I was reading comments on a Cubs fan blog, and there is a growing consensus is
that the Cubs organization is quickly falling back into the Tribune ways, i.e.
a crappy organization. When the Trib spent, it was spent unwisely. When the Trib wanted to sell the team, it went small market.
The penny pinching, small market mentality has now seeped to the surface.
Fans were promised a dynasty now see the window closing rapidly.
They are realizing that Ricketts spent all his time and resources building
outside of Wrigley Field than building a second championship team.
The core talent that Theo touts may not be as impressive as the 1929 Yankees.
And the minor league system is now horrible, with no help in sight.
I think fans are getting mad because the Cubs are not tied to talks to ANY notable
free agent, first tier or second tier. They can't understand why they let their best
relief pitcher, Chavez, walk over $4 million when Theo spouted off that performance
now counts more than potential (we are looking at Chatwood's $36 million contract).
The baseball world still cannot figure out why the Cubs had to trade Smyly and his $7 million contract in order to re-sign Hamels. Why did the Cubs pay Smyly millions in 2018 just to rehab his arm? He would have done it without being on a major league DL. But he was "an asset," or "insurance policy" for the rotation in 2019. But in reality, he seemed to be an expensive budget line item.
We have not heard any updates on Bryant's shoulder. If we compare it to the Bears' Trubisky shoulder watch, it seems more grim. Trubisky was day to day with an apparent shoulder bruise or strain. He is expected to be back for the Rams contest in 8 days. Bryant sat out 6 weeks and came back the same - - - unable to fully follow through on his swing. Is there something more on Bryant's shoulder that we do not know about?
Running through 3 hitting and pitching coaches in 3 years seems to be counterproductive - - - will the new coaches be able to improve underperforming players like a magician? Or is bringing in new coaches merely an illusion to cover-up the mistakes of the front office?
Is 2019 going to be the Rehab Tour? Russell, Chatwood, Darvish, Edwards, Bryant,
Schwarber, Contreras - - - are they all going to rebound to have career years??
Showing posts with label organization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label organization. Show all posts
December 1, 2018
November 15, 2018
HITTING THE IVY PADDED WALL
The happy family facade at Clark and Addison is beginning to crack.
The national media is confused by how the Cubs front office is acting this off-season. Even local writers have woken up to the prospect that the Cubs may not be the Midwest, free spending, big market Yankees.
It began when Theo Epstein post season autopsy, er, press conference left a lasting impression that Theo was not happy. He stressed the fact that the team has to focus in on performance and not talent. It means highly prized prospects have to perform better in order to keep their spot. But on the flip side, the Cubs brass have always been enamored with "their guys." They will keep their guys well past their trade value. And now, Epstein admits, that the 2019 roster improvement will have to come via trades.
It is stunning reversal for the genius baseball gods. The plan was to draft the best bats available and solve pitching via free agency. Young position players are cheap and controllable up to six years. Veteran reliable pitching, though expensive, is less likely to be busts. Well, until this year.
The Cubs spent more than $185 million on Yu Darvish, Tyler Chatwood and Brandon Morrow. The next consensus is that the three star pitchers flamed out badly. Darvish had injury problems from the start. Morrow had a long injury history. And Chatwood was plain bad.
The Cubs have drafted 147 pitchers in the past seven years and they have not developed one quality starting pitcher. Last season, Theo-Jed's farm system produced less than 20 innings of home grown pitching talent. It is a disaster. It has crippled the organization.
The quick promotions of Bryant, Schwarber and Happ have created a prospect vacuum in the minors. The best prospects are now at low A, four or five years away from the majors. Triple A is filled with AAA players with little chance to catch on even in a bench role. The minor league system has little trading chips. And the major league roster has very few "marketable" players to other teams because Russell, Schwarber and Happ are now solid .240 hitters which are a dime a dozen nowadays.
What struck the baseball nation odd was the story that in order for the Cubs to exercise the $20 million option on Cole Hamels, the team had to jettison $7 million in salary (Smyly was traded to the Rangers to clear that budget space.) Now that type of contract shuffling is what a small market team like the Royals, Rays or Marlins would be accused of doing for a long time.
The Cubs have been in the top 5 in spending, just under the luxury tax threshold. The ceiling goes up $9 million to $206 million in 2019. So one would ask why did the Cubs have issues signing Hamels if the team was getting a $9 million budget bump? Because the soft salary cap and the real Cubs payroll budget are two different things. The Cubs are already committed $350 million to 11 players. This does not include the arbitration awards for players like Bryant, Hendricks, Baez, Russell, Schwarber, Montgomery, Edwards and LaStella. Collectively, these arb players will be paid north of $40 million.
Major caveat: rich people stay rich by not losing money.
Epstein's off-the-cuff remark that the Ricketts have invested $750 million on development around Wrigley Field is telling; the Cubs are secondary in ownership's profit center mindset. You have to realize that the outside development is not owned by the Cubs team. Separate companies own the land and the development of the McDonald's block and the triangle. In fact, the Cubs are a tenant because Wrigley is owned by a different legal entity. Why would Theo know how much the Ricketts invested in the neighborhood? He was told it.
There has always been friction between Epstein, baseball operations and the "business" side of the Cubs run by Crane Kenney and Tom Ricketts. Ricketts wants a return on his "entire" investment and that includes premium events at Wrigley, i.e. concerts or play-off games. When the Cubs bowed out of the playoffs in the Wild Card game, the Cubs lost at least $30 million in gate receipts and the Ricketts enterprises (the hotel, the bars, etc.) lost more than that in revenue. If the business side had counted on annual deep playoff runs in their budget projections, this would have been a huge jolt to ownership.
Perhaps, that is why Epstein has been surly. He cannot buy his way out of bust or dead money deals like he tried to do in Boston. So he has to find a scapegoat, so the hitting coach gets fired after a year (and apparently the pitching coach, Maddon ally Jim Hickey is also out the door.) Epstein blames Maddon for not following "the plan" with Morrow to not pitch him more than two days in a row. Maddon pitched Morrow three times (an extra 6 pitches) that allegedly caused Morrow to get shut down. This deflects the fact that Morrow is a brittle arm, but it gave Epstein some ammo not to extend Maddon's contract. Joe will be a lame duck manager in 2019. And if the league trend continues, he will not be renewed as teams are now hiring inexperienced, stats-savvy guys front offices can control. Such a hiring would save the Cubs at least $5 million in 2020.
As you can tell, these seem to be like nickel and dime, petty things to do. But it may be by necessity. The Cubs have the weakest local television rights contracts for a big market team. In 2020, the Cubs were going to launch their own network. The idea of a multi-billion payday for Cubs broadcasts is now a pipe dream after the Dodgers deal blew up in Time Warner's face. Cable operators are losing subscribers in 2018 at a 300,000/month clip. People will not pay $5/month extra for a sports channel on their already high cable bills. Only a fool would pay a team a Dodger pay-out. (In a telling move, in the past few years, the Steinbrenners, who created the team channel revenue stream, have divested most of their stake in their YES network.)
It seems that Epstein has hit the wall. He is under strict budget restrictions. That is why there are no rumors, stories or hints that the Cubs are negotiating for Harper or Machado or a starting pitcher like Keuchel. Epstein cannot sign free agents without making room for them in the budget (the Hamels option). He does not have a strong minor league system to either promote players to fill needs or trade prospects for proven talent.
