The reason why the Mariners have suddenly become a big money player in a small market city is that the team just hit the gold mine with a new $2 billion broadcast deal. As a result, the Mariners have a significant new source of revenue to spend on elite free agents.
The Mariners attendance has dropped from 3.2 million to 1.8 million. The Mariners play on the West Coast. There is little national attention paid to the team. Until, Cano was signed last week.
The Cano signing is all about the new television money.
While other teams are playing catch-up with the Yankees, ironically, the Yankees are paring back on their television network (selling part of the Steinbrenner's stake in the YES Network). The Yankees are also actively reeling in their payroll. In some ways, they are bucking the trend they started years ago.
The big fuel for rebuilding franchises now appears to ride on a new team network deal.
The Cubs are in a cornered position. As being formerly owned by a broadcaster, the Tribune Company negotiated a bad TV deal with itself in order to increase overall profits within the conglomerate. Ricketts did not renegotiate those deals as part of the purchase agreement with the Tribune. So the Cubs are stuck with a cable partnership that runs through 2019 season. That means the Cubs cannot find a television windfall like the Mariners until 2020.
That is a long time to sit and rely upon a lesser than market value local broadcast license fees. But that is the position the Cubs are in today. So, if revenue is not going to dramatically increase, the team has to cut costs. The biggest cost is the major league payroll, which currently stands at approximately $59 million for 2014. Arbitration player contracts will probably boost the payroll to around $75 million. This would continue the payroll decline since Ricketts ownership.
It also parallels the drops in attendance at Wrigley Field. Theo Epstein admitted that the Cubs are highly dependent upon the gate as a revenue source. That is why the Cubs are not going to be a big money free agent player this year, and for the foreseeable future.
The team emphasizes the youth movement, but won't say when the rebuild will be complete. But if the other teams did not dive head first into the free agent pool without a new billion dollar TV deal, then the Cubs will be watching from the sidelines for the next 7 years.
Showing posts with label Game Plan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Game Plan. Show all posts
December 7, 2013
November 21, 2013
DISTURBING QUOTES
It appears that Theo Epstein lets down his guard a little when he does interviews with non-Chicago media. In a recent New York Post interview, Epstein made some comments which if said in the Chicago press would have caused a stir:
NYP: During the World Series, what was your emotional investment watching all the guys you know in Boston. What was that like for you?
Theo: It was a lot of fun watching those guys. I still feel really
connected with a lot of guys in the baseball operations group. Still
very good friends with them. We spent a decade together. So it was great
to watch them have success after a really tough seven months of
baseball, going back to September, 2011 and then in 2012.
And then John did an outstanding job. Watching the players perform at
such a high level was great. Restoring the franchise back to where it
had been for most of the last 10 years, it was a lot of fun to watch.
NYP: What has it been like for you? Chicago is a great baseball city,
but I think Boston is just so intense, especially your role in the rise.
Theo: I think the biggest difference is … the difference exists because
of where we are in the process. Starting two years ago, really building
from the ground up in a lot of ways. Rebuilding the scouting
department. Rebuilding the player development operation. Trying to build
a base of young talent. But it takes time, and a lot of that work is
very enjoyable, but it’s also under the radar, which gives us space and
freedom and creativity. But it makes for a different experience.
Unfortunately, you can’t provide your fans with what they deserve along
the way, which is teams that play meaningful games all year long and
play until October. So we just have to take a patient, long view. It’s a
different experience.
But I’ve always enjoyed the scouting and player development aspects
of the game, the investing in young players, more than any other aspect
of it. So to that extent, it’s been really fulfilling. But it’s
different. It’s different. It’s strange walking around the meetings and
being a little irrelevant, because we’re not major players in some of
these deals.
NYP: And what about just walking around Chicago? Are you approached a lot less than you were in Boston?
Theo: Yeah. It’s been nice. It’s been a little more … Boston’s a great
place to live. In Chicago, it’s easier to blend in. There are more
teams, more professional teams around. We’re not exactly the talk of the
town right now, so it’s easier to go under the radar. It’s nice.
What Theo said gives us some insight on his viewpoint of the Cubs and their fans.
It is clear that Theo does not feel the pressure of winning in Chicago. He enjoys being under the radar. That is not what fans want to hear. They want their teams to be as hungry and aggressive to win as the fan base. Fans want to have their team winning games year after year. Otherwise, what is the point of being a fan?
Next, another clear signal that the Cubs are not going to spend any money on free agents. "We are not major players" means that the Cubs will not be interested in any of the top veteran players such as Cano, Choo, Tanaka, etc. Any player who turned down a qualifying offer is off the Cub radar. So, the 2014 team will not improve significantly if the Cubs are only bottom feeding with second or third tier free agents.
The idea that the Cubs are putting their resources into rebuilding the organization is an excuse not to spend money on major league roster players. Rebuilding means diversion of revenue. And in the Ricketts case, the diversion is more to the real estate development projects than fielding a competitive team on the field. As a large market team, fans are given excuses or promises for future greatness from home grown players rather than an operation that goes out and spends money to field good teams (such as the Tigers, Yankees, Red Sox, Dodgers, Angels, or Rangers). Good teams realize that they have to spend money on players to make money and keep fan support. Ownership and management need to want to have their team winning year after year. Otherwise, what is the point of running a team?
The last point Theo made was the Cub challenge was to rebuild the organization from the ground up. It is a backhanded slap to prior management (which during the Tribune tenure did get the post season by signing free agents, making trades, hiring veteran managers and developing young talent.) The "process" is a large tent in which we are not allowed to peek into. It is a nebulous concept that does not spell out how it gives the team "space and freedom and creativity." Fans want players who can hit, field and run. It is a condensing approach in talking down to the fans.
But the most disturbing quote from Theo was "Unfortunately, you can’t provide your fans with what they deserve along
the way." That is false. The Cubs can provide the fans an exciting, winning baseball product at Wrigley Field if ownership would spend the money to sign the quality talent available on the market. The Cubs are choosing not to spend money on free agents or build their team through trades for veterans. Yes, the Cub system has produced a few players during Ricketts 4 year tenure (such as Samardzija, Castro, Lake and Castillo), but to put the major league team into neutral for an undetermined amount of years so Theo's draft choices can work their way slowly through the minors is incomprehensible business model.
Look at Theo's prior nemesis, the Yankees. The Yankees spend more money than just about every team in the majors. In the Red Sox AL East Cold War, it was a race to sign the best free agents year after year. But the Yankees also had a good enough farm system to trade prospects for other key veterans. They restocked their farm system with supplemental high round draft picks when their players hit the free agent market and signed with another team (this year the Yanks are expected to get 3 supplemental first round picks). So there is a way that uses all the available tools to field a quality baseball team (free agent, high payroll, trades, and prospect development.) The Cubs are putting all their eggs (the future) on one aspect of roster building: prospect development. For all the acclaim that Theo is the smartest guy in baseball today, putting your eggs in one basket seems to be a dumb idea.
As we have discussed before, it is a risky gambit because statistically less than 6 percent of all minor leaguers ever reach the major league roster, and about 3 percent become quality starting players. The Cubs plan assumes that their prospects will hit at a 80-90 percent success rate, which is insane.
Theo's job now is the give the public enough corporate-speak to keep them at bay while Ricketts builds out his neighborhood real estate theme park of ancillary secondary buildings, businesses and commercial operations. You can see the business side of the organization already laying down the foundation for future excuses when it blames the neighborhood or adjoining business owners from delaying the rebuilding operations with the threat of lawsuits.
And then there was the Cubs General Manager, Jed Hoyer, who spoke to a local reporter and said the front office was not going to change its approach to placate anxious fans. "We will not hit the fast forward button on our plan simply because people are impatient," Hoyer said. "It will make it worth it in the end."
That is another discouraging quote from the front office because Hoyer is promising something he cannot guarantee.
And then there was the Cubs General Manager, Jed Hoyer, who spoke to a local reporter and said the front office was not going to change its approach to placate anxious fans. "We will not hit the fast forward button on our plan simply because people are impatient," Hoyer said. "It will make it worth it in the end."
That is another discouraging quote from the front office because Hoyer is promising something he cannot guarantee.
October 17, 2013
September 26, 2013
TWO SIDES TO SAME COIN
At the beginning, the debate was about the Cubs rebuilding Plan. Cubs ownership firmly stated that the Tribune's Cub payroll of $140 million was "unsustainable." This statement shows (a) the Cubs are not as profitable as other big league teams with high payrolls, or (b) new ownership is scared of signing long term dead money free agent deals. As a result, the Cubs payroll has dropped below $99 million (with the prospect of dropping at least $10 million more in 2014). If that was the primary goal of the rebuilding Plan, then that purpose is working well.
But the initial debate on the Plan was the means of talent acquisition. Epstein and Hoyer are firmly entrenched with their idea that the only way to rebuild the Cubs major league roster is to rebuild the minor league system from rookie ball up with prospects. The Cubs have spent club records in amateur talent pool bonuses to sign players. To add to the prospect quantity, the Cubs have traded away their major league veterans (especially starting pitchers) to acquire more prospects.
