan base has de-emphasized performance and accountability in management and players so crappy fundamentals has become the norm for the club.
CHECK-OUT. With the influx of young 20-somethings in the early 2000s, those who were not more interested in the bleacher beach scene but cared about the game itself, started to realize that the spike in the cost of attending games was supposed to equate with winning championships. These new fans changed the target from full at the ball park (in a Harry Carey haze) to wins. And when the Cubs bumped into the playoffs under Piniella, these fans felt the finish line ahead. But the Cubs collapsed in the playoffs, and the team crawled into bankruptcy with the Tribune. These new fans and Generation Y, in a tough recession with the high cost of living in the city, have given up being die-hard supporters of the team; they have checked out of Party Wrigley.
CONTEMPT. There is a feeling that new ownership and management believe Cub fans are merely paying sheep easily corralled in the lore that is the Cubs. There is an attitude that Cub fans can be milked for some of the highest prices in the sport because of their loyalty and their affection for Wrigley Field. There is an increasing arrogant tone from management who talk down to the media representatives of the fans in a corporate speak gibberish "of the process" to glaze over the harsh reality that they incompetently fielded a roster which will only contend for the most losses in team history. And for every action, there is an equal reaction. There is a growing minority of fans and the community that have contempt for the Cubs. One group has their ire based firmly on the lack of baseball intelligence shown in game after game. The lack of improvement or accountability of players by coaching staff is a disturbing trend. Another group has their ire directed at the Ricketts family, who continue to cry "poor" in order hundreds of millions of dollars in state and local taxpayer funds to rebuild their private property while at the same time spending tens of millions of dollars on adjacent real estate acquisitions and trimming the team payroll dramatically for the next few seasons. For the fan and his/her family that has struggled from pay check (if they are lucky) to pay check, a family of millionaires who want their tax dollars is a great insult when the city is bankrupt, teachers threatening to go on strike for benefits and basic city services are in the decline.
CUBS. The Cubs are a flood debris field of mixed emotions. The "Wait to Next Year" fan loyalty slogan is being eclipsed by "What are You Doing for Me Now?" When ownership says the team is only one or two players away; then it turns out that the team is not competitive at all - - - the seeds of revolutionary thought is sown. Fans have been waiting so long ( a lifetime) that hope turns into mental abuse, which turns into acknowledgement, which leads to resentment, which then can lead to therapeutic "letting go" of one's attachment to the team. If you perceive that "your" team is taking advantage of your patience, there is only so much one can take before breaking the bonds that first group them together. It is a evolution of a child-like passion to a grown-up objective balance of putting that energy into more productive uses.
So what do average Cub fans perceive of their team as it muddles its way to the end of the season?
What does the "C" on the Cubs cap represent today?
CALAMITY. Long time Cub fans expect the worst of their team at any given moment. They are continually amazed by the new ways the team finds to lose. They are trained to expect the worst, like an ace pitcher who can't field a bunt and throw it within 30 feet of first base. It is like the inner desire to watch a car crash unfold in front of your eyes.
CURSED. Long time Cub fans seek comfort in blaming nonsensical things as a reason for their team's losing ways: the goat, the black cat, the Bartman foul ball. But objectively, none of those alleged curses affected the result of any ball game or series. It was the players inability to perform under pressure and not excuses from the grandstands that has led to a permanent legacy of following the Loveable Losers due to supernatural events beyond anyone's control.
CRAP. In a cost-benefit analysis, the Cubs as a form of entertainment is a crappy deal. "Dynamic" high ticket prices for a AAA caliber roster is not a value deal like the bad teams in the late 1970s and early 1980s when fans could just show up to the park for a few bucks and watch a game from the front row of the empty bleachers. Under Tribune ownership, the Cubs became an entertainment venue; the largest open air tavern with a baseball floor show. As a television show, it made money. As a baseball franchise, it was a death knell. A budget philosophy of collecting just enough talent to be "competitive" to draw ratings was more important than winning championships. That leaves the development organization the poor step-sister to the main stage scene stealers. In addition, a loyal fan base has de-emphasized performance and accountability in management and players so crappy fundamentals has become the norm for the club.
