THE COLLABORATOR

David Ross is the new Cubs manager.

It really did not surprise many people.

But it is a surprise hire if you thought the Cubs were ready to win in 2020.

It was no surprise because Cubs ownership needed a new "face" for the franchise after letting Joe Maddon go to the Angels. For all the "marquee" players on the roster, it was Maddon who talked to the press at least twice daily. Ross becomes the new hire because he was a popular, folklore figure from the 2016 championship team. He has a reputation of a good clubhouse leader. He had a "get in your face" attitude with his teammates. Whether he can transition from being a teammate to being their boss is an open question.

If Maddon was the only thing holding the Cubs back from a long 2019 post-season run, then one would have assumed that his replacement would be an experienced, championship caliber manager (Girardi). But the Cubs clearly signaled that they did not want to have an independent dugout voice.

The Cubs continue to spend a fortune on more layers of administrative baseball staff (like new directors of hitting and pitching) to feed more technology and information into the current team coaches (who are not going to lose their jobs with the Ross hire). Theo and Company have built a front office like baseball is a video game that they can control from their skybox. Reams of analytical data has replaced an experienced manager's gut instincts.

The press conference attempted to stress the "qualifications" of Ross to be the next Cub skipper.
Theo said the club had been grooming Ross to be the manager since he left the team in 2016. He has been a special assistant. He sat in on scouting meetings. He sat in the amateur draft. He spent this spring training shadowing Maddon. Ross said that he wanted to become a manager when he was a player, so he observed and learned from Bobby Cox and Maddon.

Not lost on anyone is the fact that Ross has not managed at any level. Ross has not coached at any professional level. If the Cubs were grooming him to take over for Maddon, why did not Ross manage a Cubs minor league team? He had three years to get some managerial experience.

But he did not. And the Cubs did not think it was necessary. Why? Because the Cubs are not looking for a manager but a front office collaborator. A person the GM and staff can control.

Just as an experienced manager would demand a working knowledge of what the team would do for him (i.e. spend on free agents, the health of the current roster and farm system) and a pledge from ownership to spend money in the off-season (as Maddon received from the Angels), Ross was in no position to get those promises. And the Cubs could not offer them.

Tom Ricketts clearly stated that the 2020 Cubs would rebuild from within, which was another clear statement that the Cubs would not be spenders in free agency. With the farm system one of the worst in baseball, and Theo's inability to draft, develop and promote a major league starting pitcher, next year's Cubs will be the same team unless major star(s) are traded for young talent.

But as the Nationals showed you can win a championship by getting rid of your franchise player (Harper). However, it only works when you have a young rookie phenom like Soto to take his place. The Cubs have a roster construction problem. There are no minor league prospects pushing for a major league roster spot.

Will Ross be a figurehead or will he put his own stamp on the Cubs? That is the million dollar question. No one has inferred that the players quit on Maddon. The complaint was Maddon was not getting the best out of the talent on the roster. But it may be that the front office continues to overvalue their talent.

A slow start. A rash of injuries. The first real 2020 crisis will show whether Ross will be an independent voice of accountability or another Cubs PR person.

BAD RULE CHANGES

Despite the increasing bad blood between the players union and owners in regard to the stagnant free agent market, MLB is pushing forward with some terrible rule changes.

CHANGES EFFECTIVE IN 2019
 
Inning breaks: Subject to discussions with broadcast partners, inning breaks will be reduced from 2:05 to 2:00 in local games and from 2:25 to 2:00 in national games. The Commissioner’s Office retains the right to further reduce the breaks to 1:55 in local and national games for the start of the 2020 season.


REACTION: Hold my beer!!!!! That is a whopping 6 minutes of alleged time saved during a game.

Trade Deadline: The waiver trade period will be eliminated. The July 31 Trade Deadline will be the only deadline. Players may still be placed and claimed on outright waivers after July 31, but trades will no longer be permitted after that date.


REACTION: A hard deadline affects all teams the same. The change in the waiver rule only helps bad teams who can make a claim of a good player trying to be sent down (when another player is activated from the DL).

All Star Game: As far as the game itself is concerned, the 10th inning -- and all subsequent innings -- of All-Star Games that go into extra innings will begin with a runner on second base.



