ESPN's Buster Olney reported that at least one MLB executive has proposed a radical solution to a mild problem. Olney's source stated that the game should be changed to seven (7) innings.
It would sure solve the 8th and 9th inning closer problems for many clubs.
But it really makes no sense.
Here are the issues MLB is stewing about:
1. The games are too long in duration. Most games now run more than three hours.
2. MLB is having trouble attracting young fans. The next generation has a perceived shorter attention span.
3. Teams are struggling with injuries, especially with pitchers.
First, the broadcasters would probably like to block out two and half hour blocks on a consistent basis to throw in another syndicated program with possibly more advertising profitability in some markets. However, baseball prides itself on being a historical game - - - which has not changed its basic format in more than 125 years. In that way, people can make player comparisons between eras. A 9 inning game is the standard for all pitching and hitting records.
Second, a study last year indicated that in a three hour game, there is only about 18 minutes of actual "action" on the playing field. If someone wants to speed the game along, batters should not step out after every pitch and/or pitchers should actually throw the next pitch within a few seconds. The expanded use of replay will add several minutes to every game. But, for a fan in the stands, baseball is a "social" game where you sit with friends with the ability to converse between the action. The next generation may have a problem with such basic social skills as conversation, but that is hardly a reason to upend an entire sports legacy.
Third, the specialization of the game is actually hurting the contest. Old school players from even the 1960s and 1970s were expected to start and finish each game, especially the pitchers. Hall of Fame caliber pitchers like Nolan Ryan or Fergie Jenkins expected to throw complete games. Many teams only had four man rotations and limited bullpen arms. But the game got caught up with the numbers of pitches, pitch counts, wear-and-tear on arm strength to morph into a controlled restriction of pitchers ability to pitch complete games. The advent of the bullpen specialist, from the long reliever to the lefty strike out guy, to the set up man and closer put starters on the course to pitch 100 tosses or 5 or 6 innings a start. The amount of pitching changes also slows down the game. Despite all the metrics to keep pitchers healthy, there is no clear evidence that pitching less actually helps.
On the flip side, many owners would want their fans to stay in the ball park as long as possible to purchase merchandise and high-priced concessions. Modern ball parks open the gates earlier or have upscale restaurants to draw fans in both pre-game and post-game. For most fans going to a game, they have already made the decision to make "a day of it." So, MLB focus on time of game is more to do with their network partners than ball park fans. But many clubs have learned recently that there is more money to be made in broadcasting than in attendance.
A seven inning game would have great ramifications on the sport. It would reduce the innings by 22.2 percent. It would reduce the amount of plate appearances by each player by at least 22.2 percent. With less innings to play, there will be a lesser need for 25 players on the roster. One could easily see a team wanting to save money by cutting a bullpen arm and a bench player to have a 23 man roster for the season. There would be less opportunity for scoring (home runs, triples, etc.). The average starting fielder may not even reach 500 AB in a season. All of the historic records would become meaningless in any comparison arguments. Baseball would effectively close its books on the past.
The bottom line is that money will make the final decision. If MLB and owners believe it is in their best profitable interest to shorten the game to seven innings, it will be done. But it would seem that decision would be the ultimate Hail Mary pass.
April 9, 2014
April 8, 2014
A BLUNT ASSESSMENT
Apparently during watching the Cubs home opener, SunTimes columnist Rick Telander gagged on the barrel of the pistol in his mouth when he heard one of the most nonsensical things out of the mouth of Tom Ricketts.
In a radio interview, Ricketts was asked why the Cubs can't field even an "average team" during their rebuilding process. Ricketts responded, ‘‘Eighty-three games? Theo and Jed could do that in their sleep!’’
So in his column, Telander proposes to put Theo and Jed to sleep.
Telander is cynical about the four years of Ricketts mouth dribble about ‘‘starting over,’’ ‘‘rebuilding,’’ and ‘‘trying to do it the right way’’to explain away the bad teams that haunt Wrigley Field the past four years. The first week of the 2014 season is a mirror image of bad play from prior campaigns.
