There continues to be great emphasis on pitching in major league baseball. Scouts tend to summarize prospects to veterans by the type of pitches throw, velocity and control. Pitching coaches tend to work on throwing mechanics such as finding a repetitive slot, arm motion, wrist snap and ball grip. Managers tend to sort pitchers by starters and relievers. Starters need to have at least three pitches; relievers need just two. Some organizations like the Athletics had a rule that all their minor league pitchers had to learn to throw a change up. Some teams look to each pitcher having their "out" pitch.
So most of the time we hear about pitchers velocity (90-96 mph) or types of pitches (fastball, slider, curve, cutter, forkball, knuckleball or change).
Now field managers and coaches want their pitchers to work the batter, and set up their out pitch.
But the emphasis is on throwing the ball at speed and location rather than understanding the art of pitching. As Greg Maddux used to point out he was not a thrower, but a pitcher. His greatest weapon was the ability to change speeds of his fastball to throw off the batter.
The batter has less than a second to digest a lot of information. First, where is the pitcher's release point. Second, what is the rotation on the ball. Third, what is the velocity of the ball. Fourth, is it in my hitting zone. The harder it is to pick up the first flight of the pitch, the harder it is to adjust and hit it. A batter relies upon eyesight, intuition and quick reflexes in order to hit major league pitching.
A pitcher should realize that he has the initial advantage. He knows what pitch he is about to throw the hitter.
Now coaching has given pitchers the concept of consistency as being the key to success. Coaches prefer to coach players who are like batting cage machines. They have the same delivery, arm motion and arm slot. For coaches, this is important in a job preservation sense. When a pitcher loses command over his pitches, the coach can compare film on the player to determine what changes, if any, is in his delivery. Pitching coaches are more concerned about throwing the ball than the art of pitching to a batter.
A starter may have three pitches: fastball, slider and curve. He may throw his fastball 55% of the time, his slider 35% of the time, and his curve 10% of the time. Scouting reports will break down the data, frequency, pitch counts and out pitches. But this does not take into consideration the variables to standard pitching: change of speeds and change of release angles.
Change of speeds as Maddux stated is probably more important than location. If one has a 94 mph fastball, if you can change its speed to 88 mph with the same motion, the batter will be fooled into swinging early. In essence, the pitcher has created a "second pitch" with the same grip and delivery.
The least used variable is change to pitching angles.
If you divide a pitcher in clock sections, you can see the zones where a pitcher's arm will pass through on the way toward the plate. Some famous curve balls were called "noon to six" pitches because they looked like they released over the head of the pitcher and dropped steeply when crossing the plate. It is rare for a pitcher to have a pure overhead delivery. Most pitchers today use a 3/4 delivery where they can power their shoulder down the line toward the plate for the most leverage. A sidearm delivery can be effective with the full body torque. Rick Reuschel had this easy motion which complimented his slider into ground ball outs. The submarine pitcher is one who is looking to surprise a batter with an odd pitching angle. Usually, these submariners have a quirky body rotation to further conceal the ball as long as possible since these style pitchers normally have a lower ball velocity. On some occasions, a veteran pitcher like Jake Peavy, will submarine a pitch to a batter late in the count in a tight situation to increase his chances for a strike out.
Pitchers do no use all their arm angles during a game. They are taught to find one arm slot and use it over and over again to get repetition control. But in theory, a two pitch 3/4 pitcher (fastball and slider) can create "four" more pitches just by going sidearm or submarine. Again, if a pitcher is looking for an edge against a batter, the change or disguise of his pitching release point angle is the first thing a pitcher can do to confuse a batter.
Showing posts with label theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label theory. Show all posts
January 3, 2013
January 20, 2012
QUALITY AT-BATS
There has been some off-season discussion about teams looking to upgrade with patient batters who can work a count, and get on base. The "quality at-bat" may be a misnomer unless the at-bats leads to runs scored.
In 2011, the NL Central teams had the following statistics:
Team Runs Scored Plate Appearances
Reds 735 6328
Brewers 721 6113
Cards 762 6242
Pirates 610 6063
Astros 615 6148
Cubs 654 6128
How many plate appearances generated a run scored?
