It was only a matter of time when the Truth would leak out about the Cubs disappointing post-championship seasons. Javy Baez recently ran out into the media highway to drop a few bombs on himself and his teammates.
The Associated Press reported that Baez said the Cubs
were lacking last year when it came to their pregame routines and work
ethic. “We had a lot of optional things, not mandatory, and
everyone kind of sat back on that — including me. I wasn’t really going
out there and preparing for the game. I was getting ready during the
game, which is not good,” Baez said. “But this year, I think before the
games, everybody should be out there as a team, stretch as a team, be
together as a team so we can play together.”
Cubs President of
Baseball Operations Theo Epstein said last week he could think of only
two times in 18 years of running major league clubs that he felt “basic
organizational standards for work, preparation and behavior” were not
being met. (One can easily say that was a shot at Joe Maddon's management style, being a "player's manager.")
New
skipper David Ross said at the end of the day, from a manager's
standpoint, coaches try to get players prepared and put them in the best
possible situation to succeed, but baseball has “always been about the
players.”
“So for (Báez) to say that, and saying the group feels
they can turn it up a notch, I mean, that’s a powerful message they are
sending,” Ross said. “This is never about the manager. It never should
be about the manager. When you're in that locker room, the players are
the ones affecting the outcome.”
(Ross is defending Maddon because he is right: players have to take the responsibility themselves to prepare for games.)
If the lack of preparation was a problem, then the front office is also to blame. The baseball executives have spent millions on new analytical labs, new coaches and trainers to tell players how to hit and pitch. Theo hired and fired three batting coaches in three years. We suspect that after a while, the players just tuned out everyone.
Dusty Baker, also a players' manager, often said that he left his players alone in their game preparation. He often cited that the players are "professionals" and professionals know how to act. He was relying on his own experience as a player (in a vastly different time.)
Ozzie Guillen was a vocal leader. But he continually stressed the fundamentals and principles of the game. Before the first game of every series, he scheduled mandatory fielding drills for all his players.
Theo wanted performance over potential in 2019. He did not get it because his players did not get the message. The reason is simple. The lack of any farm system talent and budget constraints means that there is no new players pushing the existing core to play their best. There is no real competition for starting position roster spots. There is a lack of urgency and drive if you know that there is no one on the team ready, willing and able to take your job.
The Cubs organization is in a total mess. Ross brings back the championship cred, but it may not translate to a strict manager berating his friends and former teammates to tow the line. How will he change a culture that has had the players merely going through the motions? It is not that Ross can sit players for not trying hard because he has to win now.
Showing posts with label team. Show all posts
Showing posts with label team. Show all posts
February 17, 2020
November 28, 2018
MADDON SPEAKS
At a charity event in Florida, the Tampa Bay Times caught up with Joe Maddon.
He had several things to say about his new approach in 2019, the status of Jim Hickey and not having a contract extension.
Maddon says he plans a significant change for next year in his managing style with a shift to more on field coaching work, which is apparently tied to baseball ops president Theo Epstein saying he expects Maddon to be "re-energized" by the challenges after last season's disappointing finish.
"That will be the part that will be different," Maddon said. "I've always kind of stayed free of coaching because I really want to stay out of coaches' way so they can do their job. I've always felt that is the right way to do it. But this year I'm going to get a little more hands-on involved in actually coaching. I think that's where the comment came from. …. I actually want to do less before the game talking to the media and whatever and try to get on the field more often."
Maddon said last week's departure of pitching coach Jim Hickey was not health related but said he couldn't get into specifics of what the "personal reasons" were. "He's fine," Maddon said. "He's not ill. His health is fine."
When asked about his lack of a contract extension, Maddon was nonplussed. He compared the situation as being a "free agent" not a "lame duck." He compares the situation to Manny Machado and Bryce Harper playing out their contract to get a new, better one. Players often do better in "contract years." Maddon is not worried about his future.
The three takeaways from the interview:
1. Maddon left too much coaching decisions to his staff in 2018. There will be no excuses for the 2019 results. He is going to take a more active approach in all phases of the players approach and execution. Whether he can get back to developmental basics with his players is going to be interesting.
2. Maddon was not phased by Hickey's departure or bitter by it. Perhaps there was something non-baseball related in the move. Maddon will now have new hitting and pitching coaches for the third year in a row. But he did not deflect it as a criticism of the organization or management.
3. He still wants to manage. He wants to succeed with the Cubs. He is preparing his 2019 campaign like a superstar free agent in his contract year. He is managing for a new contract, with the Cubs or some other organization.
He had several things to say about his new approach in 2019, the status of Jim Hickey and not having a contract extension.
Maddon says he plans a significant change for next year in his managing style with a shift to more on field coaching work, which is apparently tied to baseball ops president Theo Epstein saying he expects Maddon to be "re-energized" by the challenges after last season's disappointing finish.
"That will be the part that will be different," Maddon said. "I've always kind of stayed free of coaching because I really want to stay out of coaches' way so they can do their job. I've always felt that is the right way to do it. But this year I'm going to get a little more hands-on involved in actually coaching. I think that's where the comment came from. …. I actually want to do less before the game talking to the media and whatever and try to get on the field more often."
Maddon said last week's departure of pitching coach Jim Hickey was not health related but said he couldn't get into specifics of what the "personal reasons" were. "He's fine," Maddon said. "He's not ill. His health is fine."
When asked about his lack of a contract extension, Maddon was nonplussed. He compared the situation as being a "free agent" not a "lame duck." He compares the situation to Manny Machado and Bryce Harper playing out their contract to get a new, better one. Players often do better in "contract years." Maddon is not worried about his future.
The three takeaways from the interview:
1. Maddon left too much coaching decisions to his staff in 2018. There will be no excuses for the 2019 results. He is going to take a more active approach in all phases of the players approach and execution. Whether he can get back to developmental basics with his players is going to be interesting.
2. Maddon was not phased by Hickey's departure or bitter by it. Perhaps there was something non-baseball related in the move. Maddon will now have new hitting and pitching coaches for the third year in a row. But he did not deflect it as a criticism of the organization or management.
3. He still wants to manage. He wants to succeed with the Cubs. He is preparing his 2019 campaign like a superstar free agent in his contract year. He is managing for a new contract, with the Cubs or some other organization.
October 18, 2017
A WHIMPER, A WHINE
Joe Maddon said the Cubs have four Game 7s in a row.
Such the optimist.
He also said there was nothing he could say to motivate his team in this time of crisis.
We thought he was the great motivator when the Cubs hired him.
Gordon Wittenmeyer of the Sun-Times got Bryant and Rizzo to admit that they are physically tired in this Dodgers series.
The whole team looks lethargic. The mental fielding errors show a glaring problem. The lack of plate discipline is the reason for weak offensive production. The whole team seems to be dragging their heels from game to game.
But how can the team be collectively "tired?"
Yes, the Nationals series was a roller coaster ride. But the Cubs have only played 8 games since the season ended in early October. And the Cubs had 7 days off during that time period. And Maddon rested his regulars prior to the end of the regular season.
Part of it could be mental, part physical.
And the way Maddon managed the Nationals series had a direct, negative impact on the NLCS. He has a habit of doing things drastically different in the post-season than in the regular season, especially with his pitching staff. Starters as relievers, relievers pitching more innings than normal, and the quick hook on starters.
Perhaps the hitters are feeling the pressure of a weak bullpen. Perhaps the starters feel pressure of having to be perfect since the offense is not scoring runs. Perhaps the bullpen is imploding because of the pressure of bad defense plays leading to stressful relief appearances.
The Cubs are backed into a corner. A cornered, battered dog should attack. But in the case of the Cubs, they may just go out with a whimper.
If we look back at the preseason expectations, the Cubs were destined to get to the World Series and probably repeat. The young core had just learned how to win championships.
But apparently, the continuing excuse has been the young core has not learned how to celebrate championships. The championship "hang over" lasted to the All-Star break (and some whisper it is still present). If the Cub players and staff thought the Cubs were so good that they could "turn it on" at any point in the season or a series, we know now that is not true. It has never been true. Preparation, research, training, repetition and baseball intelligence of a pro player is a daily exercise.
The teams remaining in the playoffs have one thing in common: a lights out bullpen. The Yankees have former closer Robertson coming in at any inning like a firefighter containing a potential out-of-control blaze. The Dodgers use Morrow in a way to take down the other team's best hitters. A bullpen that can take the ball in the 6th and shut out an opponent is the key to victory - - - it gives the offense 12 outs to mount a comeback or hold the lead.
The 2017 Cubs did rest on their 2016 laurels. Schwarber is no longer Mr. October. Arrieta is no longer Cy Young, Jr. Hendricks looks like Older Greg Maddux. Baez looks like a lost rookie at the plate. The general expectations for 2017 were diminished by the WS win. But it is how the Cubs are losing is disappointing to many fans.
Some people are comparing the Cubs to the Blackhawks. The current Hawks won their first Stanley Cup with a young core surrounded by veterans. But they could not repeat. The team had to re-tool for the second championship and then again for the third. They had to re-learn the hunger to get the title. Hopefully, this can be the Cubs projected cycle: re-tool to win another championship before the window closes (i.e., Bryant and/or Rizzo's free agency).
Such the optimist.
He also said there was nothing he could say to motivate his team in this time of crisis.
We thought he was the great motivator when the Cubs hired him.
Gordon Wittenmeyer of the Sun-Times got Bryant and Rizzo to admit that they are physically tired in this Dodgers series.
The whole team looks lethargic. The mental fielding errors show a glaring problem. The lack of plate discipline is the reason for weak offensive production. The whole team seems to be dragging their heels from game to game.
But how can the team be collectively "tired?"
Yes, the Nationals series was a roller coaster ride. But the Cubs have only played 8 games since the season ended in early October. And the Cubs had 7 days off during that time period. And Maddon rested his regulars prior to the end of the regular season.
Part of it could be mental, part physical.
And the way Maddon managed the Nationals series had a direct, negative impact on the NLCS. He has a habit of doing things drastically different in the post-season than in the regular season, especially with his pitching staff. Starters as relievers, relievers pitching more innings than normal, and the quick hook on starters.
Perhaps the hitters are feeling the pressure of a weak bullpen. Perhaps the starters feel pressure of having to be perfect since the offense is not scoring runs. Perhaps the bullpen is imploding because of the pressure of bad defense plays leading to stressful relief appearances.
The Cubs are backed into a corner. A cornered, battered dog should attack. But in the case of the Cubs, they may just go out with a whimper.
If we look back at the preseason expectations, the Cubs were destined to get to the World Series and probably repeat. The young core had just learned how to win championships.
But apparently, the continuing excuse has been the young core has not learned how to celebrate championships. The championship "hang over" lasted to the All-Star break (and some whisper it is still present). If the Cub players and staff thought the Cubs were so good that they could "turn it on" at any point in the season or a series, we know now that is not true. It has never been true. Preparation, research, training, repetition and baseball intelligence of a pro player is a daily exercise.
