The Cubs suddenly traded David DeJesus to the Nationals, tonight's opponent, for a player to be named later. A nobody to be named later. The Nats get a spare .250 hitting outfielder with an option for his services at $6.5 million next season.
Why did the Cubs feel the need to send DeJesus packing?
It was to activate outfielder Brian Bogusevic?! There was no other roster room in the inn.
Now, of course Bogusevic costs, at the major league minimum, substantially less than DeJesus, this year and next season.
DeJesus was not doing that great this year, a 1.6 WAR, but even that figure is higher than Bogusevic's negative 0.1 WAR.
So why does a team trade a starter for someone worse than a replacement level player?
To continue to lose games. The Cubs have fallen into the NL Central cellar. That's where management wants to the club to be so it can have a higher draft choice next season. A higher draft choice means a larger amateur bonus signing budget. The Cubs current sag has lifted them to the 4th pick in the 2014 draft. That seems to be the next real cap on Epstein-Hoyer next year, as there is a clear mandate to cut major league payroll in 2014.
UPDATE: GM Hoyer confirms that the DeJesus move was to save money. The Cubs saved $2.5 million (the balance of this year's salary and the buy-out for the 2014 season). Despite all the marketing, the Cubs may still have cash flow issues due to the growing amount of no-shows at Wrigley Field. It also signals that DeJesus was no longer in the Cubs plans for 2014 at a salary of $6.5 million. The bottom line for the rest of the season and into the off season is that the Cubs are trying to save money.
The reason why the Nationals claimed DeJesus is also unclear. He does not fit into their roster very well. The Nats have a set outfield. The team immediately put DeJesus back on waivers so maybe they want to flip him before the playoff rosters are set on August 31st.
Showing posts with label DeJesus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DeJesus. Show all posts
August 19, 2013
December 6, 2012
ANOTHER FLEA MARKET PICK UP
The Cubs made another "small market" type move to patch a hole in the roster. But the team is using a small band-aid to cover up a large hole in the roster drywall. The Cubs will sign Nate Schierholtz to play right field in 2013.
Schierholtz, 28, played for the Giants and Phillies last season. He was involved in the Hunter Pence transaction at the trade deadline. His season was cut short by a broken toe on August 13, 2012. The Phillies non-tendered him. So the Cubs will sign him to a one year, $2.25 million contract.
In 114 games last season, Schierholtz hit only .257, with 6 HR, 21 RBI, 3 SB, and .321 OBP. He had a combined 0.8 WAR. As a RF last season, he had 21 errorless chances. He is a career .988 outfielder.
He has never been a full time starter. He has never had 500 AB in any one major league season.
Schierholtz appears to be another David DeJesus Lite. DeJesus, before he signed with the Cubs, went .240, 10 HR, 46 RBI, 3 SB and .323 OBP for Oakland.
Even with Bryan LaHair's struggles last season, he hit .259, 16 HR, 40 RBI, 2 SB and .334 OBP.
Even playing most part time in Colorado, Tyler Colvin hit .290, 18 HR, 72 RBI, 7 SB, and .327 OBP.
There are a few confirmations with the Schierholtz signing:
1. The new front office has a bias against the old regime Cub prospects.
2. The Ian Stewart trade, from a pure evaluation stand point, was a complete failure by the Cubs.
3. The Cubs replaced LaHair with a lesser hitter in Schierholtz but for more money.
4. The Cubs are filling major starting holes with short-term journeymen bench players.
5. The Cubs have a habit of picking up players who are recovering from season ending injuries.
Reports from the winter meetings state that the Cubs are again actively shopping Alfonso Soriano. Why? He is the only proven offensive left on the roster. The Cubs have no ready prospects to fill any outfield roles, especially if Soriano is traded to another team.
Schierholtz, 28, played for the Giants and Phillies last season. He was involved in the Hunter Pence transaction at the trade deadline. His season was cut short by a broken toe on August 13, 2012. The Phillies non-tendered him. So the Cubs will sign him to a one year, $2.25 million contract.
In 114 games last season, Schierholtz hit only .257, with 6 HR, 21 RBI, 3 SB, and .321 OBP. He had a combined 0.8 WAR. As a RF last season, he had 21 errorless chances. He is a career .988 outfielder.
He has never been a full time starter. He has never had 500 AB in any one major league season.