Fans will not complain when the Cubs went "all in" in 2016 to win the World Championship. But now Epstein is sitting a poker table with a very short stack. And he is not happy about it.
The national media is confused by how the Cubs front office is acting this off-season. Even local writers have woken up to the prospect that the Cubs may not be the Midwest, free spending, big market Yankees.
It began when Theo Epstein post season autopsy, er, press conference left a lasting impression that Theo was not happy. He stressed the fact that the team has to focus in on performance and not talent. It means highly prized prospects have to perform better in order to keep their spot. But on the flip side, the Cubs brass have always been enamored with "their guys." They will keep their guys well past their trade value. And now, Epstein admits, that the 2019 roster improvement will have to come via trades.
It is stunning reversal for the genius baseball gods. The plan was to draft the best bats available and solve pitching via free agency. Young position players are cheap and controllable up to six years. Veteran reliable pitching, though expensive, is less likely to be busts. Well, until this year.
The Cubs spent more than $185 million on Yu Darvish, Tyler Chatwood and Brandon Morrow. The next consensus is that the three star pitchers flamed out badly. Darvish had injury problems from the start. Morrow had a long injury history. And Chatwood was plain bad.
The Cubs have drafted 147 pitchers in the past seven years and they have not developed one quality starting pitcher. Last season, Theo-Jed's farm system produced less than 20 innings of home grown pitching talent. It is a disaster. It has crippled the organization.
The quick promotions of Bryant, Schwarber and Happ have created a prospect vacuum in the minors. The best prospects are now at low A, four or five years away from the majors. Triple A is filled with AAA players with little chance to catch on even in a bench role. The minor league system has little trading chips. And the major league roster has very few "marketable" players to other teams because Russell, Schwarber and Happ are now solid .240 hitters which are a dime a dozen nowadays.
What struck the baseball nation odd was the story that in order for the Cubs to exercise the $20 million option on Cole Hamels, the team had to jettison $7 million in salary (Smyly was traded to the Rangers to clear that budget space.) Now that type of contract shuffling is what a small market team like the Royals, Rays or Marlins would be accused of doing for a long time.
The Cubs have been in the top 5 in spending, just under the luxury tax threshold. The ceiling goes up $9 million to $206 million in 2019. So one would ask why did the Cubs have issues signing Hamels if the team was getting a $9 million budget bump? Because the soft salary cap and the real Cubs payroll budget are two different things. The Cubs are already committed $350 million to 11 players. This does not include the arbitration awards for players like Bryant, Hendricks, Baez, Russell, Schwarber, Montgomery, Edwards and LaStella. Collectively, these arb players will be paid north of $40 million.
Major caveat: rich people stay rich by not losing money.
Epstein's off-the-cuff remark that the Ricketts have invested $750 million on development around Wrigley Field is telling; the Cubs are secondary in ownership's profit center mindset. You have to realize that the outside development is not owned by the Cubs team. Separate companies own the land and the development of the McDonald's block and the triangle. In fact, the Cubs are a tenant because Wrigley is owned by a different legal entity. Why would Theo know how much the Ricketts invested in the neighborhood? He was told it.
There has always been friction between Epstein, baseball operations and the "business" side of the Cubs run by Crane Kenney and Tom Ricketts. Ricketts wants a return on his "entire" investment and that includes premium events at Wrigley, i.e. concerts or play-off games. When the Cubs bowed out of the playoffs in the Wild Card game, the Cubs lost at least $30 million in gate receipts and the Ricketts enterprises (the hotel, the bars, etc.) lost more than that in revenue. If the business side had counted on annual deep playoff runs in their budget projections, this would have been a huge jolt to ownership.
Perhaps, that is why Epstein has been surly. He cannot buy his way out of bust or dead money deals like he tried to do in Boston. So he has to find a scapegoat, so the hitting coach gets fired after a year (and apparently the pitching coach, Maddon ally Jim Hickey is also out the door.) Epstein blames Maddon for not following "the plan" with Morrow to not pitch him more than two days in a row. Maddon pitched Morrow three times (an extra 6 pitches) that allegedly caused Morrow to get shut down. This deflects the fact that Morrow is a brittle arm, but it gave Epstein some ammo not to extend Maddon's contract. Joe will be a lame duck manager in 2019. And if the league trend continues, he will not be renewed as teams are now hiring inexperienced, stats-savvy guys front offices can control. Such a hiring would save the Cubs at least $5 million in 2020.
As you can tell, these seem to be like nickel and dime, petty things to do. But it may be by necessity. The Cubs have the weakest local television rights contracts for a big market team. In 2020, the Cubs were going to launch their own network. The idea of a multi-billion payday for Cubs broadcasts is now a pipe dream after the Dodgers deal blew up in Time Warner's face. Cable operators are losing subscribers in 2018 at a 300,000/month clip. People will not pay $5/month extra for a sports channel on their already high cable bills. Only a fool would pay a team a Dodger pay-out. (In a telling move, in the past few years, the Steinbrenners, who created the team channel revenue stream, have divested most of their stake in their YES network.)
It seems that Epstein has hit the wall. He is under strict budget restrictions. That is why there are no rumors, stories or hints that the Cubs are negotiating for Harper or Machado or a starting pitcher like Keuchel. Epstein cannot sign free agents without making room for them in the budget (the Hamels option). He does not have a strong minor league system to either promote players to fill needs or trade prospects for proven talent.
Fans will not complain when the Cubs went "all in" in 2016 to win the World Championship. But now Epstein is sitting a poker table with a very short stack. And he is not happy about it.
October 3, 2016
DYSFUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
Robin Ventura is not going to manage the White Sox in 2017.
Some may say good riddance. Others may still question the organization which put Ventura, who never managed at any level, in charge of a major league team.
Under Ventura’s leadership, the White Sox went 375-434 (.463) which included a second-place finish in 2012 followed by a fifth-place finish and three fourth-place finishes. The White Sox have now gone eight seasons without making the postseason.
Ricky Renteria, the current bench coach, is presumed to be promoted to manager. He was the short term Cub manager until the Cubs swooped in on Joe Maddon.
Renteria had been a coach in the Padres’ organization since 2003 and was promoted to bench coach in 2011. He left after the 2013 season. Renteria has one year of managing under his belt, leading the Cubs to a 73-89 fifth-place finish in 2014.
The first issue with the Renteria promotion is that it does not change the White Sox culture or structure. Renteria is like Ventura, not a guy will a dynamic personality. The coaching staff will remain pretty much the same - - - which may not motivate the players to play better.
The second issue is that the management of the Sox does not change. There is a conflict between chairman Reinsdorf's desires, President Kenny Williams retooling philosophy and GM Rick Hahn want to rebuild. Ownership wants to win now. The press thought the White Sox "won" the last two off-seasons with their roster moves, but the players woefully underperformed.
Until the management gets on the same page, the team will continue to struggle.
The third issue is why not have a full managerial search? Renteria may be a nice buy, speaks Spanish to Latin players, and a baseball lifer. But is he the right person for this job? In San Diego, his forte was helping develop young players. The White Sox roster is besieged with veterans.
The White Sox strength is that the minor league system is filled with quality pitchers. The weakness of the White Sox is that the minor league system is devoid of hitting talent and positional players. This leads to a muddy middle of the road team in a weak division.
Some may say good riddance. Others may still question the organization which put Ventura, who never managed at any level, in charge of a major league team.