The teams remaining in the playoffs have one thing in common: a lights out bullpen. The Yankees have former closer Robertson coming in at any inning like a firefighter containing a potential out-of-control blaze. The Dodgers use Morrow in a way to take down the other team's best hitters. A bullpen that can take the ball in the 6th and shut out an opponent is the key to victory - - - it gives the offense 12 outs to mount a comeback or hold the lead.
The 2017 Cubs did rest on their 2016 laurels. Schwarber is no longer Mr. October. Arrieta is no longer Cy Young, Jr. Hendricks looks like Older Greg Maddux. Baez looks like a lost rookie at the plate. The general expectations for 2017 were diminished by the WS win. But it is how the Cubs are losing is disappointing to many fans.
Some people are comparing the Cubs to the Blackhawks. The current Hawks won their first Stanley Cup with a young core surrounded by veterans. But they could not repeat. The team had to re-tool for the second championship and then again for the third. They had to re-learn the hunger to get the title. Hopefully, this can be the Cubs projected cycle: re-tool to win another championship before the window closes (i.e., Bryant and/or Rizzo's free agency).
March 25, 2017
FIVE REASONS
There are good reasons for the Cubs to repeat their championship in 2017. There are also bad reasons why the team will not defend its crown.
FIVE REASONS CUBS CAN REPEAT
1. Kyle Schwarber.
Having Schwarber for a full season is a significant upgrade to the offense. His serious knee injury downgrades the offensive depth at the catching position, and adds to left field negative defensive stats, but Schwarber is the inspirational contact hitter the Cubs lineup really needs to help settle it into a consistent machine.
2. Experience.
The experience factor is huge. The current Cubs now know how to win. They know how to pace themselves through a season. Pitchers are now more savvy on conserving their energy for a long season. Position players know how Maddon likes to move them around on the field and in the line up.
3. Wade Davis.
Davis is no Chapman, but he is a quality closer. Last season, Davis went 2-1, 1.87 ERA, 27 saves and 1.131 WHIP for a 1.8 WAR. He will add the stabilizer to another bullpen in the midst of a retooling. If Davis cannot go, the Cubs have some insurance with Rondon, Strop and Uehara who have closed games in the past.
4. Less Pressure.
The Cubs enter this season with less expectations. Fans are still drifting on Cloud Nine with their first multi-generational championship season. They are not clamoring for a repeat with the drumbeat of a spoiled brat. The players themselves have less pressure on to win a championship. They can continue to relax and play the game instead of grinding out wins. This Cubs team is best when it takes a carefree approach.
5. Javy Baez.
Baez was the most electric player in the World Baseball Championship (WBC) series. He now rates as an international superstar player. He has the skills and the flash to become a national baseball icon. The Cubs will have to get him more playing time because his talent demands it. And the fans want to see him play.
FIVE REASONS CUBS CANNOT REPEAT
1. Injuries.
Some core aspects of the team are young. But the starting pitching staff (Lester, Arrieta and Lackey) have experience but there is always the nagging thought of reliability. The Cubs went through 2016 without a significant long term injury to key players. The odds are against them this year. When Rizzo had back tightness early in spring training, it was dismissed quickly. But if you look at the roster, there are positions like first base and starting rotation that is devoid of quality depth.
2. Rotation.
Maddon has set his rotation: Lester, Arrieta, Lackey, Anderson and Hendricks. Lester deserves the status of being the ace of the staff. Arrieta has been unreal at times. Lackey being the 3rd starter shows the level of concern. He is at the end of the line as a 5th starter. Brian Anderson is the new guy having a terrible spring. But Mike Montgomery has not blown him away to earn the starting spot. In fact, Maddon likes Montgomery as swing man in the bullpen. Hendricks being the 5th starter may be the best one in the National League, but it is a protection move from the career workload of innings pitched last season. This season's rotation does not seem as strong as last year's.
3. Log jams.
The players get along. The clubhouse seems to be a happy place. But this year there will be some tension over the amount of playing time for position players. There will be public debates on how much playing time Baez gets as compared to Zobrist, Schwarber or even a LaStella. Even though Maddon can move players to multiple positions, he will not be able to appease each of them because they believe they have earned a full time starting position. Depth is a great asset but it can be a liability of dissent. If the Cubs have significant injuries, one or more of their young players could be pressured to be traded to shore up the roster. That can create tension between the manager and the front office.
4. Malaise.
The Ricketts family's 2017 focus is not on the Cubs but all its real estate projects around Wrigley Field. The Chicago real estate market is not in rebound mode. For the second consecutive year, Cook County and Chicago led the nation in population flight. The large corporate base that used to spend millions on sky boxes and luxury tickets has been tempered in the metro area. The Cubs raised ticket prices an average of 31 percent in order to capture more revenue from the Cubs while the slow construction of new revenue sources goes on. Epstein has acknowledged that the Cubs did not do much this off-season because he is under a strict budget cap. Ricketts does not want to spend any money on baseball luxury taxes as he had to do last season. As such, Epstein is again cornered with having to find a creative solution to a money squeeze. The last thing he wants to do is to trade away young, cheap and talented players to shore up his pitching staff. But he might have to do it since the organization has no minor league pitching depth.
5. Maddon.
Maddon kept his team loose and on the same page since his tenure as the Cubs skipper. His magic act has led to a championship. He deserves some credit for the team's success. But his juggling act, tee shirt slogans and funny bits can prove to be tiresome to some veteran players who may want more professionalism on the team than a fraternity carnival. If there was a tipping point against Maddon, it was in the Series where many of his moves got immediately questioned by both players and fans. One can pinpoint the players only rain delay meeting that could be the first rail split between manager and his players when they decided to win the series in spite of their manager's moves. Maddon still needs to both motivate and develop his players through another season. He now has to balance bigger egos and real competition for positions. It will be a new minefield to navigate especially when the local press is ready, willing and able to criticize his every move.
FIVE REASONS CUBS CAN REPEAT
1. Kyle Schwarber.
Having Schwarber for a full season is a significant upgrade to the offense. His serious knee injury downgrades the offensive depth at the catching position, and adds to left field negative defensive stats, but Schwarber is the inspirational contact hitter the Cubs lineup really needs to help settle it into a consistent machine.
2. Experience.
The experience factor is huge. The current Cubs now know how to win. They know how to pace themselves through a season. Pitchers are now more savvy on conserving their energy for a long season. Position players know how Maddon likes to move them around on the field and in the line up.
3. Wade Davis.
Davis is no Chapman, but he is a quality closer. Last season, Davis went 2-1, 1.87 ERA, 27 saves and 1.131 WHIP for a 1.8 WAR. He will add the stabilizer to another bullpen in the midst of a retooling. If Davis cannot go, the Cubs have some insurance with Rondon, Strop and Uehara who have closed games in the past.
4. Less Pressure.
The Cubs enter this season with less expectations. Fans are still drifting on Cloud Nine with their first multi-generational championship season. They are not clamoring for a repeat with the drumbeat of a spoiled brat. The players themselves have less pressure on to win a championship. They can continue to relax and play the game instead of grinding out wins. This Cubs team is best when it takes a carefree approach.
5. Javy Baez.
Baez was the most electric player in the World Baseball Championship (WBC) series. He now rates as an international superstar player. He has the skills and the flash to become a national baseball icon. The Cubs will have to get him more playing time because his talent demands it. And the fans want to see him play.
FIVE REASONS CUBS CANNOT REPEAT
1. Injuries.
Some core aspects of the team are young. But the starting pitching staff (Lester, Arrieta and Lackey) have experience but there is always the nagging thought of reliability. The Cubs went through 2016 without a significant long term injury to key players. The odds are against them this year. When Rizzo had back tightness early in spring training, it was dismissed quickly. But if you look at the roster, there are positions like first base and starting rotation that is devoid of quality depth.
2. Rotation.
Maddon has set his rotation: Lester, Arrieta, Lackey, Anderson and Hendricks. Lester deserves the status of being the ace of the staff. Arrieta has been unreal at times. Lackey being the 3rd starter shows the level of concern. He is at the end of the line as a 5th starter. Brian Anderson is the new guy having a terrible spring. But Mike Montgomery has not blown him away to earn the starting spot. In fact, Maddon likes Montgomery as swing man in the bullpen. Hendricks being the 5th starter may be the best one in the National League, but it is a protection move from the career workload of innings pitched last season. This season's rotation does not seem as strong as last year's.
3. Log jams.
The players get along. The clubhouse seems to be a happy place. But this year there will be some tension over the amount of playing time for position players. There will be public debates on how much playing time Baez gets as compared to Zobrist, Schwarber or even a LaStella. Even though Maddon can move players to multiple positions, he will not be able to appease each of them because they believe they have earned a full time starting position. Depth is a great asset but it can be a liability of dissent. If the Cubs have significant injuries, one or more of their young players could be pressured to be traded to shore up the roster. That can create tension between the manager and the front office.
4. Malaise.
The Ricketts family's 2017 focus is not on the Cubs but all its real estate projects around Wrigley Field. The Chicago real estate market is not in rebound mode. For the second consecutive year, Cook County and Chicago led the nation in population flight. The large corporate base that used to spend millions on sky boxes and luxury tickets has been tempered in the metro area. The Cubs raised ticket prices an average of 31 percent in order to capture more revenue from the Cubs while the slow construction of new revenue sources goes on. Epstein has acknowledged that the Cubs did not do much this off-season because he is under a strict budget cap. Ricketts does not want to spend any money on baseball luxury taxes as he had to do last season. As such, Epstein is again cornered with having to find a creative solution to a money squeeze. The last thing he wants to do is to trade away young, cheap and talented players to shore up his pitching staff. But he might have to do it since the organization has no minor league pitching depth.
5. Maddon.
Maddon kept his team loose and on the same page since his tenure as the Cubs skipper. His magic act has led to a championship. He deserves some credit for the team's success. But his juggling act, tee shirt slogans and funny bits can prove to be tiresome to some veteran players who may want more professionalism on the team than a fraternity carnival. If there was a tipping point against Maddon, it was in the Series where many of his moves got immediately questioned by both players and fans. One can pinpoint the players only rain delay meeting that could be the first rail split between manager and his players when they decided to win the series in spite of their manager's moves. Maddon still needs to both motivate and develop his players through another season. He now has to balance bigger egos and real competition for positions. It will be a new minefield to navigate especially when the local press is ready, willing and able to criticize his every move.
July 6, 2016
SLIPPING
The Cubs fast start spoiled many of their fans.
After going a fireball 25-6 to start the season, the Cubs have since "struggled" with a 27-25 mark.
The Cubs are still 9 games ahead of second place Cardinals in the NL Central. But many feel that there is something really wrong.
The objective evidence is that the vaulted starting rotation cannot get through 6 innings.
The objective evidence is that the bullpen is not as solid as last season.
The objective evidence is that opponents have adjusted to the Cubs - - - being more patient at the plate, getting pitchers into high pitch counts and stressful innings.
The objective evidence that the Cubs have been relying more on the home run than the congo-line big inning run production.
