The White Sox made another big trade, getting rid of three major league players for three prospects and a relief pitcher.
The White Sox are following the Cubs tear down style of rebuilding their organization.
The Sox may have the best farm system in the game with 9 Top 100 prospects.
But if you look at what these rebuilds represents a key level: failure.
Failure of a team's existing draft and developmental skills of players they targeted for the minor leagues.
Only 2 of the Sox Top 10 prospects were drafted by the team (SP Fulmer and C Collins). The rest of the top prospects have been acquired through trade or international free agency.
This style of burn down the major league roster to acquire a boat load of prospects is a risky venture because not all prospects pan out to be major league players. In addition, the team is going to have a rough time winning at the major league level. Sox attendance has been historically tied to the team winning games.
This plan also is couched as a long term solution to correct mediocrity but it is a short term hit or miss operation. If the prospects you acquired do not become All-Star caliber players (or even good major league players), your major league roster is devoid of trade assets to try and second rebuild operation.
The Dodger way has been to draft well, have exceptional development programs in the minors, to create the ability to promote every season a rookie-of-the-year candidate. In the last few years, the Dodgers called up impact players Corey Seager, Joc Pedersen and Cody Bellinger. Add a home grown ace like Clayton Kershaw, the Dodgers have the luxury to trade veterans or pick up key free agents on an annual basis to meet specific needs.
The Cubs reaped the highest reward from its rebuild: a championship. But now a year removed, the Cubs have struggled to maintain the championship caliber. Last year's players are not hitting, fielding or pitching like they did last season. Was 2016 an fluke? Is 2017 more the norm?
And the Cubs now find themselves with their prized prospects on the major league roster, and their farm system weak after trading away the remaining high prospects for needs such as a closer in Chapman last season and a starter in Quintana this year. The Cubs have been caught in a trap of their own making; the team was built to win with the existing roster for the next few years. If they cannot perform up to the front office expectations, then this would be a huge set back for the organization.
Showing posts with label talent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label talent. Show all posts
July 20, 2017
April 26, 2017
DRAFTING VALUE
Tomorrow begins the annual NFL draft. It is now largely a media event. The NFL wants to create a circus atmosphere to enhance fan interest for fall ticket and merchandise sales. It is essentially a meat market auction for college talent. But it is wrapped in inconsistent statements, philosophies and dumb moves.
Leading up to the first selection, the hype is on the "skilled" positions such as quarterback, running back or "edge rusher." But most of this smoke is misguided tripe. The NFL has made the running back position a mere commodity. Running backs get burned out quicker than most positions so teams now have RB squads to carry the ball during the season. Most GMs figure they can find a quality back in the 4th round of any draft.
The "edge" rusher is the bling for defensive stat coaches who look to the "sack" as the key to a strong defense. The sack is an overrated marker. A good offensive tackle can neutralize an edge rusher, who is usually a thinner, quicker version of the defensive end. A great sack machine can have 15 in a season, but in reality that is probably less than two percent of the player's defensive snaps. Most edge rushers only look to sacks, so the other 98 percent of the time they are a non-factor.
The most focus in pre-draft mocks is the quarterback position. It is still the glamour spot on any team. Every owner wants a "franchise" quarterback to be the "face of the team." It is said that without a franchise QB, a team cannot win a Super Bowl (but tell that to Doug Williams.) Columnists admit that teams "overvalue" the quarterback position in the first round of the draft because quality, pro-ready quarterbacks are harder to find. The reason is simple: colleges are not running pro-style offenses. If a college education is supposed to prepare young men and women for their careers, college athletes does not prepare QBs for the pros because college coaches are all about winning to retain their huge salary and benefit packages. That is why some teams will reach to the lower college ranks to pick a Carson Wentz, who played a pro-style offense in college.
Another reason why QBs get picked in the first round is that the CBA allows teams to keep a QB an extra (5th year) under the rookie contract. Teams rarely put a rookie QB in charge of the offense so they use the first professional year for training and development. But there is another school of thought: baptism under fire. Some old coaches believe that it is better to put a rookie into battle right away so he can learn at "game speed." The biggest difference between college and pros is that in the NFL the opponent is bigger, faster and more skilled than college competition. The more reps a player gets against that talent level, the quicker a team will know whether their player is going to make it.
The scouting consensus is that none of the top 4 QB prospects is "worthy" of a first round selection. But everyone concedes that at least 3 QBs will be drafted in the top 15. If teams stuck with their internal valuations, all the quarterbacks would fall to the second round - - - and if a team needed to draft one, that would be the place to do it. Part of the reason for over-drafting a QB is to appease fans of bad teams. Drafting a new QB means that there will be competition at the most important position on the field. Competition should bring out the best in a player. But some front offices have taken competition out of the equation. The Bears never brought in a new, young QB to compete with Jay Cutler. The team did not want a "quarterback controversy." Cutler was their QB, period. As a result, the Bears did not draft a successor to Cutler. The position languished under Cutler, but it was reasoned that Cutler still had "potential" to get better. He never did. Now, the Bears have the third draft pick - - - and the team is still uncomfortable in selecting a QB.
Many teams tell us the overriding strategy on their draft boards is to select "the best player available." This strategy can lead to mismanaging resources and overdrafting a position of strength. Teams are supposed to use the draft to make their teams better. To improve the overall talent pool. If a team is in desperate need for a cornerback, select a cornerback - - - not a running back who has better "numbers." Old school scouts and GMs scoff at the Combine as being an irrelevant side show. Who cares if a offensive line man can dead lift a Mack truck twenty times if he is a traffic cone when it comes to pass protection. How high a man can jump, his 40 yard dash time, his "wing span" and cone drill time is meaningless because an NFL game is not made of those drills. The only thing a good general manager should ask is "can this kid play football?" Does a prospect have the football IQ to adapt to the professional level? Does he understand the fundamental concepts of the playbook? Does he understand his role and assignments on the field? You can tell the quality of the NFL product has diminished because there are so many "combine heros" on the field who do not know what they are doing - - - especially glaring in the secondary when a free safety is running around like he is trying to herd cats.
Draft boards are closely guarded secrets. Sports media tries to find ways to get scoops on how their local team plans to draft. But most of the dialog is misinformation. If a team thinks Player X is the best player on their board, they will not hype him so some other team will take him before their pick. Likewise, some teams will say a player with off-the-field issues will not impact his status on their board, when in fact some coaches and GMs will eliminate that player totally from any consideration. The Commissioner's complete discretion in player discipline has made some teams extremely uncomfortable in drafting drug users or domestic abusers because of potential long suspensions for a second offense.
There is also misinformation from the clubs who continually state that the "prime" rounds are in the middle. But this philosophy makes little sense. If you value third round talent more than first round talent, then you should always trade your highest picks for multiple middle round selections. It is a method of covering for first round mistakes or blunder picks, such as picking an injured first rounder who never makes it on to the field.
In 2011, SB Nation did a review of the 2000-2007 drafts for all pro selections. The results contradict the middle round philosophy.
Leading up to the first selection, the hype is on the "skilled" positions such as quarterback, running back or "edge rusher." But most of this smoke is misguided tripe. The NFL has made the running back position a mere commodity. Running backs get burned out quicker than most positions so teams now have RB squads to carry the ball during the season. Most GMs figure they can find a quality back in the 4th round of any draft.