Critics believed that this is a one-sided approach to building a major league roster. They believed that the Cubs, being a big market team, could have also used the free agent market and trades to field a competitive team while the organization was re-stocking its farm system. They believe that the fielding of a major league team roster and building a farm system are two distinct functions of the front office.
It turned into an academic debate because the Cubs were not changing their direction. The Cubs would not spend money on the major league roster to field a competitive team. Resources would be focused to signing new, young talent and develop those players slowly through the minor league affiliates.
After two seasons of "transparency," the realization is clear. The new Cubs prospects by the new front office are a long way away from making contributions to the major league team. In fact, all the recent call ups (Lake, Rusin, Raley, Grimm, etc.) have been developed by other teams or prior management under Hendry. Epstein-Hoyer regime has yet to produce a home grown major league player for the Cubs.
And this puts the Plan into a different light. Even if one agrees that the Epstein-Hoyer Plan is the right way to go (and the fan base will have to take several seasons of losing), there is no guarantee that Epstein and Hoyer (a) will sign the right players, (b) be able to develop the raw talent into major league contributors, or (c) give those prospects the best opportunity to succeed at the various levels of professional ball.
It is a gamble that many fans do not realize. It is like a gambler putting all his chips (prospects) on Red at the roulette wheel. He may hit it big or he may bust. In the baseball world, statistics bear out that the vast majority of prospects never reach their potential. The Plan is betting on an above average number of prospects becoming major league contributors to feed the major league roster with a consistent pipeline of talent. If it was so simple, every team would be doing it successfully.
So the current question is not whether the Cubs Plan is the right one, but whether the front office of Epstein and Hoyer are the right guys to pull it off.
But the initial debate on the Plan was the means of talent acquisition. Epstein and Hoyer are firmly entrenched with their idea that the only way to rebuild the Cubs major league roster is to rebuild the minor league system from rookie ball up with prospects. The Cubs have spent club records in amateur talent pool bonuses to sign players. To add to the prospect quantity, the Cubs have traded away their major league veterans (especially starting pitchers) to acquire more prospects.
Critics believed that this is a one-sided approach to building a major league roster. They believed that the Cubs, being a big market team, could have also used the free agent market and trades to field a competitive team while the organization was re-stocking its farm system. They believe that the fielding of a major league team roster and building a farm system are two distinct functions of the front office.
It turned into an academic debate because the Cubs were not changing their direction. The Cubs would not spend money on the major league roster to field a competitive team. Resources would be focused to signing new, young talent and develop those players slowly through the minor league affiliates.
After two seasons of "transparency," the realization is clear. The new Cubs prospects by the new front office are a long way away from making contributions to the major league team. In fact, all the recent call ups (Lake, Rusin, Raley, Grimm, etc.) have been developed by other teams or prior management under Hendry. Epstein-Hoyer regime has yet to produce a home grown major league player for the Cubs.
And this puts the Plan into a different light. Even if one agrees that the Epstein-Hoyer Plan is the right way to go (and the fan base will have to take several seasons of losing), there is no guarantee that Epstein and Hoyer (a) will sign the right players, (b) be able to develop the raw talent into major league contributors, or (c) give those prospects the best opportunity to succeed at the various levels of professional ball.
It is a gamble that many fans do not realize. It is like a gambler putting all his chips (prospects) on Red at the roulette wheel. He may hit it big or he may bust. In the baseball world, statistics bear out that the vast majority of prospects never reach their potential. The Plan is betting on an above average number of prospects becoming major league contributors to feed the major league roster with a consistent pipeline of talent. If it was so simple, every team would be doing it successfully.
So the current question is not whether the Cubs Plan is the right one, but whether the front office of Epstein and Hoyer are the right guys to pull it off.
September 20, 2013
FUMBLING TOWARD THE FINISH
In football, you cannot intentionally fumble forward in order to gain a field advantage.
As the season winds down with meaningless games, it is clear that the Cubs as an organization have fumbled through the 2013 campaign.
OWNERSHIP:
Owner Tom Ricketts said that the payrolls from the final years of Tribune Co. ownership “unsustainable.” As a result, the Cubs payroll has steadily declined in recent years, with help by trading high payroll players like Soriano. Also as a result, the Cubs will end with a fourth straight sub-.500 finish with 90-plus losses for three consecutive years.
The New Cubs have been in a fiscal bind. The Ricketts family overpaid for the franchise on a highly leveraged $845 million deal in October 2009 (which also included a stake in Comcast SportsNet Chicago). Ricketts failed to understand the Tribune's internal sweetheart broadcast deals would be problematic in the short term. Ricketts failed to get price concessions for the lack of maintenance to Wrigley Field. Then the league has put the Cubs on a debt watch list. Declining attendance (especially in the no-shows) has impacted on the team's cash flow. The team paid the first installment of its real estate taxes late.
Then the season became a footnote in the political circus of Ricketts trying to mash through a $500 million real estate development project, which included new signage inside and outside Wrigley Field and a dense commercial retail development across Clark Street. Rooftop owners, local businessmen and residents were upset with the initial plans. The "save Wrigley" message from the team diverted attention from the apparent breach of the rooftop agreement and the true impact of the new real estate developments outside of Wrigley.
Ricketts stumbled his way to a city approval, but then he pulled back any renovation work unless the rooftop owners agreed not to sue him. There is currently a stand still. Ricketts has made the odd statement that even the renovations of the locker room, training facilities under Wrigley would be halted until everything was in place. The Cubs don't need neighborhood approval to do work inside the bowels of the locker room. It seems like an excuse not to borrow or spend money this off season.
MANAGEMENT:
Team president continues to state that he has been "transparent" about his direction for the team. Theo Epstein has cautioned fans that it will take time to rebuild the organization. But he won't say when all the new prospects will bear witness on a major league roster. And he steadfastly refuses to respond to inquiries about how much of the "new revenues" from the building renovations will actually be at the Cubs disposal for payroll and free agency.
The reason is little of the new revenue streams will be earmarked for the baseball operations. The commercial-retail-hotel building will be be owned by a separate company. The triangle commercial building will be owned by a different company. And the new signage for Wrigley Field may go into the ownership entity for the field, which is not the Cubs franchise. The Cubs are merely one tenant of Wrigley Field.
Epstein's baseball budget continues to be squeezed by Crane Kenney's business side. Epstein plan has been to sign second tier free agents, usually rehabbing pitchers, to flip them at the trade deadline for prospects. This season, Scott Feldman was traded for two pitchers, Jake Arrieta and Pedro Strop who look like possible bullpen arms. Scott Baker spend most of the season rehabbing and will get paid $5.5 million for three meaningless starts. He will head off to free agency healed on the Cubs dime.
But no matter, for the front office solidified the rotation by acquiring an consistent, inning eating starter in Edwin Jackson. Jackson (8-16, 4.75 ERA) has been a major disappointment, but the Cubs gave him a four-year, $52 million deal last winter thinking he could be a rotation piece for a rebuilding team and anchor the team when it would be competitive in 2016.
But the real fumble by management this season has been another 50 plus players filling the roster at a Class AAA level of performance. The major league roster was never constructed to win now. Epstein recently said that his manager would not be evaluated based on his win-loss record, which is a glaring admission that the front office never expected this team to win.
THE TEAM:
Fans have been critical of manager Dale Sveum and his decisions when to bunt and how he uses his bullpen. Some fans will state that the real issue with this team is the lack of talent. But there is also a perception that Sveum has not given the talent their best opportunity to succeed. Sveum's moving Castro around the lineup, benching him for boneheaded plays in the field, and basically throwing his hands up on his regression show a tense leadership void. The double standard between a disappointing Castro and a disappointing Rizzo season makes little sense. As a manager, it is Sveum's job to continue to develop his young talent - - - but Castro and Rizzo have regressed so hard this year it makes people wonder.
The pitching staff again has performed well as a unit. But since the offense has been pathetic for most of the year, the quality starts have been mostly wasted efforts. The frustration as boiled over with two back-to-back dugout arguments by pitchers Jackson and Samardzija on how Sveum made in-game decisions.
Sveum may believe he is in a comfortable position since Epstein and Hoyer like him. Sveum may think he is doing exactly what management wants of him during these dark rebuilding years. But Sveum has not used the roster to manufacture runs, seize on good match-ups, or get his team to give maximum effort. Fans have witnessed for the last two months a lethargic team playing through the motions.
Sveum may be slowly losing his clubhouse because of the team's constant losing during his tenure.
As the season winds down with meaningless games, it is clear that the Cubs as an organization have fumbled through the 2013 campaign.
OWNERSHIP:
Owner Tom Ricketts said that the payrolls from the final years of Tribune Co. ownership “unsustainable.” As a result, the Cubs payroll has steadily declined in recent years, with help by trading high payroll players like Soriano. Also as a result, the Cubs will end with a fourth straight sub-.500 finish with 90-plus losses for three consecutive years.