CHECK-OUT. With the influx of young 20-somethings in the early 2000s, those who were not more interested in the bleacher beach scene but cared about the game itself, started to realize that the spike in the cost of attending games was supposed to equate with winning championships. These new fans changed the target from full at the ball park (in a Harry Carey haze) to wins. And when the Cubs bumped into the playoffs under Piniella, these fans felt the finish line ahead. But the Cubs collapsed in the playoffs, and the team crawled into bankruptcy with the Tribune. These new fans and Generation Y, in a tough recession with the high cost of living in the city, have given up being die-hard supporters of the team; they have checked out of Party Wrigley.
CONTEMPT. There is a feeling that new ownership and management believe Cub fans are merely paying sheep easily corralled in the lore that is the Cubs. There is an attitude that Cub fans can be milked for some of the highest prices in the sport because of their loyalty and their affection for Wrigley Field. There is an increasing arrogant tone from management who talk down to the media representatives of the fans in a corporate speak gibberish "of the process" to glaze over the harsh reality that they incompetently fielded a roster which will only contend for the most losses in team history. And for every action, there is an equal reaction. There is a growing minority of fans and the community that have contempt for the Cubs. One group has their ire based firmly on the lack of baseball intelligence shown in game after game. The lack of improvement or accountability of players by coaching staff is a disturbing trend. Another group has their ire directed at the Ricketts family, who continue to cry "poor" in order hundreds of millions of dollars in state and local taxpayer funds to rebuild their private property while at the same time spending tens of millions of dollars on adjacent real estate acquisitions and trimming the team payroll dramatically for the next few seasons. For the fan and his/her family that has struggled from pay check (if they are lucky) to pay check, a family of millionaires who want their tax dollars is a great insult when the city is bankrupt, teachers threatening to go on strike for benefits and basic city services are in the decline.
CUBS. The Cubs are a flood debris field of mixed emotions. The "Wait to Next Year" fan loyalty slogan is being eclipsed by "What are You Doing for Me Now?" When ownership says the team is only one or two players away; then it turns out that the team is not competitive at all - - - the seeds of revolutionary thought is sown. Fans have been waiting so long ( a lifetime) that hope turns into mental abuse, which turns into acknowledgement, which leads to resentment, which then can lead to therapeutic "letting go" of one's attachment to the team. If you perceive that "your" team is taking advantage of your patience, there is only so much one can take before breaking the bonds that first group them together. It is a evolution of a child-like passion to a grown-up objective balance of putting that energy into more productive uses.
August 28, 2012
ROSTER RE-VISIT
Seven months is not a long time. When the Cub convention last winter ran its course, the new front office pieced together a projected pre-spring training opening day roster which went something like this:
C: Soto
C: Castillo
1B: LaHair
2B: Barney
3B: Stewart
SS: Castro
IN: Baker
IN: DeWitt
LF: Soriano
CF: Byrd
RF: DeJesus
OF: R. Johnson
OF: Campana or Sappelt
SP: Garza
SP: Dempster
SP:Maholm
SP: T. Wood
SP: R. Wells or Volstad
CL: Marmol
SU: K. Wood
RP: Russell
RP: Maine
RP: Samardzija
RP: Corpas
27 players assigned to the opening day roster 25 spots. A mostly veteran group. Most conventioneers were more excited by the re-signing of Kerry Wood than speculating about floundering with a 100 loss season. So what happened to the 2012 Cubs?
