This was a recent Jeopardy Final Answer clue:
All the contestants got the answer WRONG.
Showing posts with label small market. Show all posts
Showing posts with label small market. Show all posts
May 9, 2015
February 2, 2015
SHIELDS UP, CAPT'N!
James Shields turning down a $110 million offer has run a chill down the spines of the MLB executive community. Shields asking price is high; it scares off clubs. Now, Max Scherzer's demands were also out of the ball park, but he got signed with a creative deal that deferred much of the dollars. Whether Shields final deal can be as clever will be seen.
Shields is compared to Zach Greinke. Shields went 14-8 in 34 starts for KC last year. He has a 3.21 ERA, 1.181 WHIP and a 4.3 WAR. In this 9 seasons, Shields, 33, has a career 114-90 record, 3.72 ERA, 1.220 WHIP and 27.7 WAR. Last season he earned $13.5 million.
Greinke, 31, has amassed a 38.9 career WAR. He will be paid $25 million by LA in 2015.
It seems Shields' camp is in the ball park for a $25 million deal for 4 years, but there are two differences. First, Greinke is younger by two years. Second, many believe Shields is an injury waiting to happen (a classic work horse break down after signing a huge deal).
The problem is also that the big market teams have reached their budget limits, and the smaller market teams don't have a budget to stretch $25 million.
In a game of free agent musical chairs, Shields may be the last quality pitcher standing by spring training.
Shields is compared to Zach Greinke. Shields went 14-8 in 34 starts for KC last year. He has a 3.21 ERA, 1.181 WHIP and a 4.3 WAR. In this 9 seasons, Shields, 33, has a career 114-90 record, 3.72 ERA, 1.220 WHIP and 27.7 WAR. Last season he earned $13.5 million.
Greinke, 31, has amassed a 38.9 career WAR. He will be paid $25 million by LA in 2015.
It seems Shields' camp is in the ball park for a $25 million deal for 4 years, but there are two differences. First, Greinke is younger by two years. Second, many believe Shields is an injury waiting to happen (a classic work horse break down after signing a huge deal).
The problem is also that the big market teams have reached their budget limits, and the smaller market teams don't have a budget to stretch $25 million.
In a game of free agent musical chairs, Shields may be the last quality pitcher standing by spring training.
Labels:
free agent,
Shields,
small market
May 15, 2014
GREAT OBSERVATION
Jon Greenberg of ESPNChicago may have made the observation of the year.
"CHICAGO -- In their eternal search for sponsorship dollars, the Chicago Cubs have done the impossible: They marketed watching paint dry.
No, they haven't found a sponsor for the Cubs' offense.
As part of the season-long 100th anniversary of Wrigley Field, the Cubs and new sponsor Benjamin Moore held an event at Wrigley's famous red marquee Wednesday morning. At the event, painters turned the marquee green.
The marquee paint was chipped away to find the old green color from the mid-1930s, and Benjamin Moore used a handheld spectrophotometer to match that green to its own "mallard green" color."
Is there nothing that Crane Kenney and the "business" side of the franchise won't do?
Are the Cubs so cash strapped that they are bartering for maintenance services like a small town radio station?
What could be next? On off-days, hiring out Cub players to be baby-sitters for season ticket holders?
"CHICAGO -- In their eternal search for sponsorship dollars, the Chicago Cubs have done the impossible: They marketed watching paint dry.
No, they haven't found a sponsor for the Cubs' offense.
As part of the season-long 100th anniversary of Wrigley Field, the Cubs and new sponsor Benjamin Moore held an event at Wrigley's famous red marquee Wednesday morning. At the event, painters turned the marquee green.
The marquee paint was chipped away to find the old green color from the mid-1930s, and Benjamin Moore used a handheld spectrophotometer to match that green to its own "mallard green" color."
Is there nothing that Crane Kenney and the "business" side of the franchise won't do?
Are the Cubs so cash strapped that they are bartering for maintenance services like a small town radio station?
What could be next? On off-days, hiring out Cub players to be baby-sitters for season ticket holders?
Labels:
Cubs,
small market,
Wrigley
January 27, 2014
NOSTAGLIA
Just what is the Cubs selling?
The team is at a marketing crossroads. For the past several months, executives continually state that they won't tell their fans how to spend their money, but they should continue to come to Cubs games to experience the progress in the grand rebuilding plan for the future. The executives claim that fans who ride out these bad years will get a better sense of happiness or sense of accomplishment when the team eventually turns around.
It is a soft sell approach. But the hard truth is that the 2014 team will not feature any new pieces to the rebuilding puzzle. The first two "core" players, Starlin Castro and Anthony Rizzo, regressed in 2013. It will be years away when the touted prospects in the low minors will have a chance to make the major league roster.
Long time Chicagoan and sports fan, Hub Arkush, the past publisher of Pro Football Weekly, recently said that he was a Cubs season ticket holder for more than 20 years. But when it came time to renew his Cub season tickets, he made the decision to give them up. He explained that he could not give away his unused tickets last season. He said that the way he views the rebuilding plan, the Cubs will not be competitive for two, three or four more years. Based on that viewpoint, he said it was not worth spending $25,000 for a 2014 season ticket package, let alone $75,000 for the next three years of the same bad team.
You can see his point. A business decision finally outweighed a fan decision. In an economy that still in-flux, $25,000 to $75,000 is a lot of money to spend on a luxury item such as entertainment. That type of savings could pay for a most of a state college education, a down payment on a house or a major cushion for retirement.
So the Cubs are selling The Future. Hope.
But it will be 69 years since the Cubs last played in a World Series. That is really two full generations of fans that have lived under the Hope banner. At a certain point in time, Hope turns into Harsh Reality.
