Bill Veeck owned the Chicago White Sox in two periods of the club's darkest days.
In 1959, Veeck became head of a group that purchased a controlling interest in the Sox, who went on to win their first pennant in 40 years. That year the White Sox broke a team attendance record for home games
with 1.4 million. The next year the team broke the same record with 1.6
million visitors with the addition of the first "exploding scoreboard" in the major leagues – producing electrical and sound effects and fireworks whenever the White Sox player hit a home run. He also added the players' surnames on the back of their uniform, a
practice now standard by 25 of 30 clubs on all jerseys.
Veeck could not financially compete so he sold off the team. However, he repurchased the tema in 1975. Veeck's return rankled baseball's owner establishment, most of the old
guard viewing him as a pariah after both exposing most of his peers in
his 1961 book Veeck As In Wreck, which is a must-read for any baseball fan.
Almost immediately after taking control of the Sox for a second time
Veeck unleashed another publicity stunt designed to irritate his fellow
owners. He and general manager conducted four trades in a hotel lobby, in full view of the public. Two weeks later, however, an arbitrator ruled that the reserve clause void and ushered in the era of free agency.
Veeck's power as an owner began to wane relative to richer owners. He still could not financially compete with the rich owners. In an attempt to adapt to free agency he developed a "rent-a-player"
model, centering on the acquisition of other clubs' stars in their
option years. The gambit was moderately successful: in 1977 he White Sox won 90 games, and finished third in the standings.
There were a few guiding principles that made Veeck a successful team operator. He always said that he did nothing to diminish the game of baseball his team played on the field. All of his stunts, promotions and innovations were to make the fan experience better; to draw fans in like a circus did during his own childhood. He also treated his players with respect, as he knew they were the stars of his show. He had to keep costs low in order to draw people to the ball park. The one thing he never did was discount ticket prices, because he felt fans had to know that is what they were paying for: baseball.
He was a small market operator playing in the shadow of big city rich teams. He once said that he survived by selling out home stands when the Yankees or Red Sox came into town.
Veeck was the last baseball owner in Chicago who actually knew all aspects of running a major league baseball team. He grew up in the ground crew at Wrigley when his father was with the Cubs. He knew concessions, marketing, contracts and most importantly, people. He was out in the stands talking to patrons about what they liked or disliked about the Cubs. This was before the sterile market surveys or focus groups; Veeck was out having conversations with real people who enjoyed his game. He was seen as a man of the people, and in certain respects he became the face of the franchise.
Veeck lived and died at the gate. Attendance at Comiskey was the biggest revenue source for his teams. Likewise, Epstein's recent admission that the Cubs are overly dependent on fans coming to Wrigley is a haunting echo to Veeck's past in Chicago.
Last weekend, a report surfaced that internal projects from the Cubs show that the team will only draw 1.7 million fans in 2014. That is another deep drop in attendance. If that is true, then the Cubs would be falling toward 1980-1981 attendance levels (which is the first years of the Tribune reign). This would also be another 650,000 lost ticket sales in just one off-season. In the Cubs own revenue project formula, that fan loss equates to approximately $34.5 million of top line revenue. The anecdotal evidence to support this report is that several former season ticket holders have been cold called by the Cubs numerous times this off-season to try to have them reconsider and buy a ticket package. One would not have to call former ticket holders if the team had such a long waiting list, unless of course, those people also passed on season ticket packages for 2014. The Ricketts ownership is on pace then to lose a staggering 49 percent of their attendance in the first six years of running the Cubs.
Besides the financial wreck that has hit home with the Cubs, Epstein and the front office has been grousing about the fact that the new CBA has hindered their rebuilding plans. They can no longer overpay for a hoard of prospects. But Veeck had more restrictions on him when he ran teams than Epstein does today. And Veeck figured out a way to field a competitive team by obtaining players in their final contract years before free agency. Players playing for next year's contract usually play a little harder. Epstein has done just the opposite. Instead of building a team of hungry veterans in contract years, he has traded away all those type of players for multiple low-level prospects. As a result, the major league team is very bad 100-loss expansion club.
As the old saying goes, those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it. The Cubs are on a free fall path back to the early 1960s, which is not a good thing. Ricketts is turning into a new P.K. Wrigley, which is really not a good thing.