If Theo and Jed are the boy baseball geniuses who can win 83 games in their sleep, then why have the Cubs averaged 94 losses in the past 4 years?
Telander is blunt with his assessment of the situation:
I will ask this again, as I have asked so many times in the 4½ years the Ricketts family has owned the Cubs: What other service business gets to stay open while it serves its clientele botulism-tainted meat, delivers termite-laden lumber, provides worm-infested seed corn?
In a radio interview, Ricketts was asked why the Cubs can't field even an "average team" during their rebuilding process. Ricketts responded, ‘‘Eighty-three games? Theo and Jed could do that in their sleep!’’
So in his column, Telander proposes to put Theo and Jed to sleep.
Telander is cynical about the four years of Ricketts mouth dribble about ‘‘starting over,’’ ‘‘rebuilding,’’ and ‘‘trying to do it the right way’’to explain away the bad teams that haunt Wrigley Field the past four years. The first week of the 2014 season is a mirror image of bad play from prior campaigns.
If Theo and Jed are the boy baseball geniuses who can win 83 games in their sleep, then why have the Cubs averaged 94 losses in the past 4 years?
Telander is blunt with his assessment of the situation:
I will ask this again, as I have asked so many times in the 4½ years the Ricketts family has owned the Cubs: What other service business gets to stay open while it serves its clientele botulism-tainted meat, delivers termite-laden lumber, provides worm-infested seed corn?
Telander also laments that the recent discussions taking up all our "Cub time"
is the team business, lack of capital improvement money, rooftops litigation threats and new expanded brick walls of construction projects around the park . . . but those discussions are never about
winning baseball!
Ricketts said fans will be really excited ‘‘when they see the plan in action.’’ Telander, and many other long term fans, do not believe in the final execution of any plan if the owner is a hapless sap who cannot comprehend the mediocrity that is before him on the hallowed grounds of Wrigley Field.
Very few people now buy the idea that the ONLY way for the Cubs to become competitive is to tear down the entire organization and rebuild ONLY from the minor league system like a small market, financially dependent team. Those are two separate aspects of running a baseball club: a major league team that is the focus of both present fan support and revenue generation and minor league affiliates where the club develops future talent. There is no reason to sacrifice the present for the sake of an uncertain future. But that is the core element of the Cubs plan.
It is all about the future prospects, the future ball park amenities, and the future championships . . . but nothing about the present mess costing Cub fans premium prices. At the turn of the last century, snake oil salesmen used to be run out of town for charging the public big money cures for colored tap water illusions of good health.
April 7, 2014
MONDAY MORNING MATH
Sunday was the best weather so far this season.
But of the 26,712 announced as tickets sold Sunday, it was estimated that 14,000 showed up. This was the smallest paid crowd on a Sunday at Wrigley Field since May 10, 1998 (26,710).
The no show rate was 45.5% of tickets sold. Wow.
If we take the estimated "season ticket holders" of only 16,000, that means only 10,712 non-season ticket holders bought tickets to see the game. Which means approximately 6,000 season ticket holders (37.5%) failed to show up for the game. But the no show rate was higher! That means at least 8 percent of non-season ticket holders who specifically bought tickets for Sunday's game decided at the last minute to NOT go to Wrigley Field.
Sunday's attendance was also down 12,000 from Opening Day, which itself was a 31.7% drop at the turn styles. There appears to be no groundswell of public wanting to "celebrate" Wrigley Field.
But of the 26,712 announced as tickets sold Sunday, it was estimated that 14,000 showed up. This was the smallest paid crowd on a Sunday at Wrigley Field since May 10, 1998 (26,710).
The no show rate was 45.5% of tickets sold. Wow.
If we take the estimated "season ticket holders" of only 16,000, that means only 10,712 non-season ticket holders bought tickets to see the game. Which means approximately 6,000 season ticket holders (37.5%) failed to show up for the game. But the no show rate was higher! That means at least 8 percent of non-season ticket holders who specifically bought tickets for Sunday's game decided at the last minute to NOT go to Wrigley Field.