And the stellar defense has had a few big errors in recent weeks.
The Cubs have lost 5 of the last 6; 6 of the last 10; and 12 of the last 20 games.
Part of the problem may stem from the fact that the Cubs are starting so many prospects.
Part of the problem may stem from the fact that the Cubs still carry 13 pitchers which means the bench is small. Nothing is worse than having both Travis Wood and Jason Hammel pinch hit in the same game.
Part of the problem is that the Cubs line up is still triggered by Dexter Fowler in the lead off position. Fowler has a hamstring issue. There is no word when he will return. The Cubs want to be careful with Fowler so as not to rush him back in the line up.
Maddon knows something is a miss. He has been juggling lineups as strangely as Lou Piniella in his melt down year. He sent down Adam Warren to AAA to stretch out to start a six man rotation because the Cubs are on a 24 game without a day off schedule (but Warren comes back to start one game prior to the All-Star break). There may be more fear in the five starters continually to be average to poor pitchers after the break as to demote one (Hammel is a candidate).
Maddon keeps moving players around to keep them engaged in the team concept. With no set lineups, it is an adventure every day. He wants to keep his team loose. But it almost cost him when Albert Almora and Kris Bryant collided Monday in the outfield. Bryant left the game with a leg bruise, but it could have been worse. (The Schwarber injury was on a similar play.) Maddon likes his rookies aggressive play, but they still need to learn to adapt to major league circumstances. The veterans also need to get their baseball IQ refreshed like when John Lackey put his hands on his head after a passed ball, but failed to cover home plate allowing speedy Billy Hamilton to score from second base!
The baseball season is the longest and most grueling test in American sports. There will be times when players are physically and mentally tired. But good teams find a way to push through and grind out the tough streaks in the schedule. The most critical point of the Cubs season will be the first 10 games after the All-Star break. Will the Cubs return to their favored sons status, or will the fear meter continue to creep up to crisis mode?
After going a fireball 25-6 to start the season, the Cubs have since "struggled" with a 27-25 mark.
The Cubs are still 9 games ahead of second place Cardinals in the NL Central. But many feel that there is something really wrong.
The objective evidence is that the vaulted starting rotation cannot get through 6 innings.
The objective evidence is that the bullpen is not as solid as last season.
The objective evidence is that opponents have adjusted to the Cubs - - - being more patient at the plate, getting pitchers into high pitch counts and stressful innings.
The objective evidence that the Cubs have been relying more on the home run than the congo-line big inning run production.
And the stellar defense has had a few big errors in recent weeks.
The Cubs have lost 5 of the last 6; 6 of the last 10; and 12 of the last 20 games.
Part of the problem may stem from the fact that the Cubs are starting so many prospects.
Part of the problem may stem from the fact that the Cubs still carry 13 pitchers which means the bench is small. Nothing is worse than having both Travis Wood and Jason Hammel pinch hit in the same game.
Part of the problem is that the Cubs line up is still triggered by Dexter Fowler in the lead off position. Fowler has a hamstring issue. There is no word when he will return. The Cubs want to be careful with Fowler so as not to rush him back in the line up.
Maddon knows something is a miss. He has been juggling lineups as strangely as Lou Piniella in his melt down year. He sent down Adam Warren to AAA to stretch out to start a six man rotation because the Cubs are on a 24 game without a day off schedule (but Warren comes back to start one game prior to the All-Star break). There may be more fear in the five starters continually to be average to poor pitchers after the break as to demote one (Hammel is a candidate).
Maddon keeps moving players around to keep them engaged in the team concept. With no set lineups, it is an adventure every day. He wants to keep his team loose. But it almost cost him when Albert Almora and Kris Bryant collided Monday in the outfield. Bryant left the game with a leg bruise, but it could have been worse. (The Schwarber injury was on a similar play.) Maddon likes his rookies aggressive play, but they still need to learn to adapt to major league circumstances. The veterans also need to get their baseball IQ refreshed like when John Lackey put his hands on his head after a passed ball, but failed to cover home plate allowing speedy Billy Hamilton to score from second base!
The baseball season is the longest and most grueling test in American sports. There will be times when players are physically and mentally tired. But good teams find a way to push through and grind out the tough streaks in the schedule. The most critical point of the Cubs season will be the first 10 games after the All-Star break. Will the Cubs return to their favored sons status, or will the fear meter continue to creep up to crisis mode?
April 8, 2016
DODGER SPENDING
The Los Angeles Dodgers open the season with the largest MLB payroll: $253 million. Only one other team has a payroll more than $200 million.
From the data collected by Spotrac, the Dodgers are the Kings of Dead Money. The Dodgers do not have $253 million worth of talent taking the field on Opening Day. Of the Dodgers' $253 million in 2016 salaries, only $140 million (55%) is committed to players on the active, 25-man Opening Day roster. The other 45% of payroll, $113 million, is for players on the disabled list, key players in the minors, or former players now playing on other teams. The $113 million is more than the entire payroll for 14 teams, according news reports.
The biggest chunk is for players on the disabled list, inlcuding outfielder Andre Ethier ($18.0 million salary), pitcher Brett Anderson ($15.8 million), Brandon McCarthy ($12.5 million), and second baseman Howie Kendrick ($10.0 million). The Dodgers are also paying $23.7 million for players on other teams, including all $8.0 million of the 2016 salary for first baseman Michael Morse, who was traded to the Pirates last season with the Dodgers agreeing to pay most of his remaining salary.
The Dodgers are in the position to be spendthrifts because of its billion dollar TV rights deal with Time-Warner to create new Dodger Network. The Dodgers are still getting paid, but TW is getting burned since it has been unable to sell the channel to other cable and satellite TV providers.
The blueprint follows the big money teams of the Yankees and Red Sox, who could afford to bury their mistakes by buying or trading for expensive talent. However, outspending your opponents does not necessarily mean that you can buy a championship. The KC Royals are a prime example of that principle.
From the data collected by Spotrac, the Dodgers are the Kings of Dead Money. The Dodgers do not have $253 million worth of talent taking the field on Opening Day. Of the Dodgers' $253 million in 2016 salaries, only $140 million (55%) is committed to players on the active, 25-man Opening Day roster. The other 45% of payroll, $113 million, is for players on the disabled list, key players in the minors, or former players now playing on other teams. The $113 million is more than the entire payroll for 14 teams, according news reports.
The biggest chunk is for players on the disabled list, inlcuding outfielder Andre Ethier ($18.0 million salary), pitcher Brett Anderson ($15.8 million), Brandon McCarthy ($12.5 million), and second baseman Howie Kendrick ($10.0 million). The Dodgers are also paying $23.7 million for players on other teams, including all $8.0 million of the 2016 salary for first baseman Michael Morse, who was traded to the Pirates last season with the Dodgers agreeing to pay most of his remaining salary.
The Dodgers are in the position to be spendthrifts because of its billion dollar TV rights deal with Time-Warner to create new Dodger Network. The Dodgers are still getting paid, but TW is getting burned since it has been unable to sell the channel to other cable and satellite TV providers.
The blueprint follows the big money teams of the Yankees and Red Sox, who could afford to bury their mistakes by buying or trading for expensive talent. However, outspending your opponents does not necessarily mean that you can buy a championship. The KC Royals are a prime example of that principle.
February 4, 2015
PREPARE DEPTH CHARGES
As spring training looms, the Cubs official website has a graphic on the team's current "depth chart."
It is probably the closest we can get to the mindset of the management.
The starting rotation:
Lester, Arrieta, Hammel, Hendrick, T. Wood. (Wada, Turner, Doubront)
I would think Hammel would be #2, and the #5 slot a competition between Wood, E. Jackson, Turner and Doubront.
Outfield starters:
Coghlan, Fowler, Soler
No surprise here. The trade for Fowler puts Alcantara in utility role.
Infield starters:
Olt, Castro, Baez, Rizzo, Montero
With Valbuena traded for Montero, the third base caretaker position goes to Olt, who has just been plain terrible since becoming a Cub. If Bryant wants to play third, the position is wide open for him.
Bench players:
Alcantara, La Stella (infielders)
Szczur, Sweeney, Denorfia, Lake (outfielders)
Castillo, Ross, Lopez (catchers)
Bullpen:
Rondon (closer), Motte, Strop, Ramirez, Parker, Grimm, Rosscup, Schlitter, E. Jackson, German
UPDATE: The Cubs claimed left-handed relief pitcher Drake Britton from the Boston Red Sox on Wednesday. To make room on the roster, Chicago designated right-handed pitcher Gonzalez Germen for assignment.
With 13 known starting players (8 field + 5 starters), the team only has 12 positions left on the 25 man opening day roster.
Maddon's style has been comparable to NL skippers, so it is likely he would want another position player over a bullpen specialist in order to pinch hit, double move or platoon.
The Cubs will only carry one more catcher, Ross for Lester, so Castillo continues to the be odd man out. Olt is the weak link in the infield, so Alcantara and La Stella have to make the club (with the prospect that Baez may have to learn another position, third, if Olt fails). The only outfielder who is going to be on the bench is Denorfia. Lake, Sweeney and Szczur have weak journeymen skills at this point in their careers. Alcantara will be the 5th outfielder-super sub like Bonifacio did last season.
With four bench bats, that leaves a maximum 8 bullpen slots. An extra starter, such as Wada or Doubront could make the club, leaving seven pure relievers on the roster.
The bullpen depth has Parker over Grimm which is odd, unless Grimm goes back to AAA to reconvert to being a starter. The fall of E. Jackson appears complete if he is the 9th bullpen option, a role which I don't believe he will take. The Cubs have dead money on his deal so it is possible he will be cut.
The bullpen chart only has one unproven lefty, Rosscup. It is possible that Ortiz or Wada will become the lefty reliever.
As one can judge, the Cubs still really have little depth throughout the 25 man roster. It is still dominated by utility journeymen hitters.
It is probably the closest we can get to the mindset of the management.
The starting rotation:
Lester, Arrieta, Hammel, Hendrick, T. Wood. (Wada, Turner, Doubront)
I would think Hammel would be #2, and the #5 slot a competition between Wood, E. Jackson, Turner and Doubront.
Outfield starters:
Coghlan, Fowler, Soler
No surprise here. The trade for Fowler puts Alcantara in utility role.
Infield starters:
Olt, Castro, Baez, Rizzo, Montero
With Valbuena traded for Montero, the third base caretaker position goes to Olt, who has just been plain terrible since becoming a Cub. If Bryant wants to play third, the position is wide open for him.
Bench players:
Alcantara, La Stella (infielders)
Szczur, Sweeney, Denorfia, Lake (outfielders)
Castillo, Ross, Lopez (catchers)
Bullpen:
Rondon (closer), Motte, Strop, Ramirez, Parker, Grimm, Rosscup, Schlitter, E. Jackson, German
UPDATE: The Cubs claimed left-handed relief pitcher Drake Britton from the Boston Red Sox on Wednesday. To make room on the roster, Chicago designated right-handed pitcher Gonzalez Germen for assignment.
