Baseball core principles are changing as advanced stats become the norm.
Batting averages, the key stat in a hitter's success, are now downplayed or discarded in favor of OBP or OPS. The league is now flooded with .230 hitters with high strike out rates because power stats are more "valuable" than a single or a single out (strikeout). If a lineup is filled with .230 hitters, it is more prone to long batting slumps. In 2018, the Cubs found that out the hard way by scoring one or fewer runs in 41 games.
No one is trying to find a traditional lead off hitter. A person who hits for high average, can work a walk, and steal a base with ease. The reason is that stat men believe a steal is a risky and worthless strategy. Teams no longer think on ways to "manufacture" a run when the trend is still the 3- run HR or bust mentality.
There are so many .230 BA strike out machines that pitchers no longer have to "pitch to contact." In other words, starters use to have to conserve energy to pitch 8 innings/start. But today, they are nibble on the corners and try to "trick" batters into missed swings. Other pitchers just rely on two pitches, a fastball and an off-speed pitch, and throw as hard as possible knowing that they are on a 100 pitch count. It does not matter if you are in the third or sixth, at 100 you are going to get yanked. So wins, an old measure of starting pitcher success, is another meaningless stat in the modern age. Pitchers don't have the mind set to go out a "win" a complete game because management has diminished their role by bolstering the bullpen to finish games. It also is driven by the fact that pitchers give up more hits the third time around in the batting order. So teams are planning to get a pitcher, however effective, out by the time the batting order rolls around for the third time.
All the nibbler pitchers have increased the time of games, and contributed to the wide variance in strike zones called by umpires. In the past, a quality pitcher will blister the zone with his best pitch challenging the hitter to hit it. Now, batters are sitting back looking for "a mistake" to hit. Since the pitcher has the advantage, most do themselves no great service by throwing outside the zone.
Traditional pitching coaches preach that it is not velocity that matters most in pitching, it is movement. But velocity speed guns are still the primary tool to evaluate pitchers. A 100 mph straight fast ball can be hit by any major talent. It is the 94 mph pitch that moves sideways or plummets down that causes batters more problems. Bruce Sutter was an ace closer not because he had a dynamic fastball, but because he developed the original fork ball, an enticing pitch that looked like a heart of the plate fastball until it dropped off a table at the last moment. Sutter was looking for swings and misses, but he could throw his fork ball for called strikes. He was a pitcher not a thrower.
A pitcher has a plan for each batter, because each batter has a hole in his swing. A sinker ball master can have opponents beat the ball to the infielders for easy outs. Such a plan limits the starter's pitch count and gets the entire team into the game. A thrower gets on the mound a rears back for every pitch. He does not really know where it will land because control is not his primary principle.
With all the new stat analysis, what is lost is the more basic elements of the game: runs and outs. Each team has 27 outs to score runs. How you use those outs to get runs is important. A "productive" out such as a sacrifice bunt, hitting to the opposite field, a sacrifice fly are all downplayed today. Teams have horrible collective stats with runners in scoring position. Why? An individual stat priority takes precedence over the proper situational play like moving the runner over, of choking up on the bat to hit a single instead of a home run. Scoring runs should be the priority of every player, but there is now an inherent bias to put individual stats (that's how players are paid) ahead of the team.
Front offices continue to hire cheaper, non-old school managers who management can control more with stats than gut strategy. The game is morphing into a video game without controllers.
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
October 15, 2018
February 10, 2016
TWO STRIKE HITTING
Sports Illustrated recently had an article on MLB hitting.
With run production well down because of a new era in quality pitching, several teams including the Mariners, are taking a second look at hitting instruction.
The Mariners' winter camp program was “Control the Zone.” The Mariners' instructors talked about concepts such as “getting into good counts,” “being selective but aggressive” and “being in a good position to hit” with “separation on the back side” wrote Tom Verducci.
But the syllabus also included the key acknowledgement that modern baseball has changed so much that hitters have to learn how to make contact with two strikes. The two-strike approach, which disappeared for a generation, is not just back, but is also once again a fundamental part of winning baseball.
“They heard a lot about a two-strike approach and the value of putting the ball in play,” said first-year Seattle general manager Jerry Dipoto. “This may or not be factually accurate, but I think it’s harder to draw a walk in today’s game than it’s ever been,” Dipoto said. “There’s been a debate among people for years that there are players that have the walk ‘skill’—it is something they possess. The one thing we do know you can affect as a hitter is reducing the number of strikeouts. As long as you are able to control the zone in that way with two strikes and put the ball in play good things can happen.