C: Soto, traded away after having another dismal season
C: Castillo, spent time in minors and platooning with Clevenger
1B: LaHair, All-Star first half, Titanic collapse in second half now splinter collecting on bench
2B: Barney, playing good defense but having bad offensive season
3B: Stewart, a Bust
SS: Castro, All-Star first half, semi-focus issues in second half but rewarded with contract extension
IN: Baker, gone
IN: DeWitt, long gone
LF: Soriano, having better than expected season dragging dead money contract to LF daily
CF: Byrd, traded and PED suspended
RF: DeJesus, turned into Fukudome
OF: R. Johnson, traded to Atlanta for an injured prospect
OF: Campana or Sappelt, both scraping in the minors
SP: Garza, injured before trading deadline; tarnished asset going forward
SP: Dempster, traded then not; then traded for real for a third base prospect
SP:Maholm, traded to Atlanta for an injured prospect
SP: T. Wood, started slow, then went good, then okay, still in rotation
SP: R. Wells or Volstad, Wells never effective and got injured in AAA; Volstad has Bust label, too
CL: Marmol, a bad closer on a bad team so what can go wrong?
SU: K. Wood, bad from the gate and retired
RP: Russell, only consistent relief pitcher on the staff
RP: Maine, just designated for assignment
RP: Samardzija, the lone pitching surprise as he finally bloomed into a starter
RP: Corpas, dead meat in a uniform
Only 9 players have a chance to return in 2013: Castillo, Barney, Castro, Soriano, DeJesus, Garza, T. Wood, Russell and Samardzija. Castillo, Barney and DeJesus roster spots are suspect over the winter as being needed to be upgraded via promotion or free agency. The team as constructed before spring training was poor, and the current Cubs record confirms that fact.
C: Soto
C: Castillo
1B: LaHair
2B: Barney
3B: Stewart
SS: Castro
IN: Baker
IN: DeWitt
LF: Soriano
CF: Byrd
RF: DeJesus
OF: R. Johnson
OF: Campana or Sappelt
SP: Garza
SP: Dempster
SP:Maholm
SP: T. Wood
SP: R. Wells or Volstad
CL: Marmol
SU: K. Wood
RP: Russell
RP: Maine
RP: Samardzija
RP: Corpas
27 players assigned to the opening day roster 25 spots. A mostly veteran group. Most conventioneers were more excited by the re-signing of Kerry Wood than speculating about floundering with a 100 loss season. So what happened to the 2012 Cubs?
C: Soto, traded away after having another dismal season
C: Castillo, spent time in minors and platooning with Clevenger
1B: LaHair, All-Star first half, Titanic collapse in second half now splinter collecting on bench
2B: Barney, playing good defense but having bad offensive season
3B: Stewart, a Bust
SS: Castro, All-Star first half, semi-focus issues in second half but rewarded with contract extension
IN: Baker, gone
IN: DeWitt, long gone
LF: Soriano, having better than expected season dragging dead money contract to LF daily
CF: Byrd, traded and PED suspended
RF: DeJesus, turned into Fukudome
OF: R. Johnson, traded to Atlanta for an injured prospect
OF: Campana or Sappelt, both scraping in the minors
SP: Garza, injured before trading deadline; tarnished asset going forward
SP: Dempster, traded then not; then traded for real for a third base prospect
SP:Maholm, traded to Atlanta for an injured prospect
SP: T. Wood, started slow, then went good, then okay, still in rotation
SP: R. Wells or Volstad, Wells never effective and got injured in AAA; Volstad has Bust label, too
CL: Marmol, a bad closer on a bad team so what can go wrong?
SU: K. Wood, bad from the gate and retired
RP: Russell, only consistent relief pitcher on the staff
RP: Maine, just designated for assignment
RP: Samardzija, the lone pitching surprise as he finally bloomed into a starter
RP: Corpas, dead meat in a uniform
Only 9 players have a chance to return in 2013: Castillo, Barney, Castro, Soriano, DeJesus, Garza, T. Wood, Russell and Samardzija. Castillo, Barney and DeJesus roster spots are suspect over the winter as being needed to be upgraded via promotion or free agency. The team as constructed before spring training was poor, and the current Cubs record confirms that fact.