With 13 known starting players (8 field + 5 starters), the team only has 12 positions left on the 25 man opening day roster.
Maddon's style has been comparable to NL skippers, so it is likely he would want another position player over a bullpen specialist in order to pinch hit, double move or platoon.
The Cubs will only carry one more catcher, Ross for Lester, so Castillo continues to the be odd man out. Olt is the weak link in the infield, so Alcantara and La Stella have to make the club (with the prospect that Baez may have to learn another position, third, if Olt fails). The only outfielder who is going to be on the bench is Denorfia. Lake, Sweeney and Szczur have weak journeymen skills at this point in their careers. Alcantara will be the 5th outfielder-super sub like Bonifacio did last season.
With four bench bats, that leaves a maximum 8 bullpen slots. An extra starter, such as Wada or Doubront could make the club, leaving seven pure relievers on the roster.
The bullpen depth has Parker over Grimm which is odd, unless Grimm goes back to AAA to reconvert to being a starter. The fall of E. Jackson appears complete if he is the 9th bullpen option, a role which I don't believe he will take. The Cubs have dead money on his deal so it is possible he will be cut.
The bullpen chart only has one unproven lefty, Rosscup. It is possible that Ortiz or Wada will become the lefty reliever.
As one can judge, the Cubs still really have little depth throughout the 25 man roster. It is still dominated by utility journeymen hitters.
October 18, 2014
THE NEXT MANAGER
Rick Renteria has three years remaining on his Cubs contract. A great deal of Cubs observers believe Renteria is only a caretaker manager. He is supposedly good with young players; a teacher. But he does not have the track record to take a ball club from Point C to Point A (World Series).
What managers could be available in four years?
Current skippers whose contracts expire with Renteria are Bryan Price (Reds), Terry Francona, Walt Weiss, Don Mattingly, Bob Melvin, Bruce Bochy and Ryne Sandberg.
Bochy will probably get extended with the Giants, due to their current long term success. Mattingly does not seem to have the tools to get a superstar team to the next level. Weiss and Melvin are like journeymen players, meh. Sandberg is going to get an extended look in Philadelphia during its pending major roster overhaul. So this possibly puts Francona in play.
The Indians have continued to struggle as a small town franchise. It's player development profile has stalled and their prospects underperformed. Francona has a Boston connection with Theo Epstein. Francona is a big time manager, winning for the Red Sox. But at the same time, he helmed one of the great team implosions.
Cub fans would still like Joe Girardi, but he has 4 years left on his Yankee deal. And he had the chance to become the Cub manager, but declined to say in New York. If the Cubs are going to wait for Girardi, it could be a long and fruitless wait.
What managers could be available in four years?
Current skippers whose contracts expire with Renteria are Bryan Price (Reds), Terry Francona, Walt Weiss, Don Mattingly, Bob Melvin, Bruce Bochy and Ryne Sandberg.
Bochy will probably get extended with the Giants, due to their current long term success. Mattingly does not seem to have the tools to get a superstar team to the next level. Weiss and Melvin are like journeymen players, meh. Sandberg is going to get an extended look in Philadelphia during its pending major roster overhaul. So this possibly puts Francona in play.
The Indians have continued to struggle as a small town franchise. It's player development profile has stalled and their prospects underperformed. Francona has a Boston connection with Theo Epstein. Francona is a big time manager, winning for the Red Sox. But at the same time, he helmed one of the great team implosions.
Cub fans would still like Joe Girardi, but he has 4 years left on his Yankee deal. And he had the chance to become the Cub manager, but declined to say in New York. If the Cubs are going to wait for Girardi, it could be a long and fruitless wait.
September 4, 2014
OUT OF POSITIONS
I don't really know why the Cubs continue down the Henry-Quade spectrum of playing second basemen all over the ball yard. Logan Watkins playing right field? Really? He plays well defensively at second. Alcantara in center? He is still learning the position on the fly which is very hard, since Jimmy Piersall said repeatedly that CF is the hardest outfield position to play. Baez is learning second, and is doing well, but when he fills in for Castro at short, Baez is much better SS than Castro.
I know the concept that managers and general managers like: versatility. If you can play more than one position, then the team has more options (platoons, double switches, etc.). But all those utility players, in general, have to be utility players because they can't hold down one position as a true starter. A team filled with utility players is just a replacement level team in training.
So it is a little surprising that Kyle Schwarber is being pegged as a catching prospect. In 72 pro games, he hit .344, 18 HR, 53 RBI and 1.061 OPS. He should start in Class AA in 2015, with a possible promotion to Iowa mid season if he continues to hit well.
Schwarber's draft scouting report showed that he was probably the best fundamental college hitter, but he did not have the defensive skill set (and body type) to be a catcher. Most organizations felt he was destined to play left field.
The same is actually the chord on third baseman Kris Bryant. His size and range questions had him moving his bat to left field. But Bryant has told the Cubs that he wants to continue to play third base. In 138 pro games, Bryant hit .325, 43 HR, 110 RBI and 1.098 OPS.
One takeaway from the success of both Schwarber and Bryant is that despite the perceived defensive short comings, both players are comfortable playing their current positions. And if they are comfortable on defense, then they have less to worry about at the plate.
It is in the Cubs best interest to accommodate them because the team has no alternative players who can put up .300 BA, 30 HR, 90 RBI production at catcher or third base.
You let them come to spring training and win their starting spots. If the next crop of prospects, like Addison Reed, are going to be the shortstop of the future, then Castro needs to move to another position or be traded to another team. That's how the system has worked for a century.
But by tagging Schwarber and Bryant as left fielders, you just move the position iceberg to the outfield but not solve the problem of getting the best hitters in the daily line up. Barring injuries, Jorge Soler is going to play right. Schwarber or Bryant do not have the speed to play center.
Here is the current "push" chart of prospects depth chart:
3B: Valbuena - - - -> Bryant
SS: Castro - - - > Russell
2B: Baez
1B: Rizzo
C: Castillo - - - > Schwarber
LF: Coghlan - - - > Castro?
CF: Alcantara - - - > Almora
RF: Soler
Valbuena, Coghlan, Watkins and Alcantara fall to their roles as utility players.
But this push chart also shows that despite the huzzah of a prospect pipeline, the Cubs organization is still very thin. But pundits believe that the team having so many similar good prospects is a "good problem" to have. The Cubs may have fallen in love with their collection of prospects, and over-value their talent level so as to freeze themselves out of key veteran trades in the future.
I know the concept that managers and general managers like: versatility. If you can play more than one position, then the team has more options (platoons, double switches, etc.). But all those utility players, in general, have to be utility players because they can't hold down one position as a true starter. A team filled with utility players is just a replacement level team in training.
So it is a little surprising that Kyle Schwarber is being pegged as a catching prospect. In 72 pro games, he hit .344, 18 HR, 53 RBI and 1.061 OPS. He should start in Class AA in 2015, with a possible promotion to Iowa mid season if he continues to hit well.
Schwarber's draft scouting report showed that he was probably the best fundamental college hitter, but he did not have the defensive skill set (and body type) to be a catcher. Most organizations felt he was destined to play left field.
The same is actually the chord on third baseman Kris Bryant. His size and range questions had him moving his bat to left field. But Bryant has told the Cubs that he wants to continue to play third base. In 138 pro games, Bryant hit .325, 43 HR, 110 RBI and 1.098 OPS.
One takeaway from the success of both Schwarber and Bryant is that despite the perceived defensive short comings, both players are comfortable playing their current positions. And if they are comfortable on defense, then they have less to worry about at the plate.
It is in the Cubs best interest to accommodate them because the team has no alternative players who can put up .300 BA, 30 HR, 90 RBI production at catcher or third base.
You let them come to spring training and win their starting spots. If the next crop of prospects, like Addison Reed, are going to be the shortstop of the future, then Castro needs to move to another position or be traded to another team. That's how the system has worked for a century.
But by tagging Schwarber and Bryant as left fielders, you just move the position iceberg to the outfield but not solve the problem of getting the best hitters in the daily line up. Barring injuries, Jorge Soler is going to play right. Schwarber or Bryant do not have the speed to play center.
Here is the current "push" chart of prospects depth chart:
3B: Valbuena - - - -> Bryant
SS: Castro - - - > Russell
2B: Baez
1B: Rizzo
C: Castillo - - - > Schwarber
LF: Coghlan - - - > Castro?
CF: Alcantara - - - > Almora
RF: Soler
Valbuena, Coghlan, Watkins and Alcantara fall to their roles as utility players.
But this push chart also shows that despite the huzzah of a prospect pipeline, the Cubs organization is still very thin. But pundits believe that the team having so many similar good prospects is a "good problem" to have. The Cubs may have fallen in love with their collection of prospects, and over-value their talent level so as to freeze themselves out of key veteran trades in the future.
August 11, 2014
THE SHIFT
There is sudden push to change happening inside the Cubs.
Veteran journeymen are getting pushed off the roster by younger, untested players.
It seems that around August 1st, there were new marching orders on the North Side: bring in the kids.
The team is still on pace to lose more than 90 games this season. Attendance trends continue to be moving lower. Less attendance means less top line revenue. Less top line revenue means less money to pay for the expensive and now four year Wrigley reconstruction projects.
The end of this season is a litmus test for the organization: what kind of players do we have now.
Despite having their best player, Kris Bryant, stuck in AAA for the rest of the year to avoid the service time running to free agency, the Cubs seem desperate to change the major league roster and to energize new ticket sales or recapture the "hope" for the future. The Javy Baez HOF coronation seems to be tempered now that in his first 5 games he has gone 6 for 23, 3 HRs and 10 Ks. He has made some mistakes at second base, and most observers believe he is not suited for that position.
Jacob Turner, who was claimed off waivers, has quickly arrived at Wrigley to bolster the fading bullpen. Turner, however, projects more as a starter or at least that is what the front office is hoping for next year.
The shift from veteran journeymen to young minimum salary players can be cynically said to be a cost savings move by Ricketts. But the media continues to harp that the Cubs would be in the position to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on ace free agent pitchers like Jon Lester or James Shields. But it would have been more cost efficient to keep Jeff Samardzija than try to land a Lester for a 2015 team that still does not project to win 75 games. Star pitchers want to go to teams that can win championships. Despite the change of the new youth movement, the Cubs do not project as a championship caliber team. That is why it is very rare for a Marlins, Rays or Padres team signing an ace free agent pitcher - - - their culture and roster is not appealing to free agents who want to win now.
Veteran journeymen are getting pushed off the roster by younger, untested players.
It seems that around August 1st, there were new marching orders on the North Side: bring in the kids.
The team is still on pace to lose more than 90 games this season. Attendance trends continue to be moving lower. Less attendance means less top line revenue. Less top line revenue means less money to pay for the expensive and now four year Wrigley reconstruction projects.
The end of this season is a litmus test for the organization: what kind of players do we have now.