The "edge" rusher is the bling for defensive stat coaches who look to the "sack" as the key to a strong defense. The sack is an overrated marker. A good offensive tackle can neutralize an edge rusher, who is usually a thinner, quicker version of the defensive end. A great sack machine can have 15 in a season, but in reality that is probably less than two percent of the player's defensive snaps. Most edge rushers only look to sacks, so the other 98 percent of the time they are a non-factor.
The most focus in pre-draft mocks is the quarterback position. It is still the glamour spot on any team. Every owner wants a "franchise" quarterback to be the "face of the team." It is said that without a franchise QB, a team cannot win a Super Bowl (but tell that to Doug Williams.) Columnists admit that teams "overvalue" the quarterback position in the first round of the draft because quality, pro-ready quarterbacks are harder to find. The reason is simple: colleges are not running pro-style offenses. If a college education is supposed to prepare young men and women for their careers, college athletes does not prepare QBs for the pros because college coaches are all about winning to retain their huge salary and benefit packages. That is why some teams will reach to the lower college ranks to pick a Carson Wentz, who played a pro-style offense in college.
Another reason why QBs get picked in the first round is that the CBA allows teams to keep a QB an extra (5th year) under the rookie contract. Teams rarely put a rookie QB in charge of the offense so they use the first professional year for training and development. But there is another school of thought: baptism under fire. Some old coaches believe that it is better to put a rookie into battle right away so he can learn at "game speed." The biggest difference between college and pros is that in the NFL the opponent is bigger, faster and more skilled than college competition. The more reps a player gets against that talent level, the quicker a team will know whether their player is going to make it.
The scouting consensus is that none of the top 4 QB prospects is "worthy" of a first round selection. But everyone concedes that at least 3 QBs will be drafted in the top 15. If teams stuck with their internal valuations, all the quarterbacks would fall to the second round - - - and if a team needed to draft one, that would be the place to do it. Part of the reason for over-drafting a QB is to appease fans of bad teams. Drafting a new QB means that there will be competition at the most important position on the field. Competition should bring out the best in a player. But some front offices have taken competition out of the equation. The Bears never brought in a new, young QB to compete with Jay Cutler. The team did not want a "quarterback controversy." Cutler was their QB, period. As a result, the Bears did not draft a successor to Cutler. The position languished under Cutler, but it was reasoned that Cutler still had "potential" to get better. He never did. Now, the Bears have the third draft pick - - - and the team is still uncomfortable in selecting a QB.
Many teams tell us the overriding strategy on their draft boards is to select "the best player available." This strategy can lead to mismanaging resources and overdrafting a position of strength. Teams are supposed to use the draft to make their teams better. To improve the overall talent pool. If a team is in desperate need for a cornerback, select a cornerback - - - not a running back who has better "numbers." Old school scouts and GMs scoff at the Combine as being an irrelevant side show. Who cares if a offensive line man can dead lift a Mack truck twenty times if he is a traffic cone when it comes to pass protection. How high a man can jump, his 40 yard dash time, his "wing span" and cone drill time is meaningless because an NFL game is not made of those drills. The only thing a good general manager should ask is "can this kid play football?" Does a prospect have the football IQ to adapt to the professional level? Does he understand the fundamental concepts of the playbook? Does he understand his role and assignments on the field? You can tell the quality of the NFL product has diminished because there are so many "combine heros" on the field who do not know what they are doing - - - especially glaring in the secondary when a free safety is running around like he is trying to herd cats.
Draft boards are closely guarded secrets. Sports media tries to find ways to get scoops on how their local team plans to draft. But most of the dialog is misinformation. If a team thinks Player X is the best player on their board, they will not hype him so some other team will take him before their pick. Likewise, some teams will say a player with off-the-field issues will not impact his status on their board, when in fact some coaches and GMs will eliminate that player totally from any consideration. The Commissioner's complete discretion in player discipline has made some teams extremely uncomfortable in drafting drug users or domestic abusers because of potential long suspensions for a second offense.
There is also misinformation from the clubs who continually state that the "prime" rounds are in the middle. But this philosophy makes little sense. If you value third round talent more than first round talent, then you should always trade your highest picks for multiple middle round selections. It is a method of covering for first round mistakes or blunder picks, such as picking an injured first rounder who never makes it on to the field.
In 2011, SB Nation did a review of the 2000-2007 drafts for all pro selections. The results contradict the middle round philosophy.
Round 1: In each of these
years, 31 players were taken in round 1. Out of those players, 13, 16,
10, 13, 15, 10, 13, and 10 in years 2000-2007, respectively, have made
the Pro Bowl. In only one year did at least half the players drafted in
round 1 eventually become Pro Bowlers. The average for the 8 yrs is
12.5.
Round 2: Again, 31 players
were drafted in round 2 in each of these years. Those becoming Pro
Bowlers number 5, 11, 4, 6, 2, 5, 6, and 5, for an average of 5.5 per
year. This is less than 1 in 5 players drafted in this round. Again,
2001 appears to behave been a banner year.
Round 3: The numbers in round 3
are: 1, 3, 2, 2, 6, 2, 0, and 0, for an average of 2.0, or less than 1
in every 15 players chosen (note that compensatory picks make the number
of players chosen in rounds 3-7 higher than 31).
The average for Round 4 was 2.375, for round 5 it was 1.625, for round 6 it was 1.5, and for round 7 it was 0.75.
The author's conclusion was the
odds of finding that Pro Bowler are not that good, even in the first
round (40%) And the odds of finding quality talent after the first round drops significantly as the second round is only 20%, the third round 6.7%. It shows
how important it is to address your biggest need(s) in the first round
or two. The odds are that your team will not pick a pro bowler in any round of the draft.
If you look at it objectively, even the best GM over a seven year draft cycle will only pick 6 pro bowl quality players or around 12% of total picks. An average GM over the same time period may only select 3 pro bowl quality players.
So, an NFL team needs to draft their primary, urgent needs each and every draft cycle; not the best player available but the best player at the position of need available. If you bet on the best player but he will not play because of a current starter is a veteran, then what is the point of stockpiling talent? And that does not help the problem positions on the team.
Drafts get screwed up because the nature of the clock and GMs, coaches and owners who disagree in the war room when they are on the clock. For years, commentators would wait for a team like the Raiders to pick someone out of the blue which would have a cascade effect across the rest of the NFL teams. That is part of the drama of the draft that NFL executives like to see.
But year after year, teams drafting lower in the order like the New England Patriots, seem to find more talent than the lowly Cleveland Browns. But the Pats do not necessarily draft or sign the fastest, strongest or more impressive Combine stars. They draft football players.
January 23, 2015
MADDENING JOE
As upbeat, laid back, humorous and gracious that Joe Maddon was at the Cubs fan convention, the expectations placed upon his shoulders is the weight of Sears Tower.
He was labeled one of the best managers in his generation. When he suddenly opted out of his Tampa contract, it was felt it was a heavenly godsend that the Cubs could pick up an experienced, winning coach to lead the young prospects to the promised land.
The Cubs have had a long line of saviors since the last World championship.
Maddon had two interim gigs with the Angels, in 51 games managed, he went 27-24. It took almost a decade before he became a full time manager with the Rays. In the 9 seasons with Tampa, 1459 games managed, his record was 754-705 in line with career .517 winning percentage. His teams averaged in 3rd place in their division. His club only won divisions twice, in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, his team was 5 games better than projected, winning the AL pennant but losing to the Phillies in the World Series, 4-1. Maddon won his only AL manager of the year award in 2008.