Schierholtz appears to be another David DeJesus Lite. DeJesus, before he signed with the Cubs, went .240, 10 HR, 46 RBI, 3 SB and .323 OBP for Oakland.
Even with Bryan LaHair's struggles last season, he hit .259, 16 HR, 40 RBI, 2 SB and .334 OBP.
Even playing most part time in Colorado, Tyler Colvin hit .290, 18 HR, 72 RBI, 7 SB, and .327 OBP.
There are a few confirmations with the Schierholtz signing:
1. The new front office has a bias against the old regime Cub prospects.
2. The Ian Stewart trade, from a pure evaluation stand point, was a complete failure by the Cubs.
3. The Cubs replaced LaHair with a lesser hitter in Schierholtz but for more money.
4. The Cubs are filling major starting holes with short-term journeymen bench players.
5. The Cubs have a habit of picking up players who are recovering from season ending injuries.
Reports from the winter meetings state that the Cubs are again actively shopping Alfonso Soriano. Why? He is the only proven offensive left on the roster. The Cubs have no ready prospects to fill any outfield roles, especially if Soriano is traded to another team.
September 4, 2012
TALENT EVALUATION
Most objective observers will now conclude that the Epstein-Hoyer deal for Ian Stewart was a bust. Stewart, who was in the minors last season and had nagging injuries, was the guy to replace departing Aramis Ramirez at third. As a result, the Cubs shipped off Tyler Colvin, who lost any chance of being the Cubs right fielder to the new front office's first signee, David DeJesus.
Here is the stat lines from before the weekend:
Colvin 104 G 319 AB 93 H .292 BA 15 HR 58 RBI .334 OBP 7 SB
DeJesus 121 G 410 AB 108 H .263 BA 6 HR 39 RBI .352 OBP 6 SB
Colvin, in less games with the Rockies, has had significantly move offensive production than DeJesus.
DeJesus is waffling around Koskie Fukudome numbers. For a corner outfielder, those weak offensive and non-existence power stats (home runs and RBI) are line up killers.
It brings to mind the question of how well Esptein and Hoyer are at in evaluating talent to assemble rosters. A majority of the rosters for the Red Sox championships had roots with the former GM and his staff.
Was Stewart and adequate replacement at third? No.
Was the mid-season replacement Luis Valbuena any better? No.
Was DeJesus in RF the player people expected? No.
Was DeJesus better RF than Colvin? No.
Here is the stat lines from before the weekend:
Colvin 104 G 319 AB 93 H .292 BA 15 HR 58 RBI .334 OBP 7 SB
DeJesus 121 G 410 AB 108 H .263 BA 6 HR 39 RBI .352 OBP 6 SB
Colvin, in less games with the Rockies, has had significantly move offensive production than DeJesus.
DeJesus is waffling around Koskie Fukudome numbers. For a corner outfielder, those weak offensive and non-existence power stats (home runs and RBI) are line up killers.
It brings to mind the question of how well Esptein and Hoyer are at in evaluating talent to assemble rosters. A majority of the rosters for the Red Sox championships had roots with the former GM and his staff.
Was Stewart and adequate replacement at third? No.
Was the mid-season replacement Luis Valbuena any better? No.
Was DeJesus in RF the player people expected? No.
Was DeJesus better RF than Colvin? No.
August 27, 2012
JACKSON CAMERON
The weekend revealed a random bit of opinion in some Cub circles.
The expectation and comparison game is fraught with danger, especially when dealing with young rookies early in their careers.
But when I heard someone favorably compare Brett Jackson to Mike Cameron, my stomach churned and my head said, "really, Mike Cameron is all you expect?"
Some aspects of the comparison are easy to see:
both are speedy left hand hitting outfielders.
Cameron played 17 major league seasons. His career stat line: 278 HR, 968 RBI, 297 SB, .249 BA, .338 OBP, .986 Field percentage. His career followed a normal path: starter, to journeyman to bench reserve with seven teams (White Sox, Mariners, Mets, Padres, Brewers, Red Sox and Marlins).
If you average Cameron's stats, he was a .249 hitter (which is not very good), 16.35 HR (okay for a center fielder), 57 RBI (marginal for a starting OF), 17.4 SB (probably above average in today's station to station hitting philosophy) and .986 fielding percentage (which is good but not exceptional).
Cameron's average WAR/season is 2.54 which equates to being a starter, but not an All-Star caliber player.