Despite having their best player, Kris Bryant, stuck in AAA for the rest of the year to avoid the service time running to free agency, the Cubs seem desperate to change the major league roster and to energize new ticket sales or recapture the "hope" for the future. The Javy Baez HOF coronation seems to be tempered now that in his first 5 games he has gone 6 for 23, 3 HRs and 10 Ks. He has made some mistakes at second base, and most observers believe he is not suited for that position.
Jacob Turner, who was claimed off waivers, has quickly arrived at Wrigley to bolster the fading bullpen. Turner, however, projects more as a starter or at least that is what the front office is hoping for next year.
The shift from veteran journeymen to young minimum salary players can be cynically said to be a cost savings move by Ricketts. But the media continues to harp that the Cubs would be in the position to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on ace free agent pitchers like Jon Lester or James Shields. But it would have been more cost efficient to keep Jeff Samardzija than try to land a Lester for a 2015 team that still does not project to win 75 games. Star pitchers want to go to teams that can win championships. Despite the change of the new youth movement, the Cubs do not project as a championship caliber team. That is why it is very rare for a Marlins, Rays or Padres team signing an ace free agent pitcher - - - their culture and roster is not appealing to free agents who want to win now.
April 7, 2014
MUTUAL MONEY OF OMAHA
The Ricketts have not calmed or put out the flames of last week's stories about how the family may seek minority investors for the team. The reason given by their PR people is that such a minority stake would help pay for the Wrigley renovation.
As previously posted, I don't think that would be the case in the conventional sense on how most people understand "Wrigley renovation."
To most people, Wrigley renovation means capital improvements to Wrigley Field itself. That means concourse reconstruction, new locker rooms, new public bathrooms, and the signage inside the ball park.
But the Ricketts lump their outside the ball park real estate project as part of "Wrigley Renovation." The zoning petition put together Wrigley signage and repairs, the triangle parcel and the new commercial development across the street in one package. Each one of those land developments is owned by a separate legal entity controlled by the Ricketts family.
Looking at the story from an investment viewpoint, the Ricketts out-of-pocket investment in the Cubs was about $100 million. The rest of the purchase was financed by debt as demanded by Zell and the Tribune. If Forbes valuation of the Cubs is right at $1.2 billion (and many people dispute the calculation and assumptions), if the Ricketts sell a 10% stake in the team for $120 million, they would be getting a 20 percent return on their investment.
It would get the family back its cash investment with a profit. It also would further put the Cubs baseball team on its own financial ledge. It is doubtful that the Ricketts personally guaranteed any of the existing Cub debt because of the unique collateral pledged in the deal. So the family has pulled its money out and now can wait for the team to generate dividends in the future.
Since the majority of the "renovation plan" is outside of Wrigley Field proper, this means that in order to go forward, the Ricketts would need to invest their own money in those projects (as commercial banks will not lend more than 75% of the construction value of any project). The payroll savings from the past few seasons from the Cubs could pay for the interior Wrigley Field repairs and construction projects. The new signage with sponsors should pay for themselves.
So the ability to get $120 million in cash out of the Cubs investment so the Ricketts can put that into the outside the ball park real estate projects may be the key to understanding what may be going on. For $100 million could meet the thresholds to borrow to build the triangle building, and hotel-commercial-parking structure across the street. In other words, Ricketts plan may be to move its existing investment in the Cubs to their new real estate venture. And this may be why the Ricketts are gun shy to do any work until they get everything they want from the city and neighborhood. They don't want to give up any equity in the Cubs unless they have to in order to fund their real estate projects.
Over the weekend, one potential investor was named by the media: Warren Buffett. The Oracle of Omaha is his generation's prudent investor. The Ricketts are also from Omaha. Buffett likes to say he will only buy companies that he understands, and that he always looks for a good return on his investment. Owning a baseball team is more a luxurious hobby than a prudent investment. It is an entertainment product with a growing feisty fan base. Buffett has recently dabbled in some risky businesses such as buying chains of newspapers (and winding up closing several papers because they were not profitable). Buffett taking a stake in a baseball team would be another odd divergence from his normal investment philosophy.
But adding an investor-celebrity like Buffett would give the Cubs management the aura that "they must know what they are doing" since a man like Buffett has bought in to their business model. But at this point, a business model that relies mostly on public relations and marketing is soon to fail when the actual business to build an entertaining and championship caliber baseball team.
As previously posted, I don't think that would be the case in the conventional sense on how most people understand "Wrigley renovation."
To most people, Wrigley renovation means capital improvements to Wrigley Field itself. That means concourse reconstruction, new locker rooms, new public bathrooms, and the signage inside the ball park.
But the Ricketts lump their outside the ball park real estate project as part of "Wrigley Renovation." The zoning petition put together Wrigley signage and repairs, the triangle parcel and the new commercial development across the street in one package. Each one of those land developments is owned by a separate legal entity controlled by the Ricketts family.
Looking at the story from an investment viewpoint, the Ricketts out-of-pocket investment in the Cubs was about $100 million. The rest of the purchase was financed by debt as demanded by Zell and the Tribune. If Forbes valuation of the Cubs is right at $1.2 billion (and many people dispute the calculation and assumptions), if the Ricketts sell a 10% stake in the team for $120 million, they would be getting a 20 percent return on their investment.
It would get the family back its cash investment with a profit. It also would further put the Cubs baseball team on its own financial ledge. It is doubtful that the Ricketts personally guaranteed any of the existing Cub debt because of the unique collateral pledged in the deal. So the family has pulled its money out and now can wait for the team to generate dividends in the future.
Since the majority of the "renovation plan" is outside of Wrigley Field proper, this means that in order to go forward, the Ricketts would need to invest their own money in those projects (as commercial banks will not lend more than 75% of the construction value of any project). The payroll savings from the past few seasons from the Cubs could pay for the interior Wrigley Field repairs and construction projects. The new signage with sponsors should pay for themselves.
So the ability to get $120 million in cash out of the Cubs investment so the Ricketts can put that into the outside the ball park real estate projects may be the key to understanding what may be going on. For $100 million could meet the thresholds to borrow to build the triangle building, and hotel-commercial-parking structure across the street. In other words, Ricketts plan may be to move its existing investment in the Cubs to their new real estate venture. And this may be why the Ricketts are gun shy to do any work until they get everything they want from the city and neighborhood. They don't want to give up any equity in the Cubs unless they have to in order to fund their real estate projects.
Over the weekend, one potential investor was named by the media: Warren Buffett. The Oracle of Omaha is his generation's prudent investor. The Ricketts are also from Omaha. Buffett likes to say he will only buy companies that he understands, and that he always looks for a good return on his investment. Owning a baseball team is more a luxurious hobby than a prudent investment. It is an entertainment product with a growing feisty fan base. Buffett has recently dabbled in some risky businesses such as buying chains of newspapers (and winding up closing several papers because they were not profitable). Buffett taking a stake in a baseball team would be another odd divergence from his normal investment philosophy.
But adding an investor-celebrity like Buffett would give the Cubs management the aura that "they must know what they are doing" since a man like Buffett has bought in to their business model. But at this point, a business model that relies mostly on public relations and marketing is soon to fail when the actual business to build an entertaining and championship caliber baseball team.
April 5, 2014
A CRAP SHOOT
For everything written about the Cubs since Ricketts took over ownership, they took a risk when they purchased the Cubs and its rickety old ball park (no pun intended). With each major roll of the dice, there is a decision, an outcome, an effect.
The first decision that Ricketts made was to take the highly leveraged structured deal proposed by Sam Zell. This high debt ratio has caused the team to divert millions annually for debt service. It has also limited any additional borrowing for capital improvements. It has also placed the team on the MLB watch list because the debt exceeds league standards (and MLB is afraid of teams going bankrupt and ownership being changed by the fiat of a bankruptcy court judge.) The deal has created a very weak financial team.
The second decision that the Ricketts made was the caveat that the family would not put any more investment money into the team. That meant that the Cubs had to sink or swim on its own revenues. This is also tied to the deal because the Tribune is a 5% partner, who would not contribute any more capital to the venture. As such, the Ricketts acquired the team with a very high payroll and very high debt service. After the first year, attendance has started to rapidly decline. With no infusion of new cash into the team, the team has to cut expenses and player payroll is the biggest slice of that pie.
The third decision that Ricketts made initially was to keep the Tribune's management team in place. In essence, new ownership kept old ownership executives who pumped up the deal in place instead of hiring their own independent baseball talent. In some respects, that has caused problems because the operating structure of the team was split field operations and business operations (dominated by Trib executives). One would assume that those Trib executives would hold fast to their prior view that the Ricketts got a good deal for the club, despite the set backs and onerous contract details.
The fourth decision that Ricketts made was hiring Theo Epstein to take over baseball operations. The Boston Whiz Kid was the hot commodity when he was booted from Bean Town. As a result, the baseball operations swelled with new hires, creating a two tier system of Tribune management and scouts and Theo's new crew. Epstein was not used to a financial restraint in Boston, where he could write big checks to gloss over bad free agent moves or obtain high price talent to fill gaps in the roster. With the Cubs, he was handcuffed by the financial deals in place. As a result, a new plan was adopted which was called the rebuilding program.
The fifth decision that the Cubs made was to tank seasons. By trading off veteran talent for prospects, it reduced the payroll of the team. By reducing payroll of the team, the Cubs could balance off falling revenues. By not signing free agents, the Cubs avoided the long term deals that lead to dead money payroll landmines. By filling a roster with journeymen players, the Cubs have sunk to the bottom. From their, the front office has used high draft picks to select "quality prospects." The whole rebuilding process is developing their prospects.
The sixth decision flows from the last one. The Cubs have put all their chips on their prospects becoming impact major league players, under six years of team friendly payroll control. The front office says trust us, we know what we are doing, but statistically, the odds are greatly against them. Only 6% of prospects become major leaguers. The various reasons for failure are injury, unable to keep up with competition, being blocked from promotion by better players, to family and personal matters. At this point, the Epstein-Hoyer team has not promoted one of their developed draft choices to the majors. The big roll of the dice is whether the team can field a roster of home grown talent that is competitive in the NL. Other teams, like the Royals, have tried for decades without much success.
The seventh decision is a confrontational one. The old Tribune guard was used to flexing the Tribune's muscle in the city. Politicians used to fear a major metro newspaper's power to control public opinion and election endorsements. But quickly, the newspaper and media properties have lost their clout as their readership and viewership have declined with the rise of the Internet. The Cubs grossly misunderstood their position when they first asked for public funds to rehab Wrigley Field. Then, they doubled down on trying to push through a massive real estate development project under the guise of "saving" historic Wrigley Field. The team has continued to alienate the neighborhood. The Ricketts want to have more events at Wrigley; they want to transform the intersection into a year-round party zone of their own new restaurants and taverns. Party at Cubs park is a major theme the business side of the organization is pounding on a daily basis in the minds of the public. Competition is one thing; but acting like a bully to muscle concessions from the city that the average businessman could not get is a risky proposal because the ire of the voters could lead to changes in ward.