CASTRO EXTENSION
Ken Rosenthal is reporting that Castro will receive a $6MM signing bonus before earning $5MM in 2013 and
2014, $6MM in 2015, $7MM in 2016, $9MM in 2017, $10MM in 2018 and $11MM
in 2019. If Castro finishes in the Top 5 of the MVP voting twice over
the life of his contract, his 2019 salary and the value of his $16MM
option will each increase by $2MM. All told, the maximum value of his
contract including escalators would be $79MM over eight years.
This is more than the original reports of a seven year, $60 million extension. Initial reports indicated that the Cubs and Castro's agent are talking a long term deal, which would take out his arbitration years and at least two years of free agency. The numbers being kicked around by pundits infer that the first three years could net $15-20 million and the first two years of free agency at $15 million each, or a total of a five year $50 million deal. A $10 million average would put Castro at #3 in pay for current shortstops (Jeter, Rollins, Reyes).
From Rosenthal's numbers, the first three years of the extension of the Castro deal are worth $22 million (including the bonus), an increase of 10 to 47 percent of original estimates. But the overall average of $9.8 million over 8 years is less than the projected $10 million over 5 years.
Still, it is a long term commitment to Castro. His deal will effectively block the young Cub shortstops in the system (Baez and Lake). The Cubs must really believe that Castro will bust out in the next two seasons to try to get a long term discount as set forth above.
August 27, 2012
JACKSON CAMERON
The weekend revealed a random bit of opinion in some Cub circles.
The expectation and comparison game is fraught with danger, especially when dealing with young rookies early in their careers.
But when I heard someone favorably compare Brett Jackson to Mike Cameron, my stomach churned and my head said, "really, Mike Cameron is all you expect?"
Some aspects of the comparison are easy to see:
both are speedy left hand hitting outfielders.
Cameron played 17 major league seasons. His career stat line: 278 HR, 968 RBI, 297 SB, .249 BA, .338 OBP, .986 Field percentage. His career followed a normal path: starter, to journeyman to bench reserve with seven teams (White Sox, Mariners, Mets, Padres, Brewers, Red Sox and Marlins).
If you average Cameron's stats, he was a .249 hitter (which is not very good), 16.35 HR (okay for a center fielder), 57 RBI (marginal for a starting OF), 17.4 SB (probably above average in today's station to station hitting philosophy) and .986 fielding percentage (which is good but not exceptional).
Cameron's average WAR/season is 2.54 which equates to being a starter, but not an All-Star caliber player.
You would think that Cub fans would expect MORE from Jackson since the hype had been that he was a "five tool" player that could hit for power - - - a 3-4-5 hitter in the order, with the advantage of speed to steal bases. The projection would be more like .290 BA, 20 HR, 85 RBI, 20 SB per season.
But the downgrade in expectations may be tempered by the fact that Jackson has been a strike out machine at AAA, and has a large hole in his swing so far in the majors. He has started to adjust, hitting two home runs recently, but how he fits into the Epstein rebuilding plan is unknown. He looks like a younger version of current David DeJesus, who is impersonating the old Koskie Fukudome Cub right fielder. DeJesus current Cub campaign: .269 BA, 6 HR, 39 RBI, 6 SB, .357 OBP, in 118 games. In Fukudome's three Cub seasons, he averaged. 259 BA, 11.3 HR, 52 RBI, 8.3 SB. One cannot argue that either Fukudome or DeJesus have been successful Cub acquisitions. Both played good defense, but underwhelmed in offensive production (especially in the power numbers normal for a corner outfielder).
So the Jackson to Cameron comparison may come true over time, but at present it is not an acceptable goal for a rookie with years of press glowing about his potential. Cub fans should expect more than a Cameron career from Jackson.
The expectation and comparison game is fraught with danger, especially when dealing with young rookies early in their careers.
But when I heard someone favorably compare Brett Jackson to Mike Cameron, my stomach churned and my head said, "really, Mike Cameron is all you expect?"
Some aspects of the comparison are easy to see:
both are speedy left hand hitting outfielders.