Under Ventura’s leadership, the White Sox went 375-434 (.463) which included a second-place finish in 2012 followed by a fifth-place finish and three fourth-place finishes. The White Sox have now gone eight seasons without making the postseason.
Ricky Renteria, the current bench coach, is presumed to be promoted to manager. He was the short term Cub manager until the Cubs swooped in on Joe Maddon.
Renteria had been a coach in the Padres’ organization since 2003 and was promoted to bench coach in 2011. He left after the 2013 season. Renteria has one year of managing under his belt, leading the Cubs to a 73-89 fifth-place finish in 2014.
The first issue with the Renteria promotion is that it does not change the White Sox culture or structure. Renteria is like Ventura, not a guy will a dynamic personality. The coaching staff will remain pretty much the same - - - which may not motivate the players to play better.
The second issue is that the management of the Sox does not change. There is a conflict between chairman Reinsdorf's desires, President Kenny Williams retooling philosophy and GM Rick Hahn want to rebuild. Ownership wants to win now. The press thought the White Sox "won" the last two off-seasons with their roster moves, but the players woefully underperformed.
Until the management gets on the same page, the team will continue to struggle.
The third issue is why not have a full managerial search? Renteria may be a nice buy, speaks Spanish to Latin players, and a baseball lifer. But is he the right person for this job? In San Diego, his forte was helping develop young players. The White Sox roster is besieged with veterans.
The White Sox strength is that the minor league system is filled with quality pitchers. The weakness of the White Sox is that the minor league system is devoid of hitting talent and positional players. This leads to a muddy middle of the road team in a weak division.
September 8, 2016
CHERRY PICKS
With every successful sports franchise, leaders and managers tend to get looked over for promotions with other teams. It is trying to buy past success with a new employer.
Rumors have started to circulate that Cubs executives could be top talent to other organizations. There are strong rumors that the Twins are pursuing Cubs execs Jason McLeod or Shiraz Rehman for their top baseball operations job.
McLeod has been a part of Theo Epstein's inner circle from their Boston Red Sox days.
While Jed Hoyer worked with Epstein on Boston player acquisitions, contract negotiations, player evaluations and sabermetrics, McLeod's expertise is in amateur scouting.
The Twins, being a small market team, need to have a strong scouting and development department in order to compete with big money, free agent spending teams like the Detroit Tigers, Red Sox, or Yankees.
While Epstein's contract expires after the end of the season, it is unclear the status of McLeod's contract term. In any event, it is standard practice for most teams to allow an employee to interview for a promotion with another club.
As discussed previously, the Epstein contract extension situation with the Ricketts is strange. Why both sides have not concluded an extension after last season's success is baffling to industry insiders. It shows that there has to be some rift between the baseball and business sides of the organization.
So Epstein's management team may look to parachute to new positions. This is similar to what happened when Epstein's reign was coming to an end in Boston; many of his staff went elsewhere including to the Padres before rejoining him in Chicago.
So it will be no surprise that the other teams will want to hire Cub baseball executives this off-season.
Rumors have started to circulate that Cubs executives could be top talent to other organizations. There are strong rumors that the Twins are pursuing Cubs execs Jason McLeod or Shiraz Rehman for their top baseball operations job.
McLeod has been a part of Theo Epstein's inner circle from their Boston Red Sox days.
While Jed Hoyer worked with Epstein on Boston player acquisitions, contract negotiations, player evaluations and sabermetrics, McLeod's expertise is in amateur scouting.
The Twins, being a small market team, need to have a strong scouting and development department in order to compete with big money, free agent spending teams like the Detroit Tigers, Red Sox, or Yankees.
While Epstein's contract expires after the end of the season, it is unclear the status of McLeod's contract term. In any event, it is standard practice for most teams to allow an employee to interview for a promotion with another club.
As discussed previously, the Epstein contract extension situation with the Ricketts is strange. Why both sides have not concluded an extension after last season's success is baffling to industry insiders. It shows that there has to be some rift between the baseball and business sides of the organization.
So Epstein's management team may look to parachute to new positions. This is similar to what happened when Epstein's reign was coming to an end in Boston; many of his staff went elsewhere including to the Padres before rejoining him in Chicago.
So it will be no surprise that the other teams will want to hire Cub baseball executives this off-season.
October 29, 2015
PAYING THE PRICE
David Price could have cost himself around $20 million for his weak post season performance.
It is not that he is a different pitcher, per se, in the post season.
The reason could be that post season opponents scout their opponent more closely.
During the regular season, scouting departments are charged with scouting the minors, the majors, their upcoming opponents, checking out talent to sign during the next draft or international scouting period, and some self-scout their own team for comparison purposes and trade value.
But once the post season rolls around, it is all hands-on-deck to get useful stats and materials to the manager.
The Royals admit that they found out that Price was tipping his change up, enough times the Royals hitters could handle it.
As recounted in SI, when pitching from the stretch when he threw a changeup, Price would take an extra deep breath, one where you could see his shoulders shrug, and he would hold his set a beat longer. It appeared to me the Royals knew the changeup was coming when Price was in the stretch. Royals sources confirmed it: Price tipped his changeup—maybe not 100% of the time, but enough for Kansas City to buy in.
It is not that he is a different pitcher, per se, in the post season.
The reason could be that post season opponents scout their opponent more closely.
During the regular season, scouting departments are charged with scouting the minors, the majors, their upcoming opponents, checking out talent to sign during the next draft or international scouting period, and some self-scout their own team for comparison purposes and trade value.
But once the post season rolls around, it is all hands-on-deck to get useful stats and materials to the manager.
The Royals admit that they found out that Price was tipping his change up, enough times the Royals hitters could handle it.
As recounted in SI, when pitching from the stretch when he threw a changeup, Price would take an extra deep breath, one where you could see his shoulders shrug, and he would hold his set a beat longer. It appeared to me the Royals knew the changeup was coming when Price was in the stretch. Royals sources confirmed it: Price tipped his changeup—maybe not 100% of the time, but enough for Kansas City to buy in.
There had been rumors about Price tipping his
pitches when he faced Texas in the Division Series. A Toronto source
told me then that such rumors sometimes pop up, and that the Blue Jays
heard that Price had been tipping his pitchers earlier this season when
he was pitching for Detroit, but “we looked into it and didn’t see
anything.”
A pitcher has the advantage on the mound. He knows what he is going to throw and where he wants to throw the ball. The batter is guessing. Most batters try to time the pitcher's fastball, and work back from that speed. But since it only takes a fraction of a second to determine if it is a fastball, cutter or change up, batters have to project the count and situation in order to make solid contact. If a pitcher is tipping off his pitches, then the advantage swings toward the batter.
December 29, 2014
PURGING THE PRESENT
The NFL calls the first Monday after the season ends "Black Monday," because that is when most of the coaches get the axe.
The Jets fired both their general manager and head coach, but immediately hired two former GMs to be consultants to find replacements.
The Bears just fired both their general manager and head coach, but have yet to officially announce the purge.
The concept of "cleaning house" usually means firing the coaching staff, or cutting ties with costly underperforming players. But since there is so much money at stake, and fans paying so much of it to want a quality product, ownership is now aware that only bold moves will keep the fan base content.