What does a fan expect when he or she buys a ticket? They expect their team to win. In baseball, a small market team with limited resources that fields a replacement level quality squad would be expected to only win 30 percent of their games. An average but competitive team would be expected to win 50 percent of their games. A championship caliber team would be expected to win 60 percent of their games. There is a much closer gap between a championship caliber team and a .500 club than a .500 club and AAAA team. It is the closer gap between 50 and 60 percent expectation that should drive attendance because people will know that it is more than likely their team will win the game.
So what is a baseball team's owner's role? It depends on how the owner views his ownership of the team. In a corporate setting, where executives have to answer to shareholders, the concern is profits. If the owner is a wealthy individual or family, profit may be a concern but at times it is will to win that is controlling baseball decisions. So there are is a spectrum gulf in ownership strategy, from pure profits to having a fan's expectations.
The idea that you want fans to come to your team's games with the "hope" that the team will win is not the same as fielding a team that has the opportunity to win the game. The former has a 20 percent or more chance it will not win the game, which is a significant variation from the average.
So what keeps the Wrigley Field turn styles spinning?
There is a part of the fan base that is so absorbed in the Cub culture that they will come to support their team without any expectations; like patients who love to go to the dentist to get their teeth drilled.
There is a part of the fan base that likes baseball that they will come to see the stars of other teams play at Wrigley Field; like historians mentally documenting their era of their favorite sport.
There is part of the fan base that is there to experience and pass down to the next generation the aura and history of baseball. Tom Ricketts has been adamant that he is not running a museum, but the perception of many fans is that 100 year old Wrigley Field, with its ivy covered brick walls, manual scoreboard, antiquated restroom troughs and city neighborhood setting is a rare moment of the national past time frozen in time. A grandparent cannot take their grandson to Petco Field and point to the field and tell a story that the great Babe Ruth stood their during championship game; but he could at Wrigley Field.
The easiest thing to sell Americans is nostalgia. It is an easy sell because it tugs at the fond memories from someone's past. A weekend game at Wrigley Field used to be a family outing. A tradition. An experience. A father with a young family may want to rekindle what he experienced as boy with his children. He could go to Wrigley Field and find it exactly the same as he remembered it.
There is a societal comfort level in such touchstones. A culture built upon strong institutions will survive longer than those who do not have strong bonds with the people. In a small way, the Cubs and Wrigley Field are a city institution. But there are cracks developing in that foundation.
The Cubs cannot sell nostalgia if ownership dramatically changes Wrigley Field. There are many fans who came to Wrigley and found the RF party deck and LED scoreboard totally out of place. It was not in character with the traditional cathedral of baseball. It ruined the symmetry and sight lines of the outfield walls. The plan to add a jumbrotron and large beer sign in RF bleachers will further erode the iconic vision of Wrigley Field as a time capsule to the past. To most, the new elements will detract from the beauty of old Wrigley Field; it would begin to look like any other cookie cutter stadium design. It is clear that the Ricketts have no plans to preserve Wrigley Field for the purists, traditionalists or the past generations.
Change is a natural cycle in life. But dramatic change creates dramatic results, some of which have unintended consequences. Many fans may become disillusioned or turned off by the commercialism if they are looking for the Ernie Banks statue but find it lost amongst a congested mini-Times Square of electronic advertising signs and beer carts. Many fans may become disillusioned or turned off by the changes inside the ball park: the additional party decks, advertising signage, aggressive non-stop concession stands. The consequence could be that portion of the fan base which likes Wrigley Field for its nostalgia factor will no longer come to the games because the their memories have no further connection to the new Wrigley.
It would seem that new ownership has dismissed the powerful draw of nostalgia as it relates to Wrigley Field when it created its new business plan. A business plan which does not focus solely on the Cubs team, but tries to create a multi-purpose entertainment complex.
The team is at a marketing crossroads. For the past several months, executives continually state that they won't tell their fans how to spend their money, but they should continue to come to Cubs games to experience the progress in the grand rebuilding plan for the future. The executives claim that fans who ride out these bad years will get a better sense of happiness or sense of accomplishment when the team eventually turns around.
It is a soft sell approach. But the hard truth is that the 2014 team will not feature any new pieces to the rebuilding puzzle. The first two "core" players, Starlin Castro and Anthony Rizzo, regressed in 2013. It will be years away when the touted prospects in the low minors will have a chance to make the major league roster.
Long time Chicagoan and sports fan, Hub Arkush, the past publisher of Pro Football Weekly, recently said that he was a Cubs season ticket holder for more than 20 years. But when it came time to renew his Cub season tickets, he made the decision to give them up. He explained that he could not give away his unused tickets last season. He said that the way he views the rebuilding plan, the Cubs will not be competitive for two, three or four more years. Based on that viewpoint, he said it was not worth spending $25,000 for a 2014 season ticket package, let alone $75,000 for the next three years of the same bad team.
You can see his point. A business decision finally outweighed a fan decision. In an economy that still in-flux, $25,000 to $75,000 is a lot of money to spend on a luxury item such as entertainment. That type of savings could pay for a most of a state college education, a down payment on a house or a major cushion for retirement.
So the Cubs are selling The Future. Hope.
But it will be 69 years since the Cubs last played in a World Series. That is really two full generations of fans that have lived under the Hope banner. At a certain point in time, Hope turns into Harsh Reality.
What does a fan expect when he or she buys a ticket? They expect their team to win. In baseball, a small market team with limited resources that fields a replacement level quality squad would be expected to only win 30 percent of their games. An average but competitive team would be expected to win 50 percent of their games. A championship caliber team would be expected to win 60 percent of their games. There is a much closer gap between a championship caliber team and a .500 club than a .500 club and AAAA team. It is the closer gap between 50 and 60 percent expectation that should drive attendance because people will know that it is more than likely their team will win the game.
So what is a baseball team's owner's role? It depends on how the owner views his ownership of the team. In a corporate setting, where executives have to answer to shareholders, the concern is profits. If the owner is a wealthy individual or family, profit may be a concern but at times it is will to win that is controlling baseball decisions. So there are is a spectrum gulf in ownership strategy, from pure profits to having a fan's expectations.