Cameron played 17 major league seasons. His career stat line: 278 HR, 968 RBI, 297 SB, .249 BA, .338 OBP, .986 Field percentage. His career followed a normal path: starter, to journeyman to bench reserve with seven teams (White Sox, Mariners, Mets, Padres, Brewers, Red Sox and Marlins).
If you average Cameron's stats, he was a .249 hitter (which is not very good), 16.35 HR (okay for a center fielder), 57 RBI (marginal for a starting OF), 17.4 SB (probably above average in today's station to station hitting philosophy) and .986 fielding percentage (which is good but not exceptional).
Cameron's average WAR/season is 2.54 which equates to being a starter, but not an All-Star caliber player.
You would think that Cub fans would expect MORE from Jackson since the hype had been that he was a "five tool" player that could hit for power - - - a 3-4-5 hitter in the order, with the advantage of speed to steal bases. The projection would be more like .290 BA, 20 HR, 85 RBI, 20 SB per season.
But the downgrade in expectations may be tempered by the fact that Jackson has been a strike out machine at AAA, and has a large hole in his swing so far in the majors. He has started to adjust, hitting two home runs recently, but how he fits into the Epstein rebuilding plan is unknown. He looks like a younger version of current David DeJesus, who is impersonating the old Koskie Fukudome Cub right fielder. DeJesus current Cub campaign: .269 BA, 6 HR, 39 RBI, 6 SB, .357 OBP, in 118 games. In Fukudome's three Cub seasons, he averaged. 259 BA, 11.3 HR, 52 RBI, 8.3 SB. One cannot argue that either Fukudome or DeJesus have been successful Cub acquisitions. Both played good defense, but underwhelmed in offensive production (especially in the power numbers normal for a corner outfielder).
So the Jackson to Cameron comparison may come true over time, but at present it is not an acceptable goal for a rookie with years of press glowing about his potential. Cub fans should expect more than a Cameron career from Jackson.
SHOWTIME IN LA
It was a head scratcher. The new owners of the Dodgers took on $250 million in player contracts from the Red Sox in a massive waiver wire deal centered around first baseman Adrian Gonzalez.
In order for the Dodgers to acquire Gonzalez, the Red Sox demanded that the Dodgers take two other veterans with bad contracts. In many situations, a team often is asked to take a bad contract as the sweetener to close a deal. But two really bad ones?
Carl Crawford, an outfielder, has just had Tommy John surgery and will be out for an extended period of time. The Red Sox overpaid dearly for the free agent a short time ago, and Crawford's production in Beantown has been horrible. Crawford is owed $102.5 million through 2017.
Josh Beckett is an underperforming starter who allegedly was in the center of the chicken and beer tailspin of the 2011 season collapse. Beckett is owed $31.5 million through 2014.
Gonzalez signed a massive extension with Boston after the trade from San Diego. Gonzalez is owed $130 million through 2018.
Gonzalez is the left handed hitting compliment to Matt Kemp. Gonzalez is expected to match his baseball card consistency of .295 BA, 30 HR, 100+ RBI seasons.
The Dodgers also received infielder Nick Punto, who earns $1.5 million per season through 2013. He can play all four infield positions which is a plus, but he is only hitting .200 this season which is a minus. But the Dodgers lost their existing reserve, Jerry Hairston, Jr., so the Punto pick up was to fill a need on the bench.
This big deal was all about the money. Boston getting rid of a massive amount of contractual obligations as a means of rebuilding beginning in 2013. The Red Sox received five players who have careers in the major league reserve/AAA category.
The key player in the bargain is Allen Webster, one of the Dodgers best pitching prospects. Webster is 6-8, 3.55 ERA, 1.455 WHIP, 2.05 K/BB ratio in AAA. Webster probably will be in the Red Sox rotation in 2013.
The Red Sox also got a rental player in first baseman James Loney, who is a free agent after the season. Loney is a 28 year old player who never had the break out power to be a star first baseman in the league. This year he was batting only .254, with 4 HRs and 33 RBI for LA.