You would think that Cub fans would expect MORE from Jackson since the hype had been that he was a "five tool" player that could hit for power - - - a 3-4-5 hitter in the order, with the advantage of speed to steal bases. The projection would be more like .290 BA, 20 HR, 85 RBI, 20 SB per season.
But the downgrade in expectations may be tempered by the fact that Jackson has been a strike out machine at AAA, and has a large hole in his swing so far in the majors. He has started to adjust, hitting two home runs recently, but how he fits into the Epstein rebuilding plan is unknown. He looks like a younger version of current David DeJesus, who is impersonating the old Koskie Fukudome Cub right fielder. DeJesus current Cub campaign: .269 BA, 6 HR, 39 RBI, 6 SB, .357 OBP, in 118 games. In Fukudome's three Cub seasons, he averaged. 259 BA, 11.3 HR, 52 RBI, 8.3 SB. One cannot argue that either Fukudome or DeJesus have been successful Cub acquisitions. Both played good defense, but underwhelmed in offensive production (especially in the power numbers normal for a corner outfielder).
So the Jackson to Cameron comparison may come true over time, but at present it is not an acceptable goal for a rookie with years of press glowing about his potential. Cub fans should expect more than a Cameron career from Jackson.
The expectation and comparison game is fraught with danger, especially when dealing with young rookies early in their careers.
But when I heard someone favorably compare Brett Jackson to Mike Cameron, my stomach churned and my head said, "really, Mike Cameron is all you expect?"
Some aspects of the comparison are easy to see:
both are speedy left hand hitting outfielders.
Cameron played 17 major league seasons. His career stat line: 278 HR, 968 RBI, 297 SB, .249 BA, .338 OBP, .986 Field percentage. His career followed a normal path: starter, to journeyman to bench reserve with seven teams (White Sox, Mariners, Mets, Padres, Brewers, Red Sox and Marlins).
If you average Cameron's stats, he was a .249 hitter (which is not very good), 16.35 HR (okay for a center fielder), 57 RBI (marginal for a starting OF), 17.4 SB (probably above average in today's station to station hitting philosophy) and .986 fielding percentage (which is good but not exceptional).
Cameron's average WAR/season is 2.54 which equates to being a starter, but not an All-Star caliber player.
You would think that Cub fans would expect MORE from Jackson since the hype had been that he was a "five tool" player that could hit for power - - - a 3-4-5 hitter in the order, with the advantage of speed to steal bases. The projection would be more like .290 BA, 20 HR, 85 RBI, 20 SB per season.
But the downgrade in expectations may be tempered by the fact that Jackson has been a strike out machine at AAA, and has a large hole in his swing so far in the majors. He has started to adjust, hitting two home runs recently, but how he fits into the Epstein rebuilding plan is unknown. He looks like a younger version of current David DeJesus, who is impersonating the old Koskie Fukudome Cub right fielder. DeJesus current Cub campaign: .269 BA, 6 HR, 39 RBI, 6 SB, .357 OBP, in 118 games. In Fukudome's three Cub seasons, he averaged. 259 BA, 11.3 HR, 52 RBI, 8.3 SB. One cannot argue that either Fukudome or DeJesus have been successful Cub acquisitions. Both played good defense, but underwhelmed in offensive production (especially in the power numbers normal for a corner outfielder).
So the Jackson to Cameron comparison may come true over time, but at present it is not an acceptable goal for a rookie with years of press glowing about his potential. Cub fans should expect more than a Cameron career from Jackson.
May 21, 2012
SHAKE UP
In the midst of a six game losing streak, Manager Sveum is thinking about mixing up the top three in the lineup because they are not producing runs. The Cubs offense was woeful yesterday, with the wind blowing out at a gale. The White Sox had no trouble taking Maholm's mistakes onto Waveland Avenue. But the timid Cubs rarely got a ball out of the infield.
The top three in the order of managerial ire are DeJesus, Campana and Castro.
It seems an odd choice to single out the top of the order on "run production."
The team only has three .300 hitters: LaHair, Campana and Castro.
The team has only three 20 RBI men: LaHair, Soriano and Castro.
From a statistical standpoint, Castro is doing well batting #3.
Campana is hitting for average in the #2 hole, though his speed and bunting for hits is M.O.
DeJesus is batting .276, 1 HR, 9 RBI and 0 SB.