Team RS/ PA PA/RS
Reds 735/6328 8.61
Brewers 721/6113 8.48
Cards 762/6242 8.19
Pirates 610/6063 9.94
Astros 615/6148 9.99
Cubs 654/ 6128 9.37
But how "efficient" were teams in producing runs per plate appearance?
Which teams scored more runs per plate appearance?
Team RS/ PA RS/PA
Reds 735/6328 0.116
Brewers 721/6113 0.118
Cards 762/6242 0.122
Pirates 610/6063 0.100
Astros 615/6148 0.100
Cubs 654/ 6128 0.107
The Cardinals, who finished second with 90 wins, scored almost 20% more runs than the Pirates (72 wins) and the Astros (56 wins). The Cards were 3.4% more efficient in their team at-bats than the first place Brewers (96 wins) who were close to efficiency of the Reds (79 wins). To look at it another way, it took the Astros almost 2 more at-bats than the Cardinals to score a run. It took the Cubs almost 1.33 more at-bats than the Cardinals to score a run.
In 2011, the NL Central teams had the following statistics:
Team Runs Scored Plate Appearances
Reds 735 6328
Brewers 721 6113
Cards 762 6242
Pirates 610 6063
Astros 615 6148
Cubs 654 6128
How many plate appearances generated a run scored?
Team RS/ PA PA/RS
Reds 735/6328 8.61
Brewers 721/6113 8.48
Cards 762/6242 8.19
Pirates 610/6063 9.94
Astros 615/6148 9.99
Cubs 654/ 6128 9.37
But how "efficient" were teams in producing runs per plate appearance?
Which teams scored more runs per plate appearance?
Team RS/ PA RS/PA
Reds 735/6328 0.116
Brewers 721/6113 0.118
Cards 762/6242 0.122
Pirates 610/6063 0.100
Astros 615/6148 0.100
Cubs 654/ 6128 0.107
The Cardinals, who finished second with 90 wins, scored almost 20% more runs than the Pirates (72 wins) and the Astros (56 wins). The Cards were 3.4% more efficient in their team at-bats than the first place Brewers (96 wins) who were close to efficiency of the Reds (79 wins). To look at it another way, it took the Astros almost 2 more at-bats than the Cardinals to score a run. It took the Cubs almost 1.33 more at-bats than the Cardinals to score a run.
January 4, 2012
THE ART OF THE MANUFACTURED RUN
Managers dwell on the concept of turning over their batting order as quick as possible to get more scoring chances. But many are welded to the Earl Weaver philosophy of waiting for the 3 run HR to score. You put your best hitters at the top and power hitters in the middle and let them swing for the fences.
"Small ball" is the opposite. It tries to use different baseball skills to move runners from station to station. It is not practiced by many teams because it goes against what the modern baseball player is all about: personal stats.
The art of manufacturing a run is based upon the elements of patience, speed and "productive outs." A productive out is one which advances a base runner into scoring position. A strike out is never a productive out, but in the home run era, strikeouts were no longer badges of shame for hitters. The Golden Sombrero of three strike outs in a game is no longer a symbol of failure. The lone strike out exception would be "the long at-bat," in which the batter fouls off so many pitches that it works the opponent pitcher's game pitch count higher than normal (which means the starter would get out of the game sooner).
If a team lacks power hitters to score runs, it needs to set up its batting order to manufacture runs.
(1) The lead off hitter must have a high OBP (average plus walks). The league leaders last year only had an OBP of .416. The lead off hitter must not just have speed, but base running skills (stolen bases and taking the extra base).
(2) The number 2 hitter must be a very disciplined contact hitter. His objective is to get the lead off man to third base with one out or less (stolen base + sacrifice/fielder choice or hit and run). This hitter must be able to hit to the opposite field, work a pitch count, have excellent bunting skills and protect the runner on first.
(3) The number 3 hitter must be a high contact, fly ball batter. For if the two players in front of him have done their jobs correctly, there would be a runner on third with one out. He is not the team's home run power, but someone who can get a runner home from third by any means (sac fly, suicide squeeze, ground out to right side, base hit).
(4) The clean up hitter is the last insurance policy to get a run home with 2 outs. He must be a high average hitter with good clean, line drive contact (hopefully gap power) that can get a solid base hit to score a runner from second or third.