Sunday's attendance was also down 12,000 from Opening Day, which itself was a 31.7% drop at the turn styles. There appears to be no groundswell of public wanting to "celebrate" Wrigley Field.
SANDBERG
Ryne Sandberg did a Sunday radio interview on WSCR.
Sandberg said that he got into managing as his kids were grown and leaving his house. He wanted to see if managing was something that suited him. So he went to the low minors, rode the buses and emersed himself in the job. He said that without six years in the minors, he would not have had the chance to learn to communicate with players on a daily basis and hone his skills as a manager in any given situation. He also indicated that the minor league tenure helped him set his managerial tone. He said without the minor league experience, he would have never been able to become a major league skipper.
It was a trial and error approach. Initially, Sandberg, who was a quiet leader as a player, was a boisterous and angry Larry Bowa-type manager. He got into umpires' faces. He got tossed. He had to learn how to control his emotions.
Players from the Cubs minor league system respected Sandberg as a manager, player and a teacher. And that is one thing that most people outside the Cubs organization classify as Sandberg's greatest trait: the ability to develop young players.
Baseball historians in the future may point to one or two events that shaped the continuing decline of the Cub franchise: the P.K. Wrigley ownership era, the Tribune ownership era with Sam Zell, Dusty Baker and the Bartman game, and perhaps the Cubs not hiring Sandberg to be their major league manager.
Corporate executives always preach that a company's strength is its "human capital." That means the workers who know the company products, services, methods and profitability centers are as valuable as the end product. You don't have to train a novice when you already have an expert on staff.
After 5 years in the Cubs minor league system (at all three levels), Sandberg had the expert knowledge of every prospect in the system. Most had played for him. Most knew what he expected from them. He taught them how to win as a team. These are all qualities that clubs want in their managers.
But the Cubs passed on hiring Sandberg. The reason was clear: Sandberg would have been a too popular figure in the Cubs organization. Sandberg would have public opinion on his side. He would not be "controllable" by the front office. They feared Sandberg could second guess the team's roster selections, free agent or trade moves. They did not want Sandberg to have a say in personnel moves because that would weaken their own authority.
Sandberg starts his first full season as Phillies manager. The team has decided to make one last championship run with a very old roster of veterans. But one can tell that Sandberg's hire is for a longer term, as in 2015 the Phils will start a massive rebuild with young players. Sandberg is the guy who can build a team around young players.
And this was the Cubs missed opportunity. Even with the Cubs tearing down their major league roster to "rebuild" the minor league system, a Cub manager named Sandberg could have gotten the most out of the old Hendry regime's minor league talent at the major league level. He would have stressed the fundamentals (which he does in Philadelphia: he said during the season he does an infield drill every three days; pitchers bunting drills; outfielder throw days, etc.)
During the opening home stand, the Cubs have reverted back to bad defense as Castro missed two easy grounders, and baserunning gaffes began to reappear with frequency. Renteria, who also had six years of minor league managing experience with two teams, may be a nice guy, a cheerleader, but he does not have the professional player status as a Sandberg. And at a certain level, major league players will only respond to coaches who have the credentials to back up what they are telling their team to do on the field.
In Cub lore, the missed opportunity is a recurring theme. By not hiring Sandberg, the Cubs missed a great opportunity.
Sandberg said that he got into managing as his kids were grown and leaving his house. He wanted to see if managing was something that suited him. So he went to the low minors, rode the buses and emersed himself in the job. He said that without six years in the minors, he would not have had the chance to learn to communicate with players on a daily basis and hone his skills as a manager in any given situation. He also indicated that the minor league tenure helped him set his managerial tone. He said without the minor league experience, he would have never been able to become a major league skipper.
It was a trial and error approach. Initially, Sandberg, who was a quiet leader as a player, was a boisterous and angry Larry Bowa-type manager. He got into umpires' faces. He got tossed. He had to learn how to control his emotions.
Players from the Cubs minor league system respected Sandberg as a manager, player and a teacher. And that is one thing that most people outside the Cubs organization classify as Sandberg's greatest trait: the ability to develop young players.