The New Cubs have been in a fiscal bind. The Ricketts family overpaid for the franchise on a highly leveraged $845 million deal in October 2009 (which also included a stake in Comcast SportsNet Chicago). Ricketts failed to understand the Tribune's internal sweetheart broadcast deals would be problematic in the short term. Ricketts failed to get price concessions for the lack of maintenance to Wrigley Field. Then the league has put the Cubs on a debt watch list. Declining attendance (especially in the no-shows) has impacted on the team's cash flow. The team paid the first installment of its real estate taxes late.
Then the season became a footnote in the political circus of Ricketts trying to mash through a $500 million real estate development project, which included new signage inside and outside Wrigley Field and a dense commercial retail development across Clark Street. Rooftop owners, local businessmen and residents were upset with the initial plans. The "save Wrigley" message from the team diverted attention from the apparent breach of the rooftop agreement and the true impact of the new real estate developments outside of Wrigley.
Ricketts stumbled his way to a city approval, but then he pulled back any renovation work unless the rooftop owners agreed not to sue him. There is currently a stand still. Ricketts has made the odd statement that even the renovations of the locker room, training facilities under Wrigley would be halted until everything was in place. The Cubs don't need neighborhood approval to do work inside the bowels of the locker room. It seems like an excuse not to borrow or spend money this off season.
MANAGEMENT:
Team president continues to state that he has been "transparent" about his direction for the team. Theo Epstein has cautioned fans that it will take time to rebuild the organization. But he won't say when all the new prospects will bear witness on a major league roster. And he steadfastly refuses to respond to inquiries about how much of the "new revenues" from the building renovations will actually be at the Cubs disposal for payroll and free agency.
The reason is little of the new revenue streams will be earmarked for the baseball operations. The commercial-retail-hotel building will be be owned by a separate company. The triangle commercial building will be owned by a different company. And the new signage for Wrigley Field may go into the ownership entity for the field, which is not the Cubs franchise. The Cubs are merely one tenant of Wrigley Field.
Epstein's baseball budget continues to be squeezed by Crane Kenney's business side. Epstein plan has been to sign second tier free agents, usually rehabbing pitchers, to flip them at the trade deadline for prospects. This season, Scott Feldman was traded for two pitchers, Jake Arrieta and Pedro Strop who look like possible bullpen arms. Scott Baker spend most of the season rehabbing and will get paid $5.5 million for three meaningless starts. He will head off to free agency healed on the Cubs dime.
But no matter, for the front office solidified the rotation by acquiring an consistent, inning eating starter in Edwin Jackson. Jackson (8-16, 4.75 ERA) has been a major disappointment, but the Cubs gave him a four-year, $52 million deal last winter thinking he could be a rotation piece for a rebuilding team and anchor the team when it would be competitive in 2016.
But the real fumble by management this season has been another 50 plus players filling the roster at a Class AAA level of performance. The major league roster was never constructed to win now. Epstein recently said that his manager would not be evaluated based on his win-loss record, which is a glaring admission that the front office never expected this team to win.
THE TEAM:
Fans have been critical of manager Dale Sveum and his decisions when to bunt and how he uses his bullpen. Some fans will state that the real issue with this team is the lack of talent. But there is also a perception that Sveum has not given the talent their best opportunity to succeed. Sveum's moving Castro around the lineup, benching him for boneheaded plays in the field, and basically throwing his hands up on his regression show a tense leadership void. The double standard between a disappointing Castro and a disappointing Rizzo season makes little sense. As a manager, it is Sveum's job to continue to develop his young talent - - - but Castro and Rizzo have regressed so hard this year it makes people wonder.
The pitching staff again has performed well as a unit. But since the offense has been pathetic for most of the year, the quality starts have been mostly wasted efforts. The frustration as boiled over with two back-to-back dugout arguments by pitchers Jackson and Samardzija on how Sveum made in-game decisions.
Sveum may believe he is in a comfortable position since Epstein and Hoyer like him. Sveum may think he is doing exactly what management wants of him during these dark rebuilding years. But Sveum has not used the roster to manufacture runs, seize on good match-ups, or get his team to give maximum effort. Fans have witnessed for the last two months a lethargic team playing through the motions.
Sveum may be slowly losing his clubhouse because of the team's constant losing during his tenure.
September 7, 2013
NO QUICK FIX
The Chicago Sun Times had a long interview with Cubs owner Tom Ricketts. In summation, Ricketts admits that there is no "quick fix" for the Cubs on-field losing. In semi-contradictory statements from his past positions, Ricketts coyly admits that the way he purchased the team from the Tribune has been a factor for current revenue squeeze.
In viewing the Class A Florida State League playoffs, Ricketts does not see much for next year’s Cubs — who don’t appear poised for any kind of quantum leap toward the top of the National League Central, even with a modest influx of major-league talent this offseason.
The Sun Times article states that to off-set sagging attendance, the Cubs are looking to the WGN portion of
the local TV rights that the club is trying to negotiate toward $1
million per game levels comparable to other recent deals by other teams.The Sun Times estimated that increase alone would make
attendance drops easy to tolerate — even at internal estimates of more
than $7 million per 100,000, according to the paper's sources.
In viewing the Class A Florida State League playoffs, Ricketts does not see much for next year’s Cubs — who don’t appear poised for any kind of quantum leap toward the top of the National League Central, even with a modest influx of major-league talent this offseason.
Ricketts told the Sun Times that no splashy, expensive moves to
reverse four consecutive years of losing on the field and at the gate.
And he made no assurances that the third-highest ticket prices in the
sport would get reduced for next season.
And while he acknowledged the
team’s lingering purchase debt is a factor in spending ability, he said
it’s “a lot less than you think,” and he said baseball budgets set by
ownership isn’t holding back anything team president Theo Epstein and
general manager Jed Hoyer are trying to do with the club.
“I know it’s not a money
issue,’’ Ricketts said of the methods the baseball department is using
to restock the farm system and overhaul the organization — and the
consequent results at the big-league level. “You can’t just throw money
at the problem. We have to build the organization from the ground up.
And that’s what we’re doing right now. On the business side, we
have to continue to develop more revenue lines so that we can have more
financial flexibility in the future, and we’re doing that with stadium
renovations and other media contracts that are coming up in the future.”
The priorities that Ricketts outlined including new outfield signage and the Jumbotron-like board up as soon as
possible to increase the revenues, he said. He also said that the clubhouse and
training facilities planned for underneath the existing clubhouse and
workout room are “probably not going to” be ready for the 2014 opener as
originally planned, “but it’s a priority for us.”
Ricketts doesn’t deny Wrigley
Field is a revenue producer by virtue of its drawing power as a venue,
nor does he deny that team debt that Forbes recently estimated at a
major-league high $580 million has an impact on business operations. “Every team has some form of debt. For us, it’s a factor, but there’s also a lot of other factors,” Ricketts said, stating that the team has increased capital investments and increased administration costs.
“In terms of attendance, the
way I look at it is we have to win,” Ricketts said. “We have to get a
more exciting team. We’re not disappointed with this year’s attendance.
We’ll be in the 2.7 [million] range. But obviously, it’s incumbent upon
us to make sure we put a more compelling team on the field, and
attendance will take care of itself.”
In response to Sun-Times columnist
Rick Morrissey’s contention this week that the Cubs, from an ownership
level, weren’t trying to win, Ricketts said: “We go into every season
wanting to win. But we also make personnel decisions based on what’s
best for the organization over the longer term.
“The fact is, we’re doing it
the right way. We have the best leaders in our baseball organization,
the smartest guys. It’s one step at a time. And we’re getting better.”
Here are the key takeaways from Ricketts statements:
1. The Cubs do not plan to make any expensive major league acquisitions or moves this off-season. Though Ricketts claims the baseball budget is planned separately, he acknowledges that he has money factors such as purchase debt, capital costs in constructing the new Wrigley real estate projects, and more "administrative" costs, i.e. more employees and staff that take a priority over the major league team roster.
2. Ricketts is desperate to increase his cash flow. He needs to get more advertising signage right away. He also needs to get a new local television contract to double those local TV revenues per game. But he may be just moving line items between accounts with no real new bottom line dollars. He has lost $28 million plus in just attendance revenue. The increase from WGN local TV revenue is limited by the number of games in the Sportschannel cable agreement, so it may just offset the lost attendance revenue.
3. Ricketts has no plans to appease his paying customers. He does not plan on lower the costs of tickets or concessions. Fans will show their displeasure by not buying tickets or coming to games. There was no viable secondary ticket market for Cubs tickets the last two years. A lost fan will find something else to do with his entertainment dollars. Attendance could go into a free fall in 2014 if the Cubs continue to field a AA/AAA team.
4. Ricketts is now looking only towards "the long term" of his organization. But the long term plan he has is the massive real estate development project in the McDonald's block across from Wrigley Field. In addition, his long term plan is to make Wrigley into a 12 month entertainment destination place like a mini-Disneyland - - - with 365 day bars and restaurants, corporate events and other events. The Cubs are not the sole focus of the Wrigley development - - the Cubs are merely a tenant in the grand scheme of things.