(5) The 5th hitter is the final batter in the scoring zone. This should be the team's best power hitter. If it gets to this point, there would be two outs and at least one runner on base (2 if no one scored). This is your Earl Weaver scoring chance.
The bottom of your order can also manufacture a run:
(6) The 6th hitter would be the team's second best lead off man.
(7) The 7th hitter would be the team's second best disciplined contact hitter.
(8) The 8th hitter would be a player that could get the ball in play to score a runner from third with one out.
Under this system, manufacturing a run costs two productive outs. With 27 outs in a game, a team has 18 productive out chances. If a team can convert on 50% of those opportunities, that would be 9 runs per game (RPG). 40% success rate would be approximately 7 RPG.
It is more likely that the top of the order would have the best scoring chances. The top 4 in the order would get 4 to 5 chances to bat per game. So they have an opportunity to manufacture 4 or 5 runs per game. In 2011, MLB teams averaged 4.28 RPG. A team built to manufacture 4.5 RPG would be highly likely to be over .500.
The top of the order in a manufactured run line-up would put more pressure on the opponent's pitcher and defense. Pitchers pitch differently when there is a runner on first, especially one that can steal bases. A runner in motion puts the defense in motion, which creates gaps in a defense that a good contact hitter can exploit.
A team built to manufacture runs is a contradiction to present pro baseball theory. It requires skills that are not used very often in major league games: looking to walk, stealing bases, giving yourself up to advance a runner, plate discipline, contact hitting to appropriate field, bunting, and base running skills. All those skills were called "fundamentals" when children first learned the game at an early age. By the time prospects reach the majors, most of these fundamentals are rusty or lost. And veterans don't practice them because they are professionals who have made it to the Big Show. And managers would meet huge resistance from players who want personal stats as much as team victories.
"Small ball" is the opposite. It tries to use different baseball skills to move runners from station to station. It is not practiced by many teams because it goes against what the modern baseball player is all about: personal stats.
The art of manufacturing a run is based upon the elements of patience, speed and "productive outs." A productive out is one which advances a base runner into scoring position. A strike out is never a productive out, but in the home run era, strikeouts were no longer badges of shame for hitters. The Golden Sombrero of three strike outs in a game is no longer a symbol of failure. The lone strike out exception would be "the long at-bat," in which the batter fouls off so many pitches that it works the opponent pitcher's game pitch count higher than normal (which means the starter would get out of the game sooner).
If a team lacks power hitters to score runs, it needs to set up its batting order to manufacture runs.
(1) The lead off hitter must have a high OBP (average plus walks). The league leaders last year only had an OBP of .416. The lead off hitter must not just have speed, but base running skills (stolen bases and taking the extra base).
(2) The number 2 hitter must be a very disciplined contact hitter. His objective is to get the lead off man to third base with one out or less (stolen base + sacrifice/fielder choice or hit and run). This hitter must be able to hit to the opposite field, work a pitch count, have excellent bunting skills and protect the runner on first.
(3) The number 3 hitter must be a high contact, fly ball batter. For if the two players in front of him have done their jobs correctly, there would be a runner on third with one out. He is not the team's home run power, but someone who can get a runner home from third by any means (sac fly, suicide squeeze, ground out to right side, base hit).
(4) The clean up hitter is the last insurance policy to get a run home with 2 outs. He must be a high average hitter with good clean, line drive contact (hopefully gap power) that can get a solid base hit to score a runner from second or third.
(5) The 5th hitter is the final batter in the scoring zone. This should be the team's best power hitter. If it gets to this point, there would be two outs and at least one runner on base (2 if no one scored). This is your Earl Weaver scoring chance.
The bottom of your order can also manufacture a run:
(6) The 6th hitter would be the team's second best lead off man.
(7) The 7th hitter would be the team's second best disciplined contact hitter.
(8) The 8th hitter would be a player that could get the ball in play to score a runner from third with one out.
Under this system, manufacturing a run costs two productive outs. With 27 outs in a game, a team has 18 productive out chances. If a team can convert on 50% of those opportunities, that would be 9 runs per game (RPG). 40% success rate would be approximately 7 RPG.