The Red Sox got another young pitcher in the deal, 23 year old Rubby De La Rosa, who is a starter and reliever. For the Dodgers in 2011, he made 10 starts in 13 games. His record was 4-5, 3.71 ERA, 1.401 WHIP, 1.94 K/BB ratio. De La Rosa is coming back late this year from Tommy John surgery.
The Red Sox also received two players that project as bench/utility players: Ivan De Jesus, 25 year old second and third baseman, and Jerry Sands, 24 year old left fielder/first baseman.
DeJesus played in 23 games for the Dodgers this year, having a .273 BA, 0 HR, 4 RBI and 1 SB. Sands played in 9 games this season, batting .194 with 1 RBI. In 2011, he played in 61 games batting .253, 4 HR 26 RBI and 3 SB.
If you pare back the deal to its basic rationale, the trade summary is really Red Sox send 1B Gonzalez and $250 million in contract obligations to the Dodgers for AAA SP Webster and RP De La Rosa. De Jesus and Sands are not long term solutions for Boston. Loney will not challenge Ortiz at first base.
The Dodgers got the power hitter they wanted in the line-up. But they also added two dubious dead money contracts with Crawford and Beckett. It is an expensive trade for LA to try to keep a neck to neck race with the Giants going this season.
Ownership front man Magic Johnson inferred that the deal was made to show the Dodger fans that the new ownership group was serious about bringing winning talent to the club. It may have been a move to get more fans into the empty stands at Chavez Ravine. In some circles, you need to spend money to make money; but that principle has little bearing in baseball.
In order for the Dodgers to acquire Gonzalez, the Red Sox demanded that the Dodgers take two other veterans with bad contracts. In many situations, a team often is asked to take a bad contract as the sweetener to close a deal. But two really bad ones?
Carl Crawford, an outfielder, has just had Tommy John surgery and will be out for an extended period of time. The Red Sox overpaid dearly for the free agent a short time ago, and Crawford's production in Beantown has been horrible. Crawford is owed $102.5 million through 2017.
Josh Beckett is an underperforming starter who allegedly was in the center of the chicken and beer tailspin of the 2011 season collapse. Beckett is owed $31.5 million through 2014.
Gonzalez signed a massive extension with Boston after the trade from San Diego. Gonzalez is owed $130 million through 2018.
Gonzalez is the left handed hitting compliment to Matt Kemp. Gonzalez is expected to match his baseball card consistency of .295 BA, 30 HR, 100+ RBI seasons.
The Dodgers also received infielder Nick Punto, who earns $1.5 million per season through 2013. He can play all four infield positions which is a plus, but he is only hitting .200 this season which is a minus. But the Dodgers lost their existing reserve, Jerry Hairston, Jr., so the Punto pick up was to fill a need on the bench.
This big deal was all about the money. Boston getting rid of a massive amount of contractual obligations as a means of rebuilding beginning in 2013. The Red Sox received five players who have careers in the major league reserve/AAA category.
The key player in the bargain is Allen Webster, one of the Dodgers best pitching prospects. Webster is 6-8, 3.55 ERA, 1.455 WHIP, 2.05 K/BB ratio in AAA. Webster probably will be in the Red Sox rotation in 2013.
The Red Sox also got a rental player in first baseman James Loney, who is a free agent after the season. Loney is a 28 year old player who never had the break out power to be a star first baseman in the league. This year he was batting only .254, with 4 HRs and 33 RBI for LA.
The Red Sox got another young pitcher in the deal, 23 year old Rubby De La Rosa, who is a starter and reliever. For the Dodgers in 2011, he made 10 starts in 13 games. His record was 4-5, 3.71 ERA, 1.401 WHIP, 1.94 K/BB ratio. De La Rosa is coming back late this year from Tommy John surgery.
The Red Sox also received two players that project as bench/utility players: Ivan De Jesus, 25 year old second and third baseman, and Jerry Sands, 24 year old left fielder/first baseman.
DeJesus played in 23 games for the Dodgers this year, having a .273 BA, 0 HR, 4 RBI and 1 SB. Sands played in 9 games this season, batting .194 with 1 RBI. In 2011, he played in 61 games batting .253, 4 HR 26 RBI and 3 SB.