5. Ricketts claims that he has hired "the smartest guys" in run his baseball organization. Fans have been constantly told that Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer are the smartest guys in baseball. Fans only look to wins and losses, and playoffs as the measure of baseball success and good management. So far, the Cub fan base has no reason to believe that Epstein is the smartest baseball guy on the planet. The idea of a pipeline of home grown prospects as impact players at this point in time is just a pipe dream.
6. Ricketts has bought into the Epstein approach that the baseball rebuild will only be through in-house development of talent and not expensive free agent moves. This is a small market, penny pitching baseball philosophy. This approach will lose the casual baseball fan. But that may not matter if Wrigley is an entertainment complex and not just a baseball park.
April 5, 2013
THE NEXT 19
One could say that the Cubs are in an uncomfortable position. First place after three games. The team just won their first opening series in four years. The optimism must be tempered by realism.
The Cubs play their next 19 games against teams with winning 2012 records. The next opponent, the Braves, have been penciled in as a wild card team this season.
But this first 22 game stretch (13.5% of the season) will tell you how well the Cubs are going to be this season. Good. Average. Below Average. Bad. Really Bad.
Manager Dale Sveum talked about the need for his club to have "a fast start" to the season. The front office also wants a winning April in order to sell tickets and keep up fan interest after a 100 loss season.
But from a pure statistical standpoint, the first 22 games count "the same" as as other games in the schedule.
But there is an inherit axiom in athletics. Former players will tell you that getting off to a fast start helps with individual confidence and team chemistry. In some respects, baseball is not as high energy as a hockey or basketball game where all the teammates are in fluid motion. Baseball is an individual on individual game (throw and catch, pitching and hitting). Some people call the idea of team chemistry hog wash. Some historians will reference the bad chemistry of some teams, where players hated each other or the manager (like the Yankees), led to championship seasons.
We can objectively see when a player loses his confidence. A batter swings wildly at pitches way out of the strike zone. A pitcher, like Carlos Marmol, cannot locate his slider or has no confidence that his fastball will not be a flat, fat home run offering to the batter. There is a real mental component to professional sports.
For the Cubs, a fast start may be important for a more long term reason. The Cubs are hoping that the core young players (Castro, Rizzo, Samardzija, Barney, Castillo) will continue to improve to set the foundation for a competitive team by 2015. However, young players follow the example set by the clubhouse veterans. If year after year a team loses, then losing becomes an acceptable way of life in the locker room. It is not like the players don't want to win; but there are no ramifications to them personally (since they are "the future") because of the team losses. The Cubs are nearing a tipping point with their young core players; they need to quickly learn how to win at the major league level.
And winning at the team level is complex. Throughout their lives, professional players were probably the best player on their youth team. They have been told by parents, family and friends how great they were at their position. They would garner more accolades for personal accomplishments (stats) because that is how scouts compare players. As a result, most players are quite self-centered about how they go about playing the game. Winning at a team level needs a certain amount of re-education. Teams that win together learn to sacrifice individual stats for the greater good, like bunting a base runner over, or taking an extra base on a hit to the outfield even though it will physically drain you. Teams without a basic knowledge and application of the proper way to play the game as a team are doomed for failure. We call it "baseball intelligence." Does a player have the baseball IQ to succeed? Can he predict what will happen, know the situation, know how to instinctively react, and know his role?
If the Cubs lose 3 of 5 game sets in this next stretch, then it would confirm that the 2013 Cubs would be on the same path as last season, at a .409 winning percentage (or 66 win pace).
The Cubs play their next 19 games against teams with winning 2012 records. The next opponent, the Braves, have been penciled in as a wild card team this season.
But this first 22 game stretch (13.5% of the season) will tell you how well the Cubs are going to be this season. Good. Average. Below Average. Bad. Really Bad.
Manager Dale Sveum talked about the need for his club to have "a fast start" to the season. The front office also wants a winning April in order to sell tickets and keep up fan interest after a 100 loss season.
But from a pure statistical standpoint, the first 22 games count "the same" as as other games in the schedule.
But there is an inherit axiom in athletics. Former players will tell you that getting off to a fast start helps with individual confidence and team chemistry. In some respects, baseball is not as high energy as a hockey or basketball game where all the teammates are in fluid motion. Baseball is an individual on individual game (throw and catch, pitching and hitting). Some people call the idea of team chemistry hog wash. Some historians will reference the bad chemistry of some teams, where players hated each other or the manager (like the Yankees), led to championship seasons.
We can objectively see when a player loses his confidence. A batter swings wildly at pitches way out of the strike zone. A pitcher, like Carlos Marmol, cannot locate his slider or has no confidence that his fastball will not be a flat, fat home run offering to the batter. There is a real mental component to professional sports.
For the Cubs, a fast start may be important for a more long term reason. The Cubs are hoping that the core young players (Castro, Rizzo, Samardzija, Barney, Castillo) will continue to improve to set the foundation for a competitive team by 2015. However, young players follow the example set by the clubhouse veterans. If year after year a team loses, then losing becomes an acceptable way of life in the locker room. It is not like the players don't want to win; but there are no ramifications to them personally (since they are "the future") because of the team losses. The Cubs are nearing a tipping point with their young core players; they need to quickly learn how to win at the major league level.
And winning at the team level is complex. Throughout their lives, professional players were probably the best player on their youth team. They have been told by parents, family and friends how great they were at their position. They would garner more accolades for personal accomplishments (stats) because that is how scouts compare players. As a result, most players are quite self-centered about how they go about playing the game. Winning at a team level needs a certain amount of re-education. Teams that win together learn to sacrifice individual stats for the greater good, like bunting a base runner over, or taking an extra base on a hit to the outfield even though it will physically drain you. Teams without a basic knowledge and application of the proper way to play the game as a team are doomed for failure. We call it "baseball intelligence." Does a player have the baseball IQ to succeed? Can he predict what will happen, know the situation, know how to instinctively react, and know his role?
If the Cubs lose 3 of 5 game sets in this next stretch, then it would confirm that the 2013 Cubs would be on the same path as last season, at a .409 winning percentage (or 66 win pace).
February 25, 2013
EXCELLENT COLUMN
There is an excellent column by writer Bruce Jenkins in today's SF Chronicle.
Jenkins makes a valid point on how relatively small market teams like the A's and Giants can be competitive without overspending or mortgaging their futures.
He calls it "baseball intelligence." We have commented in the past on player's having a "baseball IQ." i.e. inherently knowing what to do in a given situation and/or anticipating the situation to make the appropriate play. Players will raw talent and skills may still lack the baseball field intelligence to utility those skills to their maximum potential.
Jenkins takes that requirement to the front office. Some teams have more organizational "baseball intelligence" than other teams. He states that "the game's most essential truths: that scouting, character and basic instincts are the tools that build a winner."
Both teams have built winners. The Giants rely upon scouting and field observations more than computer sabermetrics to build their roster. The A's pioneered the mathematical approach to player evaluations. Both systems can work.
Jenkins makes a valid point on how relatively small market teams like the A's and Giants can be competitive without overspending or mortgaging their futures.
He calls it "baseball intelligence." We have commented in the past on player's having a "baseball IQ." i.e. inherently knowing what to do in a given situation and/or anticipating the situation to make the appropriate play. Players will raw talent and skills may still lack the baseball field intelligence to utility those skills to their maximum potential.
Jenkins takes that requirement to the front office. Some teams have more organizational "baseball intelligence" than other teams. He states that "the game's most essential truths: that scouting, character and basic instincts are the tools that build a winner."
Both teams have built winners. The Giants rely upon scouting and field observations more than computer sabermetrics to build their roster. The A's pioneered the mathematical approach to player evaluations. Both systems can work.
Labels:
A's,
Game Plan,
Giants,
organization,
payroll
January 7, 2013
AHEAD OF SCHEDULE
A steam locomotive could be ahead of schedule, barreling down the tracks, only to miss the sign that the bridge over the next mountain pass is out of order. But Cubs president Theo Epstein and General manager Jed Hoyer are filtering the message to the press that the Cubs will be competitive sooner than they had expected (in their previous non-committal time line).
In a column in the Boston Globe, Epstein takes a the long-range view by "an all-out gutting and rebuilding," as opposed to the Dodgers’ approach of buying up the best players.
But the writer, Nick Cafardo, states that Epstein has surprised some people by bidding for Anibal Sanchez and Edwin Jackson to a four-year deal. Most people thought Epstein would hold off on big free agent expenditures until the time was right.
“We’re certainly farther along than we were last year at this time,” said Epstein. “When we got here, we identified one core player [Starlin Castro] and now we can look around and see Anthony Rizzo, Darwin Barney, Jeff Samardzija , and others. We do have more positional prospects than pitchers, so we felt Jackson will be with us for many years to come.”
