It seems like a distant memory, but when the Cubs hired Theo Epstein from Boston, there was a convoluted trade that the teams had to execute as part of the agreement. One point which has raised its ugly head this week has been the fact that the Red Sox have not given the Cubs permission to talk to Boston coach Torey Lovullo for the open manager position.
The Red Sox believe that the agreement clearly states that the Cubs are not allowed to hire ANY Boston employee for 3 years. This means that Epstein cannot hire away a Red Sox coach for the Cubs.
Now either Epstein forgot about this clause, or he was trying to pull a fast one on Boston. But considering how badly and bitter the Bobby Valentine team implosion was (which solidified the meanness of Boston management against ex-employees) it is not a surprise that the Red Sox are not going to help Theo out of his current jam.
And it is a big jam. Jam all over the place.
It is now almost universally accepted that the Cubs managerial "plan" was to hire Girardi away from the Yankees. The media quoted sources that it was all but a "done deal." But during the last month Joe was under contract with the Yankees, the Steinbrenners came up with a good deal for Girardi to stay. When Girardi was out of the picture, the Cubs had to scramble for a Plan B.
The tepid response to the first wave of candidate interviews led to scoffs when reports had the Cubs thinking or doing a second interview with A.J. Hinch, which some other organizations find to the be "worst" person to manage a major league team. Then the local media started a build a bandwagon for Brad Ausmus for manager, but he quickly signed with the Tigers.
That led Epstein to scramble for a Plan C. Once the World Series was over, and thus the excuse in the time delay from firing Dale Sveum to present, the Cubs could claim that they were always targeting their number one guy, Lovullo. But recall, two years ago the front office claimed they found their guy in Sveum through their mutual Boston connection.
Boston management stated after the series that they expected the entire coaching staff of John Farrell to return next season. In today's Boston Globe, this was affirmed in the story that Pawtucket Red Sox manager Gary DiSarcina has been hired by the Los Angeles Angels as their third base coach. The article states that DiSarcina might have stayed in the Red Sox organization had a
position opened up on the major league staff. But general manager Ben
Cherington said Monday he expected all of the coaches to return. Bench coach Lovullo was seen as a candidate to manage, but Cherington said no teams sought permission to interview him but the speculation is that he blocked the Cubs by the agreement with former Red Sox GM Theo
Epstein not to hire Red Sox employees for a period of three years.
This leads the Cubs to find a Plan D. It is interesting to note that besides Ausmus, none of the other new managerial hires were on the Cub radar: Lloyd McClendon in Seattle, Bryan Price in Cincinnati or Matt Williams in Washington. Why was that?
As stated before, at this point it really does not matter who the Cubs hire as manager because the team will continue its rough transition for at least the next two to three seasons. But this whole managerial process does not invoke confidence in the front office and its "plans."
November 6, 2013
CUBS POST SEASON
MLBTR opines that the Cubs free agent signings this season may involve two players. However, the choices don't seem to fit into the youth movement plan.
Joaquin Benoit, 36, appeared in 66 games for the Tigers last season going 4-1, 2.01 ERA, 24 saves and 1.030 WHIP. The Cubs already have in place a closer, Fujikawa who was hurt last season, and a closer in waiting, Strop. Because of Benoit's record last season, he would most likely be signed by a contender to bolster an already good bullpen as insurance.
Chris Young, 30, is an oft-injured outfielder. In 107 games for Oakland, he hit .200, 12 HR, 40 RBI, .280 OBP and 0.0 WAR. He is a right handed hitter who can play all outfield positions, but he does not meet the qualifications of high average, high on-base sabermetrics the front office has been stating is a roster goal. The Cubs have a need for a fifth outfielder, but Young does not seem to be a substantial upgrade.
But the article does reference the national perception about the short term for the Cubs. The Cubs will have to pick up second or third tier free agents to supplement a major league roster which will not be very strong. Benoit or Young could be role players on good teams, but they make little sense in the Cubs long term future.
Joaquin Benoit, 36, appeared in 66 games for the Tigers last season going 4-1, 2.01 ERA, 24 saves and 1.030 WHIP. The Cubs already have in place a closer, Fujikawa who was hurt last season, and a closer in waiting, Strop. Because of Benoit's record last season, he would most likely be signed by a contender to bolster an already good bullpen as insurance.