DeJesus is not a lead off man. However, that is the position he has played in the past and Cubs have continued it on this season. Campana is not a solid contact hitter to be a good #2 hitter, but only has speed to be a lead off guy. But his defense in CF is weak.
What will Sveum do? Flip DeJesus and Campana in the batting order?
Besides LaHair and Soriano (who recently hit his first two homers of the season), the only weak power is Stewart at third, but his .201 average and 13 RBIs has disappointment written all over that Colorado trade.
The injured catching corps has not produced sustained offense. Barney is a total non-factor at the plate.
The pre-season fact that this Cub roster is not a balanced, run producing line up has come home to roost.
Sveum appears to be ready to pull the trigger and start full time platoons (but those never work out in the end): DeJesus-Baker in RF; Barney-Cardenas at 2B; Stewart-Mather at 3B; Campana-Johnson in CF.
Then the glimmer of hope is the anticipation of Iowa sluggers to be called up and provide instant offense. Anthony Rizzo has hit 14 HRs in AAA. However, the team is not going to push him into service time while LaHair is still productive at first base. Brett Jackson could be the solid OF, #3 hitter of the future, but he is scuffling at AAA, batting under .250. There is no rush to call up solid prospects to play part time on a bad Cubs team. This is a rebuilding season; no, more like a a season on hold until next year where the rebuilding process will start.
The top three in the order of managerial ire are DeJesus, Campana and Castro.
It seems an odd choice to single out the top of the order on "run production."
The team only has three .300 hitters: LaHair, Campana and Castro.
The team has only three 20 RBI men: LaHair, Soriano and Castro.
From a statistical standpoint, Castro is doing well batting #3.
Campana is hitting for average in the #2 hole, though his speed and bunting for hits is M.O.
DeJesus is batting .276, 1 HR, 9 RBI and 0 SB.
DeJesus is not a lead off man. However, that is the position he has played in the past and Cubs have continued it on this season. Campana is not a solid contact hitter to be a good #2 hitter, but only has speed to be a lead off guy. But his defense in CF is weak.
What will Sveum do? Flip DeJesus and Campana in the batting order?
Besides LaHair and Soriano (who recently hit his first two homers of the season), the only weak power is Stewart at third, but his .201 average and 13 RBIs has disappointment written all over that Colorado trade.
The injured catching corps has not produced sustained offense. Barney is a total non-factor at the plate.
The pre-season fact that this Cub roster is not a balanced, run producing line up has come home to roost.
Sveum appears to be ready to pull the trigger and start full time platoons (but those never work out in the end): DeJesus-Baker in RF; Barney-Cardenas at 2B; Stewart-Mather at 3B; Campana-Johnson in CF.
Then the glimmer of hope is the anticipation of Iowa sluggers to be called up and provide instant offense. Anthony Rizzo has hit 14 HRs in AAA. However, the team is not going to push him into service time while LaHair is still productive at first base. Brett Jackson could be the solid OF, #3 hitter of the future, but he is scuffling at AAA, batting under .250. There is no rush to call up solid prospects to play part time on a bad Cubs team. This is a rebuilding season; no, more like a a season on hold until next year where the rebuilding process will start.
December 30, 2011
THE ERROR ON NO DEFENSE
In politics, the term is called "spin." Candidate handlers tout explanations to the media to get a favorable reaction in the press. In baseball, the same management spin is used to propagandize organizational moves as being needed to great.
When Epstein and Hoyer made their first collective moves, a large portion of the fan base was supportive. However, the key explanation on why they acquired David DeJesus and Ian Stewart is wrong. They said they acquired these two players to improve overall team defense. This statement was to direct attention away from the fact that both DeJesus and Stewart were coming off career WORST seasons.
The Cubs made their point that the team had to upgrade their defense in order to be competitive. But how important is defense at the major league level?
Tampa Bay led the majors in fielding percentage at .988 (committing only 73 errors). The median team, Detroit, was 15th with 103 errors or fielding percentage of .983. Dead last was the Cubs, committing 134 errors for a .978 fielding percentage. The difference between the Rays and Cubs is a mere .010 (one percent).
The minimum differential between the best team and the worst team is a mere fraction. The reason is simple: pro athletes can catch and throw the baseball once they hit the majors. There is no substantial difference between 25 man rosters over a season. And from the average, the Cubs were only .005, or one-half of one percent worse.
