The White Sox made another big trade, getting rid of three major league players for three prospects and a relief pitcher.
The White Sox are following the Cubs tear down style of rebuilding their organization.
The Sox may have the best farm system in the game with 9 Top 100 prospects.
But if you look at what these rebuilds represents a key level: failure.
Failure of a team's existing draft and developmental skills of players they targeted for the minor leagues.
Only 2 of the Sox Top 10 prospects were drafted by the team (SP Fulmer and C Collins). The rest of the top prospects have been acquired through trade or international free agency.
This style of burn down the major league roster to acquire a boat load of prospects is a risky venture because not all prospects pan out to be major league players. In addition, the team is going to have a rough time winning at the major league level. Sox attendance has been historically tied to the team winning games.
This plan also is couched as a long term solution to correct mediocrity but it is a short term hit or miss operation. If the prospects you acquired do not become All-Star caliber players (or even good major league players), your major league roster is devoid of trade assets to try and second rebuild operation.
The Dodger way has been to draft well, have exceptional development programs in the minors, to create the ability to promote every season a rookie-of-the-year candidate. In the last few years, the Dodgers called up impact players Corey Seager, Joc Pedersen and Cody Bellinger. Add a home grown ace like Clayton Kershaw, the Dodgers have the luxury to trade veterans or pick up key free agents on an annual basis to meet specific needs.
The Cubs reaped the highest reward from its rebuild: a championship. But now a year removed, the Cubs have struggled to maintain the championship caliber. Last year's players are not hitting, fielding or pitching like they did last season. Was 2016 an fluke? Is 2017 more the norm?
And the Cubs now find themselves with their prized prospects on the major league roster, and their farm system weak after trading away the remaining high prospects for needs such as a closer in Chapman last season and a starter in Quintana this year. The Cubs have been caught in a trap of their own making; the team was built to win with the existing roster for the next few years. If they cannot perform up to the front office expectations, then this would be a huge set back for the organization.
Showing posts with label scouting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label scouting. Show all posts
July 20, 2017
October 29, 2015
PAYING THE PRICE
David Price could have cost himself around $20 million for his weak post season performance.
It is not that he is a different pitcher, per se, in the post season.
The reason could be that post season opponents scout their opponent more closely.
During the regular season, scouting departments are charged with scouting the minors, the majors, their upcoming opponents, checking out talent to sign during the next draft or international scouting period, and some self-scout their own team for comparison purposes and trade value.
But once the post season rolls around, it is all hands-on-deck to get useful stats and materials to the manager.
The Royals admit that they found out that Price was tipping his change up, enough times the Royals hitters could handle it.
As recounted in SI, when pitching from the stretch when he threw a changeup, Price would take an extra deep breath, one where you could see his shoulders shrug, and he would hold his set a beat longer. It appeared to me the Royals knew the changeup was coming when Price was in the stretch. Royals sources confirmed it: Price tipped his changeup—maybe not 100% of the time, but enough for Kansas City to buy in.
It is not that he is a different pitcher, per se, in the post season.
The reason could be that post season opponents scout their opponent more closely.
During the regular season, scouting departments are charged with scouting the minors, the majors, their upcoming opponents, checking out talent to sign during the next draft or international scouting period, and some self-scout their own team for comparison purposes and trade value.
But once the post season rolls around, it is all hands-on-deck to get useful stats and materials to the manager.
The Royals admit that they found out that Price was tipping his change up, enough times the Royals hitters could handle it.
As recounted in SI, when pitching from the stretch when he threw a changeup, Price would take an extra deep breath, one where you could see his shoulders shrug, and he would hold his set a beat longer. It appeared to me the Royals knew the changeup was coming when Price was in the stretch. Royals sources confirmed it: Price tipped his changeup—maybe not 100% of the time, but enough for Kansas City to buy in.
There had been rumors about Price tipping his
pitches when he faced Texas in the Division Series. A Toronto source
told me then that such rumors sometimes pop up, and that the Blue Jays
heard that Price had been tipping his pitchers earlier this season when
he was pitching for Detroit, but “we looked into it and didn’t see
anything.”
A pitcher has the advantage on the mound. He knows what he is going to throw and where he wants to throw the ball. The batter is guessing. Most batters try to time the pitcher's fastball, and work back from that speed. But since it only takes a fraction of a second to determine if it is a fastball, cutter or change up, batters have to project the count and situation in order to make solid contact. If a pitcher is tipping off his pitches, then the advantage swings toward the batter.
August 20, 2015
A QUICK CHANGE
Finding a new job in baseball is usually hard. Unless, you have a proven track record of success.