Chris Young, 30, is an oft-injured outfielder. In 107 games for Oakland, he hit .200, 12 HR, 40 RBI, .280 OBP and 0.0 WAR. He is a right handed hitter who can play all outfield positions, but he does not meet the qualifications of high average, high on-base sabermetrics the front office has been stating is a roster goal. The Cubs have a need for a fifth outfielder, but Young does not seem to be a substantial upgrade.
But the article does reference the national perception about the short term for the Cubs. The Cubs will have to pick up second or third tier free agents to supplement a major league roster which will not be very strong. Benoit or Young could be role players on good teams, but they make little sense in the Cubs long term future.
November 5, 2013
TOMORROW'S ROSTER TODAY
At this Polaroid moment in time, the Cubs 2014 roster may be constructed as follows from the current 40 man roster and minor league system:
Starting pitchers:
1. Samaradzija
2. E. Jackson
3. T. Wood
4. Arrieta
5. Villaneuva
6. Rusin *
7. Raley *
8. Hendricks *
* long relief or start season in AAA
Bullpen by role:
Closer: Fujikawa
8th: Strop
7th: Bard
6th: Grimm
LHP: Russell
RHP: Lim
RHP: Parker
Starting Position players:
LF: Lake
CF: Sweeney
RF: Schierholtz
3B: Olt
SS: Castro
2B: Watkins
1B: Rizzo
C: Castillo
Bench:
IN: Barney
IN: Valbuena
IN: Murphy
OF: Bogusevic
C: Boscan
A few points on the current depth chart:
1. The starting rotation is currently weaker in depth than in the last two seasons.
2. The bullpen is another unknown with a new closer, new set up man and a rehabbing reliever in Bard.
3. One of the reasons Sveum may have been terminated was his stubborn loyalty to veterans like Barney instead of playing a young player like Watkins, especially in the last month of the season. One would imagine that the front office wants to promote Olt and Watkins to starters to get a little fan interest bump in spring training.
4. It is hard to tell whether Lake will continue to bat well in his sophomore season, when the league begins to adjust to him.
5. There will be a large hole at back-up catcher since Navarro will leave for a better/starting role with another team. The minor league system does not have a quality catcher ready for promotion.
6. The bench is filled with journeymen infielders which is another glaring need for an upgrade.
Starting pitchers:
1. Samaradzija
2. E. Jackson
3. T. Wood
4. Arrieta
5. Villaneuva
6. Rusin *
7. Raley *
8. Hendricks *
* long relief or start season in AAA
Bullpen by role:
Closer: Fujikawa
8th: Strop
7th: Bard
6th: Grimm
LHP: Russell
RHP: Lim
RHP: Parker
Starting Position players:
LF: Lake
CF: Sweeney
RF: Schierholtz
3B: Olt
SS: Castro
2B: Watkins
1B: Rizzo
C: Castillo
Bench:
IN: Barney
IN: Valbuena
IN: Murphy
OF: Bogusevic
C: Boscan
A few points on the current depth chart:
1. The starting rotation is currently weaker in depth than in the last two seasons.
2. The bullpen is another unknown with a new closer, new set up man and a rehabbing reliever in Bard.
3. One of the reasons Sveum may have been terminated was his stubborn loyalty to veterans like Barney instead of playing a young player like Watkins, especially in the last month of the season. One would imagine that the front office wants to promote Olt and Watkins to starters to get a little fan interest bump in spring training.
4. It is hard to tell whether Lake will continue to bat well in his sophomore season, when the league begins to adjust to him.
5. There will be a large hole at back-up catcher since Navarro will leave for a better/starting role with another team. The minor league system does not have a quality catcher ready for promotion.
6. The bench is filled with journeymen infielders which is another glaring need for an upgrade.
November 4, 2013
PLAN B MANAGER
The growing consensus is that the Cubs again misfired on a target. The Cubs thought that their next manager would be Joe Girardi. The local media hyped the probability that Girardi would leave the Yankees and come manage his beloved Cubs. Many people thought it was a done deal. But Girardi never spoke officially to the Cubs, and signed an extension before his Yankee deal expired - - - leaving the Cubs scrambling for an alternative to Girardi.
