Several news organizations are reporting that there is going to be a major fall out from the Biogenesis scandal. The Florida "anti-aging" clinic has allegedly been connected to several high profile major league players. The allegations are that several MLB players connected to this clinic may have received banned performance enhancing substances.
ESPN has reported that the league may suspend approximately 20 players as a result of its investigation. An investigation which has been criticized, in part, because MLB sued the clinic's founder in order to subpoena medical records. There were also allegations that MLB may have "purchased" medical records from ex-employees, which would be in violation of federal and state health privacy laws.
The league is looking to suspend these players for 100 games, the penalty for a second offense. Many players on the suspect list have not been officially hit with a first offense conviction. MLB is trying to tag multiple violations into one charge to get the severe penalty. Everyone expects the the union and the player agent to fight the charges including litigation outside the collective bargaining agreement's drug testing policy.
The stakes are enormous. The league is still under the gun from Congress who pushed the owners to clean up their sport after the steroid era. The threat of Congressional oversight into baseball operations gives ownership the incentive to act quickly and harshly against alleged violators. On the other hand, the players are subject to 100 games without pay and tarnished reputations which will impact their income after their careers.
It would be unprecedented for the league to suspend an entire All-Star caliber roster. But that is where the sport is heading when at least 10 players have refused to answer league officials questions on this matter.
The trade deadline is only three weeks away. The timing of the proposed suspensions (and subsequent appeal hearings) can dramatically impact the divisional races and playoff series. If you are the general manager on a contending team with a player that is being tied to Biogenesis scandal, do you hedge your bets to find a quality replacement player prior to the deadline? Will that give Sellers a greater advantage this year?
The league is trying to send another message to the players that PEDs do not belong in baseball. But since the big money long term deals are all based upon high performance, players will be tempted to boost their skills by using PEDs. Many polls indicate that the fans really don't care that much about the steroid scandal. However, youth sports officials continue to worry that the PEDs in pro sports continue to work their way down through college and high school athletes, which is a dangerous, unsupervised situation.
July 10, 2013
July 9, 2013
FRUSTRATION
Jeff Samardzija was unhappy when the Cubs traded Scott Feldman to the Orioles.
He sees the Cubs continue to trade away starting pitchers for prospects and journeymen.
Samardzija was a risky prospect that former GM Jim Hendry signed a high bonus rookie deal that has paid more than $2 million per season in order for Samardzija to pass on an NFL career. He had command trouble early so he was moved to a relief role. Then, as the Cubs skidded down the standings, he was given another shot at starting. He took the challenge and is now a fixture in the Cubs rotation. Career stats 26-30, 3.79 ERA, 1.333 WHIP.
At 28, Samardzija is entering his prime pitching years. He is under team control for the next few years. He has hinted about getting a contract extension to buy out his arbitration years, but both sides have been far apart.
Like the rest of the starting staff that leads the NL in quality starts, Samardzija has to be getting frustrated with the annual de-construction of the pitching staff. And the drumbeat that Garza may have pitched his last game as a Cub has to be another downer in the clubhouse.
The hardest thing to do in baseball is build a starting rotation. For the second year in a row, the Cubs plan to destroy the rotation in order to gain prospects. But this week the front office said they now need to "build up the bullpen" with new arms. One does not trade away starting pitching for relievers.
Samardzija was a two sport star at Notre Dame. He knew what it is like to play big time sports. He has grown up with the attitude of winning games. Even in the minors where development is more important than wins, the drive to win games is still a focus of quality players. Major league players have that drive to win each game, but there comes a time when they are beaten down and go through the motions. Samardzija, by his comments, is not at that defeatist level. On the contrary, he is mad that the Cubs are selling off his teammates under the guise that the team will get better in the future. But winning is in the present.
It is frustrating to pitch well but still lose the majority of your games. But it has to be more frustrating when the solution to losing is not correct or improve the problem areas, but to knock down the areas of success. The front office will say that it can only sell its quality assets in order to get quality prospects in return. But then again, they just traded Scott Hairston for the Nationals 27th best prospect.
One would think that the Cubs would want to lock up four quality starters for the next four years. Build a staff like the Orioles did in the late 1970s. But that is not the case. Garza will be traded soon. Samardzija may also be discussed in trade talks because he is set for a large raise this off season. The only starter that will be around for some time is Edwin Jackson, a long term signing which was contrary to the rebuilding blueprint.