The Bears plight is probably a bad example of sports management. The team has constantly hired managers above their level of competency. GM Emery had never been a general manager; he was a scout. So the team promoted him several levels above his experience level. Coach Trestman had only been a QB coach in the NFL. He was an CFL head coach, but that is not at the same level. In NFL terms, Trestman's hire was promoting him three levels above his last NFL gig.
The team passed on an actual winning head coach, Bruce Arians, because the new GM wanted to control all of his staff hires. This is unacceptable to any NFL coach worth his salt. He wants his own coaching staff to fit his system; not a bunch a potential spies loyal to the GM.
So it is not a shock that the Bears woefully underperformed for the last two seasons because the managers put in place were over their head. Trestman, a quarterback coach, was supposed to fix the offense Lovie Smith could not do; and to tame Cutler and make him into a "franchise" quarterback. GM Emery made the mistake of giving Cutler a huge contract not tied to performance. As a result, there was no incentive to change his ways and actually work harder. The results were a dismal season.
A purge was necessary at Halas Hall. But with such cleaning, there still is a problem with the ownership and executives on who to hire next. These are the same people who hired Emery, who hired Trestman. The Bears have been unwilling to hire experienced NFL head coaches (possibly to save money).
The Bears make all their money before the season starts. The NFL is the king of sports television. So there is less an incentive to win because the profits are guaranteed by the league. It comes down to a matter of team pride. Does ownership want to win championships, or just be competitive in their division?
The Jets fired both their general manager and head coach, but immediately hired two former GMs to be consultants to find replacements.
The Bears just fired both their general manager and head coach, but have yet to officially announce the purge.
The concept of "cleaning house" usually means firing the coaching staff, or cutting ties with costly underperforming players. But since there is so much money at stake, and fans paying so much of it to want a quality product, ownership is now aware that only bold moves will keep the fan base content.
The Bears plight is probably a bad example of sports management. The team has constantly hired managers above their level of competency. GM Emery had never been a general manager; he was a scout. So the team promoted him several levels above his experience level. Coach Trestman had only been a QB coach in the NFL. He was an CFL head coach, but that is not at the same level. In NFL terms, Trestman's hire was promoting him three levels above his last NFL gig.
The team passed on an actual winning head coach, Bruce Arians, because the new GM wanted to control all of his staff hires. This is unacceptable to any NFL coach worth his salt. He wants his own coaching staff to fit his system; not a bunch a potential spies loyal to the GM.
So it is not a shock that the Bears woefully underperformed for the last two seasons because the managers put in place were over their head. Trestman, a quarterback coach, was supposed to fix the offense Lovie Smith could not do; and to tame Cutler and make him into a "franchise" quarterback. GM Emery made the mistake of giving Cutler a huge contract not tied to performance. As a result, there was no incentive to change his ways and actually work harder. The results were a dismal season.
A purge was necessary at Halas Hall. But with such cleaning, there still is a problem with the ownership and executives on who to hire next. These are the same people who hired Emery, who hired Trestman. The Bears have been unwilling to hire experienced NFL head coaches (possibly to save money).
The Bears make all their money before the season starts. The NFL is the king of sports television. So there is less an incentive to win because the profits are guaranteed by the league. It comes down to a matter of team pride. Does ownership want to win championships, or just be competitive in their division?
April 29, 2014
PIZZAMETRICS
In trying to explain to the casual fan or youngster about baseball, specifically why some teams are better constructed than other clubs, I had to find some sort of common ground of experience for the analogy. One could go through the philosophies of drafting, development, old school power hitting vs. power pitching and sabermetrics, but that would be like trying to teach the principles of calculus to a three year old. The most apt comparison I can think of is pizza.
Everyone knows about pizza. And everyone has had different experiences with pizza, both good and bad. So here is how I explain baseball to the novice, via pizzametrics:
A baseball team, like a pizza, can be divided into sections or slices. The whole pie is symbolic of the whole team. The hidden parts like the tomato sauce is team clubhouse chemistry. The outer crust would be the managers and coaches who hold the team slices together.
Each team can be divided into starters and non-starters. Every team has to play 9 players at a time; and depending on how you look at it, four slices or half the team performance is at stake. If each starter is a slice of pepperoni, people understand that those slices could be bigger, smaller, burned or greasy depending on the oven. A good team probably has three quality starters so that is one reliable slice of the pie. Each position player is assigned to another slice: "strong up the middle" is a philosophy of having good defenders at catcher, short and second base. The outfielders could be herded on one slice. And your traditional "power corners" of first and third base is the last starting slice. Each of the starting slices are sprinkled with green onions (which represents money) since these players are the highest paid on the team. Onions are both sweet and savory like winning performances. The last starting pitching piece is for the fourth and fifth starters, who are not the "best" starters on the team. Instead of onions, their slice has pepper flakes because these players tend to run hot and cold and give fans heartburn at times.
The other players on the team are represented by sausage because in some respects, bench and bullpen players can be grisly veterans who have lost their starting jobs. Depending on the quality of the meat, you can get some good flavor from bullpen and bench players. For example, the best pieces would be in the end of the bullpen slice: where the 7th, 8th inning and closer reside. These are the relief pitchers who are specialized to end games; and who doesn't like to savor the last piece of pizza?
The other bullpen slice is usually made up of failed starters converted to long relievers or fringe minor league journeymen who can possibly eat up innings in case of blow-out games. You don't expect too much from this slice; and as the graphic shows, the edge may be more burned than the rest of the pie.
The non-starter fielders are clustered into one final slice. They are subs. Many teams now have filled their benches with utility players, guys who can play multiple positions. That does not mean that they are any better at playing the game than just a second first baseman. Since they are not starters, they tend to perform worse than the starters (hence, the burned edges like the long relievers in the pen). So they are paired with the pepper spice. However, the stronger the bench or bullpen, the better the overall team will perform.
A good, competitive team may have six slices of the pie that are perfect.
A good team may have three slices of the pie that are acceptable.
A bad team may have six slices that are burned or undercooked or otherwise unacceptable.
By using the slice method to deconstruct your team, you can easily understand what is causing the bad taste in your mouth after a long losing streak. Pizzametrics is one way to digest your baseball!
Everyone knows about pizza. And everyone has had different experiences with pizza, both good and bad. So here is how I explain baseball to the novice, via pizzametrics:
A baseball team, like a pizza, can be divided into sections or slices. The whole pie is symbolic of the whole team. The hidden parts like the tomato sauce is team clubhouse chemistry. The outer crust would be the managers and coaches who hold the team slices together.
Each team can be divided into starters and non-starters. Every team has to play 9 players at a time; and depending on how you look at it, four slices or half the team performance is at stake. If each starter is a slice of pepperoni, people understand that those slices could be bigger, smaller, burned or greasy depending on the oven. A good team probably has three quality starters so that is one reliable slice of the pie. Each position player is assigned to another slice: "strong up the middle" is a philosophy of having good defenders at catcher, short and second base. The outfielders could be herded on one slice. And your traditional "power corners" of first and third base is the last starting slice. Each of the starting slices are sprinkled with green onions (which represents money) since these players are the highest paid on the team. Onions are both sweet and savory like winning performances. The last starting pitching piece is for the fourth and fifth starters, who are not the "best" starters on the team. Instead of onions, their slice has pepper flakes because these players tend to run hot and cold and give fans heartburn at times.