Cafardo writes that Epstein is hoping his top prospects — namely outfielders Jorge Soler (a Cuban
defector), Brett Jackson, and Albert Almora, shortstop Javier Baez , and pitcher Arodys Vizcaino — will all be in the majors together by 2015.
Epstein claims that he always wanted to build a team from the ground up. “I think, initially, what I’d been through in Boston was of interest to our fan base,” he said. “But I think they have bought into our plan and our vision. People are excited about good young players and we hope to keep adding to it and get to the point where we’re an exciting contending team year in and year out.”
The problem with Epstein's evidence that the Cubs are ahead of schedule in rebuilding the team so he can sign free agents is that his mentioned core is small and unproven. Barney is a weak .250 hitter, a utility player on most championship teams. Castro is a hitting star, but his defense is still a long term liability. Rizzo has only been in the line up for a half season. He could have a sophomore slump like All-Star Bryan LaHair, who is now exiled to Japan. And Samardzija has only started one full season in the majors, so his skill set is still unknown. It also means that Epstein has to admit that the rest of his roster (84%) is not really that good. So how can the Cubs truly believe they will be competitive in 2013?
In a team webpage interview, Hoyer kept the ahead of schedule theme in the forefront of the off-season message. Hoyer's message is that the Cubs could be one of the most improved teams in the baseball in 2013.
"It's a line we're committed to walking," said Hoyer, on building the talent core. "Our goal here is to build a consistently good team ... and hopefully a team that wins a championship. In order to do that, we're not going to sacrifice the future now for wins. But at the same time, every season is precious, and you never know when that team might catch lightning in a bottle. You never want to sacrifice that season entirely."
The challenge for the front office of a rebuilding team -- to keep bringing in talent for the next contending team while also putting a competitive team on the field in the short term.
"We just weren't deep enough [in 2012]," Hoyer said. "That's been our biggest focus, especially pitching-wise. We just [didn't] have the pitching depth in the system to withstand injuries, and we've worked hard to build a pitching staff where we feel like we have some depth."
Hoyer notes a desire to teach a selective approach in Cubs hitters, leading to greater on-base percentages (and as a result, more power too).
It appears that now the Nationals are the Cubs rebuilding model. Washington had a series of dreadful seasons, leading to number one draft picks. By drafting "can't miss" players, the Nationals quickly turned over their roster with young quality players in a span of three seasons.
"We know we can't transform this organization in one year, so every year we should be able to stop and look and say we have a lot more assets, a lot more talent than we had before," Hoyer said.
"We just have to keep on adding to it. There's plenty of examples of teams that have done a good job of that, the Nationals being the clearest. It wasn't a gradual, five-wins-per-year improvement. They struggled, they had a decent season in 2011 and they exploded in 2012. That's probably the model more than anything. At some point you get a critical mass where you become a talented team."
Hoyer is preaching a Nationals style turnaround in two years based upon high prospects reaching the majors quickly. But Epstein contradicts this statement, stating that his new core of top prospects, Soler and #1 pick Almora, won't be in the majors until 2015.
So why the disconnect? The message that the Cubs need to send to their eroding fan base is this: we will be competitive sooner than our system will develop talent. The team will be improved in 2013. The message is to keep season ticket holders from bolting and stem the bloody tide of no-shows in the latter third of last season season. Wrigley Field in August and September was not a ball park but a seagull sanctuary. So the business side of the Cubs is pushing the "ahead of schedule" mantra in order to keep fan interest for what appears to be another 100 loss season in 2013.
In a column in the Boston Globe, Epstein takes a the long-range view by "an all-out gutting and rebuilding," as opposed to the Dodgers’ approach of buying up the best players.
But the writer, Nick Cafardo, states that Epstein has surprised some people by bidding for Anibal Sanchez and Edwin Jackson to a four-year deal. Most people thought Epstein would hold off on big free agent expenditures until the time was right.
“We’re certainly farther along than we were last year at this time,” said Epstein. “When we got here, we identified one core player [Starlin Castro] and now we can look around and see Anthony Rizzo, Darwin Barney, Jeff Samardzija , and others. We do have more positional prospects than pitchers, so we felt Jackson will be with us for many years to come.”
Cafardo writes that Epstein is hoping his top prospects — namely outfielders Jorge Soler (a Cuban
defector), Brett Jackson, and Albert Almora, shortstop Javier Baez , and pitcher Arodys Vizcaino — will all be in the majors together by 2015.
Epstein claims that he always wanted to build a team from the ground up. “I think, initially, what I’d been through in Boston was of interest to our fan base,” he said. “But I think they have bought into our plan and our vision. People are excited about good young players and we hope to keep adding to it and get to the point where we’re an exciting contending team year in and year out.”
The problem with Epstein's evidence that the Cubs are ahead of schedule in rebuilding the team so he can sign free agents is that his mentioned core is small and unproven. Barney is a weak .250 hitter, a utility player on most championship teams. Castro is a hitting star, but his defense is still a long term liability. Rizzo has only been in the line up for a half season. He could have a sophomore slump like All-Star Bryan LaHair, who is now exiled to Japan. And Samardzija has only started one full season in the majors, so his skill set is still unknown. It also means that Epstein has to admit that the rest of his roster (84%) is not really that good. So how can the Cubs truly believe they will be competitive in 2013?
In a team webpage interview, Hoyer kept the ahead of schedule theme in the forefront of the off-season message. Hoyer's message is that the Cubs could be one of the most improved teams in the baseball in 2013.
"It's a line we're committed to walking," said Hoyer, on building the talent core. "Our goal here is to build a consistently good team ... and hopefully a team that wins a championship. In order to do that, we're not going to sacrifice the future now for wins. But at the same time, every season is precious, and you never know when that team might catch lightning in a bottle. You never want to sacrifice that season entirely."
The challenge for the front office of a rebuilding team -- to keep bringing in talent for the next contending team while also putting a competitive team on the field in the short term.
"We just weren't deep enough [in 2012]," Hoyer said. "That's been our biggest focus, especially pitching-wise. We just [didn't] have the pitching depth in the system to withstand injuries, and we've worked hard to build a pitching staff where we feel like we have some depth."
Hoyer notes a desire to teach a selective approach in Cubs hitters, leading to greater on-base percentages (and as a result, more power too).
It appears that now the Nationals are the Cubs rebuilding model. Washington had a series of dreadful seasons, leading to number one draft picks. By drafting "can't miss" players, the Nationals quickly turned over their roster with young quality players in a span of three seasons.
"We know we can't transform this organization in one year, so every year we should be able to stop and look and say we have a lot more assets, a lot more talent than we had before," Hoyer said.
"We just have to keep on adding to it. There's plenty of examples of teams that have done a good job of that, the Nationals being the clearest. It wasn't a gradual, five-wins-per-year improvement. They struggled, they had a decent season in 2011 and they exploded in 2012. That's probably the model more than anything. At some point you get a critical mass where you become a talented team."
Hoyer is preaching a Nationals style turnaround in two years based upon high prospects reaching the majors quickly. But Epstein contradicts this statement, stating that his new core of top prospects, Soler and #1 pick Almora, won't be in the majors until 2015.
So why the disconnect? The message that the Cubs need to send to their eroding fan base is this: we will be competitive sooner than our system will develop talent. The team will be improved in 2013. The message is to keep season ticket holders from bolting and stem the bloody tide of no-shows in the latter third of last season season. Wrigley Field in August and September was not a ball park but a seagull sanctuary. So the business side of the Cubs is pushing the "ahead of schedule" mantra in order to keep fan interest for what appears to be another 100 loss season in 2013.
September 12, 2012
THE VISION
What is the vision of the Cubs? What does the new front office believe will be "their" team on the field?
We can only speculate, but based upon the moves and the distaste for old regime players, this is what the Cubs are looking to field as soon as possible:
OUTFIELD:
SORIANO ALMORA(*) SOLER($)
INFIELD:
VILLANUEVA (T) CASTRO BAEZ RIZZO (T)
CATCHER:
KRIST (*)
STARTERS:
SAMARDZIJA T. WOOD(T) P. JOHNSON(*) J. CONWAY(*) M. HEESH (*)
(*) draft picks
(T) trade acquisitions
($) free agent signing
We can only speculate, but based upon the moves and the distaste for old regime players, this is what the Cubs are looking to field as soon as possible:
OUTFIELD:
SORIANO ALMORA(*) SOLER($)
INFIELD:
VILLANUEVA (T) CASTRO BAEZ RIZZO (T)
CATCHER:
KRIST (*)
STARTERS:
SAMARDZIJA T. WOOD(T) P. JOHNSON(*) J. CONWAY(*) M. HEESH (*)
(*) draft picks
(T) trade acquisitions
($) free agent signing
January 14, 2012
CHOP WOOD, TIMBER!
Theo Epstein threw away his principles and long term blueprint last night
when he announced the return to the mass of delusional sentimental fans
of KId K. It had to be on Friday the 13th. It had to be at the Cub convention.