The idea that you want fans to come to your team's games with the "hope" that the team will win is not the same as fielding a team that has the opportunity to win the game. The former has a 20 percent or more chance it will not win the game, which is a significant variation from the average.
So what keeps the Wrigley Field turn styles spinning?
There is a part of the fan base that is so absorbed in the Cub culture that they will come to support their team without any expectations; like patients who love to go to the dentist to get their teeth drilled.
There is a part of the fan base that likes baseball that they will come to see the stars of other teams play at Wrigley Field; like historians mentally documenting their era of their favorite sport.
There is part of the fan base that is there to experience and pass down to the next generation the aura and history of baseball. Tom Ricketts has been adamant that he is not running a museum, but the perception of many fans is that 100 year old Wrigley Field, with its ivy covered brick walls, manual scoreboard, antiquated restroom troughs and city neighborhood setting is a rare moment of the national past time frozen in time. A grandparent cannot take their grandson to Petco Field and point to the field and tell a story that the great Babe Ruth stood their during championship game; but he could at Wrigley Field.
The easiest thing to sell Americans is nostalgia. It is an easy sell because it tugs at the fond memories from someone's past. A weekend game at Wrigley Field used to be a family outing. A tradition. An experience. A father with a young family may want to rekindle what he experienced as boy with his children. He could go to Wrigley Field and find it exactly the same as he remembered it.
There is a societal comfort level in such touchstones. A culture built upon strong institutions will survive longer than those who do not have strong bonds with the people. In a small way, the Cubs and Wrigley Field are a city institution. But there are cracks developing in that foundation.
The Cubs cannot sell nostalgia if ownership dramatically changes Wrigley Field. There are many fans who came to Wrigley and found the RF party deck and LED scoreboard totally out of place. It was not in character with the traditional cathedral of baseball. It ruined the symmetry and sight lines of the outfield walls. The plan to add a jumbrotron and large beer sign in RF bleachers will further erode the iconic vision of Wrigley Field as a time capsule to the past. To most, the new elements will detract from the beauty of old Wrigley Field; it would begin to look like any other cookie cutter stadium design. It is clear that the Ricketts have no plans to preserve Wrigley Field for the purists, traditionalists or the past generations.
Change is a natural cycle in life. But dramatic change creates dramatic results, some of which have unintended consequences. Many fans may become disillusioned or turned off by the commercialism if they are looking for the Ernie Banks statue but find it lost amongst a congested mini-Times Square of electronic advertising signs and beer carts. Many fans may become disillusioned or turned off by the changes inside the ball park: the additional party decks, advertising signage, aggressive non-stop concession stands. The consequence could be that portion of the fan base which likes Wrigley Field for its nostalgia factor will no longer come to the games because the their memories have no further connection to the new Wrigley.
It would seem that new ownership has dismissed the powerful draw of nostalgia as it relates to Wrigley Field when it created its new business plan. A business plan which does not focus solely on the Cubs team, but tries to create a multi-purpose entertainment complex.
Labels:
attendance,
bad team,
Cubs,
fans,
small market
December 11, 2013
THE RISING SUN
Baseball has a long history in Japan. Their fans are extremely loud and boisterous at games. Teams take great pride in fielding competitive squads. There is honor bound within the tradition of Japanese baseball.
There are limits on the number of foreign players on any team roster. And there is a bias against foreign players setting Japanese baseball records. The league is smaller than U.S. MLB. The talent level used to be considered much weaker than the United States, but Japan has done very well in the last several World Baseball events to raise some interest.
Since Japan has a long history of professional baseball, Japanese players could not hit the free agent market like American players. Japanese players are tied to their clubs for a maximum of 9 years. In the United States, there are various CBA provisions that allow more player movement, such as minor league free agency, Rule 5 draft, 40 man protective roster, arbitration for eligible players before free agency, etc.
Under the old system, a Japanese team could "post" or offer a U.S. team the opportunity to negotiate a contract with one of their players. The posting fee would be paid to the team holding the player contract (though some reports state there may be a contractual split of the posting fee). Only one team could "win" the posting bid, and thus awarded exclusive negotiating rights to a star player. The team would give up its star players for two reasons: a) money to be financially viable or profitable and b) pressure from the players themselves to allow them to reach the majors and/or be paid highly for their services.
The posting fees have gotten extremely large in recent years, with the Rangers allegedly paying $51.5 million just for the privilege of signing RHP pitcher Darvish for even a greater sum. The concept of $100 million plus outlays of cash for Japanese players, even the very best ones, seemed to be an runaway train for U.S. clubs. Only the big market, big money teams could afford to spend that kind of money on Japanese players. Small market teams were not big players due to financial restraints.
The posting system is supposed to change. The significant change is that now a Japanese team will set the posting fee for its players, up to a maximum of $20 million. In the past, MLB teams set the posting fee amount. For secondary players, the posting fee could have been much lower than the Darvish sweepstakes. So a small market team could bid $1 million post fee for a secondary player and win the rights to sign him; but now the Japanese club can set the same player post value much higher. In theory, the Japanese club will set the fee market. So, Japanese teams believe they will receive more overall posting fee revenue as a result of the change.
It puts more team into play for talent. If more than one team bids the new posting fee, all those teams can negotiate with the player. The player is rewarded with actual free market competition for his services, which means a larger contract. It probably will result in more good will for the player's former team if and when he returns to Japan at the end of his career.
So the change in the posting system is supposed to rise all boats in the free agent sea.
Final details are still to be worked out between league officials. But there is one thing that will not change: a Japanese club may decide not to post its star player. This may happen with this year's star player, pitcher Tanaka. His team wanted Darvish posting fee money, but with the cap, it will not receive it. So they can keep Tanaka under contract until he reaches his league free agency term.