Samardzija has the right to feel frustrated with the team. Fans are also frustrated by the lack of tangible proof that the rebuilding process is going to work at the major league level. The real dark cloud on the horizon is that after this trade season, the Cubs will most likely be in worse shape than today. That means more losing and more pressure on the remaining starters to do even better. That will be quite a frustrating chore.
He sees the Cubs continue to trade away starting pitchers for prospects and journeymen.
Samardzija was a risky prospect that former GM Jim Hendry signed a high bonus rookie deal that has paid more than $2 million per season in order for Samardzija to pass on an NFL career. He had command trouble early so he was moved to a relief role. Then, as the Cubs skidded down the standings, he was given another shot at starting. He took the challenge and is now a fixture in the Cubs rotation. Career stats 26-30, 3.79 ERA, 1.333 WHIP.
At 28, Samardzija is entering his prime pitching years. He is under team control for the next few years. He has hinted about getting a contract extension to buy out his arbitration years, but both sides have been far apart.
Like the rest of the starting staff that leads the NL in quality starts, Samardzija has to be getting frustrated with the annual de-construction of the pitching staff. And the drumbeat that Garza may have pitched his last game as a Cub has to be another downer in the clubhouse.
The hardest thing to do in baseball is build a starting rotation. For the second year in a row, the Cubs plan to destroy the rotation in order to gain prospects. But this week the front office said they now need to "build up the bullpen" with new arms. One does not trade away starting pitching for relievers.
Samardzija was a two sport star at Notre Dame. He knew what it is like to play big time sports. He has grown up with the attitude of winning games. Even in the minors where development is more important than wins, the drive to win games is still a focus of quality players. Major league players have that drive to win each game, but there comes a time when they are beaten down and go through the motions. Samardzija, by his comments, is not at that defeatist level. On the contrary, he is mad that the Cubs are selling off his teammates under the guise that the team will get better in the future. But winning is in the present.
It is frustrating to pitch well but still lose the majority of your games. But it has to be more frustrating when the solution to losing is not correct or improve the problem areas, but to knock down the areas of success. The front office will say that it can only sell its quality assets in order to get quality prospects in return. But then again, they just traded Scott Hairston for the Nationals 27th best prospect.
One would think that the Cubs would want to lock up four quality starters for the next four years. Build a staff like the Orioles did in the late 1970s. But that is not the case. Garza will be traded soon. Samardzija may also be discussed in trade talks because he is set for a large raise this off season. The only starter that will be around for some time is Edwin Jackson, a long term signing which was contrary to the rebuilding blueprint.
Samardzija has the right to feel frustrated with the team. Fans are also frustrated by the lack of tangible proof that the rebuilding process is going to work at the major league level. The real dark cloud on the horizon is that after this trade season, the Cubs will most likely be in worse shape than today. That means more losing and more pressure on the remaining starters to do even better. That will be quite a frustrating chore.
ALL STAR SNUB
Dale Sveum said something peculiar in regard to the All Star game representative. He said Travis Wood's Sunday start on national television would be "enough of a show case" than skipping his start so he could pitch in the All Star Game.
There are several problems with that statement.
First, does anyone actually watch Sunday night baseball? Most teams are traveling on Sundays after their weekend series.
Second, the Cubs are not even close to contending for a playoff spot. So there is no compelling need for Wood to make a start on Sunday.
Third, a "show case" is a stage where one displays their talent to a wide audience. In baseball, there is no better place to show case one's talent in front of every front office general manager and team president than the All Star Game. All teams top brass attend that Game.
Fourth, many players believe it is a honor to play in the All Star Game. It represents recognition by the fans and their peers of their excellent skills. It is more exciting for a first time player like Wood. But by pitching on Sunday, he will not be able to pitch in the ASG. He will just be a fan with very good seat in front of the action.
Fifth, if Wood is the future of the Cubs rotation, why would the team take away his opportunity to pitch in the ASG? Why make Wood upset? Wood may never get another chance to do so.
It is hard for some fans or players to see the ASG rosters and debate whether someone deserving was snubbed by the league or the coaching staff. But in this case, Wood is getting snubbed by his own team!
There are several problems with that statement.
First, does anyone actually watch Sunday night baseball? Most teams are traveling on Sundays after their weekend series.