It is more likely that the top of the order would have the best scoring chances. The top 4 in the order would get 4 to 5 chances to bat per game. So they have an opportunity to manufacture 4 or 5 runs per game. In 2011, MLB teams averaged 4.28 RPG. A team built to manufacture 4.5 RPG would be highly likely to be over .500.
The top of the order in a manufactured run line-up would put more pressure on the opponent's pitcher and defense. Pitchers pitch differently when there is a runner on first, especially one that can steal bases. A runner in motion puts the defense in motion, which creates gaps in a defense that a good contact hitter can exploit.
A team built to manufacture runs is a contradiction to present pro baseball theory. It requires skills that are not used very often in major league games: looking to walk, stealing bases, giving yourself up to advance a runner, plate discipline, contact hitting to appropriate field, bunting, and base running skills. All those skills were called "fundamentals" when children first learned the game at an early age. By the time prospects reach the majors, most of these fundamentals are rusty or lost. And veterans don't practice them because they are professionals who have made it to the Big Show. And managers would meet huge resistance from players who want personal stats as much as team victories.
Labels:
batting order,
RBI,
theory
December 29, 2011
HOW TO CONSTRUCT A PITCHING STAFF
This article is a theory on how to construct (not build) a major league pitching staff. It does not follow the sabermetrics of wins over replacement value, but reverts to the basics of the game itself.
The only true measure of each game is the final score. The whole purpose of baseball is to score more runs than your opponent. The simple fact is that during a course of a season, you need to be in a position to hold your opponent to less runs scored than your offense produces on average. If you score more runs than allowed on average, your club will be competitive (above .500).
You have to look at the basics of a season. Each team plays 162 games. Each normal game is set to last 9 innings. Therefore, on average, a team must have its pitching staff throw 1458 innings/season.
Modern team construction has each team with a five man starting rotation. And given the nature of pitch counts, injuries and a liberal definition of a quality start, most teams have a total pitching staff of 11 or 12 pitchers. The Cubs have been more apt to carry 12 pitchers and 5 position/bench players. So in a 162 game schedule, the five starting pitchers are expected to make 32.4 starts (lets round down to 32).
The current definition of a quality start is set too high. With the 2011 MLB staff average of 3.94 ERA, a "real" quality start should be defined as follows:
1 ER/5 IP = game ERA of 1.80, which is excellent.
2 ER/6 IP = game ERA of 3.00, which is very good.
3 ER/7 IP = game ERA of 3.85, which is just below the MLB average which is slightly better than the norm.
If you want a very good pitching staff, let's assume 6 quality innings pitched per start. 32 starts times 6 IP = 192 IP/ starter. Therefore, you starters should be able to handle 960 IP during the season (192 IP x 5). That is 65.8 percent of the innings needed to be played. That leaves the rest of the pitching staff to consume 498 IP.
The next elements of innings pitched is the end of game. Modern baseball has become more specialized as the starters are no longer expected to pitch complete games. The roles of the set up man (8th inning) and the closer (9th inning) have become standard operating procedure. But you do not want to overuse either role player. If you plug in 60 IP for the closer and the set up man, that is 120 IP off the 498 IP remaining. That leaves a total of 378 innings for the middle relievers to consume during a course of a season.
Middle relievers are considered "failed" starters. They are used to pitching long stretches during their career and have to adapt to the up and down daily call. However, if your team has 5 middle relievers to divide the work load, that equates to only 75 2/3 IP per reliever. Over a 24 week season, that means an average relief pitcher would throw 3 1/3 IP per week.
There is no current stat besides the nebulous "hold" for middle relievers. Instead of a quality start, we can look to a "quality week" for middle relievers as a benchmark for success. If over the reliever's weekly work load of 3 1/3 IP, he gives up 1 ER, that would be a weekly ERA of 2.70, which would be excellent, a "quality" week. If he gives up 2 ER, his weekly ERA would be 5.40, which would be horrible. This demonstrates the paper thin margin of error for the middle relievers on a baseball staff. A general manager would need to find 5 pitchers who are each capable of giving up 24 earned runs or less to have a quality middle relief bullpen.