I recall many stories of how Greg Maddux would sit in the Cubs dugout and "call" the game to whomever was sitting next to him, before the pitcher threw a pitch. Maddux was a student of the game. He knew before he went to the mound his pitch selection sequence and how each batter would be looking to hit. Maddux used his knowledge to freeze batters with a two seam fastball that would tail back over the plate.
Great pitching is part talent and part scouting your opponent.
The same is true with great hitting. Great hitters know their pitching opponents strengths and weaknesses. I recall Darryl Ward telling young Cub hitters during a game what to look for when you faced this pitcher. Ward was an excellent contact hitter; he could foul off a dozen pitches until he found one he could turn on.
Ward knew what the pitcher threw, but he also had a great grasp of the strike zone. If you have a comfort level of being able to consistently reach all four corners of the zone, then you can get the pitch you want to hit.
Most major leaguers "sit" on a fastball. But then during a count of off-speed, breaking pitches for strikes, they get nervous. They start looking for a slider and get caught looking at an inside fastball.
Some batters have the mindset that they will only wait for a pitch in the zone, at the perfect swing plane, so they will not swing at all. In essence, they are waiting for a pitcher to make a mistake over the plate. This is a game of chicken. More and more pitchers fall into this game by trying to nibble at the corners to avoid contact, when in fact, they lose sight that only one in four batters will actually get a hit off him. The odds increase if a pitcher gets behind in the count.
This new revival of the "two-strike" approach to hitting is really a return to basic baseball fundamentals. And that is a welcome change.
With run production well down because of a new era in quality pitching, several teams including the Mariners, are taking a second look at hitting instruction.
The Mariners' winter camp program was “Control the Zone.” The Mariners' instructors talked about concepts such as “getting into good counts,” “being selective but aggressive” and “being in a good position to hit” with “separation on the back side” wrote Tom Verducci.
But the syllabus also included the key acknowledgement that modern baseball has changed so much that hitters have to learn how to make contact with two strikes. The two-strike approach, which disappeared for a generation, is not just back, but is also once again a fundamental part of winning baseball.
“They heard a lot about a two-strike approach and the value of putting the ball in play,” said first-year Seattle general manager Jerry Dipoto. “This may or not be factually accurate, but I think it’s harder to draw a walk in today’s game than it’s ever been,” Dipoto said. “There’s been a debate among people for years that there are players that have the walk ‘skill’—it is something they possess. The one thing we do know you can affect as a hitter is reducing the number of strikeouts. As long as you are able to control the zone in that way with two strikes and put the ball in play good things can happen.
I recall many stories of how Greg Maddux would sit in the Cubs dugout and "call" the game to whomever was sitting next to him, before the pitcher threw a pitch. Maddux was a student of the game. He knew before he went to the mound his pitch selection sequence and how each batter would be looking to hit. Maddux used his knowledge to freeze batters with a two seam fastball that would tail back over the plate.
Great pitching is part talent and part scouting your opponent.
The same is true with great hitting. Great hitters know their pitching opponents strengths and weaknesses. I recall Darryl Ward telling young Cub hitters during a game what to look for when you faced this pitcher. Ward was an excellent contact hitter; he could foul off a dozen pitches until he found one he could turn on.
Ward knew what the pitcher threw, but he also had a great grasp of the strike zone. If you have a comfort level of being able to consistently reach all four corners of the zone, then you can get the pitch you want to hit.
Most major leaguers "sit" on a fastball. But then during a count of off-speed, breaking pitches for strikes, they get nervous. They start looking for a slider and get caught looking at an inside fastball.
Some batters have the mindset that they will only wait for a pitch in the zone, at the perfect swing plane, so they will not swing at all. In essence, they are waiting for a pitcher to make a mistake over the plate. This is a game of chicken. More and more pitchers fall into this game by trying to nibble at the corners to avoid contact, when in fact, they lose sight that only one in four batters will actually get a hit off him. The odds increase if a pitcher gets behind in the count.
This new revival of the "two-strike" approach to hitting is really a return to basic baseball fundamentals. And that is a welcome change.
June 13, 2013
THE PHILOSOPHY OF BAD
There is a metaphoric sink hole opening up at Wrigley Field. The Cubs offense has turned comatose. Cub manager Dale Sveum has become frustrated by the fact his team cannot get hits.