In his 48 replay challenges, he got 21 overturned for a .4375 winning percentage.
Maddon hauntingly compares well with former savior, Lou Piniella.
Piniella managed 19 seasons prior to the Cubs with four different teams. He had compiled a career .517 winning percentage as a manager. In his 23 seasons as a manager, 6 of his clubs finished in first place (twice with the Cubs) and he had one world series title (1990 Reds). His teams prior to the Cubs placed around 3rd in their division.
The numbers are historically close. Piniella got off to a fast start with a veteran club and got to the post-season. The expectations of the former Yankee (and the reputable glory of that franchise) were through the roof. But the Cubs bombed in the worst way. Piniella would later say that being the Cubs manager drained him like no other tenure had ever done. The fans and the team put so much pressure to end the alleged curse that the weight of the baseball world crushed him.
Now, Piniella had nothing to prove when he came to Chicago. He had his playing career and excellent reputation as a manager. He had his championships, he had his personal glory. He liked baseball. He was an old school lifer. He was jovial, likeable, spoke his mind, got along with most of his players, kept things loose - - - until the wear and tear of the Cubs broke his baseball spirit.
In some respects, Maddon is at the same crossroads as Piniella. The Cubs job will probably be his last managerial one in baseball for Maddon. He could cement his eternal legacy by giving the Cubs a century due championship. Or it could grind him up like a Chicago red hot sausage.
The only difference between Maddon and Piniella is that Maddon is taking over a younger Cub squad. Maddon and Piniella both managed second tier organizations to the post-season. Both managed in Tampa prior to becoming the Cub skipper. Only time will tell if this is deja vu.
He was labeled one of the best managers in his generation. When he suddenly opted out of his Tampa contract, it was felt it was a heavenly godsend that the Cubs could pick up an experienced, winning coach to lead the young prospects to the promised land.
The Cubs have had a long line of saviors since the last World championship.
Maddon had two interim gigs with the Angels, in 51 games managed, he went 27-24. It took almost a decade before he became a full time manager with the Rays. In the 9 seasons with Tampa, 1459 games managed, his record was 754-705 in line with career .517 winning percentage. His teams averaged in 3rd place in their division. His club only won divisions twice, in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, his team was 5 games better than projected, winning the AL pennant but losing to the Phillies in the World Series, 4-1. Maddon won his only AL manager of the year award in 2008.
In his 48 replay challenges, he got 21 overturned for a .4375 winning percentage.
Maddon hauntingly compares well with former savior, Lou Piniella.
Piniella managed 19 seasons prior to the Cubs with four different teams. He had compiled a career .517 winning percentage as a manager. In his 23 seasons as a manager, 6 of his clubs finished in first place (twice with the Cubs) and he had one world series title (1990 Reds). His teams prior to the Cubs placed around 3rd in their division.
The numbers are historically close. Piniella got off to a fast start with a veteran club and got to the post-season. The expectations of the former Yankee (and the reputable glory of that franchise) were through the roof. But the Cubs bombed in the worst way. Piniella would later say that being the Cubs manager drained him like no other tenure had ever done. The fans and the team put so much pressure to end the alleged curse that the weight of the baseball world crushed him.
Now, Piniella had nothing to prove when he came to Chicago. He had his playing career and excellent reputation as a manager. He had his championships, he had his personal glory. He liked baseball. He was an old school lifer. He was jovial, likeable, spoke his mind, got along with most of his players, kept things loose - - - until the wear and tear of the Cubs broke his baseball spirit.
In some respects, Maddon is at the same crossroads as Piniella. The Cubs job will probably be his last managerial one in baseball for Maddon. He could cement his eternal legacy by giving the Cubs a century due championship. Or it could grind him up like a Chicago red hot sausage.
The only difference between Maddon and Piniella is that Maddon is taking over a younger Cub squad. Maddon and Piniella both managed second tier organizations to the post-season. Both managed in Tampa prior to becoming the Cub skipper. Only time will tell if this is deja vu.
October 2, 2013
JUDGMENT
Francisco Liriano looked like David Price last night. As the Pittsburgh starter in the one game wild card, Liriano threw seven strong innings in the Pirate victory.
Liriano was 16-8, 3.02 ERA and 1.224 WHIP this season. The Pirates signed the free agent last off season for 2 years, $7 million deal. Liriano had been coming off an injury rehab season with the White Sox.
Liriano was available to all teams. The Cubs chose to sign Scott Baker for one year, $5.5 million contract. Baker was coming off Tommy John surgery. He spent almost the entire season in rehab. Baker came back in September to pitch a total of 15 innings in 3 starts.
This is a question of management judgment. The Cubs signed Baker for the sole purpose of flipping the 32 year old pitcher at the trade deadline. However, Liriano, 29, had already completed his "rehab" season with the White Sox, throwing actual major league games, so all he needed to do was regain his control and not his health.
Liriano signed for significantly less than Baker. Liriano, as a left handed starter, is a more valuable asset at the trade deadline. Clearly, Liriano had a better season than Baker. This was a missed opportunity for the Cubs.
This is also a question of talent evaluation. Baker had a significant injury. He had not recovered from surgery. Even though Tommy John surgeries are now common place, there is no guarantee that a pitcher will recover fully. It may take 12 to 18 months to know the results. Why would the Cubs think that a 32 year old pitcher who has not thrown a pitch in a year would be more valuable to the club than a 29 year old lefty starter who has worked his way back from his injury?
Ricketts and his business handlers keep saying that Epstein and Hoyer are the "smartest guys" in baseball. They know what they are doing. They are building an organization. But the bottom line will always be can the Cubs properly evaluate talent. This is not a question of developing talent because Baker and Liriano were known commodities. In this litmus test, the Cubs failed when they did not go strong to sign Liriano over Baker.
Liriano was 16-8, 3.02 ERA and 1.224 WHIP this season. The Pirates signed the free agent last off season for 2 years, $7 million deal. Liriano had been coming off an injury rehab season with the White Sox.
Liriano was available to all teams. The Cubs chose to sign Scott Baker for one year, $5.5 million contract. Baker was coming off Tommy John surgery. He spent almost the entire season in rehab. Baker came back in September to pitch a total of 15 innings in 3 starts.
This is a question of management judgment. The Cubs signed Baker for the sole purpose of flipping the 32 year old pitcher at the trade deadline. However, Liriano, 29, had already completed his "rehab" season with the White Sox, throwing actual major league games, so all he needed to do was regain his control and not his health.
Liriano signed for significantly less than Baker. Liriano, as a left handed starter, is a more valuable asset at the trade deadline. Clearly, Liriano had a better season than Baker. This was a missed opportunity for the Cubs.
This is also a question of talent evaluation. Baker had a significant injury. He had not recovered from surgery. Even though Tommy John surgeries are now common place, there is no guarantee that a pitcher will recover fully. It may take 12 to 18 months to know the results. Why would the Cubs think that a 32 year old pitcher who has not thrown a pitch in a year would be more valuable to the club than a 29 year old lefty starter who has worked his way back from his injury?