The Red Sox’ stunning announcement that Dave Dombrowski was hired as new President of baseball operations
is still sinking in for many, but further changes figure to be on the
way in Boston, MLBTR summarizes.
Anthony Fenech of the Detroit Press spoke to Dombrowski and tweets that the new Boston president believes he will hire a GM to work underneath him. Bob Nightengale of USA Today Sports reports that former Braves GM Frank Wren, who worked with Dombrowski in the Marlins and Expos front offices in the 1980s and 1990s, is a leading candidate for the position.
Wren’s more traditional background of scouting would seemingly align well with Dombrowski’s strengths, as opposed to a more analytical GM like Ben Cherington, who passed on the opportunity to remain on board as the Red Sox’ GM following the addition of Dombrowski. There’s been speculation about Jerry Dipoto, who is working with the Sox on a temporary basis at the moment, but he, too, has a more analytical slant and wasn’t hired by Dombrowski.
When the Braves hired John Hart as president of baseball operations, he fired Wren. Currently, the Braves have elected to deploy a president but no GM, as they currently do not have one in place.
The 57-year-old Wren’s front office experience dates back to the mid-1980s, and he’s worked with the Orioles in addition to the previously mentioned Expos, Marlins and Braves.
Peter Abraham of the Boston Globe reports that he finds it difficult to imagine any team owned by John Henry would completely abandon analytics, noting that there will have to be a balance in place. One can imagine that even in the event of a more traditional hire in the GM department, Dombrowski may bring in some new analysts or, at the very least, make an effort to retain some of Cherington’s more analytically inclined lieutenants. Of course, many that previously worked underneath Cherington may elect to seek employment elsewhere as well.
The whole concept of a president of baseball operations is new. Many teams have started to divide functions: club business is separated from daily baseball activities. This sets up the possibility of two distinct feudal power bases. The president of baseball operations sits on a committee with the president of business operations and the owner to discuss general policies and goals.
This does add layers of bureaucracy and executives. The "business" of baseball is running a team and winning (i.e. having good fan attendance). The general manager used to control all aspects of the club: from ticket sales, advertising, sponsorships, to hiring staff, reviewing scouting reports, drafting and trading for players. Now, in the age of analytics and specialization, the GM's duties have been pared back.
In some situations, the president of baseball operations is a figure head title to move an ineffective GM upstairs to allow a better manager run a team. It is a way to keep a knowledgeable asset from taking his consultancy skills and team knowledge to other clubs. But in Dombrowski's case, the Red Sox are hiring a fully knowledgeable general manager with a great track record.
Some people were surprised that the Tigers let Dombrowski go, but his contract was not going to be renewed by ownership. The Tigers spent like a big market team in order to get its elderly owner a World Series title. But despite the spending and talent, the Tigers have never reached that goal. And that one goal fell squarely on Dombrowski's head.
The Red Sox have had a tailspinning bad season. Dombrowski has experience in tearing down and rebuilding franchises, which is something the Red Sox need to do in order to get competitive in the strong AL East. Boston's quick hire of Dombrowski makes great sense.
Anthony Fenech of the Detroit Press spoke to Dombrowski and tweets that the new Boston president believes he will hire a GM to work underneath him. Bob Nightengale of USA Today Sports reports that former Braves GM Frank Wren, who worked with Dombrowski in the Marlins and Expos front offices in the 1980s and 1990s, is a leading candidate for the position.
Wren’s more traditional background of scouting would seemingly align well with Dombrowski’s strengths, as opposed to a more analytical GM like Ben Cherington, who passed on the opportunity to remain on board as the Red Sox’ GM following the addition of Dombrowski. There’s been speculation about Jerry Dipoto, who is working with the Sox on a temporary basis at the moment, but he, too, has a more analytical slant and wasn’t hired by Dombrowski.
When the Braves hired John Hart as president of baseball operations, he fired Wren. Currently, the Braves have elected to deploy a president but no GM, as they currently do not have one in place.
The 57-year-old Wren’s front office experience dates back to the mid-1980s, and he’s worked with the Orioles in addition to the previously mentioned Expos, Marlins and Braves.
Peter Abraham of the Boston Globe reports that he finds it difficult to imagine any team owned by John Henry would completely abandon analytics, noting that there will have to be a balance in place. One can imagine that even in the event of a more traditional hire in the GM department, Dombrowski may bring in some new analysts or, at the very least, make an effort to retain some of Cherington’s more analytically inclined lieutenants. Of course, many that previously worked underneath Cherington may elect to seek employment elsewhere as well.