The perception was that the Cubs made errors at the wrong time and cost them games. Let us test this thesis:
In 2011, 8.6 percent of the runs scored in the majors were "unearned." The MLB team average for runs scored was 694. 694 times .086 equals approximately 60 unearned runs/season for an average team. If you divide 60 errors over 162 games, you get .370 unearned runs/game.
The MLB average for team errors was 102. 102 divided by 162 games equals .630 errors/game.
The ratio between E/G to UNR/G is .587, or 58.7 percent of the errors created an unearned run.
Based upon this error to unearned run ratio, the Cubs made 134 errors times .587 equals 78.65 or an expected 79 unearned runs charged to the Cubs in 2011. However, the actual runs allowed (756) minus actual earned runs allowed (690) equals only 66 unearned runs. This is 16.45 percent below the expected average.
Therefore, the Cubs "poor" defense did not lead to more unearned runs being scored.
The Cubs new players were labeled as improvements to "increase defensive" play. This is also not true. A comparison of last season's fielding statistics will show:
DeJesus RF Oak .983 replaces Fukudome RF .987
OF Oak . 984 Colvin RF .987 (all OF .991)
DeJesus is an average fielder, while Fukudome and Colvin were both above average outfielders.
Stewart 3B Colo .929 replaces A. Ramirez 3B .953
(6 E in 85 chances) (14 E in 298 chances)
Stewart and Ramirez were both below average fielders, but Ramirez was .024 better.
So, DeJesus and Stewart are not defensive upgrades over last year's Cub players.
And the final point, fans were told that "defense" wins championships. World Series champion St. Louis made 116 errors and ranked 27th with a .982 fielding percentage. Pitching and hitting are more important than defense because the major league differential between teams is so small to not be consequential over a season.
When Epstein and Hoyer made their first collective moves, a large portion of the fan base was supportive. However, the key explanation on why they acquired David DeJesus and Ian Stewart is wrong. They said they acquired these two players to improve overall team defense. This statement was to direct attention away from the fact that both DeJesus and Stewart were coming off career WORST seasons.
The Cubs made their point that the team had to upgrade their defense in order to be competitive. But how important is defense at the major league level?
Tampa Bay led the majors in fielding percentage at .988 (committing only 73 errors). The median team, Detroit, was 15th with 103 errors or fielding percentage of .983. Dead last was the Cubs, committing 134 errors for a .978 fielding percentage. The difference between the Rays and Cubs is a mere .010 (one percent).
The minimum differential between the best team and the worst team is a mere fraction. The reason is simple: pro athletes can catch and throw the baseball once they hit the majors. There is no substantial difference between 25 man rosters over a season. And from the average, the Cubs were only .005, or one-half of one percent worse.
The perception was that the Cubs made errors at the wrong time and cost them games. Let us test this thesis:
In 2011, 8.6 percent of the runs scored in the majors were "unearned." The MLB team average for runs scored was 694. 694 times .086 equals approximately 60 unearned runs/season for an average team. If you divide 60 errors over 162 games, you get .370 unearned runs/game.
The MLB average for team errors was 102. 102 divided by 162 games equals .630 errors/game.
The ratio between E/G to UNR/G is .587, or 58.7 percent of the errors created an unearned run.
Based upon this error to unearned run ratio, the Cubs made 134 errors times .587 equals 78.65 or an expected 79 unearned runs charged to the Cubs in 2011. However, the actual runs allowed (756) minus actual earned runs allowed (690) equals only 66 unearned runs. This is 16.45 percent below the expected average.
Therefore, the Cubs "poor" defense did not lead to more unearned runs being scored.
The Cubs new players were labeled as improvements to "increase defensive" play. This is also not true. A comparison of last season's fielding statistics will show:
DeJesus RF Oak .983 replaces Fukudome RF .987
OF Oak . 984 Colvin RF .987 (all OF .991)
DeJesus is an average fielder, while Fukudome and Colvin were both above average outfielders.
Stewart 3B Colo .929 replaces A. Ramirez 3B .953
(6 E in 85 chances) (14 E in 298 chances)
Stewart and Ramirez were both below average fielders, but Ramirez was .024 better.
So, DeJesus and Stewart are not defensive upgrades over last year's Cub players.
And the final point, fans were told that "defense" wins championships. World Series champion St. Louis made 116 errors and ranked 27th with a .982 fielding percentage. Pitching and hitting are more important than defense because the major league differential between teams is so small to not be consequential over a season.
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