Baseball historians in the future may point to one or two events that shaped the continuing decline of the Cub franchise: the P.K. Wrigley ownership era, the Tribune ownership era with Sam Zell, Dusty Baker and the Bartman game, and perhaps the Cubs not hiring Sandberg to be their major league manager.
Corporate executives always preach that a company's strength is its "human capital." That means the workers who know the company products, services, methods and profitability centers are as valuable as the end product. You don't have to train a novice when you already have an expert on staff.
After 5 years in the Cubs minor league system (at all three levels), Sandberg had the expert knowledge of every prospect in the system. Most had played for him. Most knew what he expected from them. He taught them how to win as a team. These are all qualities that clubs want in their managers.
But the Cubs passed on hiring Sandberg. The reason was clear: Sandberg would have been a too popular figure in the Cubs organization. Sandberg would have public opinion on his side. He would not be "controllable" by the front office. They feared Sandberg could second guess the team's roster selections, free agent or trade moves. They did not want Sandberg to have a say in personnel moves because that would weaken their own authority.
Sandberg starts his first full season as Phillies manager. The team has decided to make one last championship run with a very old roster of veterans. But one can tell that Sandberg's hire is for a longer term, as in 2015 the Phils will start a massive rebuild with young players. Sandberg is the guy who can build a team around young players.
And this was the Cubs missed opportunity. Even with the Cubs tearing down their major league roster to "rebuild" the minor league system, a Cub manager named Sandberg could have gotten the most out of the old Hendry regime's minor league talent at the major league level. He would have stressed the fundamentals (which he does in Philadelphia: he said during the season he does an infield drill every three days; pitchers bunting drills; outfielder throw days, etc.)
During the opening home stand, the Cubs have reverted back to bad defense as Castro missed two easy grounders, and baserunning gaffes began to reappear with frequency. Renteria, who also had six years of minor league managing experience with two teams, may be a nice guy, a cheerleader, but he does not have the professional player status as a Sandberg. And at a certain level, major league players will only respond to coaches who have the credentials to back up what they are telling their team to do on the field.
In Cub lore, the missed opportunity is a recurring theme. By not hiring Sandberg, the Cubs missed a great opportunity.
MUTUAL MONEY OF OMAHA
The Ricketts have not calmed or put out the flames of last week's stories about how the family may seek minority investors for the team. The reason given by their PR people is that such a minority stake would help pay for the Wrigley renovation.
As previously posted, I don't think that would be the case in the conventional sense on how most people understand "Wrigley renovation."
To most people, Wrigley renovation means capital improvements to Wrigley Field itself. That means concourse reconstruction, new locker rooms, new public bathrooms, and the signage inside the ball park.
But the Ricketts lump their outside the ball park real estate project as part of "Wrigley Renovation." The zoning petition put together Wrigley signage and repairs, the triangle parcel and the new commercial development across the street in one package. Each one of those land developments is owned by a separate legal entity controlled by the Ricketts family.
Looking at the story from an investment viewpoint, the Ricketts out-of-pocket investment in the Cubs was about $100 million. The rest of the purchase was financed by debt as demanded by Zell and the Tribune. If Forbes valuation of the Cubs is right at $1.2 billion (and many people dispute the calculation and assumptions), if the Ricketts sell a 10% stake in the team for $120 million, they would be getting a 20 percent return on their investment.
It would get the family back its cash investment with a profit. It also would further put the Cubs baseball team on its own financial ledge. It is doubtful that the Ricketts personally guaranteed any of the existing Cub debt because of the unique collateral pledged in the deal. So the family has pulled its money out and now can wait for the team to generate dividends in the future.
Since the majority of the "renovation plan" is outside of Wrigley Field proper, this means that in order to go forward, the Ricketts would need to invest their own money in those projects (as commercial banks will not lend more than 75% of the construction value of any project). The payroll savings from the past few seasons from the Cubs could pay for the interior Wrigley Field repairs and construction projects. The new signage with sponsors should pay for themselves.