Ricketts and his business handlers keep saying that Epstein and Hoyer are the "smartest guys" in baseball. They know what they are doing. They are building an organization. But the bottom line will always be can the Cubs properly evaluate talent. This is not a question of developing talent because Baker and Liriano were known commodities. In this litmus test, the Cubs failed when they did not go strong to sign Liriano over Baker.
September 2, 2013
TALENT POOLS
There is a limited number of sources for a baseball team to acquire talent.
At the lowest tier, a front office has several places to sign talent. In the U.S., there are college and high school players subject to the June draft. The most a team could sign is approximately 40 players. The next group are foreign players. The amateur players are now subject to CBA bonus pool restrictions. Most teams sign between 1 to 5 foreign youngsters (ages 16 to 18). The other is foreign professional players. Depending on the type and quality of league (Japanese, Cuban, Mexican, etc.), those talents are equivalent to middle minor league talent. After a certain amount of years of service, minor leaguers who have not been promoted can become minor league free agents. By that time, in their mid to late 20s, they are no longer considered prospects. The most talented still may find work in the high minors as insurance against injury at the major league level. The last area (which has suddenly become a feeding ground for aggressive GMs who want to improve their systems) is the waiver wire/designated for assignment pro player pools. At times, DFA's players do not get claimed and become free agents. Typically, these players have some major league experience and could be an upgrade for bad teams. However, they usually have very little upset potential.
At the next level, ball clubs have their development affiliate minor league clubs. At this point, talent is assigned to various skill levels with the hope that training, experience and pro coaching will increase the probability of success. As a general rule, 2/3 of rookie ball players will get promoted to Class A. More than half of Class A players will get promoted to Class AA where competition level increases several fold. Probably a third of Class AA players get promoted to Class AAA. Depending on various factors, including age, offensive stats, defensive prowess, and the major league club current needs, Class AAA players find themselves "blocked" at this level until an opportunity arises. On average, probably less than a third of AAA players will get any meaningful major league service time in their careers.
The next resource level is obtaining talent from other major league clubs. Major league talent coming from trades is more reliable indicator of future performance than minor league players. That is why it typically costs a team more "assets" (in cash, prospects, or other players) to obtain a quality a major league player. The other source of major league talent is the free agent pool. The top third of the annual FA pool demand top dollar, long term contracts which some teams cannot afford.
So how do successful organizations use these talent pools to their advantage?
Blue Jays general manager
Alex Anthopoulos is an aggressive general manager who does not like to stand pat. He is constantly looking to improve his major league team. Last off season he orchestrated the 12 player blockbuster deal with the Marlins. MLB only approved the deal because the Marlins received viable prospects in exchange. Anthopoulos has been active in the foreign player market. He can market Toronto as an international city.
He starts with a three year plan to build a contender around a present nucleus of major league players. He adds to the core team by not trading away
one of the Blue Jay’s top players. He does not rely on any single talent pool in order to build his major league roster. It is not out of his realm to make minor league trades. When he realized that his upper minor league system was weak, he aggressively worked the waiver wire claiming players from other clubs, then sending them back through to clear so they could be optioned to AAA. If a claimed player made the organizational flow chart, he could also be quickly dispatched if a better player was claimed off waivers a day, a week or month later. In other words, Anthopoulos takes a balanced approach to acquiring talent for the Blue Jays. He is not reliant on one aspect of player development. His focus is the current major league roster and how he can make it better this season and next year. He is not afraid to trade away top prospects for proven major league talent. He is not afraid to sign troubled free agents like Melky Cabrera if that can upgrade his team.
This is what he did just last off season:
There was a record amount of player movement for the Jays while retaining the
great talent already on the major league roster.
Key players lost in free agency: Jason Frasor (to Texas Rangers), Kelly Johnson (to Tampa Bay Rays), Brandon Lyon (to New York Mets), and Carlos Villanueva (to Chicago Cubs).
Players traded to Marlins: Henderson Álvarez, Anthony Desclafani, Yunel Escobar, Adeiny Hechavarria, Jake Marisnick, Jeff Mathis, and Justin Nicolino.
Players traded to Mets: Wuilmer Becrra, John Buck, Travis D'Arnaud, and Noah Syndergaard.
Key players brought in through free agency: Melky Cabrera (formerly with San Francisco Giants), Maicer Izturis (formerly with LA Angels).
Players brought in from Marlins: Emilio Bonifacio, John Buck (traded to Mets), Mark Buehrle, Josh Johnson, and José Reyes.
Players brought in from Mets: R.A. Dickey, Mike Nickeas, and Josh Thole.
Despite the moves, MLB.com stated during spring training that even though "the Jays traded many of the most promising prospects in deals with the Marlins and Mets, but they still have an adequate farm system filled with talent."
To summarize, Anthopoulos uses all aspects of the lower tier talent pools to upgrade his organizational depth. He is not afraid to aggressively promote talent or trade prospects for proven major league talent. He is creative enough to swing complicated three team deals. He scours the waiver wire to supplement his rosters. Then, when he believes there is a chance to have a playoff run, he pulls off a blockbuster trade. Even though some of his moves did not work out, Toronto fans are not up in arms because their GM is using all the tools at his disposal in order to try to make a championship caliber team.
August 27, 2013
THE TRAITS OF LEADERSHIP
In October, 2011, the Cubs released the following press statement:
CHICAGO- The Chicago Cubs today named Theo Epstein
as the club's President of Baseball Operations, reporting to Chairman
Tom Ricketts. Epstein and the Cubs have agreed to terms on a five-year
contract. Further terms of the deal were not disclosed. Epstein will
oversee all aspects of the club's baseball operation. Crane Kenney,
President of Business Operations, will continue to oversee all aspects
of the club's business operation and report to Ricketts.
"When we began our search a few months ago, I identified three traits our baseball leadership must possess," said Ricketts. "I talked about finding an individual with a commitment to player development, someone with a strong analytical background and someone who has been in a winning culture with a track record of success.
"With two World Championships, six playoff appearances and nine winning seasons in nine years as Boston's general manager, Theo Epstein has an established track record of winning thanks to a solid balance of analytical thinking and traditional scouting methods. And with a nucleus of homegrown players contributing to that annual success at the major league level, Theo has shown a strong commitment to player development.
"My family and I are extremely proud to welcome Theo and his family to the Chicago Cubs. We are eager to begin the next chapter in the storied history of this franchise and have every confidence that Theo will lead us to the championship our great fans so richly deserve."
"It is truly an honor and a privilege to join such a special organization," said Epstein. "I would like to thank Tom Ricketts and the entire Ricketts family for putting their faith in me and for giving me this incredible opportunity. I wouldn't be here without their commitment to the fans and their long term vision for the organization.
"Building a foundation for sustained success starts with a commitment to scouting and player development and requires a team of people working passionately to support a common vision of what the Cubs can become. Together, we will work to define and implement a new vision for the Cubs, and I can't wait to help lead the way."
Epstein, 37, joins the Cubs after 10 seasons with the Boston Red Sox, the last nine as the club's general manager. He built World Champion ballclubs in 2004 and 2007, including the organization's first World Series title in 86 years, and saw four teams advance to the American League Championship Series (2003, 2004, 2007, 2008). Epstein, the youngest general manager in major league history to win a World Series, is one of only two individuals since World War II to win two World Championships in his first five years as a general manager, joining New York's Brian Cashman, who won the World Series in each of his first three years from 1998-2000.