One of the foundational players, Starlin Castro, is now at a career low .238 BA.
The Cubs have lost 20 games when they had the lead.
The Reds have won their last 12 games played at Wrigley Field.
The Cubs have scored only 11 runs in the last 6 games. Quality start after quality start has been wasted.
"It is getting frustrating," Sveum said. "It is almost the same game (everyday): Starting pitchers getting into the seventh inning with quality starts and we are not having quality at-bats. We are not getting enough quality at-bats from everybody on a daily basis."
Sveum does not define what he considers a "quality at bat." It takes a hard, fast and enforced organizational rule of how hitters should approach their at bats that seems to be lacking with the slumping Cubs.
A "quality at bat" can mean different things to different players. For a lead off hitter, a quality at bat would mean taking many pitches, drawing a walk or getting on base by creating offense by bunting. A quality at bat for a middle of the line up hitter would mean driving in runs by pulling shots down the line, or rocketing pitches into the gaps, or even making sure to hit long sacrifice flies to score runners. Each batter in a lineup should have a clearly defined role to play, a gear in the offense machine.
"We are just not getting aggressive swings," Sveum added. "Until we start getting more aggressive in fastball counts ... we can't keep swinging the bats the way we are in hitters counts."
Being "aggressive" is not the same as having an hitting philosophy. Theo Epstein has told us that his theory on the game is to have a lineup of high OBP players. A lineup of guys who consistently get on base will push across a steady stream of runs. However, the normal high OBP player is a disciplined hitter, willing to take a strike to work a hitter's count, defend the plate with any contact (foul balls), and the baseball IQ to out-think the pitcher in situations.
The Cubs batters seem to be on their own when they reach home plate. Early in the season they were jumping on first pitches time and time again. There has only been one recent game where the batters coaxed walk after walk from an opponent (because the opponent pitcher had no strike zone control.) But more often than not, the Cubs batters don't help themselves by wearing down the pitcher.
"We just have to get these guys going," Sveum said. "We just aren't getting any solid contact or slugging percentage out of them at all."
Contact and slugging percentage are two different concepts. Contact means putting the ball into play. Moving a runner into scoring position by hitting to the opposite field would be considered a good situational at bat ("a productive out.") Slugging percentage is total bases divided by at bats. It is a comparable measure of power of hitters.
The Cubs rank 13th in team slugging percentage at .403. However, the Cubs rank 26th in OBP with .298. The Cubs rank 24th in team batting average at .241. The Cubs rank 21st in runs scored with 251 (the NL average for team runs scored is 267 and 276 for all teams).
There is a disconnect between what the front office is saying in how they want their players to perform (high OBP) and the actual performance on the field. The "do you own thing" approach at the plate will cause more inconsistency and frustration for everyone. But the Cubs approach to offense has not changed at all from Piniella, Quade or Sveum. Batters in slumps don't try to bunt for base hits. Batters don't like to work counts by taking many pitches. Batters go fishing in "their out zones" all the time. But since there is no player position competition on the major league roster, there is no sense of urgency to change any approach. And that is the true philosophy of bad that has creeped into the Cub culture.
One of the foundational players, Starlin Castro, is now at a career low .238 BA.
The Cubs have lost 20 games when they had the lead.
The Reds have won their last 12 games played at Wrigley Field.
The Cubs have scored only 11 runs in the last 6 games. Quality start after quality start has been wasted.
"It is getting frustrating," Sveum said. "It is almost the same game (everyday): Starting pitchers getting into the seventh inning with quality starts and we are not having quality at-bats. We are not getting enough quality at-bats from everybody on a daily basis."
Sveum does not define what he considers a "quality at bat." It takes a hard, fast and enforced organizational rule of how hitters should approach their at bats that seems to be lacking with the slumping Cubs.
A "quality at bat" can mean different things to different players. For a lead off hitter, a quality at bat would mean taking many pitches, drawing a walk or getting on base by creating offense by bunting. A quality at bat for a middle of the line up hitter would mean driving in runs by pulling shots down the line, or rocketing pitches into the gaps, or even making sure to hit long sacrifice flies to score runners. Each batter in a lineup should have a clearly defined role to play, a gear in the offense machine.
"We are just not getting aggressive swings," Sveum added. "Until we start getting more aggressive in fastball counts ... we can't keep swinging the bats the way we are in hitters counts."