So the ability to get $120 million in cash out of the Cubs investment so the Ricketts can put that into the outside the ball park real estate projects may be the key to understanding what may be going on. For $100 million could meet the thresholds to borrow to build the triangle building, and hotel-commercial-parking structure across the street. In other words, Ricketts plan may be to move its existing investment in the Cubs to their new real estate venture. And this may be why the Ricketts are gun shy to do any work until they get everything they want from the city and neighborhood. They don't want to give up any equity in the Cubs unless they have to in order to fund their real estate projects.
Over the weekend, one potential investor was named by the media: Warren Buffett. The Oracle of Omaha is his generation's prudent investor. The Ricketts are also from Omaha. Buffett likes to say he will only buy companies that he understands, and that he always looks for a good return on his investment. Owning a baseball team is more a luxurious hobby than a prudent investment. It is an entertainment product with a growing feisty fan base. Buffett has recently dabbled in some risky businesses such as buying chains of newspapers (and winding up closing several papers because they were not profitable). Buffett taking a stake in a baseball team would be another odd divergence from his normal investment philosophy.
But adding an investor-celebrity like Buffett would give the Cubs management the aura that "they must know what they are doing" since a man like Buffett has bought in to their business model. But at this point, a business model that relies mostly on public relations and marketing is soon to fail when the actual business to build an entertaining and championship caliber baseball team.
As previously posted, I don't think that would be the case in the conventional sense on how most people understand "Wrigley renovation."
To most people, Wrigley renovation means capital improvements to Wrigley Field itself. That means concourse reconstruction, new locker rooms, new public bathrooms, and the signage inside the ball park.
But the Ricketts lump their outside the ball park real estate project as part of "Wrigley Renovation." The zoning petition put together Wrigley signage and repairs, the triangle parcel and the new commercial development across the street in one package. Each one of those land developments is owned by a separate legal entity controlled by the Ricketts family.
Looking at the story from an investment viewpoint, the Ricketts out-of-pocket investment in the Cubs was about $100 million. The rest of the purchase was financed by debt as demanded by Zell and the Tribune. If Forbes valuation of the Cubs is right at $1.2 billion (and many people dispute the calculation and assumptions), if the Ricketts sell a 10% stake in the team for $120 million, they would be getting a 20 percent return on their investment.
It would get the family back its cash investment with a profit. It also would further put the Cubs baseball team on its own financial ledge. It is doubtful that the Ricketts personally guaranteed any of the existing Cub debt because of the unique collateral pledged in the deal. So the family has pulled its money out and now can wait for the team to generate dividends in the future.
Since the majority of the "renovation plan" is outside of Wrigley Field proper, this means that in order to go forward, the Ricketts would need to invest their own money in those projects (as commercial banks will not lend more than 75% of the construction value of any project). The payroll savings from the past few seasons from the Cubs could pay for the interior Wrigley Field repairs and construction projects. The new signage with sponsors should pay for themselves.
So the ability to get $120 million in cash out of the Cubs investment so the Ricketts can put that into the outside the ball park real estate projects may be the key to understanding what may be going on. For $100 million could meet the thresholds to borrow to build the triangle building, and hotel-commercial-parking structure across the street. In other words, Ricketts plan may be to move its existing investment in the Cubs to their new real estate venture. And this may be why the Ricketts are gun shy to do any work until they get everything they want from the city and neighborhood. They don't want to give up any equity in the Cubs unless they have to in order to fund their real estate projects.
Over the weekend, one potential investor was named by the media: Warren Buffett. The Oracle of Omaha is his generation's prudent investor. The Ricketts are also from Omaha. Buffett likes to say he will only buy companies that he understands, and that he always looks for a good return on his investment. Owning a baseball team is more a luxurious hobby than a prudent investment. It is an entertainment product with a growing feisty fan base. Buffett has recently dabbled in some risky businesses such as buying chains of newspapers (and winding up closing several papers because they were not profitable). Buffett taking a stake in a baseball team would be another odd divergence from his normal investment philosophy.
But adding an investor-celebrity like Buffett would give the Cubs management the aura that "they must know what they are doing" since a man like Buffett has bought in to their business model. But at this point, a business model that relies mostly on public relations and marketing is soon to fail when the actual business to build an entertaining and championship caliber baseball team.