The whole concept of a president of baseball operations is new. Many teams have started to divide functions: club business is separated from daily baseball activities. This sets up the possibility of two distinct feudal power bases. The president of baseball operations sits on a committee with the president of business operations and the owner to discuss general policies and goals.
This does add layers of bureaucracy and executives. The "business" of baseball is running a team and winning (i.e. having good fan attendance). The general manager used to control all aspects of the club: from ticket sales, advertising, sponsorships, to hiring staff, reviewing scouting reports, drafting and trading for players. Now, in the age of analytics and specialization, the GM's duties have been pared back.
In some situations, the president of baseball operations is a figure head title to move an ineffective GM upstairs to allow a better manager run a team. It is a way to keep a knowledgeable asset from taking his consultancy skills and team knowledge to other clubs. But in Dombrowski's case, the Red Sox are hiring a fully knowledgeable general manager with a great track record.
Some people were surprised that the Tigers let Dombrowski go, but his contract was not going to be renewed by ownership. The Tigers spent like a big market team in order to get its elderly owner a World Series title. But despite the spending and talent, the Tigers have never reached that goal. And that one goal fell squarely on Dombrowski's head.
The Red Sox have had a tailspinning bad season. Dombrowski has experience in tearing down and rebuilding franchises, which is something the Red Sox need to do in order to get competitive in the strong AL East. Boston's quick hire of Dombrowski makes great sense.
June 26, 2015
WHITE SOX WOES
During the Twins series, the Sun Times discussed the plight of the White Sox with a veteran baseball scout who said:
‘‘The White Sox, they should be ashamed of themselves the way they’re playing,’’ a veteran scout who has seen the Sox play about a dozen times in person this season.
‘‘They had two good games against the Rangers [victories Saturday and Sunday], played good baseball, and then they come out and play a game like [a 13-2 loss Monday to the Twins]. It’s unacceptable. It’s shameful.’’
‘‘Errors, bad throws, mental errors,’’ the scout said. ‘‘Defense and guys not hitting in the clutch. For players, it’s not OK. This is the major leagues.’’
‘‘Ramirez is going backwards on both sides,’’ the scout said of the 33-year-old shortstop Alexei Ramirez, who had an All-Star last season but who is on pace to have his worst season ‘‘He was one of the best in the game last year. Now he’s one of the worst.’’
‘‘I’m sure Robin (Ventura) is doing his best,’’ the scout said. ‘‘Maybe one time he should fake it and throw something against the wall. This is unacceptable, and Robin has to know it. Maybe he has handled it. I don’t know what is done behind the scenes.’’
‘‘The fans see it; they aren’t dummies on the South Side,’’ the scout said. ‘‘All they want is to see the game played the right way.’’
The White Sox skipper may be resigned to his fate. ‘‘There’s plenty [blame] to go around for everybody,’’ Ventura said.
‘‘The White Sox, they should be ashamed of themselves the way they’re playing,’’ a veteran scout who has seen the Sox play about a dozen times in person this season.
‘‘They had two good games against the Rangers [victories Saturday and Sunday], played good baseball, and then they come out and play a game like [a 13-2 loss Monday to the Twins]. It’s unacceptable. It’s shameful.’’
‘‘Errors, bad throws, mental errors,’’ the scout said. ‘‘Defense and guys not hitting in the clutch. For players, it’s not OK. This is the major leagues.’’
‘‘Ramirez is going backwards on both sides,’’ the scout said of the 33-year-old shortstop Alexei Ramirez, who had an All-Star last season but who is on pace to have his worst season ‘‘He was one of the best in the game last year. Now he’s one of the worst.’’
‘‘I’m sure Robin (Ventura) is doing his best,’’ the scout said. ‘‘Maybe one time he should fake it and throw something against the wall. This is unacceptable, and Robin has to know it. Maybe he has handled it. I don’t know what is done behind the scenes.’’
‘‘The fans see it; they aren’t dummies on the South Side,’’ the scout said. ‘‘All they want is to see the game played the right way.’’
The White Sox skipper may be resigned to his fate. ‘‘There’s plenty [blame] to go around for everybody,’’ Ventura said.
June 6, 2015
DEVELOPERS
There are talent evaluators, developers and buyers.
Steve Stone was on the radio and he cringed when sports teams announce they have taken "the best available athlete." No, Stone argues, you should be taking the best baseball player in the draft. A six letter high school athlete may have to learn baseball in six years, while actual baseball prospects are already in the majors.
So what is more important, scouting for talent or developing players? Stone argued both are important. But teams need to scout themselves in order to provide a consistent level of major league talent.
