Theo Epstein was on CSN Sports Live last night. I did not expect very many hard hitting questions from the panelists. Epstein was only there to stress his corporate talking points and to sell the Cubs to the fans.
My takeaway about the interview was the Epstein acts like dealing with the press as a necessary evil. When Gordon Wittenmyer of the Sun-Times tried to get Epstein to answer a financial question, Epstein snips at his latest story "expertise," and was evasive in his answer. Epstein told the reporter he was "wrong" but did not explain or contradict anything Wittenmyer had written for his paper.
What Epstein did contradict was his own talking points.
He said he would not criticize prior management of the Cubs, but he did say that he did not know how bad the organization was when he got to Chicago. He called it "unhealthy." He also admitted that he was unaware how things get done in Chicago; the hurdles that businesses need to take to get approvals. He was also surprised on how dependent the Cubs have been on gate (attendance) receipts. If you piece together those comments, you realize that he is taking a swipe at Ricketts and the business side (Crane Kenney) for the bad business deal that was made when Ricketts bought the team from Sam Zell and the Tribune. Epstein is still unwinding bad contracts (such as Soriano's) and as such he is not going to be able to sign free agent upgrades for position players (ironically, Soriano was the best player on the Cubs before he was traded to the Yankees.)
He said he would love to be involved in the free agent market. But he will not. He stated that his job is to create a system that provides young talent to the team. He said that building a core group of players was his goal. He explained that he wants the first 7 years of a superstar player's career at $30 million rather than the last 7 years of a player's career at $150 million (like Jacoby Ellsbury's deal). He was happy for Ellsbury, but Epstein said he wants to promote annually an Ellsbury-type player for the Cubs major league roster.
Except, Epstein has not followed his own statement. He has signed both Starlin Castro and Anthony Rizzo for more than $30 million each for their early control years.
A season ticket holder on the panel bluntly asked why he should continue to pay for an unwatchable team. Epstein could not give a solid answer why season ticket holders should renew their packages. All he could muster was the idea that if you sit through more years of bad baseball, you'd be on the ground floor for the eventual championship caliber team. It was another variation of the "trust me, I know what I am doing" line given to season ticket holders several weeks ago.
Epstein also said things will turn around when the baseball operations and the business elements come together, but he could not say when that would happen. He could not explain why the Cubs have not started on any Wrigley Field development. He explained it was easier in Boston for the Fenway renovation - - - it was quickly approved and construction staged for several years. The only difference between the Red Sox and Cubs construction plans at this stage is apparently money.
Epstein would not discuss the financial health of the Cubs. He would not say what next year's payroll would be. He said that new revenue would be coming on board - - - including a new broadcast deal. However, when pressed with the fact that there are no other radio or TV outlets in Chicago willing to take the Cub broadcasts at double the WGN rate, Epstein side stepped the question by saying that all media is looking for content and sports is the only live content people really want to see. He mentioned mobile, but failed to distinguish how the Cubs would profit from a new mobile partner when in fact MLB.com already has its league wide game packages. Either Epstein is naive about the Chicago media market or the Cubs are going to potentially breach its Comcast partnership and start their own network early, but in either situation there is no guarantee that the Cubs will see any significant short term increase in broadcast fees.
It would seem it will be business as usual. When asked about Jeff Samardzija, Epstein said he would like to get an extension because Samardzija is their best pitcher; but if that does not happen, then he is an "asset" that can be converted into two or more future assets. In other words, the policy of flipping expensive veterans for prospects will continue this next season.
Epstein came off as a man selling the viewer time shares in Detroit. Don't worry, things will come around. Trust me.
After the interview, only Wittenmeyer stated the obvious: if the Cubs' touted prospects don't pan out, for whatever reason, the franchise is doomed. Panelists agree that it is hard to continue to wait for the turnaround when their parents and grandparents waited as well until they departed this planet.
The dependence on attendance for the fiscal health of the Cubs is the hidden story line from Epstein's appearance. Since Ricketts ownership in 2010, the Cubs have been in a swift attendance decline. In 2010, the Cubs drew 3,062,973; 2011, 3,017,966; 2012, 2,882,756; and 2013, 2,642, 682.
The decline in actual numbers is accelerating: 45,007 to 135,210 to 240,074 less tickets sold the last three seasons. Overall attendance is down 13.7 percent, with 420,291 less tickets sold. Under the Cubs own metric of $70/fan, the Cubs have lost $29.42 million in gate revenue during Ricketts tenure.
The reason for the decline could be two-fold: a) the bad product on the field; and b) the direction of the team. Both could be factors on the increasing number of "no shows" at games (empty seats where tickets have been sold) which adds to the top line revenue losses of the Cubs.
With the top prospects still in Class A ball, and the system is without any fast rising stud pitchers, the time table for the convergence of baseball and financial operations seems years away, 2017 or beyond. With less revenue in 2014, there will be less chances for any impact players coming to the Cubs this season. Epstein's Cubs remain an "unhealthy" franchise, both on the field and fiscal operations.