Being "aggressive" is not the same as having an hitting philosophy. Theo Epstein has told us that his theory on the game is to have a lineup of high OBP players. A lineup of guys who consistently get on base will push across a steady stream of runs. However, the normal high OBP player is a disciplined hitter, willing to take a strike to work a hitter's count, defend the plate with any contact (foul balls), and the baseball IQ to out-think the pitcher in situations.
The Cubs batters seem to be on their own when they reach home plate. Early in the season they were jumping on first pitches time and time again. There has only been one recent game where the batters coaxed walk after walk from an opponent (because the opponent pitcher had no strike zone control.) But more often than not, the Cubs batters don't help themselves by wearing down the pitcher.
"We just have to get these guys going," Sveum said. "We just aren't getting any solid contact or slugging percentage out of them at all."
Contact and slugging percentage are two different concepts. Contact means putting the ball into play. Moving a runner into scoring position by hitting to the opposite field would be considered a good situational at bat ("a productive out.") Slugging percentage is total bases divided by at bats. It is a comparable measure of power of hitters.
The Cubs rank 13th in team slugging percentage at .403. However, the Cubs rank 26th in OBP with .298. The Cubs rank 24th in team batting average at .241. The Cubs rank 21st in runs scored with 251 (the NL average for team runs scored is 267 and 276 for all teams).
There is a disconnect between what the front office is saying in how they want their players to perform (high OBP) and the actual performance on the field. The "do you own thing" approach at the plate will cause more inconsistency and frustration for everyone. But the Cubs approach to offense has not changed at all from Piniella, Quade or Sveum. Batters in slumps don't try to bunt for base hits. Batters don't like to work counts by taking many pitches. Batters go fishing in "their out zones" all the time. But since there is no player position competition on the major league roster, there is no sense of urgency to change any approach. And that is the true philosophy of bad that has creeped into the Cub culture.
February 13, 2013
SPRING TRAINING
The origin of spring training is quite simple. There was a time where baseball players had "real" jobs in the "real" world (factory, steel mills, farmers, etc.). Baseball was a summer diversion, a hobby, which did not pay that well. In order to get an early season competitive advantage, team owners brought their squads to a warm weather climate (Florida), to conduct workouts to get the players back into "playing shape." That meant shedding some winter pounds, throwing the medicine ball around instead of hay bales, and running to sweat and limber up the muscle groups. The basic premise of spring training was to exercise and prepare for a 154 game season.
Today, players are paid beyond the average annual salary of their fans. They are professional ball players. They are paid to remain in shape all year round. Players work out on their own or in team approved settings all year round. Some players have their own off-season conditioning coaches. By the time spring training comes around, the players should be in regular season shape.
So modern spring training serves different purposes.
First, it is a media and marketing kick-off for the season. Teams want to get their fans interested in the excitement of a new season. "Hope springs eternal." This is the first true opportunity to show case what the front office did all winter: new players, new coaches, new attitude. It is a way to sell tickets.
Second, it is the first collective, in depth injury census for a team. Until a rehabbing player actually gets back on the field of play, medical reports are mere speculation. Team doctors, trainers and staff get to evaluate the host of players, their recoveries and their status to determine the most appropriate training schedule to best meet the needs of injured players. The observations and training reports will allow the front office a very clear picture of what their entire organizational roster looks like from a health, recovery and issue stand point. It will give guidelines to the team on how far off a player is to returning to a roster; and will give the team pause to find a replacement player if there are issues or setbacks.
Third, in some professional organizations, spring training still allows for open competition for major league roster spots. However, it is highly unlikely in today's guaranteed contracts, expensive free agent signings and pre-packaged faces of the franchise promotions that non-roster invitees to camp or high minor league prospects will win a starting job in The Show. However, competition for a position is a good measure of how good (or bad) your team is - - - and will force veterans to "prove" that they still belong (instead of resting upon past performance). Smaller market teams have overcome the prejudice of promoting and playing younger, less seasoned rookies. Many of those decisions have become high profile players, like Mike Trout with the Angels, who made an impression last spring and was called up early in the season.