There is another growing consensus that the Cubs believe that the managerial position with the team is a "great" job. Dale Sveum and Mike Quade would probably tell you otherwise. But from a neutral observer evaluating the Cubs, there is nothing special about a team with new management that has lost 197 games in just two seasons. There is nothing to tell a candidate that the team is on the verge of a massive turnaround in the next two years. Epstein told the world that the team would not be spending in free agency this off season. The program has been to trade 40% of the starting rotation for low level prospects to stock a farm system. A farm system that has some trade publications giddy, but scouts in other organizations question whether it really has major league talent. Some of the highly regarded prospects are not those Epstein has signed, but has traded for from other organizations (Edwards, Hendricks, Ramirez, Olt, Villaneuva). The short term prospect for the Cubs remains grim. And the long term prospect is a crap shoot: it could be as good as the Oakland A's with a steady stream of minor league talent, or it could be as bad as the Royals or Mariners or Astros.
Another oddity is that it was reported that the Cubs had second interviews with two candidates (Renteria and Hinch), but then at the same time started a new round of interviews with Ausmus and Lovullo. It seems that the front office is scrambling to find a suitable candidate that the media and baseball in general will say is an "okay" hire. The first list of candidates left nothing to be desired, and having a second talk with Hinch has caused eye balls to roll as many other organizations believe he is the worst person to run a team, let alone one as bad as the Cubs.
So what are the Cubs really looking for? Another manager that they can remotely control? One of the whispers that got Sveum fired was that he did not take kindly to the reams of information the management tech teams gave him on a daily basis. The sabermetrics is the new school of baseball management, but Sveum did not take it heart. If the next manager is merely going to be another data processor of management theories, that may not turn around Castro as a fielder or Rizzo as a hitter.
Perhaps the next Cub manager needs to meet the Hollywood casting call for the Brad Pitt Moneyball Brooks Brothers suit persona. If the Cubs cannot sell actual baseball to new fans, it has to sell something else.
But in the end, no matter who the Cubs hired as the 2014 manager he will come with the tag "Not Joe Girardi." And he was will be compared to Girardi all season long, which will be another distraction for a team filled with distractions.
There is another growing consensus that the Cubs believe that the managerial position with the team is a "great" job. Dale Sveum and Mike Quade would probably tell you otherwise. But from a neutral observer evaluating the Cubs, there is nothing special about a team with new management that has lost 197 games in just two seasons. There is nothing to tell a candidate that the team is on the verge of a massive turnaround in the next two years. Epstein told the world that the team would not be spending in free agency this off season. The program has been to trade 40% of the starting rotation for low level prospects to stock a farm system. A farm system that has some trade publications giddy, but scouts in other organizations question whether it really has major league talent. Some of the highly regarded prospects are not those Epstein has signed, but has traded for from other organizations (Edwards, Hendricks, Ramirez, Olt, Villaneuva). The short term prospect for the Cubs remains grim. And the long term prospect is a crap shoot: it could be as good as the Oakland A's with a steady stream of minor league talent, or it could be as bad as the Royals or Mariners or Astros.
Another oddity is that it was reported that the Cubs had second interviews with two candidates (Renteria and Hinch), but then at the same time started a new round of interviews with Ausmus and Lovullo. It seems that the front office is scrambling to find a suitable candidate that the media and baseball in general will say is an "okay" hire. The first list of candidates left nothing to be desired, and having a second talk with Hinch has caused eye balls to roll as many other organizations believe he is the worst person to run a team, let alone one as bad as the Cubs.
So what are the Cubs really looking for? Another manager that they can remotely control? One of the whispers that got Sveum fired was that he did not take kindly to the reams of information the management tech teams gave him on a daily basis. The sabermetrics is the new school of baseball management, but Sveum did not take it heart. If the next manager is merely going to be another data processor of management theories, that may not turn around Castro as a fielder or Rizzo as a hitter.
Perhaps the next Cub manager needs to meet the Hollywood casting call for the Brad Pitt Moneyball Brooks Brothers suit persona. If the Cubs cannot sell actual baseball to new fans, it has to sell something else.
But in the end, no matter who the Cubs hired as the 2014 manager he will come with the tag "Not Joe Girardi." And he was will be compared to Girardi all season long, which will be another distraction for a team filled with distractions.
November 3, 2013
MYTHS AND LEGENDS
In the after glow of the Red Sox third championship in 10 years, there are some pundits in Chicago who pose the question of how much of the current success can still be traced to Cub President Theo Epstein. For the Theo-heads, he is the mythical savior who is going to turn the Cubs around just as he did for the Red Sox.
But the problem with that thinking is that is it based on myth and spin.
The architect who lifted the Curse was Epstein's former boss, Dan Duquette.
Duquette became the GM of his hometown Red Sox in 1998. Duquette, not Epstein, built a baseball operations department which has allowed the Red Sox to be the only team in MLB to set attendance and revenue records every year since 1998.