REACTION: A horrid rule!  It FUNDAMENTALLY alters the foundation of the game: earning your way on base by a hit, a walk, a dropped third strike or catcher interference. But to put a runner in scoring position with no outs is a face slap to the origins of the game AND the poor pitcher who starts the inning in an artificial hole. This does not speed up the game because the pitcher now has to slow down and concentrate more, since the runner on second is trying to steal the signs.

Home Run Derby: Total player prize money for the Home Run Derby will be increased to $2.5 million. The winner receives $1 million.



REACTION: Who cares? It is an exhibition game.

Mound visits: The maximum number of mound visits per team will be reduced from six to five per game. MLB had instituted an initial mound-visit limitation prior to the 2018 season.


REACTION: Woo-hoo Johnny, that change saves a whopping 4 minutes in game time (2 minutes each for each team.)

CHANGES IN 2020 SEASON:
 
Active roster provisions: The roster size from Opening Day through Aug. 31 will increase from 25 to 26 (with the minimum number of active players rising from 24 to 25, and roster sizes for doubleheaders rising from 26 to 27).


REACTION: Adding another player but limiting the number of pitchers on the roster to 13 in regular season (and 14 in September) does nothing to help the players union beef on service time. Contending teams used to call up a half dozen players to help them win games down the stretch; including more relievers and specialty players like pinch runners or defensive specialists who could not make the regular season roster. Also, it is not like the 26th man is going to be a big money veteran player. More likely it will be the team's best AAAA earning the minimum salary.

The 40-man active roster for September will be eliminated. From Sept. 1 through the end of the regular season, all clubs will carry 28 players.


REACTION: Again, adding just two players does not help if a team is struggling with a tired arm pitching staff (especially with new restrictions on batters relievers must face and the inability to use position players as mop up guys). In the past, a team could bring up 15 players or their entire 40 man roster up in September. No one did, but they could. If a team does not want to pay for extra players, why penalize a team that wants or needs to do so?

Furthermore, the number of pitchers a club can carry on the active roster will be capped at a certain number, to be decided by a joint committee. (But MLB is suggesting 13 in regular season; 14 in September). To adhere to that rule, clubs will have to designate each of their players as either a pitcher or a position player prior to each player’s first day on the active roster for a given season. That designation cannot change for the remainder of the season.

Position players will not be allowed to pitch except in the following scenarios:

They are designated as a “Two-Way Player.” A player can only qualify for this designation if he accrues at least 20 Major League innings pitched and at least 20 Major League games started as a position player or designated hitter (with at least three plate appearances in each of those games) in either the current or the prior season.

Extra innings.
In any game in which his team is losing or winning by more than six runs when he enters as a pitcher.


REACTION: I guess this is the Otani Rule, where clubs will have to scout Japan to find the next SP-OF star. This anal retentive rule about telling the world if you are a position player or pitcher is stupid. They are all BASEBALL PLAYERS. As kids, we played all the positions depending on the circumstances. I can see dumb unintended consequences such as a manager pulling his pitcher and place him in the outfield for a reliever (which is still fine), then have the reliever get an out then switch with the original pitcher (because who says a reliever has to pitch 3 "consecutive" batters, see below). Let the managers manage for gosh sakes.

Three-batter minimum for pitchers: Rule 5.10(g) will be amended to require that starting pitchers and relief pitchers must pitch to either a minimum of three batters or to the end of a half-inning, with exceptions for incapacitating injury or illness. This will effectively end the so-called “LOOGY” (left-handed one-out guy) and other specialist roles in which pitchers are brought in for one very specific matchup.

REACTION: Another terrible rule because it destroys in-game strategy. The rule is another feeble attempt to speed up play, but it will not do it because the new rule forces a manager to leave a starter in longer. A struggling starter takes more time between pitches. A reliever is on a shorter pitch count than a starter, so instead of throwing a dozen pitches in consecutive days, a reliever can be used up after one appearance. That creates more wear and tear on pitchers . . . equates to more injuries and expensive DL time.

Injured list: The minimum time a player spends on the injured list will be increased back to 15 days from 10, and the minimum assignment period of pitchers who are optionally assigned to the minors will increase from 10 days to 15. MLB had reduced the minimum injured list period to 10 days prior to the 2017 season to reduce the incentive for teams to play shorthanded or for players having to play at less than full strength. However, teams manipulated the rule change to rotate relievers on and off their active rosters, thereby maintaining a full stash of rested arms, which resulted in more pitching changes.