Fourth, spring training is the time to tinker with the final few openings on the organizations complete roster tree. Slotting prospects at the various levels is key to their development. Matching appropriate coaches with those prospects is key. A team having a solid philosophy of training at all levels in the system is also a key to consistency in rookie promotions and performance. Every player should have a road map to success. It is the team's obligation to try to get their players in the best position to succeed. And each player needs to recognize the opportunity and individually work hard at developing his skill sets. The only reward worth anything to a professional ball player is playing time against the best competition. Example, if a prospect hits lights out in Class A last season, it would be natural to move him to Class AA this season. Likewise, if a player promoted last season to Class AA struggled, it could be thought of moving him down to Class A to get his confidence back would be better than having him be a bench player on his AA team. Any demotion may have an affect of setting back a player's mental attitude because failure to advance in the minors is a sign to scouts that the player is not on track to be a major leaguer.
Fifth, spring training gives the hometown media some human interest, feature stories to fill an otherwise dull part of the winter sports scene. There are only so many "roster battle" non-stories that a columnist or beat reporter can file in a given week. Fans of bad teams are interested in stories about younger players who may make an impact in the near future. Fans of good teams are interested in stories about the last piece(s) of a championship puzzle for this season.
Spring training has many functions. But recently, the actual playing of exhibition games by one's known starters has diminished. It may be the fear of injury, re-injury or overwork. But most teams will pull veterans fairly quickly in games, especially pitchers. It is only until the last week of camp do managers normally field their opening day lineups for extended play. And at that time, fans will really get a final picture of what their team will look like for the season.
Today, players are paid beyond the average annual salary of their fans. They are professional ball players. They are paid to remain in shape all year round. Players work out on their own or in team approved settings all year round. Some players have their own off-season conditioning coaches. By the time spring training comes around, the players should be in regular season shape.
So modern spring training serves different purposes.
First, it is a media and marketing kick-off for the season. Teams want to get their fans interested in the excitement of a new season. "Hope springs eternal." This is the first true opportunity to show case what the front office did all winter: new players, new coaches, new attitude. It is a way to sell tickets.
Second, it is the first collective, in depth injury census for a team. Until a rehabbing player actually gets back on the field of play, medical reports are mere speculation. Team doctors, trainers and staff get to evaluate the host of players, their recoveries and their status to determine the most appropriate training schedule to best meet the needs of injured players. The observations and training reports will allow the front office a very clear picture of what their entire organizational roster looks like from a health, recovery and issue stand point. It will give guidelines to the team on how far off a player is to returning to a roster; and will give the team pause to find a replacement player if there are issues or setbacks.
Third, in some professional organizations, spring training still allows for open competition for major league roster spots. However, it is highly unlikely in today's guaranteed contracts, expensive free agent signings and pre-packaged faces of the franchise promotions that non-roster invitees to camp or high minor league prospects will win a starting job in The Show. However, competition for a position is a good measure of how good (or bad) your team is - - - and will force veterans to "prove" that they still belong (instead of resting upon past performance). Smaller market teams have overcome the prejudice of promoting and playing younger, less seasoned rookies. Many of those decisions have become high profile players, like Mike Trout with the Angels, who made an impression last spring and was called up early in the season.
Fourth, spring training is the time to tinker with the final few openings on the organizations complete roster tree. Slotting prospects at the various levels is key to their development. Matching appropriate coaches with those prospects is key. A team having a solid philosophy of training at all levels in the system is also a key to consistency in rookie promotions and performance. Every player should have a road map to success. It is the team's obligation to try to get their players in the best position to succeed. And each player needs to recognize the opportunity and individually work hard at developing his skill sets. The only reward worth anything to a professional ball player is playing time against the best competition. Example, if a prospect hits lights out in Class A last season, it would be natural to move him to Class AA this season. Likewise, if a player promoted last season to Class AA struggled, it could be thought of moving him down to Class A to get his confidence back would be better than having him be a bench player on his AA team. Any demotion may have an affect of setting back a player's mental attitude because failure to advance in the minors is a sign to scouts that the player is not on track to be a major leaguer.
Fifth, spring training gives the hometown media some human interest, feature stories to fill an otherwise dull part of the winter sports scene. There are only so many "roster battle" non-stories that a columnist or beat reporter can file in a given week. Fans of bad teams are interested in stories about younger players who may make an impact in the near future. Fans of good teams are interested in stories about the last piece(s) of a championship puzzle for this season.
Spring training has many functions. But recently, the actual playing of exhibition games by one's known starters has diminished. It may be the fear of injury, re-injury or overwork. But most teams will pull veterans fairly quickly in games, especially pitchers. It is only until the last week of camp do managers normally field their opening day lineups for extended play. And at that time, fans will really get a final picture of what their team will look like for the season.