There are limits on the number of foreign players on any team roster. And there is a bias against foreign players setting Japanese baseball records. The league is smaller than U.S. MLB. The talent level used to be considered much weaker than the United States, but Japan has done very well in the last several World Baseball events to raise some interest.
Since Japan has a long history of professional baseball, Japanese players could not hit the free agent market like American players. Japanese players are tied to their clubs for a maximum of 9 years. In the United States, there are various CBA provisions that allow more player movement, such as minor league free agency, Rule 5 draft, 40 man protective roster, arbitration for eligible players before free agency, etc.
Under the old system, a Japanese team could "post" or offer a U.S. team the opportunity to negotiate a contract with one of their players. The posting fee would be paid to the team holding the player contract (though some reports state there may be a contractual split of the posting fee). Only one team could "win" the posting bid, and thus awarded exclusive negotiating rights to a star player. The team would give up its star players for two reasons: a) money to be financially viable or profitable and b) pressure from the players themselves to allow them to reach the majors and/or be paid highly for their services.
The posting fees have gotten extremely large in recent years, with the Rangers allegedly paying $51.5 million just for the privilege of signing RHP pitcher Darvish for even a greater sum. The concept of $100 million plus outlays of cash for Japanese players, even the very best ones, seemed to be an runaway train for U.S. clubs. Only the big market, big money teams could afford to spend that kind of money on Japanese players. Small market teams were not big players due to financial restraints.
The posting system is supposed to change. The significant change is that now a Japanese team will set the posting fee for its players, up to a maximum of $20 million. In the past, MLB teams set the posting fee amount. For secondary players, the posting fee could have been much lower than the Darvish sweepstakes. So a small market team could bid $1 million post fee for a secondary player and win the rights to sign him; but now the Japanese club can set the same player post value much higher. In theory, the Japanese club will set the fee market. So, Japanese teams believe they will receive more overall posting fee revenue as a result of the change.
It puts more team into play for talent. If more than one team bids the new posting fee, all those teams can negotiate with the player. The player is rewarded with actual free market competition for his services, which means a larger contract. It probably will result in more good will for the player's former team if and when he returns to Japan at the end of his career.
So the change in the posting system is supposed to rise all boats in the free agent sea.
Final details are still to be worked out between league officials. But there is one thing that will not change: a Japanese club may decide not to post its star player. This may happen with this year's star player, pitcher Tanaka. His team wanted Darvish posting fee money, but with the cap, it will not receive it. So they can keep Tanaka under contract until he reaches his league free agency term.
Labels:
baseball,
free agent,
small market
September 7, 2013
NO QUICK FIX
The Chicago Sun Times had a long interview with Cubs owner Tom Ricketts. In summation, Ricketts admits that there is no "quick fix" for the Cubs on-field losing. In semi-contradictory statements from his past positions, Ricketts coyly admits that the way he purchased the team from the Tribune has been a factor for current revenue squeeze.
In viewing the Class A Florida State League playoffs, Ricketts does not see much for next year’s Cubs — who don’t appear poised for any kind of quantum leap toward the top of the National League Central, even with a modest influx of major-league talent this offseason.
The Sun Times article states that to off-set sagging attendance, the Cubs are looking to the WGN portion of
the local TV rights that the club is trying to negotiate toward $1
million per game levels comparable to other recent deals by other teams.The Sun Times estimated that increase alone would make
attendance drops easy to tolerate — even at internal estimates of more
than $7 million per 100,000, according to the paper's sources.
In viewing the Class A Florida State League playoffs, Ricketts does not see much for next year’s Cubs — who don’t appear poised for any kind of quantum leap toward the top of the National League Central, even with a modest influx of major-league talent this offseason.
Ricketts told the Sun Times that no splashy, expensive moves to
reverse four consecutive years of losing on the field and at the gate.
And he made no assurances that the third-highest ticket prices in the
sport would get reduced for next season.
And while he acknowledged the
team’s lingering purchase debt is a factor in spending ability, he said
it’s “a lot less than you think,” and he said baseball budgets set by
ownership isn’t holding back anything team president Theo Epstein and
general manager Jed Hoyer are trying to do with the club.
“I know it’s not a money
issue,’’ Ricketts said of the methods the baseball department is using
to restock the farm system and overhaul the organization — and the
consequent results at the big-league level. “You can’t just throw money
at the problem. We have to build the organization from the ground up.
And that’s what we’re doing right now. On the business side, we
have to continue to develop more revenue lines so that we can have more
financial flexibility in the future, and we’re doing that with stadium
renovations and other media contracts that are coming up in the future.”
The priorities that Ricketts outlined including new outfield signage and the Jumbotron-like board up as soon as
possible to increase the revenues, he said. He also said that the clubhouse and
training facilities planned for underneath the existing clubhouse and
workout room are “probably not going to” be ready for the 2014 opener as
originally planned, “but it’s a priority for us.”
Ricketts doesn’t deny Wrigley
Field is a revenue producer by virtue of its drawing power as a venue,
nor does he deny that team debt that Forbes recently estimated at a
major-league high $580 million has an impact on business operations. “Every team has some form of debt. For us, it’s a factor, but there’s also a lot of other factors,” Ricketts said, stating that the team has increased capital investments and increased administration costs.
“In terms of attendance, the
way I look at it is we have to win,” Ricketts said. “We have to get a
more exciting team. We’re not disappointed with this year’s attendance.
We’ll be in the 2.7 [million] range. But obviously, it’s incumbent upon
us to make sure we put a more compelling team on the field, and
attendance will take care of itself.”
In response to Sun-Times columnist
Rick Morrissey’s contention this week that the Cubs, from an ownership
level, weren’t trying to win, Ricketts said: “We go into every season
wanting to win. But we also make personnel decisions based on what’s
best for the organization over the longer term.
“The fact is, we’re doing it
the right way. We have the best leaders in our baseball organization,
the smartest guys. It’s one step at a time. And we’re getting better.”