The Red Sox went 656-574 in the eight seasons under Duquette, winning the AL East once and finishing 2nd behind the Yankees five other seasons. The Red Sox won the AL East pennant in 1995 before bowing to the Indians in the ALDS. The Red Sox were wild-cards in 1998 and 1999, only to lose to the Indians in the ALDS and the Yankees in the ALCS.
Under Duquette, the Red Sox made exceptional strides in improving their dismal history of poor race relations as an organization in the hiring of both coaching and administrative personnel with minority candidates. The minor league facilities and coaching availability were upgraded at every level during his tenure. This sounds like the plan the Cubs for their Arizona facilities.
But Duquette had a good eye for talent. Under this tenure, he drafted Nomar Garciaparra, David Eckstein, Adam Everett, Hanley Ramirez and Freddy Sanchez. He also made several major acquisitions that would ultimately play a part in the Red Sox 2004 World Championship, including acquiring knuckleballer Tim Wakefield, Pedro Martinez, Derek Lowe, Jason Varitek, Manny Ramirez and Johnny Damon. Duquette built up his minor league system with talent that he traded over 35 players from the farm system to acquire major league talent and to put a competitive team on the field.
Duquette was let go by the Red Sox in 2002 when the team was sold to new ownership.
The current Red Sox championship team has little connection to Epstein. New GM Ben Cherington inherited a lot of big money, bad contracts from Epstein's management era. The Red Sox imploded in 2012. ESPN.com stated that Cherington deserves to be in the conversation for a series of transactions that helped propel the Red Sox from a 69-93 civic disaster to a team that got to the World Series.
Cherington revamped the team by several bold moves. He traded for manager John Farrell to replace Bobby Valentine. He then sent an All-Star roster of Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford and Josh Beckett to the Dodgers to get rid of a massive amount of payroll. The new payroll flexibility that allowed Cherington to acquire Shane Victorino, Mike Napoli, Koji Uehara, Jonny Gomes, Ryan Dempster, Stephen Drew, Mike Carp, Jake Peavy and David Ross.
A more realistic view of Epstein's Boston tenure is like the thin filling between two layers of cake. He is not the perfect wunderkind that the media parroted from the PR releases. One of the keys that pundits still point to with affection is that they like that Epstein is always trying to find a loophole in the rules, an edge, "game the system," to get talent. Except the glaring problem with that notion is that why would a competent front office need to "game" the system if they knew how to acquire talent by traditional means in the first place? It seems to be an attempt to cover up weaknesses by telling the world that the front office is smarter than the rest of baseball (a familiar quote from owner Tom Ricketts).
But the problem with that thinking is that is it based on myth and spin.
The architect who lifted the Curse was Epstein's former boss, Dan Duquette.
Duquette became the GM of his hometown Red Sox in 1998. Duquette, not Epstein, built a baseball operations department which has allowed the Red Sox to be the only team in MLB to set attendance and revenue records every year since 1998.
The Red Sox went 656-574 in the eight seasons under Duquette, winning the AL East once and finishing 2nd behind the Yankees five other seasons. The Red Sox won the AL East pennant in 1995 before bowing to the Indians in the ALDS. The Red Sox were wild-cards in 1998 and 1999, only to lose to the Indians in the ALDS and the Yankees in the ALCS.
Under Duquette, the Red Sox made exceptional strides in improving their dismal history of poor race relations as an organization in the hiring of both coaching and administrative personnel with minority candidates. The minor league facilities and coaching availability were upgraded at every level during his tenure. This sounds like the plan the Cubs for their Arizona facilities.
But Duquette had a good eye for talent. Under this tenure, he drafted Nomar Garciaparra, David Eckstein, Adam Everett, Hanley Ramirez and Freddy Sanchez. He also made several major acquisitions that would ultimately play a part in the Red Sox 2004 World Championship, including acquiring knuckleballer Tim Wakefield, Pedro Martinez, Derek Lowe, Jason Varitek, Manny Ramirez and Johnny Damon. Duquette built up his minor league system with talent that he traded over 35 players from the farm system to acquire major league talent and to put a competitive team on the field.
Duquette was let go by the Red Sox in 2002 when the team was sold to new ownership.
The current Red Sox championship team has little connection to Epstein. New GM Ben Cherington inherited a lot of big money, bad contracts from Epstein's management era. The Red Sox imploded in 2012. ESPN.com stated that Cherington deserves to be in the conversation for a series of transactions that helped propel the Red Sox from a 69-93 civic disaster to a team that got to the World Series.