Overall, Epstein's clubs combined to go 839-619 in the regular season, a .575 winning percentage that included a run that featured six seasons with 95 or more victories during his nine-year tenure as general manager. He became the youngest general manager in major league history when named to the post on November 25, 2002.
Epstein's commitment to scouting and player development has been the centerpiece of Boston's sustained success at the big league level during his time with the Red Sox. Boston's first pick (second round) in the 2004 Draft, Dustin Pedroia, was named the 2007 A.L. Rookie of the Year and the 2008 A.L. MVP, and is part of a core of homegrown, developed talent such as Jon Lester, Jonathan Papelbon, Kevin Youkilis, Jacoby Ellsbury, Daniel Bard, Clay Buchholz and others who have helped the Red Sox to their run of success.
Additionally, the Red Sox were honored by Baseball America as the Best Drafting organization of the decade encompassing the 2000s.
Epstein, who last season marked 20 years working in the major leagues, began his baseball career as a summer intern for the Baltimore Orioles from 1992-94. He worked for the San Diego Padres for seven seasons from 1995-2001, advancing to the position of director of baseball operations, before joining the Red Sox in March of 2002 as the club's assistant general manager.
*************
Ricketts main criteria for finding a new "baseball man" was
1) an individual with a commitment to player development,
2) someone with a strong analytical background and
3) someone who has been in a winning culture with a track record of success.
Epstein has spent a lot of time and resources on "player development," breaking the bank by overspending in the first two amateur drafts and the recent international player bonus pool. By shear volume, he has added numbers to the Cubs minor league system. But to this point in time, Epstein has yet to "develop" one starting Cub (with the partial exception of Anthony Rizzo who was in Boston with Theo and in San Diego with McLeod).
The analytical approach must be a homage to Moneyball, using deep player statistics to find valuable contributing players on champion caliber squads. The big push was to sign and develop high OBP players. But the players put on the major league roster are far from Moneyball icons. The Cubs rank 28th in MLB in OBP and batting average. The Cubs rank 23rd in MLB in runs scored. The Cubs do not manufacture runs by using tools such as walks, stolen bases, or hit and runs. The Cubs batting average with runners in scoring position is dreadful. By all accounts, the prized prospects in the low minors are also free swingers and not high OBP players.
It is hard to fathom the criteria of a "winning culture" when the Cubs may lose 200 games in the last two seasons. In 2011, the Cubs finished 71-91. Since Epstein's management, the Cubs have had a lower winning percentage than from 2011. Several current Cubs, including starter Jeff Samardzija, have questioned the "winning attitude" or means of rebuilding when a half dozen starting pitchers are moved in the last two years with little to take their place. Last week, manager Dale Sveum basically threw in the towel to create an extended spring training situation by batting struggling Castro and Rizzo at the top of the order to get them more at-bats.
A reoccurring point this season has been the fact that "player development" should not stop at the major league doorstep. There has been evidence of regression in both "core" players, Castro and Rizzo, this season. Supposedly, the coaching staff have worked with Castro and Rizzo to improve their games, but nothing has worked to turn around their performance funks.
All points look to 2016 as Epstein's watershed or Waterloo moment with the Cubs. There are no impact players in Iowa today who are ready to contribute full time for the Cubs in 2014. We will not see the Epstein signees begin to arrive in the majors until mid-2015 at the earliest.
Leaders lead by example. The front office states that it does not like to lose games, but they never seem really upset about it. The worst the record, the higher the draft position. The higher the draft position, the more money is available to spend in the CBA. Epstein has always have a big budget to paper his major league rosters with talent. Some was well spent, others have been dead money disasters. Epstein has never done a ground up rebuild of an organization. One cannot say at this point in time that he will be successful. The optimism of the 2011 press release seems to be a distant echo today.
"When we began our search a few months ago, I identified three traits our baseball leadership must possess," said Ricketts. "I talked about finding an individual with a commitment to player development, someone with a strong analytical background and someone who has been in a winning culture with a track record of success.
"With two World Championships, six playoff appearances and nine winning seasons in nine years as Boston's general manager, Theo Epstein has an established track record of winning thanks to a solid balance of analytical thinking and traditional scouting methods. And with a nucleus of homegrown players contributing to that annual success at the major league level, Theo has shown a strong commitment to player development.
"My family and I are extremely proud to welcome Theo and his family to the Chicago Cubs. We are eager to begin the next chapter in the storied history of this franchise and have every confidence that Theo will lead us to the championship our great fans so richly deserve."
"It is truly an honor and a privilege to join such a special organization," said Epstein. "I would like to thank Tom Ricketts and the entire Ricketts family for putting their faith in me and for giving me this incredible opportunity. I wouldn't be here without their commitment to the fans and their long term vision for the organization.
"Building a foundation for sustained success starts with a commitment to scouting and player development and requires a team of people working passionately to support a common vision of what the Cubs can become. Together, we will work to define and implement a new vision for the Cubs, and I can't wait to help lead the way."
Epstein, 37, joins the Cubs after 10 seasons with the Boston Red Sox, the last nine as the club's general manager. He built World Champion ballclubs in 2004 and 2007, including the organization's first World Series title in 86 years, and saw four teams advance to the American League Championship Series (2003, 2004, 2007, 2008). Epstein, the youngest general manager in major league history to win a World Series, is one of only two individuals since World War II to win two World Championships in his first five years as a general manager, joining New York's Brian Cashman, who won the World Series in each of his first three years from 1998-2000.
Overall, Epstein's clubs combined to go 839-619 in the regular season, a .575 winning percentage that included a run that featured six seasons with 95 or more victories during his nine-year tenure as general manager. He became the youngest general manager in major league history when named to the post on November 25, 2002.
Epstein's commitment to scouting and player development has been the centerpiece of Boston's sustained success at the big league level during his time with the Red Sox. Boston's first pick (second round) in the 2004 Draft, Dustin Pedroia, was named the 2007 A.L. Rookie of the Year and the 2008 A.L. MVP, and is part of a core of homegrown, developed talent such as Jon Lester, Jonathan Papelbon, Kevin Youkilis, Jacoby Ellsbury, Daniel Bard, Clay Buchholz and others who have helped the Red Sox to their run of success.
Additionally, the Red Sox were honored by Baseball America as the Best Drafting organization of the decade encompassing the 2000s.
Epstein, who last season marked 20 years working in the major leagues, began his baseball career as a summer intern for the Baltimore Orioles from 1992-94. He worked for the San Diego Padres for seven seasons from 1995-2001, advancing to the position of director of baseball operations, before joining the Red Sox in March of 2002 as the club's assistant general manager.
*************
Ricketts main criteria for finding a new "baseball man" was
1) an individual with a commitment to player development,
2) someone with a strong analytical background and
3) someone who has been in a winning culture with a track record of success.
Epstein has spent a lot of time and resources on "player development," breaking the bank by overspending in the first two amateur drafts and the recent international player bonus pool. By shear volume, he has added numbers to the Cubs minor league system. But to this point in time, Epstein has yet to "develop" one starting Cub (with the partial exception of Anthony Rizzo who was in Boston with Theo and in San Diego with McLeod).