Here are the key takeaways from Ricketts statements:
1. The Cubs do not plan to make any expensive major league acquisitions or moves this off-season. Though Ricketts claims the baseball budget is planned separately, he acknowledges that he has money factors such as purchase debt, capital costs in constructing the new Wrigley real estate projects, and more "administrative" costs, i.e. more employees and staff that take a priority over the major league team roster.
2. Ricketts is desperate to increase his cash flow. He needs to get more advertising signage right away. He also needs to get a new local television contract to double those local TV revenues per game. But he may be just moving line items between accounts with no real new bottom line dollars. He has lost $28 million plus in just attendance revenue. The increase from WGN local TV revenue is limited by the number of games in the Sportschannel cable agreement, so it may just offset the lost attendance revenue.
3. Ricketts has no plans to appease his paying customers. He does not plan on lower the costs of tickets or concessions. Fans will show their displeasure by not buying tickets or coming to games. There was no viable secondary ticket market for Cubs tickets the last two years. A lost fan will find something else to do with his entertainment dollars. Attendance could go into a free fall in 2014 if the Cubs continue to field a AA/AAA team.
4. Ricketts is now looking only towards "the long term" of his organization. But the long term plan he has is the massive real estate development project in the McDonald's block across from Wrigley Field. In addition, his long term plan is to make Wrigley into a 12 month entertainment destination place like a mini-Disneyland - - - with 365 day bars and restaurants, corporate events and other events. The Cubs are not the sole focus of the Wrigley development - - the Cubs are merely a tenant in the grand scheme of things.
5. Ricketts claims that he has hired "the smartest guys" in run his baseball organization. Fans have been constantly told that Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer are the smartest guys in baseball. Fans only look to wins and losses, and playoffs as the measure of baseball success and good management. So far, the Cub fan base has no reason to believe that Epstein is the smartest baseball guy on the planet. The idea of a pipeline of home grown prospects as impact players at this point in time is just a pipe dream.
6. Ricketts has bought into the Epstein approach that the baseball rebuild will only be through in-house development of talent and not expensive free agent moves. This is a small market, penny pitching baseball philosophy. This approach will lose the casual baseball fan. But that may not matter if Wrigley is an entertainment complex and not just a baseball park.
August 16, 2013
MODEL FRANCHISE
The Tampa Bay Rays have been a successful small market team playing in the worst multipurpose stadium. Ownership has been trying to get a new public stadium deal for a long time. Talks between the sides has stalled, and commissioner Bud Selig is not happy about it.
But the Rays are stuck with a current lease that runs through 2027. The Rays have a hard time drawing fans and have the increasing expense of upkeeping a stadium built in 1990.
At the recent owners meeting Selig said he is considering assigning someone from his office to become directly involved with the negotiations to build a new ballpark for the Tampa Bay Rays.
The problem is that the city of St. Petersburg, the landlord for Tropicana Field, does not want to spend millions of dollars on a new stadium for a single purpose tenant like the Rays. And the city does not have to because it has an ironclad lease, and the threat of litigation if any other local city wants to try to lure the Rays to their town.
Every city in America should be skittish about funding new professional sports stadiums. The Miami Marlins got a sweetheart deal for their new digs, complete with all the new revenue streams owners salivate for, but the taxpayers got burned - - - and the team imploded into futility.
The Rays are a better run franchise. The Rays, with the fourth-best record in the American League at 67-51, are last in AL home attendance and next to last among the 30 Major League teams, averaging 18,330 per game through their first 60 home games. That is a consistent problem throughout Florida: professional sports teams do not draw well, and not includes the championship Miami Heat.
But MLB puffs out its chest to help strong arm a new, favorable deal for its team owners. MLB believes that there is some god-given right for professional sports teams to have taxpayer paid first class facilities for their private business enterprise. There have been numerous economic studies done in regard to the impact of publicly financed stadiums in U.S. cities. The common result and finding is that taxpayers do not reap any benefits from these deals, while the pro sports teams have a major windfall.
When baseball was struggling after the last strike, there were calls against expansion. There was even talk of contraction (the elimination of teams). Ownership solved the small market problem by instituting revenue sharing, luxury taxes on large payroll teams, and league loan programs. But at some point, even small market teams have to make it on their own.
The Rays may be a model franchise in quality drafting, excellent development of talent, and keen trades of players too expensive to keep in exchange for more promising prospects. The Rays are competitive in the most competitive division in baseball, the AL East. But the road to a new, ownership friendly baseball stadium is going to be harder than beating the Yankees or Red Sox.
But the Rays are stuck with a current lease that runs through 2027. The Rays have a hard time drawing fans and have the increasing expense of upkeeping a stadium built in 1990.
At the recent owners meeting Selig said he is considering assigning someone from his office to become directly involved with the negotiations to build a new ballpark for the Tampa Bay Rays.
The problem is that the city of St. Petersburg, the landlord for Tropicana Field, does not want to spend millions of dollars on a new stadium for a single purpose tenant like the Rays. And the city does not have to because it has an ironclad lease, and the threat of litigation if any other local city wants to try to lure the Rays to their town.
Every city in America should be skittish about funding new professional sports stadiums. The Miami Marlins got a sweetheart deal for their new digs, complete with all the new revenue streams owners salivate for, but the taxpayers got burned - - - and the team imploded into futility.
The Rays are a better run franchise. The Rays, with the fourth-best record in the American League at 67-51, are last in AL home attendance and next to last among the 30 Major League teams, averaging 18,330 per game through their first 60 home games. That is a consistent problem throughout Florida: professional sports teams do not draw well, and not includes the championship Miami Heat.
But MLB puffs out its chest to help strong arm a new, favorable deal for its team owners. MLB believes that there is some god-given right for professional sports teams to have taxpayer paid first class facilities for their private business enterprise. There have been numerous economic studies done in regard to the impact of publicly financed stadiums in U.S. cities. The common result and finding is that taxpayers do not reap any benefits from these deals, while the pro sports teams have a major windfall.