August 30, 2012
FAN PERSPECTIVE
The 2013 Cubs media guide will probably herald Darwin Barney's NL consecutive errorless streak at second base as the accomplishment of the season. It is a stretch. Everything is a stretch with the Cubs this season. Barney's errorless streak is tainted by the fact that during his "streak" he committed an error this season at shortstop. Is it a meaningless stat? Of course. Is it something the Cubs PR department dug up to try to flicker any waning interest in this season? Of course. The Cubs continue to announce crowds of more than 31,000 at home games when the pictures of the stands show less than half show up to actually watch the game. Many fans have abandoned ship.
So what do average Cub fans perceive of their team as it muddles its way to the end of the season?
What does the "C" on the Cubs cap represent today?
CHICAGO. There is an institutionalized feeling that the Second City is somehow inferior to its large metropolitan rivals. There is a historical sense that one has to literally burn down the town in order to rebuild it into a World Class city. In one sense, second place is not deemed a total failure when the goal is first.
CALAMITY. Long time Cub fans expect the worst of their team at any given moment. They are continually amazed by the new ways the team finds to lose. They are trained to expect the worst, like an ace pitcher who can't field a bunt and throw it within 30 feet of first base. It is like the inner desire to watch a car crash unfold in front of your eyes.
CURSED. Long time Cub fans seek comfort in blaming nonsensical things as a reason for their team's losing ways: the goat, the black cat, the Bartman foul ball. But objectively, none of those alleged curses affected the result of any ball game or series. It was the players inability to perform under pressure and not excuses from the grandstands that has led to a permanent legacy of following the Loveable Losers due to supernatural events beyond anyone's control.
CRAP. In a cost-benefit analysis, the Cubs as a form of entertainment is a crappy deal. "Dynamic" high ticket prices for a AAA caliber roster is not a value deal like the bad teams in the late 1970s and early 1980s when fans could just show up to the park for a few bucks and watch a game from the front row of the empty bleachers. Under Tribune ownership, the Cubs became an entertainment venue; the largest open air tavern with a baseball floor show. As a television show, it made money. As a baseball franchise, it was a death knell. A budget philosophy of collecting just enough talent to be "competitive" to draw ratings was more important than winning championships. That leaves the development organization the poor step-sister to the main stage scene stealers. In addition, a loyal fan base has de-emphasized performance and accountability in management and players so crappy fundamentals has become the norm for the club.
CHECK-OUT. With the influx of young 20-somethings in the early 2000s, those who were not more interested in the bleacher beach scene but cared about the game itself, started to realize that the spike in the cost of attending games was supposed to equate with winning championships. These new fans changed the target from full at the ball park (in a Harry Carey haze) to wins. And when the Cubs bumped into the playoffs under Piniella, these fans felt the finish line ahead. But the Cubs collapsed in the playoffs, and the team crawled into bankruptcy with the Tribune. These new fans and Generation Y, in a tough recession with the high cost of living in the city, have given up being die-hard supporters of the team; they have checked out of Party Wrigley.
CONTEMPT. There is a feeling that new ownership and management believe Cub fans are merely paying sheep easily corralled in the lore that is the Cubs. There is an attitude that Cub fans can be milked for some of the highest prices in the sport because of their loyalty and their affection for Wrigley Field. There is an increasing arrogant tone from management who talk down to the media representatives of the fans in a corporate speak gibberish "of the process" to glaze over the harsh reality that they incompetently fielded a roster which will only contend for the most losses in team history. And for every action, there is an equal reaction. There is a growing minority of fans and the community that have contempt for the Cubs. One group has their ire based firmly on the lack of baseball intelligence shown in game after game. The lack of improvement or accountability of players by coaching staff is a disturbing trend. Another group has their ire directed at the Ricketts family, who continue to cry "poor" in order hundreds of millions of dollars in state and local taxpayer funds to rebuild their private property while at the same time spending tens of millions of dollars on adjacent real estate acquisitions and trimming the team payroll dramatically for the next few seasons. For the fan and his/her family that has struggled from pay check (if they are lucky) to pay check, a family of millionaires who want their tax dollars is a great insult when the city is bankrupt, teachers threatening to go on strike for benefits and basic city services are in the decline.