Stone means that every team hits and misses in their drafts. The White Sox took OF Jared Mitchell a few spots ahead of OF Mike Trout. Ouch. So Stone says good organizations evaluate their own scouts to see which ones recommended players and why to see if they got it right or got it wrong. The same is true with player development coaches. Good prospects should develop quickly in the minors. If there are issues with prospects that rated highly in draft preparation consistently fail to make a major league impact, the farm system needs re-evaluation.
There is also a need for an organization to have a developmental blue print on how farm players are supposed to act, play and learn the game. Many teams allow their minor league managers and coaches free discretion to teach the fundamentals and baseball IQ. But this approach gives an inconsistent product as players move up and down the farm system.
Stone thinks an organization needs a balance between good scouting and good development. He admits that the White Sox have been very deficient in developing field position players.
There are some who say the best talent will rise to the surface no matter who is training them. We are not so sure about that. If pure talent wins out there would be more college studs skipping the minors to a spot immediately on a MLB roster. There are probably more Round 20 players that were marginal prospects who have developed into competent players than highly touted first round bonus baby busts.
Then there are teams that just like to buy other teams developed players. Usually confined to big market clubs, these buyers out more emphasis on winning at the major league level over having a consistent or sound minor league system that can supply one or two players every year. Buyers like to have major league experience players because it takes out the risk of scouting "potential" out of the equation because veterans have actual experience.
There is another factor key to developing talent: the player's own sacrificial drive to succeed at every level of competition. If you look at a preview magazine in any sport that lists the rosters and hometowns for all the players, how many do you find from your hometown? From your county? From your state? Very few if any. And that is the point. The best player on your high school team moves up to college or rookie ball playing against the "best" players at his level or above. It is how that prospect reacts to stiffer competition is the gateway for whether he meets the challenge or hits a wall.
There is a mental aspect that elite professionals have that the average player does not: drive. Michael Jordan could by example will his team to victory. Jonathan Toews can put his team into a different skill level during games. Some players are born with this innate ability. Others have to struggle to find an equivalent desire to be better than one's natural skill set. That is where a player with better Baseball IQ is a better prospect than a pure athlete who can play the game.
Steve Stone was on the radio and he cringed when sports teams announce they have taken "the best available athlete." No, Stone argues, you should be taking the best baseball player in the draft. A six letter high school athlete may have to learn baseball in six years, while actual baseball prospects are already in the majors.
So what is more important, scouting for talent or developing players? Stone argued both are important. But teams need to scout themselves in order to provide a consistent level of major league talent.
Stone means that every team hits and misses in their drafts. The White Sox took OF Jared Mitchell a few spots ahead of OF Mike Trout. Ouch. So Stone says good organizations evaluate their own scouts to see which ones recommended players and why to see if they got it right or got it wrong. The same is true with player development coaches. Good prospects should develop quickly in the minors. If there are issues with prospects that rated highly in draft preparation consistently fail to make a major league impact, the farm system needs re-evaluation.
There is also a need for an organization to have a developmental blue print on how farm players are supposed to act, play and learn the game. Many teams allow their minor league managers and coaches free discretion to teach the fundamentals and baseball IQ. But this approach gives an inconsistent product as players move up and down the farm system.
Stone thinks an organization needs a balance between good scouting and good development. He admits that the White Sox have been very deficient in developing field position players.
There are some who say the best talent will rise to the surface no matter who is training them. We are not so sure about that. If pure talent wins out there would be more college studs skipping the minors to a spot immediately on a MLB roster. There are probably more Round 20 players that were marginal prospects who have developed into competent players than highly touted first round bonus baby busts.
Then there are teams that just like to buy other teams developed players. Usually confined to big market clubs, these buyers out more emphasis on winning at the major league level over having a consistent or sound minor league system that can supply one or two players every year. Buyers like to have major league experience players because it takes out the risk of scouting "potential" out of the equation because veterans have actual experience.
There is another factor key to developing talent: the player's own sacrificial drive to succeed at every level of competition. If you look at a preview magazine in any sport that lists the rosters and hometowns for all the players, how many do you find from your hometown? From your county? From your state? Very few if any. And that is the point. The best player on your high school team moves up to college or rookie ball playing against the "best" players at his level or above. It is how that prospect reacts to stiffer competition is the gateway for whether he meets the challenge or hits a wall.
There is a mental aspect that elite professionals have that the average player does not: drive. Michael Jordan could by example will his team to victory. Jonathan Toews can put his team into a different skill level during games. Some players are born with this innate ability. Others have to struggle to find an equivalent desire to be better than one's natural skill set. That is where a player with better Baseball IQ is a better prospect than a pure athlete who can play the game.
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