The other players on the team are represented by sausage because in some respects, bench and bullpen players can be grisly veterans who have lost their starting jobs. Depending on the quality of the meat, you can get some good flavor from bullpen and bench players. For example, the best pieces would be in the end of the bullpen slice: where the 7th, 8th inning and closer reside. These are the relief pitchers who are specialized to end games; and who doesn't like to savor the last piece of pizza?
The other bullpen slice is usually made up of failed starters converted to long relievers or fringe minor league journeymen who can possibly eat up innings in case of blow-out games. You don't expect too much from this slice; and as the graphic shows, the edge may be more burned than the rest of the pie.
The non-starter fielders are clustered into one final slice. They are subs. Many teams now have filled their benches with utility players, guys who can play multiple positions. That does not mean that they are any better at playing the game than just a second first baseman. Since they are not starters, they tend to perform worse than the starters (hence, the burned edges like the long relievers in the pen). So they are paired with the pepper spice. However, the stronger the bench or bullpen, the better the overall team will perform.
A good, competitive team may have six slices of the pie that are perfect.
A good team may have three slices of the pie that are acceptable.
A bad team may have six slices that are burned or undercooked or otherwise unacceptable.
By using the slice method to deconstruct your team, you can easily understand what is causing the bad taste in your mouth after a long losing streak. Pizzametrics is one way to digest your baseball!
April 19, 2014
MODELS CAN BE BROKEN
Mark Potash of the SunTimes tries to get a handle on the Cubs baseball model.
He finds it waning at the moment.
Potash knows that Cub fans will suffer through
another terrible season while the touted minor league prospects learn their craft in places like Kane County and Daytona.
Jackson may become the poster boy of what is wrong with the Cubs baseball plans. The system is lacking quality starting pitching, but the Cardinals seem to keep finding good arms like the 22-year-old Wacha who bested Jackson in the first St. Louis series of the year. And the issue is that the Cubs could have drafted Wacha, but instead chose Almora. The Cardinals picked 13 places later to select Wacha, who in less than two years made it to the majors.
Find talent. Evaluate talent. Draft talent. Quickly develop talent. Insert talent in majors. That has been the factory assembly line of young players being promoted to the Cardinals roster.
It could be that since new ownership, the models keep on changing: first it was the continuation of the Tribune entertainment model; then it was the Boston Way; then it was the minor league way of the Rays; and now people think the Cubs should pattern their organization after the rival Cardinals.
But it seems the Cubs front office is desperately trying to hold back talent to build of a surge of great young players hitting the majors at the same time to overwhelm the NL Central. But trying to "time" the arrival date of a low minor league prospect is like trying to time the stock market. It rarely works.
The Cubs are steadfast that their baseball model will work. They continue to draft higher than the rival Cardinals, who continue to have their prospects beat the Cubs' prospects to the majors. It seems the Cubs are standing still while the Cardinals to continue to beat them to the punch.
He finds it waning at the moment.
Potash writes "While
most Cub fans wait with anticipation for the Big Four — Javier Baez,
Kris Bryant, Jorge Soler and Albert Almora — to lead a
player-development renaissance that turns Theo Epstein’s woebegone Cubs
into a perennial contender, there’s another faction of Cub loyalists
that considers Epstein and Jed Hoyer flim-flam men whose baseball
judgment is not nearly as keen as they would like us to believe.
"Edwin Jackson continues to be
Exhibits A, B and C for that faction and that contention. The signing of
a pitcher with such a well-established record of fool’s gold to a
four-year, $52 million contract in January of 2013 reeked before the ink
was even dry. A fairly predictably dreadful season in which Jackson
habitually pitched poorly enough to lose — either falling behind early
or blowing sizable leads — made it clear that Epstein & Co. were
guilty of either signing a guy off some cherry-picked numbers or
terribly misjudging Jackson’s ability to compete."
Jackson may become the poster boy of what is wrong with the Cubs baseball plans. The system is lacking quality starting pitching, but the Cardinals seem to keep finding good arms like the 22-year-old Wacha who bested Jackson in the first St. Louis series of the year. And the issue is that the Cubs could have drafted Wacha, but instead chose Almora. The Cardinals picked 13 places later to select Wacha, who in less than two years made it to the majors.
Find talent. Evaluate talent. Draft talent. Quickly develop talent. Insert talent in majors. That has been the factory assembly line of young players being promoted to the Cardinals roster.
Even if you like the Cubs new focus farm
system is encouraging, the emphasis has been on taking prospects who will take longer to develop than a Wacha. And that may be the flaw in the Cubs current model: not signing enough major league ready talent that need only one plus years in the minors for seasoning.
But the Cubs will claim they drafted a slew of college pitchers one year. That is a true statement, but the team then assigned them to rookie and low A ball where some have been mired for years. At some point, caution has to be thrown out and the birds must leave the nest to see if they can fly at the next level of promotion.
It could be that since new ownership, the models keep on changing: first it was the continuation of the Tribune entertainment model; then it was the Boston Way; then it was the minor league way of the Rays; and now people think the Cubs should pattern their organization after the rival Cardinals.
But it seems the Cubs front office is desperately trying to hold back talent to build of a surge of great young players hitting the majors at the same time to overwhelm the NL Central. But trying to "time" the arrival date of a low minor league prospect is like trying to time the stock market. It rarely works.
The Cubs are steadfast that their baseball model will work. They continue to draft higher than the rival Cardinals, who continue to have their prospects beat the Cubs' prospects to the majors. It seems the Cubs are standing still while the Cardinals to continue to beat them to the punch.
November 3, 2013
MYTHS AND LEGENDS
In the after glow of the Red Sox third championship in 10 years, there are some pundits in Chicago who pose the question of how much of the current success can still be traced to Cub President Theo Epstein. For the Theo-heads, he is the mythical savior who is going to turn the Cubs around just as he did for the Red Sox.
But the problem with that thinking is that is it based on myth and spin.
The architect who lifted the Curse was Epstein's former boss, Dan Duquette.
Duquette became the GM of his hometown Red Sox in 1998. Duquette, not Epstein, built a baseball operations department which has allowed the Red Sox to be the only team in MLB to set attendance and revenue records every year since 1998.
The Red Sox went 656-574 in the eight seasons under Duquette, winning the AL East once and finishing 2nd behind the Yankees five other seasons. The Red Sox won the AL East pennant in 1995 before bowing to the Indians in the ALDS. The Red Sox were wild-cards in 1998 and 1999, only to lose to the Indians in the ALDS and the Yankees in the ALCS.
Under Duquette, the Red Sox made exceptional strides in improving their dismal history of poor race relations as an organization in the hiring of both coaching and administrative personnel with minority candidates. The minor league facilities and coaching availability were upgraded at every level during his tenure. This sounds like the plan the Cubs for their Arizona facilities.
But Duquette had a good eye for talent. Under this tenure, he drafted Nomar Garciaparra, David Eckstein, Adam Everett, Hanley Ramirez and Freddy Sanchez. He also made several major acquisitions that would ultimately play a part in the Red Sox 2004 World Championship, including acquiring knuckleballer Tim Wakefield, Pedro Martinez, Derek Lowe, Jason Varitek, Manny Ramirez and Johnny Damon. Duquette built up his minor league system with talent that he traded over 35 players from the farm system to acquire major league talent and to put a competitive team on the field.
Duquette was let go by the Red Sox in 2002 when the team was sold to new ownership.