Second, the Cubs are not even close to contending for a playoff spot. So there is no compelling need for Wood to make a start on Sunday.
Third, a "show case" is a stage where one displays their talent to a wide audience. In baseball, there is no better place to show case one's talent in front of every front office general manager and team president than the All Star Game. All teams top brass attend that Game.
Fourth, many players believe it is a honor to play in the All Star Game. It represents recognition by the fans and their peers of their excellent skills. It is more exciting for a first time player like Wood. But by pitching on Sunday, he will not be able to pitch in the ASG. He will just be a fan with very good seat in front of the action.
Fifth, if Wood is the future of the Cubs rotation, why would the team take away his opportunity to pitch in the ASG? Why make Wood upset? Wood may never get another chance to do so.
It is hard for some fans or players to see the ASG rosters and debate whether someone deserving was snubbed by the league or the coaching staff. But in this case, Wood is getting snubbed by his own team!
July 8, 2013
MONEY BALLED
Cubs broadcaster Len Kasper wrote a column for the Daily Herald. In it, he states that the Cubs front office recent transactions moves the club closer to a World Series.
Kasper is one of those expanded stats guys. He likes to talk about the sabermetrics of a player or a situation, especially on lazy Sunday afternoon broadcasts. He believes that Epstein-Hoyer front office is using the principles of sabermetrics and Moneyball philosophy of Billy Beane, Oakland's successful GM, to build a winning organization. Beane found a way to analyze player performance by new metrics such as OPS, OBP and situational performance measures. Beane realized that you do not need a line up of HR, RBI and high BA players in order to produce runs. (Which had historic precedent before with the Go-Go- White Sox in the 1950s).
Kasper writes that "But, for the millionth time, "Moneyball" was not about on-base percentage. Or computers taking over for scouts. It was about exploiting market inefficiencies. Again, repeat after me: It was about EXPLOITING … MARKET … INEFFICIENCIES."
What Oakland did and continues to do is to find players that fit into their run production system. Players that have consistent performance traits who when put in the right situation have an opportunity to perform well. A player who can coax a walk and steal a base is just as valuable as a .300 hitter making contact for a double. That is not a market "inefficiency" but scouting players to fit specific roles on the ball club.
This was the first year that teams could "trade" international salary pool money. Kasper believes the Cubs strategy of trading for more bonus money was a genius move. He believes the Cubs were the first team to target pool money in trades to give them an edge on other teams in signing young, raw players from other countries. Except, that observation misses the point.
In prior years, teams could spend an unlimited amount of money to sign international free agents. The Cubs overspent tens of millions of dollars on international players, including Jorge Soler and the bust, Geraldo Concepcion. However, other teams such as the White Sox, spent little on foreign players by comparison. But an objective view of current rosters shows the White Sox have more impact foreign players on their roster (especially in pitching) than the Cubs.
Further, the Cubs are not "exploiting" the situation when the rules clearly state clubs can trade bonus money. What the Cubs are actually doing is overspending for foreign players which in the long run inflates the cost for talent for every club. The Cubs may have to scramble to find more IFA bonus money to sign the number one prospect for $2.8 million (to avoid a penalty tax and future signing restrictions). The Cubs did not corner the market in talent, but may have cornered themselves in a budget and future signing sinkhole by overspending this year.
And the Cubs also overspent on the amateur draft. The team has overspent on lower round draft choices which now has impacted on whether the team can sign No. 1 pick Kris Bryant. Currently, the Cubs do not have enough bonus pool space to sign Bryant at even the recommended slot price. Bryant's agent wants more than the slot value. If the Cubs sign Bryant, the team will incur a financial penalty. If the Cubs don't sign Bryant, the team will incur more substantial penalties including potential loss of future first round pick. Again, this compulsive overspending on prospects is not gaming the system but creating one's own budget inefficiencies.
And Kasper buys into the myth that spending big money on a player means that player will be great in the future. "Because it accelerates the essential process of adding a large quantity of young players to a system that badly needs it, which in turn should push championship-caliber talent to the big leagues on a yearly basis," Kasper states. Except, that is not true.
Less than two percent of the international players signed this year will have any impact on a major league roster. High school players drafted by teams have less than a one percent chance to have an impact on a major league roster.