April 6, 2014
CONCENTRATION FAIL
I have seen a player wear the wrong uniform number in a game, but not the wrong uniform.
Junior Lake made the fashion faux-paux during the Pittsburgh series. He came out wearing the wrong uniform.
How could that happen?
Why didn't anyone notice?
The clubhouse attendants get the lockers in order for the players. The equipment managers pack and unpack the uniforms and place them in the lockers. Everyone is supposed to be on the same page.
So how could Lake wear the wrong uniform?
A prank. The press reports afterward did not indicate Lake was made the butt of a brutal joke.
Did the equipment people put the wrong uniform in Lake's locker? Well, yes, Lake had to have access to it. There may have been two uniforms in his (and everyone else's) lockers.
Why didn't the players next to Lake tell him he was suiting up wrong?
And this gets to the inner circle of a baseball locker room. Fans hear from the press (and various former players) that the locker room is the players room. Team leaders have great control and influence over the culture and professionalism of this fraternity house. A good, tight, professional, no nonsense locker room is good - - - the Yankees have maintained one for decades.
So besides Lake dropping the ball on his uniform snafu, so did the unnamed leaders in the locker room. One can imagine that the Cubs locker room may be like the ante room of a funeral home - - - the players expect the worst this season after the brutality of the past three campaigns. So there may be a lack of focus during the pregame. Everyone may be just looking after his self (because of all the press about the youngsters on the way.)
Or maybe many of the Cubs are blind. (Which could solve the riddle of the horrible RISP problem.)
The Cubs did not need another example of being a baseball laughing stock. But in pure Cub fashion, this team seems to gravitate towards badness like a moth to a light bulb.
How could that happen?
Why didn't anyone notice?
The clubhouse attendants get the lockers in order for the players. The equipment managers pack and unpack the uniforms and place them in the lockers. Everyone is supposed to be on the same page.
So how could Lake wear the wrong uniform?
A prank. The press reports afterward did not indicate Lake was made the butt of a brutal joke.
Did the equipment people put the wrong uniform in Lake's locker? Well, yes, Lake had to have access to it. There may have been two uniforms in his (and everyone else's) lockers.
Why didn't the players next to Lake tell him he was suiting up wrong?
And this gets to the inner circle of a baseball locker room. Fans hear from the press (and various former players) that the locker room is the players room. Team leaders have great control and influence over the culture and professionalism of this fraternity house. A good, tight, professional, no nonsense locker room is good - - - the Yankees have maintained one for decades.
So besides Lake dropping the ball on his uniform snafu, so did the unnamed leaders in the locker room. One can imagine that the Cubs locker room may be like the ante room of a funeral home - - - the players expect the worst this season after the brutality of the past three campaigns. So there may be a lack of focus during the pregame. Everyone may be just looking after his self (because of all the press about the youngsters on the way.)
Or maybe many of the Cubs are blind. (Which could solve the riddle of the horrible RISP problem.)
The Cubs did not need another example of being a baseball laughing stock. But in pure Cub fashion, this team seems to gravitate towards badness like a moth to a light bulb.
April 5, 2014
A CRAP SHOOT
For everything written about the Cubs since Ricketts took over ownership, they took a risk when they purchased the Cubs and its rickety old ball park (no pun intended). With each major roll of the dice, there is a decision, an outcome, an effect.
The first decision that Ricketts made was to take the highly leveraged structured deal proposed by Sam Zell. This high debt ratio has caused the team to divert millions annually for debt service. It has also limited any additional borrowing for capital improvements. It has also placed the team on the MLB watch list because the debt exceeds league standards (and MLB is afraid of teams going bankrupt and ownership being changed by the fiat of a bankruptcy court judge.) The deal has created a very weak financial team.
The second decision that the Ricketts made was the caveat that the family would not put any more investment money into the team. That meant that the Cubs had to sink or swim on its own revenues. This is also tied to the deal because the Tribune is a 5% partner, who would not contribute any more capital to the venture. As such, the Ricketts acquired the team with a very high payroll and very high debt service. After the first year, attendance has started to rapidly decline. With no infusion of new cash into the team, the team has to cut expenses and player payroll is the biggest slice of that pie.