The current Red Sox championship team has little connection to Epstein. New GM Ben Cherington inherited a lot of big money, bad contracts from Epstein's management era. The Red Sox imploded in 2012. ESPN.com stated that Cherington deserves to be in the conversation for a series of transactions that helped propel the Red Sox from a 69-93 civic disaster to a team that got to the World Series.
Cherington revamped the team by several bold moves. He traded for manager John Farrell to replace Bobby Valentine. He then sent an All-Star roster of Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford and Josh Beckett to the Dodgers to get rid of a massive amount of payroll. The new payroll flexibility that allowed Cherington to acquire Shane Victorino, Mike Napoli, Koji Uehara, Jonny Gomes, Ryan Dempster, Stephen Drew, Mike Carp, Jake Peavy and David Ross.
A more realistic view of Epstein's Boston tenure is like the thin filling between two layers of cake. He is not the perfect wunderkind that the media parroted from the PR releases. One of the keys that pundits still point to with affection is that they like that Epstein is always trying to find a loophole in the rules, an edge, "game the system," to get talent. Except the glaring problem with that notion is that why would a competent front office need to "game" the system if they knew how to acquire talent by traditional means in the first place? It seems to be an attempt to cover up weaknesses by telling the world that the front office is smarter than the rest of baseball (a familiar quote from owner Tom Ricketts).
But the problem with that thinking is that is it based on myth and spin.
The architect who lifted the Curse was Epstein's former boss, Dan Duquette.
Duquette became the GM of his hometown Red Sox in 1998. Duquette, not Epstein, built a baseball operations department which has allowed the Red Sox to be the only team in MLB to set attendance and revenue records every year since 1998.
The Red Sox went 656-574 in the eight seasons under Duquette, winning the AL East once and finishing 2nd behind the Yankees five other seasons. The Red Sox won the AL East pennant in 1995 before bowing to the Indians in the ALDS. The Red Sox were wild-cards in 1998 and 1999, only to lose to the Indians in the ALDS and the Yankees in the ALCS.
Under Duquette, the Red Sox made exceptional strides in improving their dismal history of poor race relations as an organization in the hiring of both coaching and administrative personnel with minority candidates. The minor league facilities and coaching availability were upgraded at every level during his tenure. This sounds like the plan the Cubs for their Arizona facilities.
But Duquette had a good eye for talent. Under this tenure, he drafted Nomar Garciaparra, David Eckstein, Adam Everett, Hanley Ramirez and Freddy Sanchez. He also made several major acquisitions that would ultimately play a part in the Red Sox 2004 World Championship, including acquiring knuckleballer Tim Wakefield, Pedro Martinez, Derek Lowe, Jason Varitek, Manny Ramirez and Johnny Damon. Duquette built up his minor league system with talent that he traded over 35 players from the farm system to acquire major league talent and to put a competitive team on the field.
Duquette was let go by the Red Sox in 2002 when the team was sold to new ownership.
The current Red Sox championship team has little connection to Epstein. New GM Ben Cherington inherited a lot of big money, bad contracts from Epstein's management era. The Red Sox imploded in 2012. ESPN.com stated that Cherington deserves to be in the conversation for a series of transactions that helped propel the Red Sox from a 69-93 civic disaster to a team that got to the World Series.
Cherington revamped the team by several bold moves. He traded for manager John Farrell to replace Bobby Valentine. He then sent an All-Star roster of Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford and Josh Beckett to the Dodgers to get rid of a massive amount of payroll. The new payroll flexibility that allowed Cherington to acquire Shane Victorino, Mike Napoli, Koji Uehara, Jonny Gomes, Ryan Dempster, Stephen Drew, Mike Carp, Jake Peavy and David Ross.
A more realistic view of Epstein's Boston tenure is like the thin filling between two layers of cake. He is not the perfect wunderkind that the media parroted from the PR releases. One of the keys that pundits still point to with affection is that they like that Epstein is always trying to find a loophole in the rules, an edge, "game the system," to get talent. Except the glaring problem with that notion is that why would a competent front office need to "game" the system if they knew how to acquire talent by traditional means in the first place? It seems to be an attempt to cover up weaknesses by telling the world that the front office is smarter than the rest of baseball (a familiar quote from owner Tom Ricketts).
October 23, 2013
THE FORMULA
The St. Louis Cardinals have advanced to the World Series. Again. Nothing distresses long time Cubs fans than the success of the rival Cardinals.
The Cards are a hybrid franchise: a small market team that has a big market fan base. They are what some called a "middle market" team as a result.
A Card fan breaks down the consistency of the organization as follows:
Strong farm.
Low-priced homegrown talent.
Smart trades.
Smart free agent signings.
Smart non-signings (cough, Pujols, cough)
Good managers.
3 million+ a year through the gates.
A good farm system is only as strong as the players in it. For that to happen, the front office must have an excellent scouting staff to find the diamonds in the rough. The organization must have a clear, set and consistent training method for all their minor league players. The Dodgers had a successful track record of teaching fundamentals and how they expected their players to play in the big leagues. This means that the minor league system must have coaching staffs that a) buy into to team training program; b) have the teaching skills to convey those principles; and c) the experience to make adjustments to help players succeed at each level of progress.
The major league minimum salary is about $500,000. The average major league player salary in 2013 was $3.65 million. Basic math shows that if you can plug in two or three home grown players on the 25 man roster (bench, bullpen or otherwise), you immediately save $9.3 million in payroll (which can be used to sign free agents).
Smart trades mean that you get what you expected in return. Trading veterans for prospects is more risky than trading prospects for a known commodity like a veteran. Trades are most important to fill immediate roster needs.
Free agent signings have two components: the age of the player (his expected performance life over his contract) and the deal (salary times years). Many organizations got caught in the trap of signing desirable free agents for extended years beyond their useful contributions. They "overpaid" in the back end in order to sign the player to the here and now play off run. Short sighted FA signings usually cost a team in the long run because it eats up the budget and causes inflexibility in future roster moves.
Many teams believe it is important to re-sign your club's own free agents. The fans have a connection with their star players, so some teams listen to the marketing department and re-sign players who may be over the hill but our popular with the fan base. Again, this is another potential trap that will cost a team in the long run.
There is a debate whether a baseball manager really affects the win loss totals. In some statistical analysis and general discussion, the consensus appears to be that a good manager can win a team 1 or 2 games per year; a great manager could win a team 3 or 4 games per year; but a bad manager can lose a team 4 games or more. This proposition presumes that the manager is using his roster to the best of his player's abilities. That the manager is putting his players in the best position to succeed. Generations ago, teams kept their managers for decades. There was some consistency that the field boss would not change. Players came to expect what their manager wanted from them. Today, managers have short tenures because of their win-loss records have a major impact on attendance or fan interest (the bread and butter finances of a team).
A consistent product on the field, with good fundamentals will bring fans to the ball park to support their team. Every fan buys a ticket to the game with the expectation that his team is going to win that day. Even if his team loses, the fan will be happy if his team was competitive, that the players hustled on the field, and that they did not lose on some bonehead mistakes. Fan loyalty is a hard thing to break unless the organization really screws up the way the team plays on the field.
The Cards are a hybrid franchise: a small market team that has a big market fan base. They are what some called a "middle market" team as a result.
A Card fan breaks down the consistency of the organization as follows:
Strong farm.
Low-priced homegrown talent.
Smart trades.
Smart free agent signings.
Smart non-signings (cough, Pujols, cough)
Good managers.
