At the beginning, the debate was about the Cubs rebuilding Plan. Cubs ownership firmly stated that the Tribune's Cub payroll of $140 million was "unsustainable." This statement shows (a) the Cubs are not as profitable as other big league teams with high payrolls, or (b) new ownership is scared of signing long term dead money free agent deals. As a result, the Cubs payroll has dropped below $99 million (with the prospect of dropping at least $10 million more in 2014). If that was the primary goal of the rebuilding Plan, then that purpose is working well.
But the initial debate on the Plan was the means of talent acquisition. Epstein and Hoyer are firmly entrenched with their idea that the only way to rebuild the Cubs major league roster is to rebuild the minor league system from rookie ball up with prospects. The Cubs have spent club records in amateur talent pool bonuses to sign players. To add to the prospect quantity, the Cubs have traded away their major league veterans (especially starting pitchers) to acquire more prospects.
Critics believed that this is a one-sided approach to building a major league roster. They believed that the Cubs, being a big market team, could have also used the free agent market and trades to field a competitive team while the organization was re-stocking its farm system. They believe that the fielding of a major league team roster and building a farm system are two distinct functions of the front office.
It turned into an academic debate because the Cubs were not changing their direction. The Cubs would not spend money on the major league roster to field a competitive team. Resources would be focused to signing new, young talent and develop those players slowly through the minor league affiliates.
After two seasons of "transparency," the realization is clear. The new Cubs prospects by the new front office are a long way away from making contributions to the major league team. In fact, all the recent call ups (Lake, Rusin, Raley, Grimm, etc.) have been developed by other teams or prior management under Hendry. Epstein-Hoyer regime has yet to produce a home grown major league player for the Cubs.
And this puts the Plan into a different light. Even if one agrees that the Epstein-Hoyer Plan is the right way to go (and the fan base will have to take several seasons of losing), there is no guarantee that Epstein and Hoyer (a) will sign the right players, (b) be able to develop the raw talent into major league contributors, or (c) give those prospects the best opportunity to succeed at the various levels of professional ball.
It is a gamble that many fans do not realize. It is like a gambler putting all his chips (prospects) on Red at the roulette wheel. He may hit it big or he may bust. In the baseball world, statistics bear out that the vast majority of prospects never reach their potential. The Plan is betting on an above average number of prospects becoming major league contributors to feed the major league roster with a consistent pipeline of talent. If it was so simple, every team would be doing it successfully.
So the current question is not whether the Cubs Plan is the right one, but whether the front office of Epstein and Hoyer are the right guys to pull it off.