REACTION: Teams were trying to PUT THE BEST PRODUCT on the field. Now, they are penalized for using their full 40 man roster? If MLB wants more action by having tired, injured and bad players on the field, then let the batters hit off tees and run around the bases like little kids.

None of these rule changes help the game. It is trying to hack a quality video game. 

If you really want to speed up play of the game, do not allow batters to leave the batter's box after the first pitch (except if they are knocked down or a foreign object gets into their eyes). A batter takes 10 seconds between pitches to re-set his gloves and armor. In a 300 pitch game, that is 50 minutes of dead air. Once a batter is in the box, the ball remains live. If he steps out, the pitcher can throw home for a ball or strike. Remember, current rules allow the umpire not the player to call time out. Umpires can speed up the game by not giving batters unlimited time outs to step out of the box. In fact, quick pitchers like Mark Buerhle got the game into a fast rhythm that home plate umpires liked (and subliminally helped him with calls).

THE SHIFT TOWARD OFFENSE

More and more sports leagues are trying to increase "offense" and "scoring" in order to lock in casual viewers into fans.  There is almost a video game expectation that sports leaders want to market toward the public whom are immersed in their Fortnite and other battle royale games.

MLB has been whining about its game for a long time. First it was too much pitching. "Women love the long ball" campaign helped fuel the specter of the steroid era and juiced baseballs. Second, it was pace of play. Games were getting too long, people could not pay attention. Third, it was "engaging" the fans during games by pushing MLB stat and fantasy apps on their phones (ironically, causing fans in the stands to pay less attention to the actual game.)

The current bane of the MLB is the over-gospel use of advanced stats to "improve" the game. The current foil is the defensive shift. The shift is ruining the game, so they say. It is taking away hitting, run scoring - - - offense.

There is nothing against the rules about where you can place fielders on any given play, except for the pitcher, who has be in contact with the rubber 60 feet 6 inches away from the plate, and the catcher who has to sit in the catcher's box behind the plate. Otherwise, a team could place the seven other fielders in the infield - - - as close to the plate as possible (in bunting situations).

Advanced statistics provide data that shows tendencies of hitters. But even general experience will tell you that certain hitters are "pull" hitters and others "slap" or opposite field hitters. Pitchers have been taught to pitch against those tendencies. But adding another fielder, usually in the short outfield, takes away base hits, or so is the theory.

Yahoo Sports notes that the overall analysis of the shift is unclear.

The usage of shifts has gone from a rarity to begin the decade, to almost routine in 2018.
In 2010, Fangraph’s data on the frequency of defensive shifting shows that the Tampa Bay Rays under manager Joe Maddon employed the shift against a league-leading 261 batters.

In 2018, Maddon’s Cubs actually employed the lowest number of shifts to opposing batters with 631. But that low number is still nearly 150 percent higher than the league high just eight years ago.
In fact, only five teams, the Cubs, Angels, Padres, Rangers and Cardinals, shifted for less than 1,000 batters in 2018. The Chicago White Sox set the pace, shifting for 2,150 batters. Overall, teams shifted 17 percent of the time during the past regular season, which is nearly one in every five batters.

It has undeniably become a big part of the strategy across MLB. But has it really impacted the game in a negative way?

The success rate varies, and like all aspects of baseball relies on a degree of luck. Fangraphics digested the types of shifts being used, and the accompanying success rates. The five teams that shifted most frequently (infield and outfield) in 2018 did so an average of 11.9 times per game, with opposing batters averaging 3.3 hits against per games. That’s a .277 batting average. The five teams that shifted the least averaged five shifts per games. Opposing batters averaged 1.5 hits, or a .300 average.

Does that mean shifting more is better? Does that tell us that shifting is even having a notable impact? Not necessarily is the correct answer to both, yet there’s a crowd that’s convinced it’s unfairly dragging down offense in MLB.

There are some variables those numbers don’t account for. It doesn’t tell us the number of times a shifted defender saved a hit, or how often a hit went through his vacated position. But the overriding numbers tell the real story. Shifting does more to get people talking than it does to drain offense from the game.