So a season's work load can be divided as follows:
Starters: 960 IP
Middle Relievers: 378 IP
Set Up Man: 60 IP
Closer: 60 IP
Total IP: 1458
In 2011, the Seattle Mariners scored the least amount of runs (556). That means the M's averaged only 3.43 runs/game in offense. The league averages for runs scored was 723 for the AL, 668 for the NL and 694 for MLB.
In 2011, the Cubs scored 654 runs, below all league averages. The Cubs runs per game average (RPG) was 4.03. The NL Central RPG average was St. Louis 4.70, Cincinnati 4.53, Milwaukee 4.45, Houston 3.80, Pittsburgh 3.76.
By contrast, average runs allowed were as follows: AL: 717 R (656 ER); NL: 673 R (615 ER); MLB: 694 (634 ER). (Note: 8.6 percent of runs scored in the majors last season were "unearned.")
In the NL Central, team ERA was as follows: Milwaukee 3.63, St. Louis 3,74, Pittsburgh 4.04, Cincinnati 4.16, Cubs 4.33, Houston 4.54.
The RPG/ERA differential can be calculated as follows:
St. Louis: 0.96
Milwaukee: 0.82
Cincinnati: 0.38
Pittsburgh: (0.28)
Cubs: (0.30)
Houston: (0.78)
The RPG/ERA ratio almost mirrors the final standings:
Milwaukee: 0.82 -- 96 wins
St. Louis: 0.96 -- 90 wins
Cincinnati: 0.38 -- 79 wins
Pittsburgh: (0.28) -- 72 wins
Cubs: (0.30) -- 71 wins
Houston: (0.78) - - 56 wins
The numbers show that a team really needs to have a RPG/ERA ratio of 0.40 + to get to 81 wins (.500). To get 81 wins, using the NL RPG of 4.12 less the .40 ratio, a pitching staff ERA needs to be 3.72 or 603 earned runs.
We already calculated that a quality middle relief corps should only give up 24 ER/season or 120 in total. 603- 120 = 483 ER remaining. The closer and set up man should have an ERA of 3.00 or less, which would equate to 20 ER/each or 40 total. 483 -40 = 443 ER remaining. If you divide that by the five starters, they each can give up 88.6 ER in the season. This calculates to a starter ERA of 4.15, which is above all the league ERA staff averages and above our quality start ERA.
So what is the bottom line in this exercise?
You can construct a viable pitching staff in the NL Central with:
Five starters with an ERA of 4.15;
Five middle relievers with ERAs of 2.85; and
Two end of game relievers with ERAs of 3.00.
It is interesting to note that a team can have a starting staff of average pitchers and closers and still be competitive. However, if each middle reliever adds one additional ER/week, their ERAs soar to 5.70. The RPG/ERA ratio changes from a .500 competitive ratio of .0.40 to only 0.16 which is an approximate 73 win season at best. The middle relievers are the key bridge to an overall pitching staff's success.
The only true measure of each game is the final score. The whole purpose of baseball is to score more runs than your opponent. The simple fact is that during a course of a season, you need to be in a position to hold your opponent to less runs scored than your offense produces on average. If you score more runs than allowed on average, your club will be competitive (above .500).
You have to look at the basics of a season. Each team plays 162 games. Each normal game is set to last 9 innings. Therefore, on average, a team must have its pitching staff throw 1458 innings/season.
Modern team construction has each team with a five man starting rotation. And given the nature of pitch counts, injuries and a liberal definition of a quality start, most teams have a total pitching staff of 11 or 12 pitchers. The Cubs have been more apt to carry 12 pitchers and 5 position/bench players. So in a 162 game schedule, the five starting pitchers are expected to make 32.4 starts (lets round down to 32).
The current definition of a quality start is set too high. With the 2011 MLB staff average of 3.94 ERA, a "real" quality start should be defined as follows:
1 ER/5 IP = game ERA of 1.80, which is excellent.
2 ER/6 IP = game ERA of 3.00, which is very good.
3 ER/7 IP = game ERA of 3.85, which is just below the MLB average which is slightly better than the norm.
If you want a very good pitching staff, let's assume 6 quality innings pitched per start. 32 starts times 6 IP = 192 IP/ starter. Therefore, you starters should be able to handle 960 IP during the season (192 IP x 5). That is 65.8 percent of the innings needed to be played. That leaves the rest of the pitching staff to consume 498 IP.