It had to give the attendees some warm and fuzzy overtones of their past idols.
What the hell?
Again, what the hell?
A 34 year old relief pitcher coming off another knee surgery gets $3 million
while the New Management has no qualms about trading away the best
left handed reliever in MLB (Sean Marshall)?
Kerry Wood got Marshall's money, simple as that. But Marshall is a better pitcher - - -
well, he does not have a 14 year old 20 strikeout performance against a hapless
overjuiced Astros lineup on the old short and tattered resume that is Kerry Wood.
So the Cubs are back to PR moves instead of baseball moves. This has the
smell of a Ricketts-Kenney-old Tribune marketing intervention in order to put
lipstick on a pig before the prom.
But what misplaced loyalty. This is another blindsided slap at Ryne Sandberg.
He never got the respect from ownership or new management. Epstein announced
before the managerial search began that Sandberg was not a candidate. Why?
He had only won 4 years straight in the minors, with two championships. He had
paid his dues. He was loyal to the Cubs organization. He is a Hall of Famer!
And he is a fan favorite. But somehow, all these good works makes Sandberg
unqualified to be a manager. But somehow, Wood's total career of major disappointments,
blown expectations, injury plagued seasons is more important public relations
hiring a former manager who has shown clear success in winning to manage the Cubs.
This also puts Garza on the next plane out of town, for Maholm's $4.75 million plus
Wood's $3 million equals Garza's 2012 projected salary. In a zero sum game that the
Cubs payroll is going to be, PR wins out over performance, again.
when he announced the return to the mass of delusional sentimental fans
of KId K. It had to be on Friday the 13th. It had to be at the Cub convention.
It had to give the attendees some warm and fuzzy overtones of their past idols.
What the hell?
Again, what the hell?
A 34 year old relief pitcher coming off another knee surgery gets $3 million
while the New Management has no qualms about trading away the best
left handed reliever in MLB (Sean Marshall)?
Kerry Wood got Marshall's money, simple as that. But Marshall is a better pitcher - - -
well, he does not have a 14 year old 20 strikeout performance against a hapless
overjuiced Astros lineup on the old short and tattered resume that is Kerry Wood.
So the Cubs are back to PR moves instead of baseball moves. This has the
smell of a Ricketts-Kenney-old Tribune marketing intervention in order to put
lipstick on a pig before the prom.
But what misplaced loyalty. This is another blindsided slap at Ryne Sandberg.
He never got the respect from ownership or new management. Epstein announced
before the managerial search began that Sandberg was not a candidate. Why?
He had only won 4 years straight in the minors, with two championships. He had
paid his dues. He was loyal to the Cubs organization. He is a Hall of Famer!
And he is a fan favorite. But somehow, all these good works makes Sandberg
unqualified to be a manager. But somehow, Wood's total career of major disappointments,
blown expectations, injury plagued seasons is more important public relations
hiring a former manager who has shown clear success in winning to manage the Cubs.
This also puts Garza on the next plane out of town, for Maholm's $4.75 million plus
Wood's $3 million equals Garza's 2012 projected salary. In a zero sum game that the
Cubs payroll is going to be, PR wins out over performance, again.
This also puts more pressure on James Russell in the bullpen. As the only projected
left handed reliever, he must suddenly turn into the Next Sean Marshall. In a hurry.
Russell appeared in 64 games, 1-6 record, 4.12 ERA in 67.2 IP. He gave up 37 runs,
had a WHIP of 1.330, with 43 K and 14 BB.
Marshall appeared in 78 games, 6-6 record with 5 saves, 2.26 ERA in 75.2 IP. Marshall
gave up 21 runs, had a stellar WHIP of 1.097, with 79 K and 17 BB.
Russell needs to pitch 21% more innings at the same time cut down on runs allowed by
43% in order to come close to Marshall's performance.
December 27, 2011
THE GHOST OF HENDRY
The Cubs are operating in the ghostly shadow of Jim Hendry. The new Theo Trio have been underwhelming the fan base with all their moves so far this off-season. Some of these moves smack of the old GM playbook. Some are just rolling the dice and praying for a miracle comeback, also a chapter in the old Hendry playbook.
Sonnanstine is a fly ball pitcher and is very homer prone. The exact opposite of the type of starting pitcher you want at Wrigley Field.
So far, this off-season looks like a 1900 looping film reel of two steam locomotives colliding at full speed. The model is signing players coming off their career WORST season with the hope that he will be the comeback player of the year. Even scrappy players pulled off the league scrap heap are there for a reason.
But Epstein must be playing with a short stack of chips. Crane Kenney did that to Hendry, who told the media that he had no financial strings to sign players, when in private Kenney said he did not.
So it appears that the mandate is to keep the 2012 payroll under $100 million, which would be a 28% decline from last season. The only way to turn over a 71 win roster is to take a $3.1 million chip (Sean Marshall) and turn it into two $1 million markers (Corpas, Sonnanstine) and two $500,000 chips (T. Wood and Sappelt.)
The last two additions are strange. The Cubs signed right-handers Manny Corpas, a former Rockies closer and Andy Sonnanstine a former Rays starter, to non-guaranteed contracts for the coming season. Financial terms weren’t disclosed but they are probably at one million or less.
Corpas, 29, is "hoping to rebound" after missing last season while recovering from Tommy John surgery on his right elbow. He has not been a good pitcher since 2007.
In 2010, he was 3-5 with 10 saves and a 4.62 ERA. He was in the Texas Rangers’ organization last season but didn’t pitch.
Sonnanstine, 28, has worked mostly in relief over the last two seasons, pitching to a 4.78 ERA in 116 2/3 innings. He will be auditioning for the fifth starter spot. He was 0-2 with a 5.55 ERA in 15 appearances last season with the Rays.
Sonnanstine is a fly ball pitcher and is very homer prone. The exact opposite of the type of starting pitcher you want at Wrigley Field.
So far, this off-season looks like a 1900 looping film reel of two steam locomotives colliding at full speed. The model is signing players coming off their career WORST season with the hope that he will be the comeback player of the year. Even scrappy players pulled off the league scrap heap are there for a reason.
But Epstein must be playing with a short stack of chips. Crane Kenney did that to Hendry, who told the media that he had no financial strings to sign players, when in private Kenney said he did not.
So it appears that the mandate is to keep the 2012 payroll under $100 million, which would be a 28% decline from last season. The only way to turn over a 71 win roster is to take a $3.1 million chip (Sean Marshall) and turn it into two $1 million markers (Corpas, Sonnanstine) and two $500,000 chips (T. Wood and Sappelt.)
Labels:
Corpas,
Game Plan,
payroll,
Sossanstine
December 24, 2011
THE POST TRIBUNE REBUILD
When Tom Ricketts overpaid for the Cubs from the bankrupt Chicago Tribune, he made several key mistakes, foremost was the retention of the current team management. Jim Hendry and his corporate overlords in the Tribune Tower viewed the Cubs as merely a production company to fill entertaining programming slots on the television or radio station properties. The plan was to spend money like a sit-com to be "competitive" enough to draw enough fans (ratings) to sustain The Brand.
It was okay to give Alfonso Soriano an insane player contract because the Cubs were drawing 3 million fans and had a national cable television audience. It wasn't the team executives money; it was just numbers on a conglomerate's balance sheet. It was just like the feasts and greed just before the Fall of the Roman Empire: quaint little Wrigley Field had been transformed into the largest yuppie spring break in the summer tavern. Baseball was secondary to the party atmosphere in the bleachers. As any saloon keeper will tell you, alcohol is more profitable than theater ticket sales.
The Tribune minions never used the term "rebuild" during its ownership tenure that began in 1981. The corporate executives brought in a baseball man, Dallas Green, to re-tool the organization. Green brought in the Phillies way, and was turning the team from the lovable loser label into a contender until he began to clash with the corporate executives in the Tower. It always seemed that someone outside of baseball circles knew better. The Tribune board used to stash near retiring executives to the kid's table called the Cubs to be the team president (which should have been merely an honorary title) to do little until retirement benefits kicked in. With no baseball knowledge, but a desire to keep the park filled, the Tribune kept writing checks for Hendry to spend on stop gap free agents to keep the team competitive. Meanwhile, the minor league system swelled with career minor leaguers blocked from an opportunity to be promoted or noticed by the team.
And that is what Ricketts inherited: an old minor league system of 28 plus year old AAAA talent and a serious amount of deadwood major league no-trade contracts for underperforming old veterans. Instead of sweeping clean the entire house on day one, Ricketts left the management crew in tact, which continued the same philosophy until the payroll budget burst the $150 million mark and the team crashed and burned in the playoffs and fell from grace in 2011.
Ricketts has slowly turned the corner (possibly by accident). Attendance fell, player production fell, losses mounted both in the standings and financially; change was on the horizon. Ricketts obsession with the Red Sox made him hire Theo Epstein and his band of merry young executives (Hoyer and McLeod) to remake the Cubs into the image of the Red Sox Way. Epstein was in charge when the Red Sox won two World Series for a starved fan base (even though the team foundation for the first championship was done by former GM Dan Duquette, now the Orioles new GM). Winning over the fan base with the reputation of Epstein & Company was a media coup.