Spending bonus money does not equate at all to actually finding and developing baseball players. Old time scouts would tell you that there are things that they could observe that do not show up on a stat sheet. Things like whether the prospect positions himself correctly in the field; whether he understands the game situation; whether he is anticipating the play on the next pitch; whether he makes the correct baseball IQ play in the field (hitting the cut off man, taking an extra base, etc.) Also, whether a prospect has the demeanor to play at more competitive levels. The raw stats like height, weight, 40 yard dash, mph on fastball are only starting points. Like at the pro football combine, people get caught up with number of bench reps or vertical leaps. But the wise general managers come back to a simple question after seeing all that data: "can the kid play football?"
Oakland has developed a long line of baseball players who play fundamentally sound baseball. That is the key to building a successful organization, not the ability to spend a fortune on 16 year old kid's potential.
Kasper is one of those expanded stats guys. He likes to talk about the sabermetrics of a player or a situation, especially on lazy Sunday afternoon broadcasts. He believes that Epstein-Hoyer front office is using the principles of sabermetrics and Moneyball philosophy of Billy Beane, Oakland's successful GM, to build a winning organization. Beane found a way to analyze player performance by new metrics such as OPS, OBP and situational performance measures. Beane realized that you do not need a line up of HR, RBI and high BA players in order to produce runs. (Which had historic precedent before with the Go-Go- White Sox in the 1950s).
Kasper writes that "But, for the millionth time, "Moneyball" was not about on-base percentage. Or computers taking over for scouts. It was about exploiting market inefficiencies. Again, repeat after me: It was about EXPLOITING … MARKET … INEFFICIENCIES."
What Oakland did and continues to do is to find players that fit into their run production system. Players that have consistent performance traits who when put in the right situation have an opportunity to perform well. A player who can coax a walk and steal a base is just as valuable as a .300 hitter making contact for a double. That is not a market "inefficiency" but scouting players to fit specific roles on the ball club.
This was the first year that teams could "trade" international salary pool money. Kasper believes the Cubs strategy of trading for more bonus money was a genius move. He believes the Cubs were the first team to target pool money in trades to give them an edge on other teams in signing young, raw players from other countries. Except, that observation misses the point.
In prior years, teams could spend an unlimited amount of money to sign international free agents. The Cubs overspent tens of millions of dollars on international players, including Jorge Soler and the bust, Geraldo Concepcion. However, other teams such as the White Sox, spent little on foreign players by comparison. But an objective view of current rosters shows the White Sox have more impact foreign players on their roster (especially in pitching) than the Cubs.
Further, the Cubs are not "exploiting" the situation when the rules clearly state clubs can trade bonus money. What the Cubs are actually doing is overspending for foreign players which in the long run inflates the cost for talent for every club. The Cubs may have to scramble to find more IFA bonus money to sign the number one prospect for $2.8 million (to avoid a penalty tax and future signing restrictions). The Cubs did not corner the market in talent, but may have cornered themselves in a budget and future signing sinkhole by overspending this year.
And the Cubs also overspent on the amateur draft. The team has overspent on lower round draft choices which now has impacted on whether the team can sign No. 1 pick Kris Bryant. Currently, the Cubs do not have enough bonus pool space to sign Bryant at even the recommended slot price. Bryant's agent wants more than the slot value. If the Cubs sign Bryant, the team will incur a financial penalty. If the Cubs don't sign Bryant, the team will incur more substantial penalties including potential loss of future first round pick. Again, this compulsive overspending on prospects is not gaming the system but creating one's own budget inefficiencies.
And Kasper buys into the myth that spending big money on a player means that player will be great in the future. "Because it accelerates the essential process of adding a large quantity of young players to a system that badly needs it, which in turn should push championship-caliber talent to the big leagues on a yearly basis," Kasper states. Except, that is not true.
Less than two percent of the international players signed this year will have any impact on a major league roster. High school players drafted by teams have less than a one percent chance to have an impact on a major league roster.
Spending bonus money does not equate at all to actually finding and developing baseball players. Old time scouts would tell you that there are things that they could observe that do not show up on a stat sheet. Things like whether the prospect positions himself correctly in the field; whether he understands the game situation; whether he is anticipating the play on the next pitch; whether he makes the correct baseball IQ play in the field (hitting the cut off man, taking an extra base, etc.) Also, whether a prospect has the demeanor to play at more competitive levels. The raw stats like height, weight, 40 yard dash, mph on fastball are only starting points. Like at the pro football combine, people get caught up with number of bench reps or vertical leaps. But the wise general managers come back to a simple question after seeing all that data: "can the kid play football?"
