Cubs broadcaster Len Kasper wrote a column for the Daily Herald. In it, he states that the Cubs front office recent transactions moves the club closer to a World Series.
Kasper is one of those expanded stats guys. He likes to talk about the sabermetrics of a player or a situation, especially on lazy Sunday afternoon broadcasts. He believes that Epstein-Hoyer front office is using the principles of sabermetrics and Moneyball philosophy of Billy Beane, Oakland's successful GM, to build a winning organization. Beane found a way to analyze player performance by new metrics such as OPS, OBP and situational performance measures. Beane realized that you do not need a line up of HR, RBI and high BA players in order to produce runs. (Which had historic precedent before with the Go-Go- White Sox in the 1950s).
Kasper writes that "But, for the millionth time, "Moneyball" was not about on-base percentage. Or computers taking over for scouts. It was about exploiting market inefficiencies. Again, repeat after me: It was about EXPLOITING … MARKET … INEFFICIENCIES."
What Oakland did and continues to do is to find players that fit into their run production system. Players that have consistent performance traits who when put in the right situation have an opportunity to perform well. A player who can coax a walk and steal a base is just as valuable as a .300 hitter making contact for a double. That is not a market "inefficiency" but scouting players to fit specific roles on the ball club.
This was the first year that teams could "trade" international salary pool money. Kasper believes the Cubs strategy of trading for more bonus money was a genius move. He believes the
Cubs were the first team to target pool money in trades to give them an
edge on other teams in signing young, raw players from other countries. Except, that observation misses the point.
In prior years, teams could spend an unlimited amount of money to sign international free agents. The Cubs overspent tens of millions of dollars on international players, including Jorge Soler and the bust, Geraldo Concepcion. However, other teams such as the White Sox, spent little on foreign players by comparison. But an objective view of current rosters shows the White Sox have more impact foreign players on their roster (especially in pitching) than the Cubs.
Further, the Cubs are not "exploiting" the situation when the rules clearly state clubs can trade bonus money. What the Cubs are actually doing is overspending for foreign players which in the long run inflates the cost for talent for every club. The Cubs may have to scramble to find more IFA bonus money to sign the number one prospect for $2.8 million (to avoid a penalty tax and future signing restrictions). The Cubs did not corner the market in talent, but may have cornered themselves in a budget and future signing sinkhole by overspending this year.
And the Cubs also overspent on the amateur draft. The team has overspent on lower round draft choices which now has impacted on whether the team can sign No. 1 pick Kris Bryant. Currently, the Cubs do not have enough bonus pool space to sign Bryant at even the recommended slot price. Bryant's agent wants more than the slot value. If the Cubs sign Bryant, the team will incur a financial penalty. If the Cubs don't sign Bryant, the team will incur more substantial penalties including potential loss of future first round pick. Again, this compulsive overspending on prospects is not gaming the system but creating one's own budget inefficiencies.
And Kasper buys into the myth that spending big money on a player means that player will be great in the future. "Because it accelerates the essential process of adding a
large quantity of young players to a system that badly needs it, which
in turn should push championship-caliber talent to the big leagues on a
yearly basis," Kasper states. Except, that is not true.
Less than two percent of the international players signed this year will have any impact on a major league roster. High school players drafted by teams have less than a one percent chance to have an impact on a major league roster.
Spending bonus money does not equate at all to actually finding and developing baseball players. Old time scouts would tell you that there are things that they could observe that do not show up on a stat sheet. Things like whether the prospect positions himself correctly in the field; whether he understands the game situation; whether he is anticipating the play on the next pitch; whether he makes the correct baseball IQ play in the field (hitting the cut off man, taking an extra base, etc.) Also, whether a prospect has the demeanor to play at more competitive levels. The raw stats like height, weight, 40 yard dash, mph on fastball are only starting points. Like at the pro football combine, people get caught up with number of bench reps or vertical leaps. But the wise general managers come back to a simple question after seeing all that data: "can the kid play football?"
Oakland has developed a long line of baseball players who play fundamentally sound baseball. That is the key to building a successful organization, not the ability to spend a fortune on 16 year old kid's potential.