Cherington revamped the team by several bold moves. He traded for manager John Farrell to replace Bobby Valentine. He then sent an All-Star roster of Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford and Josh Beckett to the Dodgers to get rid of a massive amount of payroll. The new payroll flexibility that allowed Cherington to acquire Shane Victorino, Mike Napoli, Koji Uehara, Jonny Gomes, Ryan Dempster, Stephen Drew, Mike Carp, Jake Peavy and David Ross.
A more realistic view of Epstein's Boston tenure is like the thin filling between two layers of cake. He is not the perfect wunderkind that the media parroted from the PR releases. One of the keys that pundits still point to with affection is that they like that Epstein is always trying to find a loophole in the rules, an edge, "game the system," to get talent. Except the glaring problem with that notion is that why would a competent front office need to "game" the system if they knew how to acquire talent by traditional means in the first place? It seems to be an attempt to cover up weaknesses by telling the world that the front office is smarter than the rest of baseball (a familiar quote from owner Tom Ricketts).
November 2, 2013
STAGNATION
The Cubs had five free agents going into the off-season:
Closer Kevin Gregg, back up catcher Dioner Navarro, injured starter Scott Baker, reliever Matt Guerrier, and outfielder Ryan Sweeney.
The Cubs quickly re-signed Sweeney for two years. As stated before, this signaled that the Cubs were not going to push to upgrade their roster this off-season. After spending $86 million last off season for the likes Baker, Scott Feldman and Edwin Jackson, the Cubs front office said that it would not be a player in the big free agent market. The Cubs still owe Alfonso Soriano $17.2 million for 2014, and Scott Hairston $500,000. That dead money makes signing impact free agents a nullity.
The franchise is in full stagnation mode. The Epstein era's win-loss record is 127-197. Epstein's manager of choice, Dale Sveum, was fired for guiding the club to back to back horrible seasons. The Cubs will soon hire their fourth manager in five seasons, prioritizing "managerial or other on-field leadership experience" and "expertise developing young talent." Hint: we are going to become leaner and cheaper through our own minor league system. This is not the light at the end of the tunnel since the Cubs have not had a .500 record since 2009.
Keeping the band together after a 96-loss season does not seem prudent, but considering The Plan is to flounder until the prospect hoard hits the majors, this is the default.
Gregg was not a happy camper at the end of the season. He feuded with Sveum. Why Gregg, who had a good first half, was not traded at the deadline, remains a mystery. He will not be back because Fujikawa appears to have been signed to be the closer in 2014.
Navarro played above expectations so he will be signed by another team, probably as a starting catcher. The Cubs want to continue to develop Wellington Castillo behind the plate. Castillo has made improvement on his defense, but injuries may be a future concern. Also, in the improving minor league system, the Cubs are devoid of any true catching prospects.
Baker got paid $5.5 million to rehab for an entire season. His three starts and 15 innings pitched were a mere showcase for him to sign a lucrative deal elsewhere. The Cubs will say they gambled and lost on Baker, as they would say they found gold with Feldman (and traded him for two arms). Baker will sign with another team for a good three year, above market deal because starting pitching is still a premium for clubs on the cusp of the playoffs.
Guerrier was at the end of his career when he was shipped instead of a bag of used baseballs to the Cubs in the Carlos Marmol deal. New pick ups like Arrieta or Grimm can easily take his spot in the bullpen.
Basically, the Cubs will stand pat with the talent they have going into 2014. They only change would be if they again trade off veteran talent like Jeff Samardzija for more prospects or major league ready AAA players. As it stands now, the team will continue to stagnate at the bottom of the NL Central.
Closer Kevin Gregg, back up catcher Dioner Navarro, injured starter Scott Baker, reliever Matt Guerrier, and outfielder Ryan Sweeney.
The Cubs quickly re-signed Sweeney for two years. As stated before, this signaled that the Cubs were not going to push to upgrade their roster this off-season. After spending $86 million last off season for the likes Baker, Scott Feldman and Edwin Jackson, the Cubs front office said that it would not be a player in the big free agent market. The Cubs still owe Alfonso Soriano $17.2 million for 2014, and Scott Hairston $500,000. That dead money makes signing impact free agents a nullity.