The eighth decision was rather childish. The Cubs will not do any restoration work inside Wrigley Field until everyone agrees with their grand plans. It is like a kid on the playground upset with the scoring of his fellow players - - - so much so he takes his ball and goes home. It is like holding Wrigley Field hostage from itself. Even the most supportive Cub fan base question that tactic because they cannot understand why work on the public toilets, a new clubhouse and batting cage have anything to do with advertising signage or building a hotel across the street. Overreaching one's position is also risky: if your position gets to an absurd level, even supporters will turn on you.
The most current decision the team has made is to celebrate Wrigley's 100th anniversary with so much merchandising and special events that it makes all the talk merely white noise. It shows that ownership has continued to de-emphasize "baseball" as the foundation for coming to Wrigley Field. Wrigley Field is its own brand for special events, concerts, corporate outings, tours and other sporting events. It is being positioned not as the cathedral of baseball, but as an revamped entertainment complex like the Allstate Arena or United Center. It spanks of desperation to try to increase revenue at any cost. But that ties into the financial questions and decisions made above.
At this stage, all of the Cubs plans are one big crap shoot.
March 18, 2014
MORALE OF THE STORY
Theo Epstein states that the Cubs morale is "fantastic."
Moraleis defined as the confidence, enthusiasm, and discipline of a person or group at a particular time: example, their morale was high.
The word's origin is 18th Century French from "moral," respelled to preserve the final stress in pronunciation.
The real final stress of spring training and the Cubs is the fact that good morale does not equal a good, winning baseball team.
What we know is that exiled Brett Jackson is second on the spring team in RBIs with 7.
The Cubs have gone 9-10 in Cactus league play through Sunday; with 80 runs scored against 103 runs allowed (second worst in the league).
The starters have all had horrible springs: ERAs: Rusin 5.40, C. Villaneuva 5.87, T. Wood 5.90. Samardzija 6.39 and E. Jackson 7.20.
And the only truth be told this spring so far is that Mike Olt would make a fine DH. Except the Cubs play in a league without the designated hitter.
Moraleis defined as the confidence, enthusiasm, and discipline of a person or group at a particular time: example, their morale was high.
The word's origin is 18th Century French from "moral," respelled to preserve the final stress in pronunciation.
The real final stress of spring training and the Cubs is the fact that good morale does not equal a good, winning baseball team.
What we know is that exiled Brett Jackson is second on the spring team in RBIs with 7.
The Cubs have gone 9-10 in Cactus league play through Sunday; with 80 runs scored against 103 runs allowed (second worst in the league).
The starters have all had horrible springs: ERAs: Rusin 5.40, C. Villaneuva 5.87, T. Wood 5.90. Samardzija 6.39 and E. Jackson 7.20.
And the only truth be told this spring so far is that Mike Olt would make a fine DH. Except the Cubs play in a league without the designated hitter.
March 4, 2014
LINE UP CONSTRUCTION
There are various theories on how a manager should construct his line up card.
A group of statisticians and sabermetric guys have proposed that the numbers show that:
A. Lefty/right platoon situations do work. Right handed hitters hit lefty pitchers better; and vice versa.
B. High on-base percentage players are more valuable than free swingers (i.e. hitters who cannot get on base by walk or hit-by-pitch).
C. Team speed at critical positions is important to avoid double plays (which destroys run production opportunities).
The two critical stats in their minds are
OBP = (hits + walks+ hit by pitches)/plate appearances
OPS = OBP + (total bases/at bats)
There is a theory that this is the format for a good National League line up:
1. Lead off hitter should be the highest OBP hitter on the team.
2. Second hitter should be the second highest OBP hitter, preferable with speed to avoid double plays.
3. The third hitter should be the highest OPS hitter on the team.
4. The clean up hitter should be the second highest OPS hitter on the team. The #3 and #4 hitters are the main gears in driving in runs.
5. The fifth hitter should be the third highest OBP hitter or third highest OPS hitter if statistically close.
6. The sixth hitter should be the third or fourth highest OPS hitter on the team.
7. The seventh batter should be the best OPS starter left.
8. The eighth hitter should be the best OBP starter left, so that the pitcher in the #9 slot can sacrifice him into scoring position to have the best hitters on the team come up at the top of the order.
On the other hand, shouldn't the best line up card have the best hitters at the top of the order?
If the key stat is OPS (which incorporates OBP into the formula),
the true meaning of OPS can be condensed as follows:
OPS = H/SF + TB/AB
A random player is chosen to discuss: Starlin Castro.
In 2013, he played in 161 games. He had a .245 BA, .284 OBP and .631 OPS. He hit 10 HR, 44 RBI and 9 SB with a negative 0.6 WAR.
Castro's 2013 condensed OPS = 163 H/1SF + 231 TB/666AB
Castro's condensed OPS = 163 77/222.
What jumps out is that this result nearly matches Castro's HIT total.
In 2013, Anthony Rizzo played in 160 games. By comparison, he hit .233 BA, .323 OBP, .724 OPS with 23 HR, 80 RBI, 6 SB and 2.6 WAR. By all measures, Rizzo had a better season than Castro.
Rizzo's 2013 condensed OPS = 141 H/2SF + 254 TB/606AB
Rizzo's condensed OPS = 70 557/606
What jumps out is that this number is nearly one-half of Rizzo's hit total (which is skewered by the fact he had one more sacrifice fly than Castro did).
If you believe that a sacrifice is a "productive out," then it should not have so much negative drag in judging a player's offensive production.
Statistics can be manipulated to achieve certain results. Baseball is another example of trying to glean a bigger pitcher from smaller quantitative analysis of putting game action into numbers.
But one cannot lose simple common sense. In order to have the best line up, the key statistic for all hitters is HITS. The team's best hitters should be at the top of the order.
Based on last year's stats, the 2013 Cubs order should have been:
1. Castro, ss 163
2. Rizzo, 1b, 141
3. Schierholtz, rf, 116
4. Castillo, c, 104
5. Barney, 2b, 104
6. Soriano, lf, 92
7. Valbuena 3b 72
8. DeJesus, cf, 71
A group of statisticians and sabermetric guys have proposed that the numbers show that:
A. Lefty/right platoon situations do work. Right handed hitters hit lefty pitchers better; and vice versa.
B. High on-base percentage players are more valuable than free swingers (i.e. hitters who cannot get on base by walk or hit-by-pitch).
C. Team speed at critical positions is important to avoid double plays (which destroys run production opportunities).
The two critical stats in their minds are
OBP = (hits + walks+ hit by pitches)/plate appearances
OPS = OBP + (total bases/at bats)
There is a theory that this is the format for a good National League line up:
1. Lead off hitter should be the highest OBP hitter on the team.
2. Second hitter should be the second highest OBP hitter, preferable with speed to avoid double plays.
3. The third hitter should be the highest OPS hitter on the team.
4. The clean up hitter should be the second highest OPS hitter on the team. The #3 and #4 hitters are the main gears in driving in runs.
5. The fifth hitter should be the third highest OBP hitter or third highest OPS hitter if statistically close.
6. The sixth hitter should be the third or fourth highest OPS hitter on the team.
7. The seventh batter should be the best OPS starter left.
8. The eighth hitter should be the best OBP starter left, so that the pitcher in the #9 slot can sacrifice him into scoring position to have the best hitters on the team come up at the top of the order.
On the other hand, shouldn't the best line up card have the best hitters at the top of the order?
If the key stat is OPS (which incorporates OBP into the formula),
the true meaning of OPS can be condensed as follows:
OPS = H/SF + TB/AB
A random player is chosen to discuss: Starlin Castro.
In 2013, he played in 161 games. He had a .245 BA, .284 OBP and .631 OPS. He hit 10 HR, 44 RBI and 9 SB with a negative 0.6 WAR.
Castro's 2013 condensed OPS = 163 H/1SF + 231 TB/666AB
Castro's condensed OPS = 163 77/222.
What jumps out is that this result nearly matches Castro's HIT total.
In 2013, Anthony Rizzo played in 160 games. By comparison, he hit .233 BA, .323 OBP, .724 OPS with 23 HR, 80 RBI, 6 SB and 2.6 WAR. By all measures, Rizzo had a better season than Castro.
Rizzo's 2013 condensed OPS = 141 H/2SF + 254 TB/606AB
Rizzo's condensed OPS = 70 557/606
What jumps out is that this number is nearly one-half of Rizzo's hit total (which is skewered by the fact he had one more sacrifice fly than Castro did).
If you believe that a sacrifice is a "productive out," then it should not have so much negative drag in judging a player's offensive production.
Statistics can be manipulated to achieve certain results. Baseball is another example of trying to glean a bigger pitcher from smaller quantitative analysis of putting game action into numbers.
But one cannot lose simple common sense. In order to have the best line up, the key statistic for all hitters is HITS. The team's best hitters should be at the top of the order.
Based on last year's stats, the 2013 Cubs order should have been:
1. Castro, ss 163
2. Rizzo, 1b, 141
3. Schierholtz, rf, 116
4. Castillo, c, 104
5. Barney, 2b, 104
6. Soriano, lf, 92
7. Valbuena 3b 72
8. DeJesus, cf, 71
February 27, 2014
LEADERSHIP
The Cubs have asked Anthony Rizzo take a leadership role when the young prospects hit camp and make it to the major league roster. Rizzo is inclined to help his team out. He understands that the front office has made him one of their "core" players for the future. But being told to be a leader, and actually being one, are two different things.
Leadership and clubhouse chemistry are hard concepts to quantify in major league sports. There have been some teams where players hated each other, like the Bill Martin Yankees, but still won. There were some teams where the players hated management or ownership, like the Finley Oakland A's or the Black Sox, but still won. A little team edge can be helpful at times.
On the other side, bad chemistry can be a disaster. A prime example is the 2004 Cubs, who imploded in September in a vile rants against even their own broadcasters. Losing has a cascade effect on some players - - - who lose focus, then seek to blame others for their poor performance.
There are two types of sports leaders. First, is the rah-rah, talkative, inspirational leader. This is the kind of guy who does not have to be the best player on the team, but he is the one with the most passion to win. They speak their mind, call out their teammates, help younger players and calm clubhouse incidents before they get out of control. Organizations cannot teach that type of assertive personality. You have to be born with it. A.J. Pierzynski is a recent example of an on-field, take charge player who led by example and who was not afraid to speak his mind.
Second, is the leader by example. Other players will listen or follow a successful player because those players want to be as successful. The mindset is that if that player is so good, I need to learn what he is doing so I can be as good. This is especially true for young prospects who need some guidance from a successful veteran that has dealt with the stress, slumps, disappointments and successes early in one's career. Greg Maddux was a quiet leader who knew his stuff and shared his knowledge with young pitchers.
From all accounts, Rizzo is a nice guy. But he is not an outspoken agenda setter. And his performance on the field has been not up to expectations. Losing season after losing season will slowly permeate his leadership Q like smokey bacon wrapped around a grilling hot dog. Players want to win, but at a certain point in time, they can learn to accept losing because there are little to no adverse consequences to their individual careers.