The best way to counter a shift is to hit the ball where they are not. To stop the shift, a batter needs to be able to place the ball in the vacated area. And that usually means bunting the ball for a base hit. But that is viewed as a cowardly or unmanly way to get a hit. But it is not. It is part of the game. But players and agents focus more on the glamor stats: like HRs and RBIs than whether you got a measly bunt single.

It would be nice to hear the view of the late Tony Gywnn on the shift controversy. He probably would have told you that a batter has to make the adjustments. If you looked at his hitting chart, you could see that he sprayed the ball to all parts of the ball park. He was not a pure pull hitter, or an opposite field slap hitter. Just as others were taught to hit the ball "up the middle" to get solid contact, Gwynn was a pure hitter capable of adjusting his swing to the pitch, circumstance and the elements. But that type of hitting dedication is rare. It would seem scapegoating the shift instead of telling players to adjust is the easy way out to jump start some more offense.

There are old schoolers who just go by the mantra "hit em where they ain't." Some hitting coaches are now focused in on "launch angles" and contact velocity as the statistical means to get past the shift, because harder ground balls get through the shift faster, and no one can catch a HR ball except a fan in the stands.

Baseball should do nothing to affect the strategy evolutions in the game. Let the shift ride out its fad until the next great Big Data thing happens.

BULLPENNING

In the evolution of baseball strategy, the role of the starting pitcher has diminished dramatically. In the past, including the modern golden era of the 1960s and even through to early 2000s, a premium position was starting pitcher. Aces were paid like stars. They were expected to pitch 7 or 8 quality innings for 35 times a season. They were expected to win 20 games. The mental position was that once I got the ball on the mound in the first inning, I would not leave until the game was over.

But there has been a sudden shift in pitching philosophy. The idea of a complete game by a starter is ancient history. Starters are now expected to only pitch through the 5th of 6th inning. Bullpens have expanded to 8 or 9 relievers making the bench for position players extremely small.

Tampa Bay started to carry this trend to a new level by "bullpenning" games. The stat mavens have concluded that starters get weaker as they go through the opponent's lineup a second or third time. Therefore, to eliminate that outcome, a manager will take out a starter, however effective that day, for a series of bullpen arms. But the Rays have started to adopt a more radical approach: start games with bullpen arms and let starters become long, middle relievers. It has worked as the Rays have the best team ERA since May.

Some people are not happy.

The Oakland Athletics are among Major League Baseball’s most surprising contending teams this season. The Athletic website reports that a late-season change in pitching philosophy could threaten to disrupt the relationship between the players and front office.

It all started over the weekend when the A’s became the latest team to adopt the “bullpenning” approach to pitching. Scheduled starter Daniel Mengden arrived to the ballpark for Saturday’s game against the Seattle Mariners expecting to begin his usual pregame routine. That’s when manager Bob Melvin informed him of the change in plans.

Instead, reliever Liam Hendriks was getting the starting nod as an opener, while Mendgen only knew he’d be pitching multiple innings in relief. The confusion admittedly led to frustration, and Mendgen’s performance suffered as a result.

Rather than go through one warm up routine, Mendgen was asked to warm up three different times before entering in the third inning. Seattle took advantage of the staggered Mendgen, scoring three runs in two innings. Now the entire A’s clubhouse seems to be wondering if bullpenning is necessary to achieve their goals.

The A’s obviously took notice of Tampa Bay’s success. Injuries to starters Sean Manaea and Brett Anderson left their rotation depth even thinner, Oakland's management decided bullpenning can help cover their rotation shortcomings. In long stretches during the season with no days off, a manager, including Cubs Joe Maddon, have had to resort to a "bullpen" game where a long reliever started hoping to get 3 or 4 good innings of work, then have the rest of the pen mop up. No starters were sacrificed in bullpen games.

Starting pitchers are creatures of habit. They prefer getting to the ballpark knowing what they have to do and when they have to do it to get ready. They have a set time to prepare for each game. They go over hitter charts with the catcher and bench coach. The pitcher starts his long toss and long bullpen session to get ready for the first inning. IN that preparation, a starter can see what pitches are actually working that day, and to adapt prior to seeing the first batter. It is totally different for a bullpen arm, who may only have 5 minutes to warm up (sometimes less).

“It’s going to affect the routine a little bit,” Mengden said after Saturday’s game. “But you have to adjust to it. It’s a little different sitting down for an inning or two in the bullpen. But playing at this level you have to be ready for anything and make adjustments on the fly.”

