In his first A's post-game press conference, Jeff Samardzija was beaming about his new team.
It was like he had just been released from prison and on the way home
he used his last dollar to purchase a winning lottery ticket.
He was happy with his new situation and teammates. He liked that during the games the players are discussing the game as it unfolds. He likes the atmosphere and the drive to win in the clubhouse. It is like when he first came up, and teammates like Greg Maddux would discuss strategy and what would happen during the game. There was a mentoring process, and a winning attitude present at that time.
While he was praising his new team, Samardzija was also mentally ticking off the things he felt was wrong about his former team, the Cubs. He had been vocal in the past about the Cubs trading away its pitching staff for prospects; he had been vocal about the losing culture. So he painted from a player's perspective a bleak picture of the current Cub team.
Now, there were some nasty comments by media members and fans who lashed out at any criticism of the trade. They called dissenters "idiots" because they don't "understand" the great haul the Cubs received in return for two starting pitchers. They are fully invested in Theo Epstein's rebuilding plan. But if you listen to Epstein's own words, he is not fully sure what is going to happen. He said he was "hopeful" that the front office would not have another year of trading away starters for prospects (and tanking the season for higher draft pick). Epstein again had no timetable for when the Cubs will be competitive.
The key to the trade was acquiring shortstop Addison Russell, who is listed as a Top Ten prospect in all of baseball by scouting services. He was the #14 draft pick in the first round. Scouts rave about his abilities and projections. However, he has played only 19 games this year due to hamstring injuries. And statistically, any prospect has a 6 percent chance to develop into an impact player. A first rounder should have better odds to making the majors (12%-to 25%). There is no guarantee that Russell will make his mark at the major league level or even be a Cub. And that is a real concern.
One must start to realize that the majority of Cub organizational prospects that scouts like have come from outside the Cubs own draft picks. Trading for players is one tool to build a team. But if a team has a problem developing their own picks, then trading for better developed prospects from other organizations becomes a long term problem. One of the statements on why this trade was done weeks before the deadline was that Oakland wanting pitching now. And other teams, such as the Blue Jays, did not want to give up one or two premiere pitching prospects for Samardzija or Jason Hammel. The Cubs need starting pitchers but took two position players and a AAA starter in return.
So even if one accepts the premise that the trade was good for the Cubs because it helps re-stock the minor league system with quality players, it does create a present problem in that the Cubs have no solution to their pitching woes. Samardzija and Hammel were projected to pitch another 210 innings this season. (This is the reason the A's wanted an early deal: they get at least 8 additional starts from their new pitchers). The Cubs have no one to take those innings. Carlos Villaneuva was put in the awkward position of being the spot starter from his bullpen duties and he failed in the great 13-0 letdown game after the trade. Chris Rusin was brought up (but oddly did not start), and he could not stop the damage after Villaneuva was pulled from the game.
Tsuyoshi Wada, 33, will probably take one starter position. He was 9-5, 2.66 ERA and 1.161 WHIP for Iowa. Then the Hammel slot will probably filled by a rotating committee of Villaneuva, Russell or Dallas Beeler. The trade of 40% of one's starting rotation is a major team disruption that the Cubs have had a problem addressing in the past and the present.
The other problem is perception. The Cubs had actually won four games in a row. They were no longer the worst club in baseball. (In fact, the team was heading outside of the top ten draft pick slot for next year's draft). But even before the team could start to sow the seeds of a turnaround, the trade wipes out the clubhouse. And even casual fans see that the Cubs don't want to win this year; another "tanked" season is what the front office wants. The trade does nothing to stop the falling attendance figures at Wrigley.
The other perception is the players. Samardzija pitched his way off the Cubs roster by refusing an extension request. He saw better opportunities elsewhere. His former teammates in Chicago no doubt have mixed emotions when their best players and leaders are traded away year after year with no immediate major league help coming in return. Free agents see the Cubs as a sign and flip destination for rehabbing players, not a place to sign a long term deal for a championship run. Even if the front office believes it can suddenly open the faucet and spend big money on free agents, there is no guarantee that they will want to come to the Cubs (see, Tanaka FA derby).
Yes, this deal fits into the pattern of Epstein's rebuilding program, but its consequences continues to create new problems that many fans don't see or don't want acknowledge.