When baseball was struggling after the last strike, there were calls against expansion. There was even talk of contraction (the elimination of teams). Ownership solved the small market problem by instituting revenue sharing, luxury taxes on large payroll teams, and league loan programs. But at some point, even small market teams have to make it on their own.
The Rays may be a model franchise in quality drafting, excellent development of talent, and keen trades of players too expensive to keep in exchange for more promising prospects. The Rays are competitive in the most competitive division in baseball, the AL East. But the road to a new, ownership friendly baseball stadium is going to be harder than beating the Yankees or Red Sox.
Labels:
Rays. MLB,
revenue,
Selig,
small market
August 9, 2013
WAIT AND SEE
This week there has been a heated discussion in regard to the direction of the Cubs.
Many local sportswriters believe strongly in the plan Theo Epstein has laid out. It is a complete rebuild of the minor league system to add depth within the organization. When the system begins producing major league talent, it has a sustainable infrastructure in place to continue adding talent to the Cubs year after year.
This is a small market philosophy. The supporters acknowledge that this has never been done before in a major market team (unless you go back to the days of the Philadelphia A's who only fielded a farm team in the late teens and early 1920s).
This strategy has several diverse moving parts. First, it takes time to restock an entire farm system of four levels of teams (rookie, A, AA, and AAA). Second, it takes overachieving scouting department to draft and sign an inventory of quality prospects. Third, it takes a significant commitment of resources to develop talent at the minor league levels with the best managers, pitching coaches, batting coaches and trainers. Fourth, it takes ownership to eat several years of operating losses.
On the opposite side of the discussion are vocal critics. They believe that Cub fans have been sold a bill of worthless promises. That this whole idea of being patient and "we have a plan" is a scam. There is evidence that management is diverting its resources away from the major league ball club in order to chase a hunch that they can develop an entire roster of quality impact players. The Cubs payroll under Ricketts has decreased from $145 million to a projected $74.5 million for 2014. Next year's payroll could be reduced further if in the off-season the Cubs trade veterans for more prospects.
The team is horrible. It is not competitive. Fans are forced to pay high ticket prices for a AAA product. Critics claim why should the fans "be patient" when the Cubs job is to field a competitive team year after year. They remember when Ricketts bought the team he said the Cubs were only "one or two players away." That the sole goal was to win championships. But nothing in the past two years shows any major focus on the major league roster. It is a patchwork of injured pitchers on rehab and discarded journeymen.
Critics also stress that Epstein's M.O. in Boston was to pave over mistakes by spending a load of cash. Epstein's system of overspending was eliminated under the new CBA. So he has gone out and overspent on international players this year, to a tune of a 100% tax penalty and a restriction of only a $250,000 signing bonus for the next two years. Some may say that Epstein blew the bank on signing 16, 17 and 18 year old Latin players with little track record because they were ranked highly in scouting service lists. But at best, only 1 in 10 prospects will ever make a major league team. Only 1 in 20 will become an impact All-Star player. So when the Cubs state they have spent more than $20 million on new talent, that is true, but the reality is that the team may only produce one quality player from this year's signees.
The same is true with the amateur draft picks. The Cubs continue to draft a boatload pitchers, but they wind up in the low minors for years. In the best prospect lists of BA or MLB, despite the Cubs drafting so many pitchers, none make the Top 10. Epstein is hoarding and protecting his selections in the low minors for a reason. The reason is that he is trying to buy time by not promoting them or putting artificial thresholds like 500 AB in AAA. If the prospect does not get to the majors (and fails) then he is still considered a prospect and the plan slowly moves forward. A player should be promoted immediately when he excels at that minor league talent level. Baez is the only example of pushing his way up the organizational ladder because of his insane offensive HR production. Lake was a fluke call-up because of the injuries to all the Cubs bargain bin outfielders. What surprised everyone was Lake's enthusiasm and offensive production. Yes, he is a free swinger just like Castro was in his rookie season. He is playing out of position so there will be defensive concerns just like
Castro in his rookie season. Critics think Lake does not fit into the long term plans of the Cubs because he is not an Epstein-Hoyer "pick" or prospect.
Critics also seem concerned about the quality of player coming back in Cub trades. Olt was once considered the Rangers best prospect until he was hit on the head and suffered concussion/vision problems. But the Cubs took Olt in the Garza trade. Olt has struggled in Iowa. Likewise, the bullpen arms acquired in trades have erratic fastballs and control issues.
Critics also think the front office has been reaching too much in second/third tier free agents. Scott Baker was signed for a $5.5 million deal even though he was coming off Tommy John surgery. Baker's rehab hit another set back this week so this signing seems to be a total bust. The Edwin Jackson signing for $52 million still puzzles most Cub fans. If the Cubs were in rebuilding mode, why spend so much money on a .500 pitcher? The only reason for that panic move was that season ticket sales were falling and ownership wanted some public relations story to stem some red ink.
Also, cynics believes ownership sole goal the last few years has been to redevelop the ball park. A bad Cub team, a crumbling infrastructure, and the need for new revenue streams are "the reasons" the Ricketts went all-in on a massive real estate redevelopment plan. But the Cubs management refused to answer sportswriters questions on if or when the Cubs team would be receiving the benefits of these new revenue streams. The reason is simple: the Cubs won't be the beneficiaries of these new properties. It is a classic misdirection. Wrigley Field is not owned by the Cubs, but by a separate company. The Cubs are only a tenant. Ricketts separate company will be fronting the money to redo Wrigley, and it will take those new income streams to pay back new construction debt. This Wrigley Field landlord wants the place to become a year round entertainment venue not just a baseball field. Further, the parking facility is owned by a different company; the triangle parcel is owned by a separate company; and the McDonald's block is owned by a separate LLC. No real money will be trickling down to the Cubs from those entities. The Cubs will have to sink or swim from now on from the baseball operations such as ticket sales, concessions, and broadcast rights fees (which start to turn in 2014 and 2019).