CUBS. The Cubs are a flood debris field of mixed emotions. The "Wait to Next Year" fan loyalty slogan is being eclipsed by "What are You Doing for Me Now?" When ownership says the team is only one or two players away; then it turns out that the team is not competitive at all - - - the seeds of revolutionary thought is sown. Fans have been waiting so long ( a lifetime) that hope turns into mental abuse, which turns into acknowledgement, which leads to resentment, which then can lead to therapeutic "letting go" of one's attachment to the team. If you perceive that "your" team is taking advantage of your patience, there is only so much one can take before breaking the bonds that first group them together. It is a evolution of a child-like passion to a grown-up objective balance of putting that energy into more productive uses.
So what do average Cub fans perceive of their team as it muddles its way to the end of the season?
What does the "C" on the Cubs cap represent today?
CALAMITY. Long time Cub fans expect the worst of their team at any given moment. They are continually amazed by the new ways the team finds to lose. They are trained to expect the worst, like an ace pitcher who can't field a bunt and throw it within 30 feet of first base. It is like the inner desire to watch a car crash unfold in front of your eyes.
CURSED. Long time Cub fans seek comfort in blaming nonsensical things as a reason for their team's losing ways: the goat, the black cat, the Bartman foul ball. But objectively, none of those alleged curses affected the result of any ball game or series. It was the players inability to perform under pressure and not excuses from the grandstands that has led to a permanent legacy of following the Loveable Losers due to supernatural events beyond anyone's control.
CRAP. In a cost-benefit analysis, the Cubs as a form of entertainment is a crappy deal. "Dynamic" high ticket prices for a AAA caliber roster is not a value deal like the bad teams in the late 1970s and early 1980s when fans could just show up to the park for a few bucks and watch a game from the front row of the empty bleachers. Under Tribune ownership, the Cubs became an entertainment venue; the largest open air tavern with a baseball floor show. As a television show, it made money. As a baseball franchise, it was a death knell. A budget philosophy of collecting just enough talent to be "competitive" to draw ratings was more important than winning championships. That leaves the development organization the poor step-sister to the main stage scene stealers. In addition, a loyal fan base has de-emphasized performance and accountability in management and players so crappy fundamentals has become the norm for the club.
CHECK-OUT. With the influx of young 20-somethings in the early 2000s, those who were not more interested in the bleacher beach scene but cared about the game itself, started to realize that the spike in the cost of attending games was supposed to equate with winning championships. These new fans changed the target from full at the ball park (in a Harry Carey haze) to wins. And when the Cubs bumped into the playoffs under Piniella, these fans felt the finish line ahead. But the Cubs collapsed in the playoffs, and the team crawled into bankruptcy with the Tribune. These new fans and Generation Y, in a tough recession with the high cost of living in the city, have given up being die-hard supporters of the team; they have checked out of Party Wrigley.
CONTEMPT. There is a feeling that new ownership and management believe Cub fans are merely paying sheep easily corralled in the lore that is the Cubs. There is an attitude that Cub fans can be milked for some of the highest prices in the sport because of their loyalty and their affection for Wrigley Field. There is an increasing arrogant tone from management who talk down to the media representatives of the fans in a corporate speak gibberish "of the process" to glaze over the harsh reality that they incompetently fielded a roster which will only contend for the most losses in team history. And for every action, there is an equal reaction. There is a growing minority of fans and the community that have contempt for the Cubs. One group has their ire based firmly on the lack of baseball intelligence shown in game after game. The lack of improvement or accountability of players by coaching staff is a disturbing trend. Another group has their ire directed at the Ricketts family, who continue to cry "poor" in order hundreds of millions of dollars in state and local taxpayer funds to rebuild their private property while at the same time spending tens of millions of dollars on adjacent real estate acquisitions and trimming the team payroll dramatically for the next few seasons. For the fan and his/her family that has struggled from pay check (if they are lucky) to pay check, a family of millionaires who want their tax dollars is a great insult when the city is bankrupt, teachers threatening to go on strike for benefits and basic city services are in the decline.
CUBS. The Cubs are a flood debris field of mixed emotions. The "Wait to Next Year" fan loyalty slogan is being eclipsed by "What are You Doing for Me Now?" When ownership says the team is only one or two players away; then it turns out that the team is not competitive at all - - - the seeds of revolutionary thought is sown. Fans have been waiting so long ( a lifetime) that hope turns into mental abuse, which turns into acknowledgement, which leads to resentment, which then can lead to therapeutic "letting go" of one's attachment to the team. If you perceive that "your" team is taking advantage of your patience, there is only so much one can take before breaking the bonds that first group them together. It is a evolution of a child-like passion to a grown-up objective balance of putting that energy into more productive uses.