The question is how long will be the media honeymoon.
It may not be as long as people would have hoped; the initial plan was to have Epstein "overpay" draft choices (especially those high schooler first round picks with signability issues) to bolster the number of prospects in the system. For example, the White Sox do the opposite and hardly spend on draft choices ($2-4 million) while last year the Cubs (under Hendry) spent nearly $12 million in signing bonus contracts, giving later round picks first round money in order to sign. This is what Epstein was going to do next June, until the new collective bargaining agreement effectively outlawed the practice.
The slow scramble to find a Plan B has been a cumbersome process for Epstein and Hoyer. It is clear they have no real affection for the Hendry prospects in the minor league system. It is also clear that they have little to work with on the major league roster. At the winter meetings, it was reported that the Cubs would not be big players in the free agent market because the Cubs "were out of money." There is probably great truth to that statement since when Daddy Ricketts spent the family money on the purchase of Tom's hobby horse, the Cubs, he said that no further money would be invested in the team. In other word, the Cubs had to pay for itself going forward. That was hard to do with a huge debt service on the purchase, a high payroll of $140 million, a bad economy, a fan base that turned to no-shows for the last two months of the season, and declining ratings to match the slide in the standings. So the old way of buying free agents to stem the tide and hover around a "competitive" .500 club was out the window, too.
So the snail crawl to find a Plan C was a mental gizzard grinder for Cubs fans in the first weeks of the hot stove league. The new young genius in charge of the Cubs was already painted himself into a corner with high expectations and little tools to change the situation. It is now apparent that the new Cubs three-headed-monster (Epstein-Hoyer-McLeod) are trying to turnover both the major league and minor league rosters as quickly as possible with their own "players." They have definitively gone to the bargain basement used player bin to patch together an ugly quilt for 2012.
The real anticipation for the new regime would be their first big move. It came as a dud in the minds of many fans: the signing of free agent OF David DeJesus. DeJesus was coming off a career WORST season. The team said they liked his defense, but he lacked power and RBI production throughout his career.
Then, some fans decided to give management a break and wait for the first big trade. It came as another dud: the Cubs sent Tyler Colvin and D.J. LeMahieu to the Colorado Rockies for Ian Stewart and Casey Weathers.
With the loss of Aramis Ramirez at third, Stewart's numbers are extremely weak. He only .156 with zero homers in 122 at-bats with the Rockies last season. He was sent to the minors during the season, and now says he had a wrist injury. (Cub fans know wrist injuries do not heal quickly and have multiple season issues; example, Derek Lee). It appears that the Cubs were looking at Stewart's inflated 2009 numbers (25 HRs) and hoping that he could rebound with a change of scenery. A change of scenery does not change a flawed swing or a wrist injury.
The same holds true for Weathers, who was a first round pick of the Rockies in the 2007 draft. The 26-year-old reliever has a 4.20 ERA and 1.47 WHIP in four minor-league seasons but showed potential before undergoing Tommy John surgery in 2009. He has a real control problem and is thought of by major league scouts as "a project."
Hendry used to collect injured pitchers in a MASH unit of "rehab" projects that never panned out. But it was a way to keep signing veterans with an alleged track record to keep the heat off poor talent evaluations and the lack of prospects contributing on the major league club.
So, the Cubs continued the roster turnover with a clear move of going cheaper and collecting bodies. The trade of Sean Marshall to the Reds for a starter with a severe sophomore slump and two minor leaguers shows that Epstein is now in full "rebuild" mode even though his owner is in complete denial. Marshall, who statistically the best left handed relief pitcher the last two seasons, goes to the Reds for left handed starter Travis Wood and prospects Dave Sappelt and Ronald Torreyes.
Marshall has emerged as one of the league’s elite relievers since moving to the bullpen full time in 2010, going 6-6, wth 34 holds in 150 innings of work with a 2.45 ERA and 169/42 K/BB ratio.
The key to the deal was financial. Marshall was set to make $3.1 million in 2012 plus an expensive contract extension. Wood is being paid the league minimum, and at age 24 is under team control through 2016. Neither Torreyes nor Sappelt were among the Reds’ top 10 prospects according to Baseball America. Sappelt is a short, scrappy player with some speed and is projected as a major league bench outfielder while Torreyes, at 5'9" 140 lbs, is a 19-year-old slick fielding second baseman looked good in Single-A last season. Some believe Torreyes could be a Dustin Pedoria type player; others think small compact gritty players like ex-Cubs Ryan Theriot or Mike Fontenot, for whom the Cubs let go for a reason: lack of production.
It is one thing to get a bunch of scrappy players, but another to field an entire major league team with scraps. Season ticket holders are already complaining that the 2012 club is going to be awful, and awful does not sell tickets.
This is acknowledged now by Epstein as Plan C. From finding bottom-out players like DeJesus and Stewart with the hope of a bounce back season, the Cubs are trying to "buy low" and get higher unexpected returns. The team is also now hellbent on trading any valuable "assets" into more "assets," i.e. trading a quality relief pitcher for three other players. As Epstein said at the winter meetings to other GMs, he'd listen to offers on "anybody," he meant it. Starting pitcher Matt Garza appears to be next in the conga line out the door in a three or four for one swap.
If the Cubs do nothing further this off-season, the 2012 payroll is projected to drop 28 percent to $98 million from $135 million. This is the beginning of a significant change in corporate philosophy; the Cubs were labeled as a big market, big spending club. Now, they are falling back to a small market value mentality.
Epstein is rolling the dice on out-of-favor players during his honeymoon period. He is hoping against hope that if he fills the roster with comeback of the year candidates, some will actually play well enough to surprise some people. But how surprised will fans be when they unwrap (player) packages bought at the dollar store?
And this is shaping up not to be a one season lull. The only upside prospect so far, Torreyes, is an A ball player. That means he will need three more years to get major league ready. And Epstein's first June draft will not yield a crop of players for at least two or three years. So the statements that the Cubs will be competitive in 2013 are misguided at best. Look at the Epstein way: stock piling A or AA players means that it is going to take three years to get to the major league roster fully turned over, if at all. That means 2015 and not 2013. And if you keep getting bottom feeder placeholder players at the major league level (Stewart, DeJesus) the club is not going to get progressively better at time soon.
Epstein & Company really need to find gold nuggets in the manure of other team's run-off. They have to act faster and with more desperation or they will lose out on chances to improve the stale product.
You really need to cull the wire to plug in guys with at least some POTENTIAL in the near term. Example, the A's just put on waivers AAA RF Jai Miller, who hit .276 with 32 HR 88 RBI and 14 SB last season. The Chronicle reports the team hopes he clears waivers so he can be back in spring training and make the team. (The A's had to make the roster move due to the players received in the Gio trade). This is the type of player the Cubs should claim - - - some one who has been blocked by his current team and who can be given an opportunity to win a job. And given the fact the Cubs current roster is like the Bears (no back ups at key positions), Miller would be insurance if DeJesus gets hurt or just plain sucks again. Reed Johnson or Sappelt are not full time starters. Plus, who else besides Soriano or LaHair can hit a home run on this team?
If Epstein is reincarnating the Go-Go White Sox of the late 1950s, defense and speed, that won't win at Wrigley when the opponent is blasting homers onto Waveland and the Cubs have no answer. None of the moves so far has excited the fan base.
Besides, signing a guy like Miller costs the team nothing but the major league minimum if he makes the club! That would make Ricky happy happy!!!
But there is nothing to make die-hard Cub fans happy. This rebuilding plan is going to be a long term struggle against the odds of having stop gap, fill in players hoping for career comeback seasons to field a competitive team. The Cubs are not better today by the mere subtraction of Pujols in St. Louis or Fielder or Braun (possible 50 game suspension) in Milwaukee. The free spending Tribune days are over. It is possible that the second coming of the P.K. Wrigley clueless and cheap era is here.
It was okay to give Alfonso Soriano an insane player contract because the Cubs were drawing 3 million fans and had a national cable television audience. It wasn't the team executives money; it was just numbers on a conglomerate's balance sheet. It was just like the feasts and greed just before the Fall of the Roman Empire: quaint little Wrigley Field had been transformed into the largest yuppie spring break in the summer tavern. Baseball was secondary to the party atmosphere in the bleachers. As any saloon keeper will tell you, alcohol is more profitable than theater ticket sales.
The Tribune minions never used the term "rebuild" during its ownership tenure that began in 1981. The corporate executives brought in a baseball man, Dallas Green, to re-tool the organization. Green brought in the Phillies way, and was turning the team from the lovable loser label into a contender until he began to clash with the corporate executives in the Tower. It always seemed that someone outside of baseball circles knew better. The Tribune board used to stash near retiring executives to the kid's table called the Cubs to be the team president (which should have been merely an honorary title) to do little until retirement benefits kicked in. With no baseball knowledge, but a desire to keep the park filled, the Tribune kept writing checks for Hendry to spend on stop gap free agents to keep the team competitive. Meanwhile, the minor league system swelled with career minor leaguers blocked from an opportunity to be promoted or noticed by the team.