Finally, the critics take issue with the Epstein reasoning that the Cubs have to be built from the minors. Critics state that there is no reason why the Cubs could have a two plan attack: draft and develop prospects and sign quality free agents for the major league roster. This two-prong approach is how other major market teams like the Red Sox and Yankees operate. By relying solely on the prospect model, the Cubs could turn into Kansas City - - - mediocre for a long time because even though the system produces a lot of prospects, none have any real impact at the major league level (the AAAA player curse). Opponents don't trust Epstein's talent evaluation or development track record as a general manager. And the concern is justified when management refuses to say when the Cubs plan will be completed and a championship caliber team will take the field.
There were a third class of fans who decided to take a "wait and see" attitude with the new Cubs front office. They were told that the boy geniuses had a plan so they decided they would be patient and let them do their jobs. Yes, the Cubs would take a hit for a few seasons but that sacrifice would be worth it in the long run. But as each season passes with little movement at the major league quality level or promotion of hot prospects in the minors, offset with more trades for more prospects, these "wait and see" fans will start to gravitate toward one side of the debate spectrum.
Many local sportswriters believe strongly in the plan Theo Epstein has laid out. It is a complete rebuild of the minor league system to add depth within the organization. When the system begins producing major league talent, it has a sustainable infrastructure in place to continue adding talent to the Cubs year after year.
This is a small market philosophy. The supporters acknowledge that this has never been done before in a major market team (unless you go back to the days of the Philadelphia A's who only fielded a farm team in the late teens and early 1920s).
This strategy has several diverse moving parts. First, it takes time to restock an entire farm system of four levels of teams (rookie, A, AA, and AAA). Second, it takes overachieving scouting department to draft and sign an inventory of quality prospects. Third, it takes a significant commitment of resources to develop talent at the minor league levels with the best managers, pitching coaches, batting coaches and trainers. Fourth, it takes ownership to eat several years of operating losses.
On the opposite side of the discussion are vocal critics. They believe that Cub fans have been sold a bill of worthless promises. That this whole idea of being patient and "we have a plan" is a scam. There is evidence that management is diverting its resources away from the major league ball club in order to chase a hunch that they can develop an entire roster of quality impact players. The Cubs payroll under Ricketts has decreased from $145 million to a projected $74.5 million for 2014. Next year's payroll could be reduced further if in the off-season the Cubs trade veterans for more prospects.
The team is horrible. It is not competitive. Fans are forced to pay high ticket prices for a AAA product. Critics claim why should the fans "be patient" when the Cubs job is to field a competitive team year after year. They remember when Ricketts bought the team he said the Cubs were only "one or two players away." That the sole goal was to win championships. But nothing in the past two years shows any major focus on the major league roster. It is a patchwork of injured pitchers on rehab and discarded journeymen.
Critics also stress that Epstein's M.O. in Boston was to pave over mistakes by spending a load of cash. Epstein's system of overspending was eliminated under the new CBA. So he has gone out and overspent on international players this year, to a tune of a 100% tax penalty and a restriction of only a $250,000 signing bonus for the next two years. Some may say that Epstein blew the bank on signing 16, 17 and 18 year old Latin players with little track record because they were ranked highly in scouting service lists. But at best, only 1 in 10 prospects will ever make a major league team. Only 1 in 20 will become an impact All-Star player. So when the Cubs state they have spent more than $20 million on new talent, that is true, but the reality is that the team may only produce one quality player from this year's signees.
The same is true with the amateur draft picks. The Cubs continue to draft a boatload pitchers, but they wind up in the low minors for years. In the best prospect lists of BA or MLB, despite the Cubs drafting so many pitchers, none make the Top 10. Epstein is hoarding and protecting his selections in the low minors for a reason. The reason is that he is trying to buy time by not promoting them or putting artificial thresholds like 500 AB in AAA. If the prospect does not get to the majors (and fails) then he is still considered a prospect and the plan slowly moves forward. A player should be promoted immediately when he excels at that minor league talent level. Baez is the only example of pushing his way up the organizational ladder because of his insane offensive HR production. Lake was a fluke call-up because of the injuries to all the Cubs bargain bin outfielders. What surprised everyone was Lake's enthusiasm and offensive production. Yes, he is a free swinger just like Castro was in his rookie season. He is playing out of position so there will be defensive concerns just like
Castro in his rookie season. Critics think Lake does not fit into the long term plans of the Cubs because he is not an Epstein-Hoyer "pick" or prospect.
Critics also seem concerned about the quality of player coming back in Cub trades. Olt was once considered the Rangers best prospect until he was hit on the head and suffered concussion/vision problems. But the Cubs took Olt in the Garza trade. Olt has struggled in Iowa. Likewise, the bullpen arms acquired in trades have erratic fastballs and control issues.
Critics also think the front office has been reaching too much in second/third tier free agents. Scott Baker was signed for a $5.5 million deal even though he was coming off Tommy John surgery. Baker's rehab hit another set back this week so this signing seems to be a total bust. The Edwin Jackson signing for $52 million still puzzles most Cub fans. If the Cubs were in rebuilding mode, why spend so much money on a .500 pitcher? The only reason for that panic move was that season ticket sales were falling and ownership wanted some public relations story to stem some red ink.
Also, cynics believes ownership sole goal the last few years has been to redevelop the ball park. A bad Cub team, a crumbling infrastructure, and the need for new revenue streams are "the reasons" the Ricketts went all-in on a massive real estate redevelopment plan. But the Cubs management refused to answer sportswriters questions on if or when the Cubs team would be receiving the benefits of these new revenue streams. The reason is simple: the Cubs won't be the beneficiaries of these new properties. It is a classic misdirection. Wrigley Field is not owned by the Cubs, but by a separate company. The Cubs are only a tenant. Ricketts separate company will be fronting the money to redo Wrigley, and it will take those new income streams to pay back new construction debt. This Wrigley Field landlord wants the place to become a year round entertainment venue not just a baseball field. Further, the parking facility is owned by a different company; the triangle parcel is owned by a separate company; and the McDonald's block is owned by a separate LLC. No real money will be trickling down to the Cubs from those entities. The Cubs will have to sink or swim from now on from the baseball operations such as ticket sales, concessions, and broadcast rights fees (which start to turn in 2014 and 2019).