The next elements of innings pitched is the end of game. Modern baseball has become more specialized as the starters are no longer expected to pitch complete games. The roles of the set up man (8th inning) and the closer (9th inning) have become standard operating procedure. But you do not want to overuse either role player. If you plug in 60 IP for the closer and the set up man, that is 120 IP off the 498 IP remaining. That leaves a total of 378 innings for the middle relievers to consume during a course of a season.
Middle relievers are considered "failed" starters. They are used to pitching long stretches during their career and have to adapt to the up and down daily call. However, if your team has 5 middle relievers to divide the work load, that equates to only 75 2/3 IP per reliever. Over a 24 week season, that means an average relief pitcher would throw 3 1/3 IP per week.
There is no current stat besides the nebulous "hold" for middle relievers. Instead of a quality start, we can look to a "quality week" for middle relievers as a benchmark for success. If over the reliever's weekly work load of 3 1/3 IP, he gives up 1 ER, that would be a weekly ERA of 2.70, which would be excellent, a "quality" week. If he gives up 2 ER, his weekly ERA would be 5.40, which would be horrible. This demonstrates the paper thin margin of error for the middle relievers on a baseball staff. A general manager would need to find 5 pitchers who are each capable of giving up 24 earned runs or less to have a quality middle relief bullpen.
So a season's work load can be divided as follows:
Starters: 960 IP
Middle Relievers: 378 IP
Set Up Man: 60 IP
Closer: 60 IP
Total IP: 1458
In 2011, the Seattle Mariners scored the least amount of runs (556). That means the M's averaged only 3.43 runs/game in offense. The league averages for runs scored was 723 for the AL, 668 for the NL and 694 for MLB.
In 2011, the Cubs scored 654 runs, below all league averages. The Cubs runs per game average (RPG) was 4.03. The NL Central RPG average was St. Louis 4.70, Cincinnati 4.53, Milwaukee 4.45, Houston 3.80, Pittsburgh 3.76.
By contrast, average runs allowed were as follows: AL: 717 R (656 ER); NL: 673 R (615 ER); MLB: 694 (634 ER). (Note: 8.6 percent of runs scored in the majors last season were "unearned.")
In the NL Central, team ERA was as follows: Milwaukee 3.63, St. Louis 3,74, Pittsburgh 4.04, Cincinnati 4.16, Cubs 4.33, Houston 4.54.
The RPG/ERA differential can be calculated as follows:
St. Louis: 0.96
Milwaukee: 0.82
Cincinnati: 0.38
Pittsburgh: (0.28)
Cubs: (0.30)
Houston: (0.78)
The RPG/ERA ratio almost mirrors the final standings:
Milwaukee: 0.82 -- 96 wins
St. Louis: 0.96 -- 90 wins
Cincinnati: 0.38 -- 79 wins
Pittsburgh: (0.28) -- 72 wins
Cubs: (0.30) -- 71 wins
Houston: (0.78) - - 56 wins
The numbers show that a team really needs to have a RPG/ERA ratio of 0.40 + to get to 81 wins (.500). To get 81 wins, using the NL RPG of 4.12 less the .40 ratio, a pitching staff ERA needs to be 3.72 or 603 earned runs.
We already calculated that a quality middle relief corps should only give up 24 ER/season or 120 in total. 603- 120 = 483 ER remaining. The closer and set up man should have an ERA of 3.00 or less, which would equate to 20 ER/each or 40 total. 483 -40 = 443 ER remaining. If you divide that by the five starters, they each can give up 88.6 ER in the season. This calculates to a starter ERA of 4.15, which is above all the league ERA staff averages and above our quality start ERA.
So what is the bottom line in this exercise?
You can construct a viable pitching staff in the NL Central with:
Five starters with an ERA of 4.15;
Five middle relievers with ERAs of 2.85; and
Two end of game relievers with ERAs of 3.00.
It is interesting to note that a team can have a starting staff of average pitchers and closers and still be competitive. However, if each middle reliever adds one additional ER/week, their ERAs soar to 5.70. The RPG/ERA ratio changes from a .500 competitive ratio of .0.40 to only 0.16 which is an approximate 73 win season at best. The middle relievers are the key bridge to an overall pitching staff's success.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