If you pare back the deal to its basic rationale, the trade summary is really Red Sox send 1B Gonzalez and $250 million in contract obligations to the Dodgers for AAA SP Webster and RP De La Rosa. De Jesus and Sands are not long term solutions for Boston. Loney will not challenge Ortiz at first base.
The Dodgers got the power hitter they wanted in the line-up. But they also added two dubious dead money contracts with Crawford and Beckett. It is an expensive trade for LA to try to keep a neck to neck race with the Giants going this season.
Ownership front man Magic Johnson inferred that the deal was made to show the Dodger fans that the new ownership group was serious about bringing winning talent to the club. It may have been a move to get more fans into the empty stands at Chavez Ravine. In some circles, you need to spend money to make money; but that principle has little bearing in baseball.
August 24, 2012
A TALE OF TWO ARMS
Sportswriter Tom Verducci has written extensively that if you give a young pitcher more than 30 innings more than he has ever pitched before, his chances of developing arm troubles increases or he takes a major step backward in his development. The anecdotal evidence of the risk of young arm injuries is about 67 percent using Verducci's methodology.
Teams have become obsessed with pitch counts and innings pitched for their starters. A starter who hits 100 pitches in a game is likely to be pulled from the mound. It is the assumption that like a machine, a pitcher only has so many built-in throws before his body starts to wear out.
Now, some older pitchers from the 1970s believe that the increase in pitcher injuries in the majors is not tied to innings pitched but on how players are being trained and conditioned from amateur to pro levels. Old school pitchers believed the more one threw, the stronger your arm would become. In addition, a pitcher would want to develop an "elastic" arm with strong leg action. Today, pitchers are into weight training routines that builds up and tones arm muscles which in some ways is the opposite of the old school way. In addition, throwing techniques have changed. Old school pitchers merely released the ball from their grip like a catapult shot. Now, pitchers are taught to "snap" their hands or wrists to add spin to the ball for sharper breaks around the plate. The snap motion puts more stress on a pitcher's elbow. That is why youth baseball teams do not allow their pitchers to even attempt to throw curve balls until the high school level.
This season we have two young star pitchers throwing their teams into the playoffs. But each team is handling their star starter differently.
The Nationals Stephen Strasburg is currently 15-5, 2.85 ERA in 145.1 IP. He is coming off arm surgery last season, which limited his major league innings to 24 and minor leagues to 20. He has added more than 100 innings of work this year, which puts him near the top of the Verducci watch list. As a result, the Nationals general manager has put a strict limit on IP for Strasburg: 180. Once he hits that mark, Strasburg will be shut down. It is projected that Strasburg will run out of innings with two weeks left in the season; he will miss the playoffs. Strasburg's success has been pivotal to the Nationals first place position. The Nats have overspent on starting pitching talent to go deep into the playoffs. But as fans know, success is fleeting at the major league level. Some teams (like the Cubs) may only get one shot at glory in a decade. When a team is on the cusp of a championship, it usually goes "all in" and does not think about "next year." But the Nationals are conserving Strasburg for future years.
The White Sox Chris Sale does not have any restrictions. He is currently 15-4, 2.65 ERA in 153 IP. Last year he pitched 71 innings in the majors. He also has gone past the Verducci number of increased IP. But the ChiSox are handling Sale much different than the Nationals with Strasburg. Sale has been given extended rest (skipped starts) during the season to "rest" his arm to avoid fatigue or "tired arm" syndrome. At the All-Star break, he was given around 10 days off. In September, he will get another 9-10 day break. The coaching staff has not limited his innings per start, as Sale continues to go deep into contests, especially when the games are close, In his last outing, he struck out a dozen Yankees.