The problem is that no matter who is left when the Almoras, Brandts, Edwards arrive at Wrigley, it is possible that the Cub veterans may have played their entire careers on losing, noncompetitive baseball teams.
Leadership and clubhouse chemistry are hard concepts to quantify in major league sports. There have been some teams where players hated each other, like the Bill Martin Yankees, but still won. There were some teams where the players hated management or ownership, like the Finley Oakland A's or the Black Sox, but still won. A little team edge can be helpful at times.
On the other side, bad chemistry can be a disaster. A prime example is the 2004 Cubs, who imploded in September in a vile rants against even their own broadcasters. Losing has a cascade effect on some players - - - who lose focus, then seek to blame others for their poor performance.
There are two types of sports leaders. First, is the rah-rah, talkative, inspirational leader. This is the kind of guy who does not have to be the best player on the team, but he is the one with the most passion to win. They speak their mind, call out their teammates, help younger players and calm clubhouse incidents before they get out of control. Organizations cannot teach that type of assertive personality. You have to be born with it. A.J. Pierzynski is a recent example of an on-field, take charge player who led by example and who was not afraid to speak his mind.
Second, is the leader by example. Other players will listen or follow a successful player because those players want to be as successful. The mindset is that if that player is so good, I need to learn what he is doing so I can be as good. This is especially true for young prospects who need some guidance from a successful veteran that has dealt with the stress, slumps, disappointments and successes early in one's career. Greg Maddux was a quiet leader who knew his stuff and shared his knowledge with young pitchers.
From all accounts, Rizzo is a nice guy. But he is not an outspoken agenda setter. And his performance on the field has been not up to expectations. Losing season after losing season will slowly permeate his leadership Q like smokey bacon wrapped around a grilling hot dog. Players want to win, but at a certain point in time, they can learn to accept losing because there are little to no adverse consequences to their individual careers.
The problem is that no matter who is left when the Almoras, Brandts, Edwards arrive at Wrigley, it is possible that the Cub veterans may have played their entire careers on losing, noncompetitive baseball teams.
February 22, 2014
PAYROLL SPENDING
The last year of the Tribune ownership of the Cubs, team payroll was $203.7 million. Except for Ricketts first year of ownership, payroll has dramatically decreased.
Year Owner Hitters Pitchers Total Change
2009 Tribune $139.65M $64.06M $203.7M
2010 Ricketts $145.8M $69.34M $215.1M +5.5 %
2011 Ricketts $125.04M $53.8M $178.8M -16.9%
2012 Ricketts $ 79.9M $44.5M $124.5M -30.4% (first year Epstein)
2013 Ricketts $ 56.3M $42.8M $ 99.2M -20.3%
2014 Ricketts projected $ 86.8M -12.5%
2015 Ricketts projected $ 56.3M -35.1%
The real Cubs payroll for 2014 is much lower, as it contains $14.5 million in dead money (obligations to past players no longer on the team). That puts the real player budget for 2014 at $72.3 million.
From Ricketts first year of ownership, payroll has declined dramatically. And it will continue to do so.
In 2015, $16 million of current player salaries is off the books, plus the dead money obligations or a total of $30.5 million. The base payroll for the 2015 Cubs would be only $56.3 million, another 35.1 percent decrease year over year. Since Ricketts ownership, team payroll is $158.8 million less than in 2010 or a projected decrease of 73.8 percent by 2015.
There has been a steady decline in budget allocated toward pitching (a real need area), but there has been an accelerated free fall in money for hitters.
When Ricketts and his business minions state publicly that the team has money to spend on talent, it clearly does not show up on the major league roster.
Ricketts has lashed out at questions about taking profits from the team, but he has no specifics on where the payroll savings has gone. Considering that the broadcast revenues have been steady (and nationally increased), ticket prices maintained at near the top of the league (but attendance being down), payroll savings since Ricketts took over ownership may be the real method of funding his outside real estate projects.
Payroll reduction from Ricketts 1st year:
2011: $36.3M
2012: $54.3M
2013 $25.3M
2014: $12.4 M (projected)
2015: $30.5 M (projected)
Total: $158.8M
Payroll savings from Ricketts 1st year baseline:
2011: $36.3M
2012: $90.6M
2013 $115.9M
2014: $128.3 M (projected)
2015: $158.8 M (projected)
Total: $529.9M
Steve Stone predicts that the Cubs prospect team will come to fruition in 2016. As such, rookie ball players will again command lower salaries than veteran free agents.
The team's statement that it can save the Tanaka signing money (noted only to be $20 million posting fee) and spend it later is an unfulfilled promise. If money is not spent, that means it is not an expense. Lower expenses increases the profit line on the balance sheet. There is no rule that says Ricketts must "return" the payroll savings to the baseball operations. On the contrary, he needs those funds for his other projects.
The other projects include a massive real estate development across from Wrigley Field. Those projects could lead to higher profits than the Cubs because those new venues would operate 365 days per year. In the new grand scheme of things, the Cubs are no longer a priority to ownership. And the declining payroll for the major league roster is a blunt clue to the owner's real motivations.
Year Owner Hitters Pitchers Total Change
2009 Tribune $139.65M $64.06M $203.7M
2010 Ricketts $145.8M $69.34M $215.1M +5.5 %
2011 Ricketts $125.04M $53.8M $178.8M -16.9%
2012 Ricketts $ 79.9M $44.5M $124.5M -30.4% (first year Epstein)
2013 Ricketts $ 56.3M $42.8M $ 99.2M -20.3%
2014 Ricketts projected $ 86.8M -12.5%
2015 Ricketts projected $ 56.3M -35.1%
The real Cubs payroll for 2014 is much lower, as it contains $14.5 million in dead money (obligations to past players no longer on the team). That puts the real player budget for 2014 at $72.3 million.
From Ricketts first year of ownership, payroll has declined dramatically. And it will continue to do so.
In 2015, $16 million of current player salaries is off the books, plus the dead money obligations or a total of $30.5 million. The base payroll for the 2015 Cubs would be only $56.3 million, another 35.1 percent decrease year over year. Since Ricketts ownership, team payroll is $158.8 million less than in 2010 or a projected decrease of 73.8 percent by 2015.
There has been a steady decline in budget allocated toward pitching (a real need area), but there has been an accelerated free fall in money for hitters.
When Ricketts and his business minions state publicly that the team has money to spend on talent, it clearly does not show up on the major league roster.
Ricketts has lashed out at questions about taking profits from the team, but he has no specifics on where the payroll savings has gone. Considering that the broadcast revenues have been steady (and nationally increased), ticket prices maintained at near the top of the league (but attendance being down), payroll savings since Ricketts took over ownership may be the real method of funding his outside real estate projects.
Payroll reduction from Ricketts 1st year:
2011: $36.3M
2012: $54.3M
2013 $25.3M
2014: $12.4 M (projected)
2015: $30.5 M (projected)
Total: $158.8M
Payroll savings from Ricketts 1st year baseline:
2011: $36.3M
2012: $90.6M
2013 $115.9M
2014: $128.3 M (projected)
2015: $158.8 M (projected)
Total: $529.9M
Steve Stone predicts that the Cubs prospect team will come to fruition in 2016. As such, rookie ball players will again command lower salaries than veteran free agents.
The team's statement that it can save the Tanaka signing money (noted only to be $20 million posting fee) and spend it later is an unfulfilled promise. If money is not spent, that means it is not an expense. Lower expenses increases the profit line on the balance sheet. There is no rule that says Ricketts must "return" the payroll savings to the baseball operations. On the contrary, he needs those funds for his other projects.
The other projects include a massive real estate development across from Wrigley Field. Those projects could lead to higher profits than the Cubs because those new venues would operate 365 days per year. In the new grand scheme of things, the Cubs are no longer a priority to ownership. And the declining payroll for the major league roster is a blunt clue to the owner's real motivations.
February 17, 2014
WAR ZONES
Spring training is here. Columnists will soak in some sun and make in the next few weeks bold predictions on the success or failure of baseball teams.
In 2013, the Cubs record was 66-96. It's Pythagoean record was calculated (by a formula that takes in account runs scored and runs allowed) to be 71-91, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (15.6) and pitchers (10.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 75.1 wins.
In 2012, the Cubs record was 61-101. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 65-97, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (13.6) and pitchers (2.3), one would have calculated the Cubs having 64.9 wins.
In 2011, the Cubs record was 71-91. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 70-92, which was only a game off. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (14.0) and pitchers (7.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 70.5 wins.
In 2010, the Cubs record was 75-87. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 73-89, which represents to some that the Cubs overperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (7.4) and pitchers (15.9), one would have calculated the Cubs having 72.3 wins.
In 2009, the Cubs record was 83-78, the last above .500 record. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 84-77, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record by a game. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (10.8) and pitchers (24.2), one would have calculated the Cubs having 84.0 wins.
Charting the win totals:
Real Wins Pyth Wins WAR Wins
66 71 75.1
61 65 64.9
71 70 70.5
75 73 72.3
83 84 84.0
356 363 366.8
It appears that the Pythagoean record is a 2 percent deviation from Real Wins. The WAR win calculation is higher at a 3 percent deviation. A 2 to 3 percent deviation calculates to a difference of 3.24 to 4.86 wins per 162 game season. This number is interesting because it can explain many things. First, the deviation falls within the general discussion of what is the "value" of a manager to the performance of his club. A great manager can improve his team's record by a few games. A bad manager can cost a team a few games. Since the Cubs underperformed by 3 to 5 wins on average, is this proof that bad managers cost even a bad team wins? Second, this could also show that the players themselves did not play well as a team (the sum of their individual parts, i.e. stats was greater than the the team record). This could show a lack of collective baseball IQ, the ability to manufacturer runs or give a team less second chance opportunities to score runs. Bad teams have a tendency to fail in the basic game fundamentals.
If one would want to predict the number of Cubs wins in 2014, I would suggest taking the final 25 man roster, average the last two seasons players' WARs, minus 2.5 percent. That figure should be close to the last five year average track record for the Cubs.
In 2013, the Cubs record was 66-96. It's Pythagoean record was calculated (by a formula that takes in account runs scored and runs allowed) to be 71-91, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (15.6) and pitchers (10.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 75.1 wins.
In 2012, the Cubs record was 61-101. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 65-97, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (13.6) and pitchers (2.3), one would have calculated the Cubs having 64.9 wins.
In 2011, the Cubs record was 71-91. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 70-92, which was only a game off. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (14.0) and pitchers (7.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 70.5 wins.
In 2010, the Cubs record was 75-87. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 73-89, which represents to some that the Cubs overperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (7.4) and pitchers (15.9), one would have calculated the Cubs having 72.3 wins.
In 2009, the Cubs record was 83-78, the last above .500 record. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 84-77, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record by a game. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (10.8) and pitchers (24.2), one would have calculated the Cubs having 84.0 wins.