The analytical approach must be a homage to Moneyball, using deep player statistics to find valuable contributing players on champion caliber squads. The big push was to sign and develop high OBP players. But the players put on the major league roster are far from Moneyball icons. The Cubs rank 28th in MLB in OBP and batting average. The Cubs rank 23rd in MLB in runs scored. The Cubs do not manufacture runs by using tools such as walks, stolen bases, or hit and runs. The Cubs batting average with runners in scoring position is dreadful. By all accounts, the prized prospects in the low minors are also free swingers and not high OBP players.
It is hard to fathom the criteria of a "winning culture" when the Cubs may lose 200 games in the last two seasons. In 2011, the Cubs finished 71-91. Since Epstein's management, the Cubs have had a lower winning percentage than from 2011. Several current Cubs, including starter Jeff Samardzija, have questioned the "winning attitude" or means of rebuilding when a half dozen starting pitchers are moved in the last two years with little to take their place. Last week, manager Dale Sveum basically threw in the towel to create an extended spring training situation by batting struggling Castro and Rizzo at the top of the order to get them more at-bats.
A reoccurring point this season has been the fact that "player development" should not stop at the major league doorstep. There has been evidence of regression in both "core" players, Castro and Rizzo, this season. Supposedly, the coaching staff have worked with Castro and Rizzo to improve their games, but nothing has worked to turn around their performance funks.
All points look to 2016 as Epstein's watershed or Waterloo moment with the Cubs. There are no impact players in Iowa today who are ready to contribute full time for the Cubs in 2014. We will not see the Epstein signees begin to arrive in the majors until mid-2015 at the earliest.
Leaders lead by example. The front office states that it does not like to lose games, but they never seem really upset about it. The worst the record, the higher the draft position. The higher the draft position, the more money is available to spend in the CBA. Epstein has always have a big budget to paper his major league rosters with talent. Some was well spent, others have been dead money disasters. Epstein has never done a ground up rebuild of an organization. One cannot say at this point in time that he will be successful. The optimism of the 2011 press release seems to be a distant echo today.
April 23, 2013
WHY IT DID IT TAKE SO LONG?
After the Cubs found a new way to lose last night in Cincinnati, the pressure was mounting on the Cubs manager, Dale Sveum. He finally realized that the poor talent assembled on his roster is going to RUIN his career. And he is not happy about it.
Paul Sullivan quoted the steamed manager in the Chicago Tribune:
“Yeah, I’d be lying if you didn’t think about yourself through some of this stuff too,” Sveum said. “But that’s stuff you don’t have control over. I’ve got control over my job and the coaching staff to prepare everybody every day in spring training and this and that, and that’s all I can do.”
Sveum realizes that other teams (potential employers) will look at his Cub win-loss record as a barometer of his managerial abilities. With the losses piling up quickly, and the Cubs players making the same mistakes over and over again, Sveum's personal frustration is coming to light.
Sveum admits that it’s up to him and his coaching staff “to get (the players) to respond to all of us.”
But Sveum fails to answer WHY his team is not responding to his coaching instructions. The reason is simple: there is no pressure on the players to perform because there are no ramifications for poor play. For the starters, there are no prospects ready to take their jobs from them. And maybe that's why Sveum is angry; he has been boxed into a corner with no exit.
Sveum's tenor began to percolate over the weekend when he was asked whether some of the position players could be sent down to the minor leagues "to send a message." Reporters inferred that they were discussing Rizzo (for his offensive woes) and Castro (for his defensive lapses).
“You guys asked me if those guys couldn’t get sent down. I said nobody was exempt (from) it. They're not the only ones.”
Sveum added: “That’s all basically what (I’m) talking about. I’m not pointing fingers at them or anything. I’m just (saying), 'Hey, we’re all (culpable for) this. I’m (not) exempt (from) being fired, and so is my coaching staff. We’re all in this together as a team.”
Except, there is a perception that is reality with the 2013 Cubs. Rizzo, Castro, Valbuena, Barney, and the rest are not going to be sent down to the minors (barring injury rehabs) because the Cubs have no ready replacements in Iowa. The only shuffle continues to be pitchers, but that deck of cards is so thin that the Cubs are playing waiver wire roulette just to find arms for the bullpen. The team, as constructed, is flawed. When Sveum tries to motivate by playing the demotion to the minors card, he has no clout to pull off such a move. And the players (and their agents) know it. It is an idle threat.
Instead, Sveum has the only weapon in his arsenal that professions do understand: playing time. Sveum could bench underperforming players to "send a message" to focus more, train better and play harder. Which would be fine on a competitive team. But the idea that Castro will be benched for whom? The Cubs roster has no true back up shortstop. The same goes for Rizzo at first; there is no competent back up on the roster. And the front office is pushing to keep the "young stars" in the line up because, frankly, why else would any fan buy a ticket to see this Cub team play.
The dogma of the Cubs history is that losing teams breed the acceptance of losing. Even if managers do their best to get their players focused on playing "winning baseball," i.e. handling the fundamentals of the game by instinct and making the correct situational decisions, if the locker room has accepted losing as a way of life with no accountability for poor play, the team will have another lost season.
Paul Sullivan quoted the steamed manager in the Chicago Tribune:
“Yeah, I’d be lying if you didn’t think about yourself through some of this stuff too,” Sveum said. “But that’s stuff you don’t have control over. I’ve got control over my job and the coaching staff to prepare everybody every day in spring training and this and that, and that’s all I can do.”
Sveum realizes that other teams (potential employers) will look at his Cub win-loss record as a barometer of his managerial abilities. With the losses piling up quickly, and the Cubs players making the same mistakes over and over again, Sveum's personal frustration is coming to light.
Sveum admits that it’s up to him and his coaching staff “to get (the players) to respond to all of us.”
But Sveum fails to answer WHY his team is not responding to his coaching instructions. The reason is simple: there is no pressure on the players to perform because there are no ramifications for poor play. For the starters, there are no prospects ready to take their jobs from them. And maybe that's why Sveum is angry; he has been boxed into a corner with no exit.
Sveum's tenor began to percolate over the weekend when he was asked whether some of the position players could be sent down to the minor leagues "to send a message." Reporters inferred that they were discussing Rizzo (for his offensive woes) and Castro (for his defensive lapses).
“You guys asked me if those guys couldn’t get sent down. I said nobody was exempt (from) it. They're not the only ones.”
Sveum added: “That’s all basically what (I’m) talking about. I’m not pointing fingers at them or anything. I’m just (saying), 'Hey, we’re all (culpable for) this. I’m (not) exempt (from) being fired, and so is my coaching staff. We’re all in this together as a team.”
Except, there is a perception that is reality with the 2013 Cubs. Rizzo, Castro, Valbuena, Barney, and the rest are not going to be sent down to the minors (barring injury rehabs) because the Cubs have no ready replacements in Iowa. The only shuffle continues to be pitchers, but that deck of cards is so thin that the Cubs are playing waiver wire roulette just to find arms for the bullpen. The team, as constructed, is flawed. When Sveum tries to motivate by playing the demotion to the minors card, he has no clout to pull off such a move. And the players (and their agents) know it. It is an idle threat.
Instead, Sveum has the only weapon in his arsenal that professions do understand: playing time. Sveum could bench underperforming players to "send a message" to focus more, train better and play harder. Which would be fine on a competitive team. But the idea that Castro will be benched for whom? The Cubs roster has no true back up shortstop. The same goes for Rizzo at first; there is no competent back up on the roster. And the front office is pushing to keep the "young stars" in the line up because, frankly, why else would any fan buy a ticket to see this Cub team play.