Oakland has developed a long line of baseball players who play fundamentally sound baseball. That is the key to building a successful organization, not the ability to spend a fortune on 16 year old kid's potential.
HAIRSTON TODAY, GONE TOMORROW
Scott Hairston is no longer a Cub. The 33-year old outfielder has been traded to the Nationals for a Class A player. The Cubs also sent some salary relief ($500,000) to offset the remaining balance of the two-year, $5 million contract.
In 52 games, Hairston had 99 AB, and hit 8 HR, 19 RBI but batted .172. His season WAR is negative 0.5, which is worse than a AAA replacement player.
Why would the Nationals want a veteran like this? The Nats have had injury problems in their outfield and may wish to solidify a home run bat off the bench.
It also seems that the Cubs are not getting very much in return for their "assets" on the 25 man roster.
How many Class A level prospects can the Cubs absorb in one year (draft and international signings plus trades)?
One must also consider the possibility that the Cubs need to move payroll in order to balance overspending on prospects. The Hairston trade will cut $2 million off the 2014 payroll.
Even though the Cubs are playing poker with Matt Garza by holding on to him to the last minute to try to get a bidding war for that trade, the risk that Garza has one or two bad outings (or gets hurt again) is growing which each start.
The two most valuable trade pieces right now are Luis Valbuena and Dioner Navarro. Valbuena because he is a utility infielder who has flashed some glove skills recently. And Navarro who has excellent pinch hitting numbers, plus he is a switch hitting catcher (a rare commodity). I would not be surprised if these two players get traded before Garza.
In 52 games, Hairston had 99 AB, and hit 8 HR, 19 RBI but batted .172. His season WAR is negative 0.5, which is worse than a AAA replacement player.
Why would the Nationals want a veteran like this? The Nats have had injury problems in their outfield and may wish to solidify a home run bat off the bench.
It also seems that the Cubs are not getting very much in return for their "assets" on the 25 man roster.
How many Class A level prospects can the Cubs absorb in one year (draft and international signings plus trades)?
One must also consider the possibility that the Cubs need to move payroll in order to balance overspending on prospects. The Hairston trade will cut $2 million off the 2014 payroll.
Even though the Cubs are playing poker with Matt Garza by holding on to him to the last minute to try to get a bidding war for that trade, the risk that Garza has one or two bad outings (or gets hurt again) is growing which each start.
The two most valuable trade pieces right now are Luis Valbuena and Dioner Navarro. Valbuena because he is a utility infielder who has flashed some glove skills recently. And Navarro who has excellent pinch hitting numbers, plus he is a switch hitting catcher (a rare commodity). I would not be surprised if these two players get traded before Garza.
July 5, 2013
WHICH OCTOBER?
It is kind of hard to read the tea leaves with the cup is on fire.
"Realistically, our chance of playing in October is very small and we need to add a lot of talent to get better for the future. That's the reality of the situation." - - - Jed Hoyer
The real question is which October?
2013 was an expected write-off season like 2012.
2014 was the first competitive marker when Epstein and Hoyer joined the Cubs. Since the Cubs plan is to blow up the current roster for more prospects, the team will not be competitive in 2014.
2015 should have been the end line: playoffs. But since most of the Epstein-Hoyer talent is in rookie and Class A ball, none will progress through a full season at AAA Iowa (a metric for hitters to be promoted). Further, most of this year's international signee class will not even make it to the United States until 2015 rookie ball.
2016 now appears the earliest glimmer of hope if Baez, Soler, Almora, etc. pan out as the front office projects. But to have a rookie heavy everyday roster is fit with perils, too. Think Kansas City Royals.
2017 will be when the current low level minor talent straggles to the big league club to join the first wave who may or may not have their sophomore slump seasons. The roster core should be in the prime production years. But it still less than a fifty-fifty proposition that the Cubs will make the playoffs based upon the historical record that only one in five players make an impact when they make the major leagues.
Realistically, there is a very slim chance that the Cubs will have a playoff caliber club in the next four years. This year's motto may be "spend now, pray for results later."
