During a long weekend road trip, I heard a lot of sports radio conversation. Some of the talk reaffirmed many points that I have been making for years in regard to the Cubs. A recap of some of the interesting points I heard while cruising down the interstates:
1. The Cubs continue to propagate the myth that bad teams have a better chance to draft good players.
This point got the strongest reaction from the hosts who made it. The Red Sox, Yankees, Rays, and Cardinals all have had very good drafts for the past decade while selecting well after the Cubs. The real bottom line is that teams drafting in the middle to late rounds are drafting BETTER TALENT. The Cubs need to draft better talent not tank seasons to get high draft picks.
I agree that scouting is fundamentally important to have a consistent and viable farm system. However, that is only one part of the equation. The organization still needs to train and develop the draft picks into major league players. The Cubs have had a woeful track record on developing their own players.
2. People are beginning to question whether ownership knows what it is doing.
The off-the-cuff admission by Crane Kenney that Tom Ricketts gave Kenney a 5 year extension several months ago is still a headline head scratcher. What has Kenney done to deserve such a reward? He is the face of the bungled rehab of Wrigley Field. He is part of the team that put together the Zell Tribune restrictions that allegedly has handcuffed the team financially with high debt and poor broadcast contracts.
I said from the beginning that Ricketts failed to due his own proper due diligence. He did not bring on board his own independent baseball and financial people to review the Zell proposals and the real financial shape of the franchise. As a result, Ricketts overpaid for a franchise by more than $350 million, and carried on with the same failed management group. That does not show confidence or business savvy to run a baseball team.
3. The split between the baseball operations and the "business side" of the equation is a growing canyon.
It really never made much sense to have the baseball operations severed from the "business" operations. Ricketts bought a baseball franchise - - - its business is to run a profitable and winning major league team. For example, the White Sox have one management team reviewing and setting policy for the team. The business of the Cubs is baseball not the growing "side" projects that Ricketts has kicked around Clark and Addison since he bought the team.
Some commentators wonder if Theo Epstein knew what he was getting himself into; he has not come out and said it, but it appears that the baseball team has to "wait" for the business side to "get up to speed" before the Cubs can actually function as a major league contender. Epstein knew or should have known what he was getting into; he may not care because he got his contract and a built-in excuse if things fail: the interference by Ricketts and Kenney.
4. The numbers do not add up.
When Ricketts purchased the franchise, the Cubs had a high payroll and high attendance at Wrigley (3.3 million paid gate). However, this season is tracking at a low payroll and much lower attendance levels (approx. 2.3 million). In less than five years, the new ownership has sliced 1 million in attendance.
Now, the team the last three years has been barely watchable. You can't sell 100 loss teams as being fun entertainment. So true to the tourism board's statements, it is possible that the majority of people still attending games at Wrigley are not there just to see the Cubs but to experience the "unique" ball yard.
Wrigley Field is the only major league park that has not been transformed into a electronic arcade. It has the same look and feel for the past 8 decades: a manual scoreboard, ivy covered brick walls, a green park in the middle of a residential neighborhood. It is those features that draw tourists to the park; to show their children what baseball was like when they were young and their (grand) parents took them to a game.
So, Ricketts is adamant that he now needs 7 large outfield signs in order to field a competitive team. It is projected that at most, the new park signage could bring in $30 million in revenue per season. But, since the team has already lost 1 million visitors at $70 per patron spending, the new outdoor advertising revenue does not come close to off-setting the lost attendance of $70 million.
Further, of the remaining 2.3 million, there will be a good portion of baseball purists who will no longer feel that Wrigley is Wrigley if all the new video scoreboards and signage is put up. It will ruin the atmosphere, architecture and pristine baseball viewing experience. Even if those baseball purists number 500,000, that means the new revenue enhancements will not off-set the loss of $35 million in future attendance losses from this segment of the fan base.
It was said that it makes more sense to add $10 to every ticket than put in the new signage. You get about the same new revenue increases without destroying the landmarked historic nature of Wrigley Field. But ownership is hell bent now on dramatically changing Wrigley Field.
5. Wrigley Field is the priority, not the Cubs.
All of the resources and energy of the "business side" of the Cubs has been directed toward non-baseball things: the new buildings and party plaza outside Wrigley; the new Wrigley Field construction plans and ad signs; the new commercial hotel-gym-parking complex across the street. The business managers want to increase night events, concerts, tours, corporate outings and movie nights. Wrigley Field is being transformed from baseball park into a multipurpose entertainment venue like the Rosemont Horizon or Sears Center.
And all this ancillary revenue has nothing to do with the Cubs getting better ball players or winning more games. The Cubs are merely a tenant at Wrigley Field. The non-baseball revenue will go into a different Ricketts bank account. People are beginning to realize that all the talk about revenue enhancement has nothing to do with the baseball operations. They are not tied together. That is why the payrolls continue to drop, and veterans traded for cheaper prospects. That is why Epstein is cornered with the one thing he can control (and must succeed in order to win): establish an unprecedented stream of home grown impact talent from the minor league system.