The dogma of the Cubs history is that losing teams breed the acceptance of losing. Even if managers do their best to get their players focused on playing "winning baseball," i.e. handling the fundamentals of the game by instinct and making the correct situational decisions, if the locker room has accepted losing as a way of life with no accountability for poor play, the team will have another lost season.
August 13, 2012
INSIDE
For the past several years, sports teams have allowed filming documentaries on the behind the scenes operations of a football or baseball team. These reality shows are to give the fans some insight in the coach and player dynamics, the grind of the season, and the emotional roller coaster people having trying to compete at the highest level of professional sports.
It is extremely rare for a team to grant access to their draft war room. But Fox Sports Houston gained such access to the general manager and scouts during this year's Astros draft.
The process of a major league is what most fans assumed would happen.
The general manager met with the New Owner and club president to agree that the team needs to major rebuilding effort through the draft and international free agent signings. With all executives on board with the plan, the general manager then began the process of evaluating players.
The scouting process focused on setting forth what drives players to succeed at the major league level and finding out how "early" in a player's career can you find those characteristics. For example, Astros identified the major league characteristics as a) contact vs. striking out and b) locating a fastball. In reality, the key to the Astro evaluation process is player "skills" and not what other teams tout as "tools."
Some people may think that the terms "skills" and "tools" are the same thing. A tool is an objective measure of a player: size, speed, range. When some scouts declare a player is a "five tool" guy, they are talking about the abilities to hit for average, hit for power, base running skills/speed, throwing ability (arm strength) and fielding. Scouts look at the numbers to rank a player's tools.
But the Astros look deeper than the career stats to determine when a player found major league skill characteristics. It almost goes beyond pure statistics to see if the prospect actually has a "baseball IQ" character to meet the demands of a major league player. The most important thing about success in the major leagues is the ability to adapt. If a player has the personal skills to adapt well at an early age, he is more likely to adapt as his professional career advances.
Then, the scouting reports were compiled to determine what players the team wanted to draft. Then the general manager and his staff tried to figure out how much the players were "worth." In their lexicon, the goal of the draft was to get "the most major league value" out of it. The general manager must project how much each players will cost, and what sort of "return" on investment the team will receive in the future. The best return would be a projected major league starter.
The team goes into the draft with a player ranking and their potential selections. The team then runs simulations of a mock draft to determine what their reaction would be if a certain player is drafted ahead of their pick or not drafted as they thought another team would do. If one looks at all the mock drafts this year by columnists, pundits and scouting services, each one was different because of the truly fluid dynamic of how each team evaluates a player is slightly different; each team has different philosophies in finding talent; each team has different needs to fill at both the major and minor league levels; each team has a different talent budget; and each team has a risk evaluation program to determine whether or not a pick is signable for a reasonable cost.
Once the draft started, the situation changed and internal debates began as "good" players were falling down the board due to perceived signability issues. The new collective bargaining rules may have made some teams much more conservative than in past drafts. In the end, most baseball writers believed that the Astros had an excellent draft, securing three first round talents. The Astros rebuilding process was interesting because it showed a layered evaluation program after identifying areas of solutions: high school, college, international free agents, or major league free agents (which have little impact due to the rebuilding blueprint agreed to with ownership).
The team broke down the scouting reports into objective criteria that most scouts use to rank prospects. Similar information was taken by management to find whether the prospects tools meet with skill characteristics of successful major league players. Then a consensus of prospect rankings comes to the forefront. With that list, a cost-benefit analysis is made by the general manager to determine major league values of each player. Armed with all this information, the team then goes into the draft room to iron out each selection as the draft progressed; not making their picks until they were on the clock to find the best major league value at that slot.
It is extremely rare for a team to grant access to their draft war room. But Fox Sports Houston gained such access to the general manager and scouts during this year's Astros draft.
The process of a major league is what most fans assumed would happen.
The general manager met with the New Owner and club president to agree that the team needs to major rebuilding effort through the draft and international free agent signings. With all executives on board with the plan, the general manager then began the process of evaluating players.
The scouting process focused on setting forth what drives players to succeed at the major league level and finding out how "early" in a player's career can you find those characteristics. For example, Astros identified the major league characteristics as a) contact vs. striking out and b) locating a fastball. In reality, the key to the Astro evaluation process is player "skills" and not what other teams tout as "tools."
Some people may think that the terms "skills" and "tools" are the same thing. A tool is an objective measure of a player: size, speed, range. When some scouts declare a player is a "five tool" guy, they are talking about the abilities to hit for average, hit for power, base running skills/speed, throwing ability (arm strength) and fielding. Scouts look at the numbers to rank a player's tools.
But the Astros look deeper than the career stats to determine when a player found major league skill characteristics. It almost goes beyond pure statistics to see if the prospect actually has a "baseball IQ" character to meet the demands of a major league player. The most important thing about success in the major leagues is the ability to adapt. If a player has the personal skills to adapt well at an early age, he is more likely to adapt as his professional career advances.
Then, the scouting reports were compiled to determine what players the team wanted to draft. Then the general manager and his staff tried to figure out how much the players were "worth." In their lexicon, the goal of the draft was to get "the most major league value" out of it. The general manager must project how much each players will cost, and what sort of "return" on investment the team will receive in the future. The best return would be a projected major league starter.
The team goes into the draft with a player ranking and their potential selections. The team then runs simulations of a mock draft to determine what their reaction would be if a certain player is drafted ahead of their pick or not drafted as they thought another team would do. If one looks at all the mock drafts this year by columnists, pundits and scouting services, each one was different because of the truly fluid dynamic of how each team evaluates a player is slightly different; each team has different philosophies in finding talent; each team has different needs to fill at both the major and minor league levels; each team has a different talent budget; and each team has a risk evaluation program to determine whether or not a pick is signable for a reasonable cost.
Once the draft started, the situation changed and internal debates began as "good" players were falling down the board due to perceived signability issues. The new collective bargaining rules may have made some teams much more conservative than in past drafts. In the end, most baseball writers believed that the Astros had an excellent draft, securing three first round talents. The Astros rebuilding process was interesting because it showed a layered evaluation program after identifying areas of solutions: high school, college, international free agents, or major league free agents (which have little impact due to the rebuilding blueprint agreed to with ownership).
The team broke down the scouting reports into objective criteria that most scouts use to rank prospects. Similar information was taken by management to find whether the prospects tools meet with skill characteristics of successful major league players. Then a consensus of prospect rankings comes to the forefront. With that list, a cost-benefit analysis is made by the general manager to determine major league values of each player. Armed with all this information, the team then goes into the draft room to iron out each selection as the draft progressed; not making their picks until they were on the clock to find the best major league value at that slot.
July 10, 2012
HARSH
CBS Sports report was quite harsh on one of Cubs new management's prized prospects:
The Cubs spent $6 million and a 40-man roster spot on 20-year-old Cuban pitcher Gerardo Concepcion, but scouts who have seen him pitch in the Class A Midwest League have come away totally unimpressed. "They're trying to tell people it's just mechanics that he needs to get straightened out," one scout said. "But I'm telling you, he stinks. If he was in a junior college game you were at, you'd leave." Concepcion is 2-6 with a 7.39 ERA in 12 starts for Peoria.