What is different between these two young pitchers is more than just philosophy. Strasburg is the prototypical power pitcher. He has the large frame build that he leverages to overpower batters. Sale has the capacity of a 96 mph fastball that he showed as a reliever in 2011, but with his lanky frame, Sale has evolved into a pitcher rather than a thrower. Sale now uses an 88-93 mph fastball to punctuate his slider and change up.
The Nationals have counted on Strasburg to get them the divisional crown. The White Sox are counting on Sale to pitch them deep into the playoffs and possible championship series.
This will be the litmus test for future pitching decisions by major league clubs. Which procedure worked out the best for their team? Is shutting down a pitcher a better long term solution to the injury risk for a young arm, or is in-season rest stops the way to go? Teams may take the objective data from this season to formulate their own hybrid analysis for their young prospects.
Teams have become obsessed with pitch counts and innings pitched for their starters. A starter who hits 100 pitches in a game is likely to be pulled from the mound. It is the assumption that like a machine, a pitcher only has so many built-in throws before his body starts to wear out.
Now, some older pitchers from the 1970s believe that the increase in pitcher injuries in the majors is not tied to innings pitched but on how players are being trained and conditioned from amateur to pro levels. Old school pitchers believed the more one threw, the stronger your arm would become. In addition, a pitcher would want to develop an "elastic" arm with strong leg action. Today, pitchers are into weight training routines that builds up and tones arm muscles which in some ways is the opposite of the old school way. In addition, throwing techniques have changed. Old school pitchers merely released the ball from their grip like a catapult shot. Now, pitchers are taught to "snap" their hands or wrists to add spin to the ball for sharper breaks around the plate. The snap motion puts more stress on a pitcher's elbow. That is why youth baseball teams do not allow their pitchers to even attempt to throw curve balls until the high school level.
This season we have two young star pitchers throwing their teams into the playoffs. But each team is handling their star starter differently.
The Nationals Stephen Strasburg is currently 15-5, 2.85 ERA in 145.1 IP. He is coming off arm surgery last season, which limited his major league innings to 24 and minor leagues to 20. He has added more than 100 innings of work this year, which puts him near the top of the Verducci watch list. As a result, the Nationals general manager has put a strict limit on IP for Strasburg: 180. Once he hits that mark, Strasburg will be shut down. It is projected that Strasburg will run out of innings with two weeks left in the season; he will miss the playoffs. Strasburg's success has been pivotal to the Nationals first place position. The Nats have overspent on starting pitching talent to go deep into the playoffs. But as fans know, success is fleeting at the major league level. Some teams (like the Cubs) may only get one shot at glory in a decade. When a team is on the cusp of a championship, it usually goes "all in" and does not think about "next year." But the Nationals are conserving Strasburg for future years.
The White Sox Chris Sale does not have any restrictions. He is currently 15-4, 2.65 ERA in 153 IP. Last year he pitched 71 innings in the majors. He also has gone past the Verducci number of increased IP. But the ChiSox are handling Sale much different than the Nationals with Strasburg. Sale has been given extended rest (skipped starts) during the season to "rest" his arm to avoid fatigue or "tired arm" syndrome. At the All-Star break, he was given around 10 days off. In September, he will get another 9-10 day break. The coaching staff has not limited his innings per start, as Sale continues to go deep into contests, especially when the games are close, In his last outing, he struck out a dozen Yankees.
What is different between these two young pitchers is more than just philosophy. Strasburg is the prototypical power pitcher. He has the large frame build that he leverages to overpower batters. Sale has the capacity of a 96 mph fastball that he showed as a reliever in 2011, but with his lanky frame, Sale has evolved into a pitcher rather than a thrower. Sale now uses an 88-93 mph fastball to punctuate his slider and change up.
The Nationals have counted on Strasburg to get them the divisional crown. The White Sox are counting on Sale to pitch them deep into the playoffs and possible championship series.
This will be the litmus test for future pitching decisions by major league clubs. Which procedure worked out the best for their team? Is shutting down a pitcher a better long term solution to the injury risk for a young arm, or is in-season rest stops the way to go? Teams may take the objective data from this season to formulate their own hybrid analysis for their young prospects.
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