The third decision that Ricketts made initially was to keep the Tribune's management team in place. In essence, new ownership kept old ownership executives who pumped up the deal in place instead of hiring their own independent baseball talent. In some respects, that has caused problems because the operating structure of the team was split field operations and business operations (dominated by Trib executives). One would assume that those Trib executives would hold fast to their prior view that the Ricketts got a good deal for the club, despite the set backs and onerous contract details.
The fourth decision that Ricketts made was hiring Theo Epstein to take over baseball operations. The Boston Whiz Kid was the hot commodity when he was booted from Bean Town. As a result, the baseball operations swelled with new hires, creating a two tier system of Tribune management and scouts and Theo's new crew. Epstein was not used to a financial restraint in Boston, where he could write big checks to gloss over bad free agent moves or obtain high price talent to fill gaps in the roster. With the Cubs, he was handcuffed by the financial deals in place. As a result, a new plan was adopted which was called the rebuilding program.
The fifth decision that the Cubs made was to tank seasons. By trading off veteran talent for prospects, it reduced the payroll of the team. By reducing payroll of the team, the Cubs could balance off falling revenues. By not signing free agents, the Cubs avoided the long term deals that lead to dead money payroll landmines. By filling a roster with journeymen players, the Cubs have sunk to the bottom. From their, the front office has used high draft picks to select "quality prospects." The whole rebuilding process is developing their prospects.
The sixth decision flows from the last one. The Cubs have put all their chips on their prospects becoming impact major league players, under six years of team friendly payroll control. The front office says trust us, we know what we are doing, but statistically, the odds are greatly against them. Only 6% of prospects become major leaguers. The various reasons for failure are injury, unable to keep up with competition, being blocked from promotion by better players, to family and personal matters. At this point, the Epstein-Hoyer team has not promoted one of their developed draft choices to the majors. The big roll of the dice is whether the team can field a roster of home grown talent that is competitive in the NL. Other teams, like the Royals, have tried for decades without much success.
The seventh decision is a confrontational one. The old Tribune guard was used to flexing the Tribune's muscle in the city. Politicians used to fear a major metro newspaper's power to control public opinion and election endorsements. But quickly, the newspaper and media properties have lost their clout as their readership and viewership have declined with the rise of the Internet. The Cubs grossly misunderstood their position when they first asked for public funds to rehab Wrigley Field. Then, they doubled down on trying to push through a massive real estate development project under the guise of "saving" historic Wrigley Field. The team has continued to alienate the neighborhood. The Ricketts want to have more events at Wrigley; they want to transform the intersection into a year-round party zone of their own new restaurants and taverns. Party at Cubs park is a major theme the business side of the organization is pounding on a daily basis in the minds of the public. Competition is one thing; but acting like a bully to muscle concessions from the city that the average businessman could not get is a risky proposal because the ire of the voters could lead to changes in ward.
The eighth decision was rather childish. The Cubs will not do any restoration work inside Wrigley Field until everyone agrees with their grand plans. It is like a kid on the playground upset with the scoring of his fellow players - - - so much so he takes his ball and goes home. It is like holding Wrigley Field hostage from itself. Even the most supportive Cub fan base question that tactic because they cannot understand why work on the public toilets, a new clubhouse and batting cage have anything to do with advertising signage or building a hotel across the street. Overreaching one's position is also risky: if your position gets to an absurd level, even supporters will turn on you.
The most current decision the team has made is to celebrate Wrigley's 100th anniversary with so much merchandising and special events that it makes all the talk merely white noise. It shows that ownership has continued to de-emphasize "baseball" as the foundation for coming to Wrigley Field. Wrigley Field is its own brand for special events, concerts, corporate outings, tours and other sporting events. It is being positioned not as the cathedral of baseball, but as an revamped entertainment complex like the Allstate Arena or United Center. It spanks of desperation to try to increase revenue at any cost. But that ties into the financial questions and decisions made above.
At this stage, all of the Cubs plans are one big crap shoot.
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