April 27, 2012
PRODUCTIVE OUTS
A team only has 27 outs per game. An out is a valuable commodity. Thirty years ago, managers and players stressed the value of a "productive out," something on the field which helped the team as a whole score runs.
But in the statistic era of the sport, players are more concerned about individual stats for their arbitration hearings or free agency market comparisons. Outs are not considered good leverage at the bargaining table.
In theory, a team can score 9 runs per game without getting a single hit.
Walk. Stolen Base. Fielder's choice or sacrifice to move runner to third. Sacrifice fly scores runner at third. It is counter intuitive to have a team batting average zero but score 9 runs.
There is less emphasis on moving runners along or sacrifice hits. Bunting is a lost art.
If a team has an offense that averages .300, that equates to around 8 hits per 9 innings. That is why some managers try to stress bunching hits in one inning and hope for the Earl Weaver mantra: the three run HR.
But most teams do not have .300 hitters and power hitters throughout the line up. More like .250 hitters, which means between 6 or 7 hits per game. Timely hits needed, indeed.
In today's modern specialization, a newer productive out category could be the "long at-bat." With starting pitchers corralled at 100 pitches per game, a productive at bat would mean any series of more than 10 pitches (a full count equals minimally five pitches; the decider would be the sixth pitch). A batter that fouls off a series of pitches wears down the pitcher, most physically and mentally. If a team is patient and can make a starter throw 25-30 pitches in the first inning(s), they will be seeing a weaker bullpen pitcher by the fourth inning. However, we rarely see long at-bats in the majors. Most players are looking to rip away at the first two pitches because mentally, they think the pitcher needs to get ahead in the count.
We only see glimpses of this philosophy in the late inning(s) in a one run game, where the team that is behind attempts to "manufacture" the tying run. In most cases it does not work, because you are asking the hitters to dramatically change gears on their strategy in the batter's box that they had used he last 8 innings. Baseball is all about making little adjustments, not major leaps of faith or character.
It makes more sense to "manufacture" a run in the first inning than the 9th. How many teams have a lead off hitter willing to bunt for a base hit out of the gate? How many teams then have a number two batter willing to sacrifice himself (an out) to move the lead off man into scoring position? Not very many. Instead, teams just allow the players to go up and hack, not realizing that managing outs is just as important has getting hits.
But in the statistic era of the sport, players are more concerned about individual stats for their arbitration hearings or free agency market comparisons. Outs are not considered good leverage at the bargaining table.
In theory, a team can score 9 runs per game without getting a single hit.
Walk. Stolen Base. Fielder's choice or sacrifice to move runner to third. Sacrifice fly scores runner at third. It is counter intuitive to have a team batting average zero but score 9 runs.
There is less emphasis on moving runners along or sacrifice hits. Bunting is a lost art.
If a team has an offense that averages .300, that equates to around 8 hits per 9 innings. That is why some managers try to stress bunching hits in one inning and hope for the Earl Weaver mantra: the three run HR.
But most teams do not have .300 hitters and power hitters throughout the line up. More like .250 hitters, which means between 6 or 7 hits per game. Timely hits needed, indeed.
In today's modern specialization, a newer productive out category could be the "long at-bat." With starting pitchers corralled at 100 pitches per game, a productive at bat would mean any series of more than 10 pitches (a full count equals minimally five pitches; the decider would be the sixth pitch). A batter that fouls off a series of pitches wears down the pitcher, most physically and mentally. If a team is patient and can make a starter throw 25-30 pitches in the first inning(s), they will be seeing a weaker bullpen pitcher by the fourth inning. However, we rarely see long at-bats in the majors. Most players are looking to rip away at the first two pitches because mentally, they think the pitcher needs to get ahead in the count.
We only see glimpses of this philosophy in the late inning(s) in a one run game, where the team that is behind attempts to "manufacture" the tying run. In most cases it does not work, because you are asking the hitters to dramatically change gears on their strategy in the batter's box that they had used he last 8 innings. Baseball is all about making little adjustments, not major leaps of faith or character.
It makes more sense to "manufacture" a run in the first inning than the 9th. How many teams have a lead off hitter willing to bunt for a base hit out of the gate? How many teams then have a number two batter willing to sacrifice himself (an out) to move the lead off man into scoring position? Not very many. Instead, teams just allow the players to go up and hack, not realizing that managing outs is just as important has getting hits.
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