The franchise is in full stagnation mode. The Epstein era's win-loss record is 127-197. Epstein's manager of choice, Dale Sveum, was fired for guiding the club to back to back horrible seasons. The Cubs will soon hire their fourth manager in five seasons, prioritizing "managerial or other on-field leadership experience" and "expertise developing young talent." Hint: we are going to become leaner and cheaper through our own minor league system. This is not the light at the end of the tunnel since the Cubs have not had a .500 record since 2009.
Keeping the band together after a 96-loss season does not seem prudent, but considering The Plan is to flounder until the prospect hoard hits the majors, this is the default.
Gregg was not a happy camper at the end of the season. He feuded with Sveum. Why Gregg, who had a good first half, was not traded at the deadline, remains a mystery. He will not be back because Fujikawa appears to have been signed to be the closer in 2014.
Navarro played above expectations so he will be signed by another team, probably as a starting catcher. The Cubs want to continue to develop Wellington Castillo behind the plate. Castillo has made improvement on his defense, but injuries may be a future concern. Also, in the improving minor league system, the Cubs are devoid of any true catching prospects.
Baker got paid $5.5 million to rehab for an entire season. His three starts and 15 innings pitched were a mere showcase for him to sign a lucrative deal elsewhere. The Cubs will say they gambled and lost on Baker, as they would say they found gold with Feldman (and traded him for two arms). Baker will sign with another team for a good three year, above market deal because starting pitching is still a premium for clubs on the cusp of the playoffs.
Guerrier was at the end of his career when he was shipped instead of a bag of used baseballs to the Cubs in the Carlos Marmol deal. New pick ups like Arrieta or Grimm can easily take his spot in the bullpen.
Basically, the Cubs will stand pat with the talent they have going into 2014. They only change would be if they again trade off veteran talent like Jeff Samardzija for more prospects or major league ready AAA players. As it stands now, the team will continue to stagnate at the bottom of the NL Central.
November 1, 2013
THE SHARK TANK
The Cubs are not close in contract talks with Jeff Samardzija. The Shark had been unhappy with the current front office's churn of 40% of the starting rotation year after year. Samardzija wants to win, but finds it difficult with the current major league roster.
Samardzija is treated as the Cubs' ace starter, but in reality he is not. In 2013, he had 33 starts and threw a career high 213.2 IP. He went 8-13, 4.34 ERA, 1.348 WHIP, 2.74 K/BB ratio and 1.0 WAR.
For his career, he has 189 GP, 29-35 record, 4.19 ERA, 1.355 WHIP, 2.29 K/BB ratio, a career 3.1 WAR over 6 seasons.
His career WAR and record indicate that he is 4th or 5th starter at best. But since the Cubs are such a bad team, in the state of flux, a durable starting pitcher is hard to find so Samardzija is promoted by the PR department to sell tickets.
At age 28, Samardzija is coming into his prime years. He expects to be paid more than the $2.64 million he earned last season.
He gave up the option of playing pro football to become a major league pitcher. He signed a large minor league deal by former GM Jim Hendry. Samardzija had a rough beginning, but most people believe he continues to slowly improved over the years. Whether he has reached his plateau is open to debate.
If the Cubs do not want to commit Edwin Jackson type money on Samardzija, then the Shark most likely will be traded by the July, 2014 deadline. With the pitching prospects in the Cubs system probably two to three years away from contributing, this will leave another hole in the rotation.
Samardzija is treated as the Cubs' ace starter, but in reality he is not. In 2013, he had 33 starts and threw a career high 213.2 IP. He went 8-13, 4.34 ERA, 1.348 WHIP, 2.74 K/BB ratio and 1.0 WAR.
For his career, he has 189 GP, 29-35 record, 4.19 ERA, 1.355 WHIP, 2.29 K/BB ratio, a career 3.1 WAR over 6 seasons.
His career WAR and record indicate that he is 4th or 5th starter at best. But since the Cubs are such a bad team, in the state of flux, a durable starting pitcher is hard to find so Samardzija is promoted by the PR department to sell tickets.
At age 28, Samardzija is coming into his prime years. He expects to be paid more than the $2.64 million he earned last season.
He gave up the option of playing pro football to become a major league pitcher. He signed a large minor league deal by former GM Jim Hendry. Samardzija had a rough beginning, but most people believe he continues to slowly improved over the years. Whether he has reached his plateau is open to debate.
If the Cubs do not want to commit Edwin Jackson type money on Samardzija, then the Shark most likely will be traded by the July, 2014 deadline. With the pitching prospects in the Cubs system probably two to three years away from contributing, this will leave another hole in the rotation.
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