And that is what Ricketts inherited: an old minor league system of 28 plus year old AAAA talent and a serious amount of deadwood major league no-trade contracts for underperforming old veterans. Instead of sweeping clean the entire house on day one, Ricketts left the management crew in tact, which continued the same philosophy until the payroll budget burst the $150 million mark and the team crashed and burned in the playoffs and fell from grace in 2011.
Ricketts has slowly turned the corner (possibly by accident). Attendance fell, player production fell, losses mounted both in the standings and financially; change was on the horizon. Ricketts obsession with the Red Sox made him hire Theo Epstein and his band of merry young executives (Hoyer and McLeod) to remake the Cubs into the image of the Red Sox Way. Epstein was in charge when the Red Sox won two World Series for a starved fan base (even though the team foundation for the first championship was done by former GM Dan Duquette, now the Orioles new GM). Winning over the fan base with the reputation of Epstein & Company was a media coup.
The question is how long will be the media honeymoon.
It may not be as long as people would have hoped; the initial plan was to have Epstein "overpay" draft choices (especially those high schooler first round picks with signability issues) to bolster the number of prospects in the system. For example, the White Sox do the opposite and hardly spend on draft choices ($2-4 million) while last year the Cubs (under Hendry) spent nearly $12 million in signing bonus contracts, giving later round picks first round money in order to sign. This is what Epstein was going to do next June, until the new collective bargaining agreement effectively outlawed the practice.
The slow scramble to find a Plan B has been a cumbersome process for Epstein and Hoyer. It is clear they have no real affection for the Hendry prospects in the minor league system. It is also clear that they have little to work with on the major league roster. At the winter meetings, it was reported that the Cubs would not be big players in the free agent market because the Cubs "were out of money." There is probably great truth to that statement since when Daddy Ricketts spent the family money on the purchase of Tom's hobby horse, the Cubs, he said that no further money would be invested in the team. In other word, the Cubs had to pay for itself going forward. That was hard to do with a huge debt service on the purchase, a high payroll of $140 million, a bad economy, a fan base that turned to no-shows for the last two months of the season, and declining ratings to match the slide in the standings. So the old way of buying free agents to stem the tide and hover around a "competitive" .500 club was out the window, too.
So the snail crawl to find a Plan C was a mental gizzard grinder for Cubs fans in the first weeks of the hot stove league. The new young genius in charge of the Cubs was already painted himself into a corner with high expectations and little tools to change the situation. It is now apparent that the new Cubs three-headed-monster (Epstein-Hoyer-McLeod) are trying to turnover both the major league and minor league rosters as quickly as possible with their own "players." They have definitively gone to the bargain basement used player bin to patch together an ugly quilt for 2012.
The real anticipation for the new regime would be their first big move. It came as a dud in the minds of many fans: the signing of free agent OF David DeJesus. DeJesus was coming off a career WORST season. The team said they liked his defense, but he lacked power and RBI production throughout his career.
Then, some fans decided to give management a break and wait for the first big trade. It came as another dud: the Cubs sent Tyler Colvin and D.J. LeMahieu to the Colorado Rockies for Ian Stewart and Casey Weathers.
With the loss of Aramis Ramirez at third, Stewart's numbers are extremely weak. He only .156 with zero homers in 122 at-bats with the Rockies last season. He was sent to the minors during the season, and now says he had a wrist injury. (Cub fans know wrist injuries do not heal quickly and have multiple season issues; example, Derek Lee). It appears that the Cubs were looking at Stewart's inflated 2009 numbers (25 HRs) and hoping that he could rebound with a change of scenery. A change of scenery does not change a flawed swing or a wrist injury.
The same holds true for Weathers, who was a first round pick of the Rockies in the 2007 draft. The 26-year-old reliever has a 4.20 ERA and 1.47 WHIP in four minor-league seasons but showed potential before undergoing Tommy John surgery in 2009. He has a real control problem and is thought of by major league scouts as "a project."
Hendry used to collect injured pitchers in a MASH unit of "rehab" projects that never panned out. But it was a way to keep signing veterans with an alleged track record to keep the heat off poor talent evaluations and the lack of prospects contributing on the major league club.
So, the Cubs continued the roster turnover with a clear move of going cheaper and collecting bodies. The trade of Sean Marshall to the Reds for a starter with a severe sophomore slump and two minor leaguers shows that Epstein is now in full "rebuild" mode even though his owner is in complete denial. Marshall, who statistically the best left handed relief pitcher the last two seasons, goes to the Reds for left handed starter Travis Wood and prospects Dave Sappelt and Ronald Torreyes.
Marshall has emerged as one of the league’s elite relievers since moving to the bullpen full time in 2010, going 6-6, wth 34 holds in 150 innings of work with a 2.45 ERA and 169/42 K/BB ratio.
The key to the deal was financial. Marshall was set to make $3.1 million in 2012 plus an expensive contract extension. Wood is being paid the league minimum, and at age 24 is under team control through 2016. Neither Torreyes nor Sappelt were among the Reds’ top 10 prospects according to Baseball America. Sappelt is a short, scrappy player with some speed and is projected as a major league bench outfielder while Torreyes, at 5'9" 140 lbs, is a 19-year-old slick fielding second baseman looked good in Single-A last season. Some believe Torreyes could be a Dustin Pedoria type player; others think small compact gritty players like ex-Cubs Ryan Theriot or Mike Fontenot, for whom the Cubs let go for a reason: lack of production.
It is one thing to get a bunch of scrappy players, but another to field an entire major league team with scraps. Season ticket holders are already complaining that the 2012 club is going to be awful, and awful does not sell tickets.
This is acknowledged now by Epstein as Plan C. From finding bottom-out players like DeJesus and Stewart with the hope of a bounce back season, the Cubs are trying to "buy low" and get higher unexpected returns. The team is also now hellbent on trading any valuable "assets" into more "assets," i.e. trading a quality relief pitcher for three other players. As Epstein said at the winter meetings to other GMs, he'd listen to offers on "anybody," he meant it. Starting pitcher Matt Garza appears to be next in the conga line out the door in a three or four for one swap.
If the Cubs do nothing further this off-season, the 2012 payroll is projected to drop 28 percent to $98 million from $135 million. This is the beginning of a significant change in corporate philosophy; the Cubs were labeled as a big market, big spending club. Now, they are falling back to a small market value mentality.
Epstein is rolling the dice on out-of-favor players during his honeymoon period. He is hoping against hope that if he fills the roster with comeback of the year candidates, some will actually play well enough to surprise some people. But how surprised will fans be when they unwrap (player) packages bought at the dollar store?
And this is shaping up not to be a one season lull. The only upside prospect so far, Torreyes, is an A ball player. That means he will need three more years to get major league ready. And Epstein's first June draft will not yield a crop of players for at least two or three years. So the statements that the Cubs will be competitive in 2013 are misguided at best. Look at the Epstein way: stock piling A or AA players means that it is going to take three years to get to the major league roster fully turned over, if at all. That means 2015 and not 2013. And if you keep getting bottom feeder placeholder players at the major league level (Stewart, DeJesus) the club is not going to get progressively better at time soon.
Epstein & Company really need to find gold nuggets in the manure of other team's run-off. They have to act faster and with more desperation or they will lose out on chances to improve the stale product.
You really need to cull the wire to plug in guys with at least some POTENTIAL in the near term. Example, the A's just put on waivers AAA RF Jai Miller, who hit .276 with 32 HR 88 RBI and 14 SB last season. The Chronicle reports the team hopes he clears waivers so he can be back in spring training and make the team. (The A's had to make the roster move due to the players received in the Gio trade). This is the type of player the Cubs should claim - - - some one who has been blocked by his current team and who can be given an opportunity to win a job. And given the fact the Cubs current roster is like the Bears (no back ups at key positions), Miller would be insurance if DeJesus gets hurt or just plain sucks again. Reed Johnson or Sappelt are not full time starters. Plus, who else besides Soriano or LaHair can hit a home run on this team?
If Epstein is reincarnating the Go-Go White Sox of the late 1950s, defense and speed, that won't win at Wrigley when the opponent is blasting homers onto Waveland and the Cubs have no answer. None of the moves so far has excited the fan base.
Besides, signing a guy like Miller costs the team nothing but the major league minimum if he makes the club! That would make Ricky happy happy!!!
But there is nothing to make die-hard Cub fans happy. This rebuilding plan is going to be a long term struggle against the odds of having stop gap, fill in players hoping for career comeback seasons to field a competitive team. The Cubs are not better today by the mere subtraction of Pujols in St. Louis or Fielder or Braun (possible 50 game suspension) in Milwaukee. The free spending Tribune days are over. It is possible that the second coming of the P.K. Wrigley clueless and cheap era is here.
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