3 million+ a year through the gates.
A good farm system is only as strong as the players in it. For that to happen, the front office must have an excellent scouting staff to find the diamonds in the rough. The organization must have a clear, set and consistent training method for all their minor league players. The Dodgers had a successful track record of teaching fundamentals and how they expected their players to play in the big leagues. This means that the minor league system must have coaching staffs that a) buy into to team training program; b) have the teaching skills to convey those principles; and c) the experience to make adjustments to help players succeed at each level of progress.
The major league minimum salary is about $500,000. The average major league player salary in 2013 was $3.65 million. Basic math shows that if you can plug in two or three home grown players on the 25 man roster (bench, bullpen or otherwise), you immediately save $9.3 million in payroll (which can be used to sign free agents).
Smart trades mean that you get what you expected in return. Trading veterans for prospects is more risky than trading prospects for a known commodity like a veteran. Trades are most important to fill immediate roster needs.
Free agent signings have two components: the age of the player (his expected performance life over his contract) and the deal (salary times years). Many organizations got caught in the trap of signing desirable free agents for extended years beyond their useful contributions. They "overpaid" in the back end in order to sign the player to the here and now play off run. Short sighted FA signings usually cost a team in the long run because it eats up the budget and causes inflexibility in future roster moves.
Many teams believe it is important to re-sign your club's own free agents. The fans have a connection with their star players, so some teams listen to the marketing department and re-sign players who may be over the hill but our popular with the fan base. Again, this is another potential trap that will cost a team in the long run.
There is a debate whether a baseball manager really affects the win loss totals. In some statistical analysis and general discussion, the consensus appears to be that a good manager can win a team 1 or 2 games per year; a great manager could win a team 3 or 4 games per year; but a bad manager can lose a team 4 games or more. This proposition presumes that the manager is using his roster to the best of his player's abilities. That the manager is putting his players in the best position to succeed. Generations ago, teams kept their managers for decades. There was some consistency that the field boss would not change. Players came to expect what their manager wanted from them. Today, managers have short tenures because of their win-loss records have a major impact on attendance or fan interest (the bread and butter finances of a team).
A consistent product on the field, with good fundamentals will bring fans to the ball park to support their team. Every fan buys a ticket to the game with the expectation that his team is going to win that day. Even if his team loses, the fan will be happy if his team was competitive, that the players hustled on the field, and that they did not lose on some bonehead mistakes. Fan loyalty is a hard thing to break unless the organization really screws up the way the team plays on the field.
September 12, 2013
REINFORCEMENTS
Any general going into battle will have a handle on his reserves or
reinforcements. It is common sense and a tenet of preparation in order
to win any war.
A baseball organization is no different than a military force.
The Class AAA affiliate is the prime reserve for a team. Players are the most ready to contribute to the major league club by substituting for injured players, spot starts and depth at positions. The Cubs have used a record 54 players so far this year.
Here are all the player stats from Iowa:
Besides the Cubs in full rebuild mode, Iowa needs to turn over its roster as well. There are not any impact players who will be able to help the Cubs in 2014.
A baseball organization is no different than a military force.
The Class AAA affiliate is the prime reserve for a team. Players are the most ready to contribute to the major league club by substituting for injured players, spot starts and depth at positions. The Cubs have used a record 54 players so far this year.
Here are all the player stats from Iowa:
| Individual Stats (Batting) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Player | POS | G | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | TB | BB | SO | SB | CS | OBP | SLG | AVG | OPS | E |
| Brad Nelson | 1B | 126 | 428 | 52 | 116 | 20 | 2 | 20 | 71 | 200 | 49 | 90 | 2 | 1 | .346 | .467 | .271 | .814 | 6 |
| Logan Watkins | 2B | 107 | 412 | 51 | 100 | 18 | 7 | 8 | 26 | 156 | 52 | 98 | 10 | 9 | .333 | .379 | .243 | .711 | 13 |
| Mike Olt | 1B | 104 | 361 | 48 | 71 | 18 | 1 | 14 | 40 | 133 | 55 | 126 | 0 | 0 | .302 | .368 | .197 | .671 | 10 |
| Darnell McDonald | LF | 92 | 263 | 31 | 62 | 13 | 2 | 4 | 26 | 91 | 27 | 50 | 8 | 2 | .307 | .346 | .236 | .653 | 2 |
| Dave Sappelt | CF | 90 | 321 | 39 | 81 | 15 | 3 | 5 | 45 | 117 | 27 | 38 | 4 | 7 | .305 | .364 | .252 | .670 | 2 |
| Donnie Murphy | SS | 89 | 302 | 32 | 80 | 18 | 2 | 12 | 41 | 138 | 27 | 75 | 5 | 3 | .338 | .457 | .265 | .795 | 9 |
| Brian Bogusevic | LF | 79 | 265 | 50 | 84 | 14 | 3 | 10 | 32 | 134 | 41 | 58 | 16 | 2 | .416 | .506 | .317 | .922 | 2 |
| J.C. Boscan | C | 74 | 233 | 17 | 54 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 63 | 21 | 44 | 1 | 1 | .297 | .270 | .232 | .567 | 4 |
| Edwin Maysonet | SS | 72 | 219 | 22 | 53 | 15 | 1 | 6 | 33 | 88 | 11 | 44 | 1 | 3 | .283 | .402 | .242 | .685 | 5 |
| Ian Stewart | 3B | 67 | 199 | 32 | 34 | 12 | 1 | 7 | 26 | 69 | 34 | 81 | 0 | 0 | .303 | .347 | .171 | .649 | 6 |
| Ty Wright | LF | 66 | 232 | 19 | 65 | 14 | 1 | 6 | 36 | 99 | 22 | 36 | 3 | 2 | .344 | .427 | .280 | .770 | 1 |
| Jae-Hoon Ha | CF | 62 | 228 | 22 | 55 | 13 | 0 | 5 | 21 | 83 | 15 | 42 | 7 | 2 | .288 | .364 | .241 | .652 | 3 |
| Brett Jackson | CF | 61 | 215 | 24 | 48 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 23 | 79 | 21 | 77 | 7 | 5 | .300 | .367 | .223 | .667 | 1 |
| Tim Torres | 1B | 61 | 140 | 12 | 29 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 43 | 9 | 45 | 4 | 1 | .252 | .307 | .207 | .559 | 4 |
| Luis Flores | C | 61 | 191 | 17 | 39 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 17 | 62 | 23 | 32 | 0 | 0 | .295 | .325 | .204 | .620 | 4 |
| Brent Lillibridge | 1B | 48 | 160 | 19 | 45 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 13 | 68 | 9 | 45 | 6 | 3 | .331 | .425 | .281 | .756 | 6 |
| Edgar Gonzalez | 2B | 47 | 165 | 19 | 44 | 9 | 0 | 5 | 20 | 68 | 9 | 39 | 8 | 0 | .309 | .412 | .267 | .721 | 4 |
| Junior Lake | 3B | 40 | 156 | 30 | 46 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 18 | 72 | 10 | 33 | 14 | 5 | .341 | .462 | .295 | .803 | 9 |
| Josh Vitters | 3B | 28 | 88 | 14 | 26 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 45 | 11 | 19 | 1 | 0 | .380 | .511 | .295 | .891 | 4 |
| Julio Borbon | CF | 24 | 73 | 10 | 19 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 24 | 12 | 15 | 5 | 1 | .360 | .329 | .260 | .689 | 0 |
| Ryan Sweeney | RF | 23 | 83 | 12 | 28 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 16 | 52 | 8 | 15 | 1 | 0 | .396 | .627 | .337 | 1.022 | 0 |