There are a few risks in signing prospects:
1. The younger the prospect, the more chance of failure than success.
2. There is a maturity factor that can impede development.
3. The younger the prospect, the more likely his stats are inflated because he faced lesser talent than older prospects (like college players).
4. Young, international prospects are a greater risk for all the above reasons plus language and cultural issues when they come to the U.S.
You don't spend $6 million in the dark hoping for the best; you normally would shoot yourself in the foot instead. Concepcion had an almost non-existent resume. Cuban baseball is still insulated, and the international teams play a limited schedule. It is very hard to judge the current standard of Cuban baseball. Some Scouts used to believe that a player on the Cuban national team could be at a talent level of major league-AAA caliber; but now most believe national players are developmental, around high A ball.
Concepcion had all the risk factors plus the "mystery" factor that no one had really seen him pitch in person. At the time of the player signing, many other clubs were stunned a) by the amount of money spent and b) giving a 20 year old a major league contract (and 40 man roster spot). Further confounding other organizations was the fact the Cubs sent Concepcion to Class A Peoria, where based upon the Cubs hype, he should dominate the competition.
When another scout opines that one of the alleged best 40 players in your entire organization "stinks," you have to consider whether it is just sour grapes or a really, really bad trend. At this point, objectively you have to lean toward the "stink" or bust label as a 7.39 ERA in 12 starts shows no improvement, only bad consistency.
In a broader context, this report sheds light on a nagging concern: Epstein is used to throwing money at roster problems and hoping that the problems resolve themselves. In Boston, he spent big money on free agents who turned out to be dead money contracts. Epstein took credit for Boston's championships, but local writers still defer to former GM Dan Duquette who drafted and built the core players on those teams as the real architect of the Red Sox success. Hoyer short term in San Diego yielded a press clipping portfolio of having one the of the best farm systems in the league, but after one anomalous year, the Padres have fallen back into the cellar.
Since the blueprint for the Cubs rebuilding, talent evaluation is critical. And at this point, there is very little good news on Cub prospect front. Epstein and Hoyer have concentrated on signing younger players (especially pitchers) to re-stock the system, but that means a longer redevelopment period with more risk. They have also spent more money on younger talent than the average club. The signing of high school outfielder Alberto Almora for $650,000 more than the slot figure of $3.25 million will cost the Cubs a reported luxury tax of $280,000. An extra million here and there suddenly adds up to payroll issues in the future at the major league level. Ricketts has claimed that the team is poor; he needs public money in order to rehab Wrigley. But signs point to the baseball side burning through money like there is no tomorrow.
The only optimistic catch has been Anthony Rizzo. Most people believe he is the real deal. However, he has not gone through the league once, and pitchers will make adjustments and find his out pitch (off-speed down and away). He will have to make adjustments unlike other fast starters like Micah Hoffpauir, who fizzled quickly once the league caught up to him. The only big trade of the off-season was Tyler Colvin for Ian Stewart. Stewart was coming off a horrible, injury plagued season - - - and was a bust this year for the Cubs. That was a bad deal. The big free agent signing was David DeJesus to play RF. Recently, substitute Cubs broadcaster Dave Campbell remarked that DeJesus was at best a "fourth or fifth outfielder" because he does not hit for power or RBI production to be a corner outfielder or the speed and average to be a lead off hitter. The major league roster is filled with bench players who are starting because there is no depth.
The end of the year report card on Epstein's first season may be pretty harsh.
The Cubs spent $6 million and a 40-man roster spot on 20-year-old Cuban pitcher Gerardo Concepcion, but scouts who have seen him pitch in the Class A Midwest League have come away totally unimpressed. "They're trying to tell people it's just mechanics that he needs to get straightened out," one scout said. "But I'm telling you, he stinks. If he was in a junior college game you were at, you'd leave." Concepcion is 2-6 with a 7.39 ERA in 12 starts for Peoria.
There are a few risks in signing prospects:
1. The younger the prospect, the more chance of failure than success.
2. There is a maturity factor that can impede development.
3. The younger the prospect, the more likely his stats are inflated because he faced lesser talent than older prospects (like college players).
4. Young, international prospects are a greater risk for all the above reasons plus language and cultural issues when they come to the U.S.
You don't spend $6 million in the dark hoping for the best; you normally would shoot yourself in the foot instead. Concepcion had an almost non-existent resume. Cuban baseball is still insulated, and the international teams play a limited schedule. It is very hard to judge the current standard of Cuban baseball. Some Scouts used to believe that a player on the Cuban national team could be at a talent level of major league-AAA caliber; but now most believe national players are developmental, around high A ball.
Concepcion had all the risk factors plus the "mystery" factor that no one had really seen him pitch in person. At the time of the player signing, many other clubs were stunned a) by the amount of money spent and b) giving a 20 year old a major league contract (and 40 man roster spot). Further confounding other organizations was the fact the Cubs sent Concepcion to Class A Peoria, where based upon the Cubs hype, he should dominate the competition.
When another scout opines that one of the alleged best 40 players in your entire organization "stinks," you have to consider whether it is just sour grapes or a really, really bad trend. At this point, objectively you have to lean toward the "stink" or bust label as a 7.39 ERA in 12 starts shows no improvement, only bad consistency.
In a broader context, this report sheds light on a nagging concern: Epstein is used to throwing money at roster problems and hoping that the problems resolve themselves. In Boston, he spent big money on free agents who turned out to be dead money contracts. Epstein took credit for Boston's championships, but local writers still defer to former GM Dan Duquette who drafted and built the core players on those teams as the real architect of the Red Sox success. Hoyer short term in San Diego yielded a press clipping portfolio of having one the of the best farm systems in the league, but after one anomalous year, the Padres have fallen back into the cellar.
Since the blueprint for the Cubs rebuilding, talent evaluation is critical. And at this point, there is very little good news on Cub prospect front. Epstein and Hoyer have concentrated on signing younger players (especially pitchers) to re-stock the system, but that means a longer redevelopment period with more risk. They have also spent more money on younger talent than the average club. The signing of high school outfielder Alberto Almora for $650,000 more than the slot figure of $3.25 million will cost the Cubs a reported luxury tax of $280,000. An extra million here and there suddenly adds up to payroll issues in the future at the major league level. Ricketts has claimed that the team is poor; he needs public money in order to rehab Wrigley. But signs point to the baseball side burning through money like there is no tomorrow.
The only optimistic catch has been Anthony Rizzo. Most people believe he is the real deal. However, he has not gone through the league once, and pitchers will make adjustments and find his out pitch (off-speed down and away). He will have to make adjustments unlike other fast starters like Micah Hoffpauir, who fizzled quickly once the league caught up to him. The only big trade of the off-season was Tyler Colvin for Ian Stewart. Stewart was coming off a horrible, injury plagued season - - - and was a bust this year for the Cubs. That was a bad deal. The big free agent signing was David DeJesus to play RF. Recently, substitute Cubs broadcaster Dave Campbell remarked that DeJesus was at best a "fourth or fifth outfielder" because he does not hit for power or RBI production to be a corner outfielder or the speed and average to be a lead off hitter. The major league roster is filled with bench players who are starting because there is no depth.
The end of the year report card on Epstein's first season may be pretty harsh.
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