Finally, the critics take issue with the Epstein reasoning that the Cubs have to be built from the minors. Critics state that there is no reason why the Cubs could have a two plan attack: draft and develop prospects and sign quality free agents for the major league roster. This two-prong approach is how other major market teams like the Red Sox and Yankees operate. By relying solely on the prospect model, the Cubs could turn into Kansas City - - - mediocre for a long time because even though the system produces a lot of prospects, none have any real impact at the major league level (the AAAA player curse). Opponents don't trust Epstein's talent evaluation or development track record as a general manager. And the concern is justified when management refuses to say when the Cubs plan will be completed and a championship caliber team will take the field.
There were a third class of fans who decided to take a "wait and see" attitude with the new Cubs front office. They were told that the boy geniuses had a plan so they decided they would be patient and let them do their jobs. Yes, the Cubs would take a hit for a few seasons but that sacrifice would be worth it in the long run. But as each season passes with little movement at the major league quality level or promotion of hot prospects in the minors, offset with more trades for more prospects, these "wait and see" fans will start to gravitate toward one side of the debate spectrum.
June 25, 2013
PADRE GARZA?
MLBTR cites a report by baseball writer Peter Gammons that the Padres may be interested in Cub starter Matt Garza. The rumor has the credibility because Gammons is reporting it. But it really does not make too much sense for San Diego.
The Padres are a small market team. It rarely goes for big contract free agents. Garza is in the last year of his contract. Unless the Padres think they can extend Garza with a favorable long term deal, San Diego is no position to rent a starter for half a season.
The Padres are one game over .500 for the season, but in second place in the odd NL West. The defending champion Giants and the better than expected Diamondbacks are clear favorites to separate from the pack. The Padres are not the type of team to mortgage the future for a one year shot at a division title.
The Padres have a current $65 million payroll. It is doubtful that they would want to add a top line $15 million per year starter in the mix with Garza. The current rotation is filled with ex-Chicago arms: Jason Marquis (9-2), Andrew Cashner (5-3), Clayton Richard (2-5) join Eric Stults (6-5) and Edinson Volquez (5-6). So, yes, the Padres are in the market to upgrade their rotation, but so is every other team still in contention. But the Padres would probably prefer to add a starter pitcher under their control for a few years (like the Rizzo for Cashner deal).
Gammons thinks the deal is Garza for Class AA outfielder Reymond Fuentes and two minor leaguers that Cubs GM Jed Hoyer drafted when he was with San Diego. Fuentes, 22, had a down year in 2012 at Class AA: .218 BA, 4 HR and 34 RBI. He has had a comeback 2013: .332 BA, 5 HR, 26 RBI. Fuentes is not on the Padres 40 man roster, or listed on the team's Top 20 prospects. A scouting report indicates that Fuentes is not an elite prospect. Fuentes thin frame is like his famous cousin, Carlos Beltran. Fuentes is a superior defender who makes great reads and uses his plus plus speed to reach even the deepest outfield gaps but has a weak throwing arm. Fuentes has compact line-drive swing but lacks power.
A deal to trade Garza makes sense for the Cubs who have little interest in keeping Garza after this season. Fuentes would add another outfielder to the system (who should be in Iowa/AAA for 2014) who may progress faster than Jorge Soler who is at Class A. But Fuentes projects to be a fifth outfielder/defensive replacement player.
The Padres are a small market team. It rarely goes for big contract free agents. Garza is in the last year of his contract. Unless the Padres think they can extend Garza with a favorable long term deal, San Diego is no position to rent a starter for half a season.
The Padres are one game over .500 for the season, but in second place in the odd NL West. The defending champion Giants and the better than expected Diamondbacks are clear favorites to separate from the pack. The Padres are not the type of team to mortgage the future for a one year shot at a division title.
The Padres have a current $65 million payroll. It is doubtful that they would want to add a top line $15 million per year starter in the mix with Garza. The current rotation is filled with ex-Chicago arms: Jason Marquis (9-2), Andrew Cashner (5-3), Clayton Richard (2-5) join Eric Stults (6-5) and Edinson Volquez (5-6). So, yes, the Padres are in the market to upgrade their rotation, but so is every other team still in contention. But the Padres would probably prefer to add a starter pitcher under their control for a few years (like the Rizzo for Cashner deal).
Gammons thinks the deal is Garza for Class AA outfielder Reymond Fuentes and two minor leaguers that Cubs GM Jed Hoyer drafted when he was with San Diego. Fuentes, 22, had a down year in 2012 at Class AA: .218 BA, 4 HR and 34 RBI. He has had a comeback 2013: .332 BA, 5 HR, 26 RBI. Fuentes is not on the Padres 40 man roster, or listed on the team's Top 20 prospects. A scouting report indicates that Fuentes is not an elite prospect. Fuentes thin frame is like his famous cousin, Carlos Beltran. Fuentes is a superior defender who makes great reads and uses his plus plus speed to reach even the deepest outfield gaps but has a weak throwing arm. Fuentes has compact line-drive swing but lacks power.
A deal to trade Garza makes sense for the Cubs who have little interest in keeping Garza after this season. Fuentes would add another outfielder to the system (who should be in Iowa/AAA for 2014) who may progress faster than Jorge Soler who is at Class A. But Fuentes projects to be a fifth outfielder/defensive replacement player.
Labels:
Garza,
Padres,
payroll,
pitching,
small market
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