Mendgen adjusted well the second time he was asked to follow a reliever, tossing 4 2/3 scoreless innings of relief in Tuesday’s game against the New York Yankees. However, frustration remains in the clubhouse because such a drastic change came without any warning. Players like knowing what’s going on, and like being able to prepare ahead of time.

Whether this is a trend, or part of an effort to reduce costs (relievers are less expensive than starters) will be seen. Tampa Bay is not in a pennant race, but the A's are in one.

MISSING PIECES

ESPN's Buster Olney opines that many aspects of the traditional game of baseball are vanishing before our own eyes. Basic managerial strategies like the hit-and-run, or the squeeze bunt, or pitchouts, or stolen bases are all significantly down over the past decade.

The game’s three true outcomes -- the strikeout, the walk, the home run -- have increased exponentially, and "like invasive species, they are swallowing other parts of the game."

He blames the wide spread use of statistical models that are now ruling the game.

Pitchers are now being programmed to make exacting pitch locations with various pitches. So there is no emphasis on keeping a runner close at first base, or worse, wasting a pitch on a pitch out.

Likewise, runners have been taught that the risk-reward for stealing a base is not worth the chance. Unless you have an 80 percent success rate, it is better to stay close to the bag to wait for a batter to walk or hit a home run.

Even with a slow runner on first base, managers used to employ the hit-and-run. The reason was simple: once the runner broke to the bag, one middle infielder had to start moving to cover second. The motion of the defense created holes in the infield that could be exploited by a good contact hitter. But there is a huge lack of .300 contact hitters in the majors. Hitters are being more concerned about their launch angles (swings so they can hit HRs), exit velocity of the ball off the bat (for distance) and OBP (the general manager's pet statistic come contract renewal time.) 

But with the statistical probability defensive grid shifts applied to every batter, the hit and run play may be the only way some batters can actually hit a grounder into the outfield for a single.

With a runner at third with less than two outs, the manager had several options to call. First, the batter could try to hit a deep fly ball to the outfield (sacrifice fly) to score the runner. Second, the batter could make the pitcher work a count, and in a high stress situation may throw a wild pitch to score the runner. Third, the batter could try to fool the infield with a "safety" squeeze in an attempt to get an infield single - - - and if the defenders were not paying attention, the runner from third could try to score in the confusion. Fourth, the manager could on the pitch send the runner racing for home forcing the batter to make any sort of contact in play so the runner could score (the suicide squeeze since the runner would be out if the batter failed to get contact).

Rarely does a manager call for a bunt. The problem is that players don't want to learn to bunt. Bunting does not help their stat line. Players would rather try to get a hit than sacrifice. Sacrifices are left to the weak hitting pitchers in the NL.

For some, major league baseball is now becoming a modified home run derby contest. It is swing for the fences or coax a walk. There is less strategy but more controversy about calls made by umpires (and the breakdown of replay to resolve issues).

Olney may be on to something. The game is supposed to have more moving parts than just pitching and hitting.

A SHIFT IN DEFENSE

Defense and statistic metrics have become so important in baseball. Teams can now accurately predict each batter's contact areas, fly ball rates, ground out locations, etc. The extreme shifts on certain pull hitters have become the norm.

But the Astros have taken defense alignment to a new level: the four outfielder set up. As Yahoo Sports noted, it was a success:

The first player to face the Astros extreme shift is one Houston will see a lot of over the years. Rangers slugger Joey Gallo, whose power-oriented approach often leads him to hit the ball in the air, looked out and saw this arrangement before him.

Astros third baseman Alex Bregman became the fourth outfielder and essentially played a straight up left field. Houston puts its three remaining infielders on the right side, with second baseman Jose Altuve essentially playing short right field. That wrinkle is included because of Gallo’s tendency to pull the ball to right field.

After one game anyway, Houston’s extreme shift should be considered a success.

Gallo hit directly into the shift in three of his four plate appearances. In the first inning, he lofted a fly ball to the relocated Bregman in left field. In the fourth, he hit a sharp fly ball that Josh Reddick  handled in left-center field. In the eighth, it was a fly ball to right field. Gallo added a strikeout to go 0 for 4.

 Here’s a clearer visual of the alignment via Statcast’s Daren Willman.