| Steve Clevenger | C | 15 | 52 | 14 | 17 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 11 | 31 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 0 | .426 | .596 | .327 | 1.022 | 2 |
| Anthony Giansanti | OF | 14 | 29 | 3 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 13 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0 | .367 | .448 | .345 | .815 | 0 |
| Greg Rohan | 1B | 12 | 36 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 13 | 0 | 0 | .211 | .250 | .167 | .461 | 2 |
| Alberto Gonzalez | 2B | 10 | 33 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | .395 | .333 | .303 | .728 | 0 |
| Chad Noble | C | 6 | 24 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | .167 | .167 | .167 | .333 | 0 |
| Darwin Barney | 2B | 3 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | .615 | .600 | .500 | 1.215 | 0 |
| Danny Lockhart | 2B | 2 | 9 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | .444 | .556 | .444 | 1.000 | 0 |
| Cael Brockmeyer | C | 2 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | .375 | .167 | .167 | .542 | 1 |
| Individual Stats (Pitching) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Player | W | L | ERA | G | GS | CG | SHO | SV | IP | H | R | ER | HR | HB | BB | SO | WHIP | HLD | GF |
| Brooks Raley | 8 | 10 | 4.46 | 27 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 141.1 | 142 | 73 | 70 | 13 | 6 | 45 | 95 | 1.32 | 0 | 1 |
| Chris Rusin | 8 | 7 | 3.35 | 19 | 18 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 121.0 | 113 | 49 | 45 | 8 | 3 | 27 | 69 | 1.16 | 0 | 1 |
| Nick Struck | 6 | 8 | 6.17 | 22 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 109.1 | 139 | 83 | 75 | 17 | 4 | 54 | 56 | 1.77 | 0 | 0 |
| Yoanner Negrin | 4 | 7 | 4.17 | 34 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 108.0 | 126 | 58 | 50 | 6 | 7 | 31 | 118 | 1.45 | 3 | 5 |
| Guillermo Moscoso | 7 | 5 | 3.93 | 17 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 94.0 | 75 | 46 | 41 | 14 | 2 | 47 | 94 | 1.30 | 0 | 0 |
| Casey Coleman | 5 | 3 | 3.16 | 41 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 88.1 | 77 | 35 | 31 | 7 | 1 | 36 | 66 | 1.28 | 7 | 12 |
| Barret Loux | 4 | 6 | 4.84 | 19 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 80.0 | 85 | 46 | 43 | 4 | 2 | 46 | 76 | 1.64 | 0 | 0 |
| Drew Carpenter | 3 | 7 | 6.96 | 15 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75.0 | 99 | 59 | 58 | 14 | 0 | 30 | 45 | 1.72 | 0 | 0 |
| Hisanori Takahashi | 2 | 1 | 4.25 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53.0 | 53 | 33 | 25 | 5 | 0 | 22 | 61 | 1.42 | 6 | 7 |
| Justin Grimm | 3 | 3 | 4.31 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 48.0 | 50 | 24 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 19 | 45 | 1.44 | 0 | 0 |
| Marcus Hatley | 3 | 2 | 4.22 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42.2 | 40 | 23 | 20 | 2 | 1 | 21 | 49 | 1.43 | 2 | 10 |
| Brian Schlitter | 1 | 4 | 3.24 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 41.2 | 38 | 15 | 15 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 45 | 1.13 | 0 | 34 |
| Jeffry Antigua | 2 | 2 | 5.40 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40.0 | 43 | 26 | 24 | 6 | 1 | 14 | 30 | 1.43 | 0 | 4 |
| Kyle Hendricks | 3 | 1 | 2.48 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40.0 | 35 | 12 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 27 | 1.08 | 0 | 0 |
| Eduardo Sanchez | 1 | 1 | 3.38 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 40.0 | 31 | 16 | 15 | 3 | 5 | 23 | 35 | 1.35 | 3 | 16 |
| Jake Arrieta | 2 | 2 | 3.56 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30.1 | 32 | 16 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 39 | 1.58 | 0 | 0 |
| Esmailin Caridad | 3 | 3 | 5.02 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28.2 | 27 | 18 | 16 | 2 | 2 | 18 | 24 | 1.57 | 2 | 0 |
| Alberto Cabrera | 1 | 3 | 7.08 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20.1 | 26 | 16 | 16 | 4 | 0 | 12 | 19 | 1.87 | 3 | 3 |
| Zach Putnam | 1 | 1 | 3.26 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 19.1 | 20 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 22 | 1.34 | 2 | 8 |
| Michael Bowden | 0 | 0 | 2.41 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 18.2 | 14 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 28 | 0.91 | 1 | 5 |
| Blake Parker | 0 | 1 | 2.04 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 17.2 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 26 | 1.02 | 0 | 15 |
| Cory Wade | 0 | 2 | 7.94 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 17.0 | 29 | 15 | 15 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 18 | 2.12 | 0 | 4 |
| Marcos Mateo | 0 | 0 | 2.76 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 16.1 | 15 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 15 | 1.16 | 3 | 5 |
| Rafael Dolis | 1 | 0 | 5.40 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11.2 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 13 | 1.54 | 2 | 8 |
| Chang-Yong Lim | 0 | 0 | 0.79 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11.1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 12 | 0.79 | 3 | 1 |
| Matt Garza | 1 | 0 | 0.96 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9.1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 0.64 | 0 | 0 |
| Zach Rosscup | 0 | 1 | 0.00 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7.2 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 17 | 1.43 | 3 | 2 |
| Jaye Chapman | 0 | 0 | 17.05 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6.1 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2.84 | 0 | 1 |
| Jensen Lewis | 0 | 1 | 17.18 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.2 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3.55 | 0 | 3 |
| Alex Burnett | 1 | 0 | 8.10 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.1 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 2.40 | 0 | 1 |
| Henry Rodriguez | 0 | 1 | 5.40 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1.80 | 0 | 2 |
| Kyuji Fujikawa | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1.00 | 1 | 0 |
| Larry Suarez | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2.00 | 0 | 1 |
Besides the Cubs in full rebuild mode, Iowa needs to turn over its roster as well. There are not any impact players who will be able to help the Cubs in 2014.
| On offense, the best player was first baseman Nelson who is blocked by Rizzo. Third base is for the taking by Olt, but he had a dreadful season. He batted only .197, which brings back Vitters into the discussion about future third basemen. McDonald, Murphy, Bogusevic, Maysonet, Boscan and Gonzalez are old AAAA journeymen who even if they had "career" years are end of the bench reserves on a bad club. Watkins was promoted to the big club but has sat on the bench while Barney dolts around at .215 BA. B. Jackson was demoted to Class AA so his tenure with the organization is about over. On the pitching staff, we have seen the turnstyle of AAA pitchers come and go this season. Rusin beat out Raley as the 8th starter for the Cubs. Grimm, Lim, Arrieta and Rosscup are all going to be given a chance to show something this month. The rest are holdovers and not even projected to be good bullpen arms. The Cubs have an organization depth problem at the higher levels. There is certainly the rare occasion when a player is skipped up to the majors quickly like Junior Lake to have some success. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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