Charting the win totals:
Real Wins Pyth Wins WAR Wins
66 71 75.1
61 65 64.9
71 70 70.5
75 73 72.3
83 84 84.0
356 363 366.8
It appears that the Pythagoean record is a 2 percent deviation from Real Wins. The WAR win calculation is higher at a 3 percent deviation. A 2 to 3 percent deviation calculates to a difference of 3.24 to 4.86 wins per 162 game season. This number is interesting because it can explain many things. First, the deviation falls within the general discussion of what is the "value" of a manager to the performance of his club. A great manager can improve his team's record by a few games. A bad manager can cost a team a few games. Since the Cubs underperformed by 3 to 5 wins on average, is this proof that bad managers cost even a bad team wins? Second, this could also show that the players themselves did not play well as a team (the sum of their individual parts, i.e. stats was greater than the the team record). This could show a lack of collective baseball IQ, the ability to manufacturer runs or give a team less second chance opportunities to score runs. Bad teams have a tendency to fail in the basic game fundamentals.
If one would want to predict the number of Cubs wins in 2014, I would suggest taking the final 25 man roster, average the last two seasons players' WARs, minus 2.5 percent. That figure should be close to the last five year average track record for the Cubs.
February 7, 2014
OWNERSHIP RECORD
The baseball side of the Cubs operation has gotten its share of bad stings in the press and on fan blogs. But the Ricketts ownership has something to be reviewed too.
Some touted the Ricketts clan as the savior of the franchise; grapple it away from the evil corporation. A fan would be running the team without the pitfalls of meeting shareholder objectives, etc. It was supposed to be a return to the golden age. But instead, the team fell back down the P.K. Wrigley rabbit hole.
Under Ricketts ownership, the team has gone 356-454, a .429 winning percentage which equates to a 90 loss season. During his five years of ownership, the Cubs have been 115.5 games behind in the NL Central, or an average of 23 GB the divisional winner.
In the past four years, 1,069,059 less fans have come through the gates at Wrigley. That is an average of 267,264 less fans in the stands. From the team's own metrics, that is at least a loss of $53.45 million in baseball revenue in the past four years. To put it in further light, that is the equivalent of the Edwin Jackson contract.
Since Ricketts ownership, the Cubs have
** less wins
** less attendance
** less normal revenue
** lower broadcast ratings
** lower team payrolls.
When Tom Ricketts took the podium when his family bought the team, he said that he was there to win a championship. He opined that the team was only one or two players away. He kept on telling fans this speech for the next few years, until today that charade would not be tolerated by the fans or media.
As a sports talker said this morning on the radio, Tom Ricketts may be a nice guy, but he has no idea how to run a baseball club. And that is the worst kind of owner: one who thinks he knows what he is doing.
From an objective standpoint, the Ricketts ownership of the Cubs has been a failure. It has been a failure on the field based upon the club's standings. It has been a failure off the field for the constant problems with the city and neighbors about the Wrigley Field rehab project.
| Season | Team | W | L | PCT | GB | Place | Attendance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Chicago Cubs | 66 | 96 | .407 | 31.0 | 5 | 2,642,682 | |
| 2012 | Chicago Cubs | 61 | 101 | .377 | 36.0 | 5 | 2,882,756 | |
| 2011 | Chicago Cubs | 71 | 91 | .438 | 25.0 | 5 | 3,017,966 | |
| 2010 | Chicago Cubs | 75 | 87 | .463 | 16.0 | 5 | 3,062,973 | |
| 2009 | Chicago Cubs | 83 | 78 | .516 | 7.5 | 2 | 3,168,859 |
Some touted the Ricketts clan as the savior of the franchise; grapple it away from the evil corporation. A fan would be running the team without the pitfalls of meeting shareholder objectives, etc. It was supposed to be a return to the golden age. But instead, the team fell back down the P.K. Wrigley rabbit hole.
Under Ricketts ownership, the team has gone 356-454, a .429 winning percentage which equates to a 90 loss season. During his five years of ownership, the Cubs have been 115.5 games behind in the NL Central, or an average of 23 GB the divisional winner.
In the past four years, 1,069,059 less fans have come through the gates at Wrigley. That is an average of 267,264 less fans in the stands. From the team's own metrics, that is at least a loss of $53.45 million in baseball revenue in the past four years. To put it in further light, that is the equivalent of the Edwin Jackson contract.
Since Ricketts ownership, the Cubs have
** less wins
** less attendance
** less normal revenue
** lower broadcast ratings
** lower team payrolls.
When Tom Ricketts took the podium when his family bought the team, he said that he was there to win a championship. He opined that the team was only one or two players away. He kept on telling fans this speech for the next few years, until today that charade would not be tolerated by the fans or media.
As a sports talker said this morning on the radio, Tom Ricketts may be a nice guy, but he has no idea how to run a baseball club. And that is the worst kind of owner: one who thinks he knows what he is doing.
From an objective standpoint, the Ricketts ownership of the Cubs has been a failure. It has been a failure on the field based upon the club's standings. It has been a failure off the field for the constant problems with the city and neighbors about the Wrigley Field rehab project.
December 15, 2013
PREPARE FOR WAR
“ This is no time for ease and comfort. It is the time to dare and endure. ”
Winston Churchill
From a fan's perspective, each season is a war.
Their army is their team. Their foe is their game opponents. Each series is a battle.
Win each series, you will the battle in the standings.
Whether your team is equipped for battle like a superpower like the U.S., Britain or China or like Albania depends upon one's opening day roster. But before any war, there is preparation. Training. Developing. Drafting. Preparation. Strategy. A Plan.
The days of soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder to walk across the battle field to be cut down by their opponent ended in the Revolutionary War with American Indian guerrilla warfare tactics and Pickett's Charge in the Civil War. But the Cubs appear to continue this tradition.
There is a growing unease within the ranks of Cubs fans over the state of the club. Cub fans have been taking fire from rival fans in St. Louis, Milwaukee and Cincinnati over the last few years. It is hard to defend a bad team.
Most military strategists will say that it is either to defend the high ground than climb up the hill to take the high ground. The same is true in the standings. It is much harder to dig out of the hole of last place to fight your way back to the top of the standings than to keep the top of the hill.
The fans are like the fife and drum corps - - - they have no weapons in which to fight - - - but are front and center in the battles. They get a lot of flack from both sides.
The fan unease is coming to the surface as the Cubs do little change the major league roster into a reasonable fighting machine. Fans look at the 5 year tenure of new owner Ricketts as being a descending spiral of doubt. Fans now look at the 3rd year of the new front office as being narrow minded, arrogant and risky. The team is not spending money at the major league level to improve talent. It is filling roster holes with leftovers from other team's AAAA journeymen stock pile (one cannot argue that Kottaras, Ruggiano or Wesley is a significant upgrade over anyone on last year's team.)
The idea that one day the baseball and business sides of the operation will converge into a glorious championship season is an illusion. You can package dog waste in a pretty box with a ribbon and call it Hope. The business side won't receive any jolt in revenue until a new broadcast deal is struck in 2019-2020. But that assumes that the billion dollar cable network deals will still be viable in 6 years with the ever changing landscape of entertainment media. The baseball side won't sign big money free agents because the front office is banking that all their top prospects will make a huge impact when they reach the majors. Prospects are the most unpredictable aspect of a baseball operation, but the front office tells fans that this plan is golden - - - the secret weapon of success. A strategy that no other major market team has ever done. Is this really thinking outside a pine box?
The Cubs have been hard to watch the last two seasons. Fans have begun to lose interest in their team. The club has been aggressively marketing all things Cubs except for a quality product on the field. Frustrated fans are to the point of asking why their team is not doing enough to reverse the horrible record on the field. Answers such as "be patient," "it's a process," "be loyal," "we have a plan," and "you'd be on the ground floor to something great" have nothing to do with fielding a competitive ball team in 2014. Fans are coming to the realization that the future is now when they are paying premium prices for a bad minor league product.
Fans look back at the last three seasons as totally lost opportunities. The team traded away a dozen or so veteran players for two dozen minor league prospects. The turnover has left deep holes in the major league roster filled with journeymen players. It is like a farmer who tills in his field before harvest, then hopes that any random soldier stalks of corn will repopulate all the fields by the next season.
If the Cubs just tried to fix one or two positions each off season, the team could have a competitive roster for 2014. Instead, the holes at 3B, LF, CF, 2B continued to be filled with utility players. The Cubs have turned over their starting rotation and bullpen, but have kept very little major league talent in the process. If a team is unwilling to spend money on free agents to fill needs, then the team will be fighting an uphill battle with very little ammo. Hence, the 2012 and 2013 disasters.
And when the team did make a "core" acquisition, the front office signed SP Edwin Jackson to a long term deal.
Even the world's greatest armies have collapsed when their subjects lost trust in their general's leadership. The Union Army was in disarray and defeatist until President Lincoln installed General Grant in command. It is getting to the point of judgment on the Cubs new front office.
If the Cubs don't care to wage a good fight in the NL Central, they should be aware of the storm clouds of a civil war within its own rank and file fan base if things don't change quickly.
December 13, 2013
A MOMENT TO PAUSE
Gordon Wittenmyer of the Sun Times had a column today in which Theo Epstein made several comments which should make even the most die-hard fans who have bought into the full rebuild plan to pause for a moment.
Even though the Cubs have added
elite hitting prospects in their farm system, which is the cornerstone of the team's current marketing plan for this third-year
rebuilding process, Wittenmyer writes that not even a baseball
operations department firmly committed to its player-development plan
will try to sell the idea that those top prospects will be the
championship solution on the North Side when they arrive.
Team president Theo Epstein
talked this week about the two “currencies” in baseball needed for
lengthy championship windows: deep enough reserves of young major-league
(or close) talent to make impact trades and/or “massive amounts of
payroll flexibility.”
As the article states, the Cubs have neither at this point, despite the promise of prospects Javy Baez, Kris Bryant and Albert Almora.
“We have to guard against this
perception that we believe that once our most talented prospects come
up to the big leagues all of our problems are solved, because that’s not
the way it works in baseball,” said Epstein, who highlighted the tough
transition for most young players even when they get to the big leagues.
Wittenmyer raises the question of when the talented prospects arrive at Wrigley Field, but the business side hasn’t
stepped up with that “massive” flexibility?
“Let’s not think we reached
the finish line just because we get a few prospects to the big leagues,”
Epstein said. “It’s going to be a heck of a lot more interesting when
it happens, but it doesn’t necessarily mean right away that all our
players in their early 20s are going to be the cornerstones of a World
Series club.”
>>>>> From my reading between the lines, the backtracking has begun on the baseball side of the Cubs. We have been sold that the future of Cubs success is in developing major league talent; to have a pipeline of good players being promoted year after year. The front office has been sold as the young guard who can make that happen. But all prospects are risky propositions. Very few make an impact in the majors. But Epstein's current statements now throw in a future excuse if the Cubs touted prospects do not pan out - - - the business side of the Cubs operation needs to open the bank like the Yankees, Red Sox and Mariners to sign high priced free agents in order to get a World Series club.
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