"Realistically, our chance of playing in October is very small and we need to add a lot of talent to get better for the future. That's the reality of the situation." - - - Jed Hoyer
The real question is which October?
2013 was an expected write-off season like 2012.
2014 was the first competitive marker when Epstein and Hoyer joined the Cubs. Since the Cubs plan is to blow up the current roster for more prospects, the team will not be competitive in 2014.
2015 should have been the end line: playoffs. But since most of the Epstein-Hoyer talent is in rookie and Class A ball, none will progress through a full season at AAA Iowa (a metric for hitters to be promoted). Further, most of this year's international signee class will not even make it to the United States until 2015 rookie ball.
2016 now appears the earliest glimmer of hope if Baez, Soler, Almora, etc. pan out as the front office projects. But to have a rookie heavy everyday roster is fit with perils, too. Think Kansas City Royals.
2017 will be when the current low level minor talent straggles to the big league club to join the first wave who may or may not have their sophomore slump seasons. The roster core should be in the prime production years. But it still less than a fifty-fifty proposition that the Cubs will make the playoffs based upon the historical record that only one in five players make an impact when they make the major leagues.
Realistically, there is a very slim chance that the Cubs will have a playoff caliber club in the next four years. This year's motto may be "spend now, pray for results later."
OVERSPENDING
I don't know if it is a desperation move or laying the foundation for
the Big Excuse, but the Cubs have blown through their international
signing bonus pool money. As a result, the Cubs could face stiff
penalties including a 100 percent fine and signing limitations for next
year.
Steve Adams of MLBTR believes that with the signing of Elroy Jimenez, the Cubs have spent $6.27 million for international players. The Cubs original bonus pool of $4.557 million and the trades that brought in bonus slot values gave the Cubs only to $5.520 million.
That would mean the Cubs are over their allotted bonus pool by $749,700 -- an overage of 13.6 percent. The CBA penalty for exceeding a bonus pool by 10-15 percent would be a 100 percent tax on the overage as well as the inability to sign a player for more than $500K in next year's signing period. The penalty for exceeding the pool by 15% or more is a 100 percent tax on the overage and a $250K per player limit next year.
If the reported signing bonuses aren't 100 percent accurate, the Cubs could be less than 10 percent over. However, barring a significant inaccuracy, they would still fall into the 5-10 percent overage bracket, which would prevent them from signing a player for more than $500K in 2014-15 but require only a 75 percent overage tax.
Per the new CBA, teams are allowed to acquire up to 50 percent of their initial bonus pool. That would be a total of $2,278,600 for the Cubs, meaning they can still acquire an additional $1,315,600. That would be enough to cover the remaining difference and keep the Cubs from incurring limitations on next year's spending.
The problem is that every other team now knows what the Cubs are up to with the international draft pool. They all know that the Cubs have overspent their allotment and will seek to get more slot values in trades before the deadline to offset their overage spending. But other teams have no duty to help the Cubs out of their problem. Other teams have been using their bonus pools to sign players. It would be in those teams best interests to NOT send additional cap money to the Cubs in deals so the Cubs will be forced to spend significantly less per player next season.
It is a familiar refrain that we will hear in the near future. The Epstein draft model was to overspend on the draft picks, but the new CBA made that nearly impossible with hard caps and harsh penalties. Epstein whined about the new CBA hindering his ability to stockpile talent. Likewise, we will hear that the Cubs rebuilding plans will stall next year if the Cubs are penalized by only being able to offer $500,000 bonuses to 16 year Latin ballplayers.
In any event, is this money well spent? The Cubs are on pace to spend more than a million dollars each on a hand full of foreign teenagers. This is the equivalent of first round draft slot money for six kids who have no real high level competition or experience.
High schoolers drafted in the normal draft only have a 0.5 percent chance of making to a big league roster during the professional career. It is not that much better for Latin teenagers. Only two percent of prospects signed out of the Dominican Republic make it to the majors. SI.com examined the signings of 3,099 Dominican amateurs from 2003 to 2010 and found that 18-year-old players were twice as likely to appear in the majors as 16-year-olds, and at a fraction of the price.
That is why many teams will sign as many international players as possible in the budget. The Blue Jays have averaged more than a dozen over the years, but at a fraction of the U.S. draft signing allotments for players chose after Round 10.
The Cubs, with penalties, may spend $7.7 million for five players. With the odds that only two percent of foreign signees make it to the majors, the odds are that none of the Cubs signees will make it to the big club.
Then, one has to consider what the Cubs could have done with $6.25 to $7.7 million to better this season the current major league roster. When Ricketts bought the club, he proudly proclaimed that the team was only one or two players away from competing for a championship. Many thought his statement was naive. But it was all about winning from Day One. Now, three years later the regression continues.
Overspending does not guarantee success. The financial ability to spend more to cover one's mistakes is a crutch that many general managers have used in the past. But the Cubs are quickly turning into a small market team by diverting all capital and resources to develop real estate holdings at the expense of the actual baseball operations. Epstein's international spending spree may have been done because he will not be allowed to spend like a drunken sailor anymore once the Wrigley renovations begin.
Steve Adams of MLBTR believes that with the signing of Elroy Jimenez, the Cubs have spent $6.27 million for international players. The Cubs original bonus pool of $4.557 million and the trades that brought in bonus slot values gave the Cubs only to $5.520 million.
That would mean the Cubs are over their allotted bonus pool by $749,700 -- an overage of 13.6 percent. The CBA penalty for exceeding a bonus pool by 10-15 percent would be a 100 percent tax on the overage as well as the inability to sign a player for more than $500K in next year's signing period. The penalty for exceeding the pool by 15% or more is a 100 percent tax on the overage and a $250K per player limit next year.
If the reported signing bonuses aren't 100 percent accurate, the Cubs could be less than 10 percent over. However, barring a significant inaccuracy, they would still fall into the 5-10 percent overage bracket, which would prevent them from signing a player for more than $500K in 2014-15 but require only a 75 percent overage tax.
Per the new CBA, teams are allowed to acquire up to 50 percent of their initial bonus pool. That would be a total of $2,278,600 for the Cubs, meaning they can still acquire an additional $1,315,600. That would be enough to cover the remaining difference and keep the Cubs from incurring limitations on next year's spending.
The problem is that every other team now knows what the Cubs are up to with the international draft pool. They all know that the Cubs have overspent their allotment and will seek to get more slot values in trades before the deadline to offset their overage spending. But other teams have no duty to help the Cubs out of their problem. Other teams have been using their bonus pools to sign players. It would be in those teams best interests to NOT send additional cap money to the Cubs in deals so the Cubs will be forced to spend significantly less per player next season.
It is a familiar refrain that we will hear in the near future. The Epstein draft model was to overspend on the draft picks, but the new CBA made that nearly impossible with hard caps and harsh penalties. Epstein whined about the new CBA hindering his ability to stockpile talent. Likewise, we will hear that the Cubs rebuilding plans will stall next year if the Cubs are penalized by only being able to offer $500,000 bonuses to 16 year Latin ballplayers.
In any event, is this money well spent? The Cubs are on pace to spend more than a million dollars each on a hand full of foreign teenagers. This is the equivalent of first round draft slot money for six kids who have no real high level competition or experience.
High schoolers drafted in the normal draft only have a 0.5 percent chance of making to a big league roster during the professional career. It is not that much better for Latin teenagers. Only two percent of prospects signed out of the Dominican Republic make it to the majors. SI.com examined the signings of 3,099 Dominican amateurs from 2003 to 2010 and found that 18-year-old players were twice as likely to appear in the majors as 16-year-olds, and at a fraction of the price.
That is why many teams will sign as many international players as possible in the budget. The Blue Jays have averaged more than a dozen over the years, but at a fraction of the U.S. draft signing allotments for players chose after Round 10.
The Cubs, with penalties, may spend $7.7 million for five players. With the odds that only two percent of foreign signees make it to the majors, the odds are that none of the Cubs signees will make it to the big club.
Then, one has to consider what the Cubs could have done with $6.25 to $7.7 million to better this season the current major league roster. When Ricketts bought the club, he proudly proclaimed that the team was only one or two players away from competing for a championship. Many thought his statement was naive. But it was all about winning from Day One. Now, three years later the regression continues.
Overspending does not guarantee success. The financial ability to spend more to cover one's mistakes is a crutch that many general managers have used in the past. But the Cubs are quickly turning into a small market team by diverting all capital and resources to develop real estate holdings at the expense of the actual baseball operations. Epstein's international spending spree may have been done because he will not be allowed to spend like a drunken sailor anymore once the Wrigley renovations begin.
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