A major league team filled with a roster of "replacement level players" would be expected only to win 48 games. In reviewing the Cubs 2018 season, let us look at a few key statistics.
The Cubs won 95 games. That is 47 games above replacement level.
The Cubs combined hitters had a 24.0 WAR.
The Cubs pitching staff had a 21.1 WAR.
Combined, the roster had a 45.1 WAR.
In the end, the Cubs wins was 1.9 above their collective WAR. So the Cubs won two more games than reasonably expected during the season. Is this the quantitative measure of Maddon's managerial skill?
If you look at the Cubs win total to actual WAR, the 1.9 WAR difference is 4.2 percent. That would equate to a projected seasonal impact in approximately 7 games (6.82).
The Cubs were 11th in the NL with 104 errors made. That means the Cubs gave their opponents 104 more outs, or the equivalent of 3.85 games. For a tired pitching staff, adding another 4 games to 163 regular season contests is a burden. They had to perform 2.4 percent more than the norm.
Errors create base runners which leads to more "highly leveraged" pitching situations. For starters, that means changing one's mechanic's to the stretch position. For relievers, it puts more pressure to get strikes with your best pitch. For relievers, the errors could have added an average hidden 4 1/3 IP to their work load, or 4 more appearances during the season. Cishek had 80 appearances for 70.1 IP. Wilson had 60 appearances for 52.1 IP.
The Cubs season could be summed up as being conflicted; there was inconsistent offense and tired pitching but it lead to a slight overachievement in the end.
Showing posts with label WAR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WAR. Show all posts
October 12, 2018
December 6, 2016
THE PRIZE (UPDATED)
The Winter meetings are slowly moving through the bars and lobby. The talk is still about Chris Sale.
Sale would be the prize of this off-season.
The reason is simple: he has tremendous locked in value.
He is signed through the next three years at the low price of $48 million.
He has amassed a career 31.1 WAR, an average of 4.44 per season.
Last year WAR was 6.6.
Based on valuation, his contract value WAR is 2.71. His average career performance WAR is 4.44 or a difference of 1.73 WAR at an annual value of $10.21 million. Over the life of the contract, a team is getting a minimum $30.62 million more value from Sale and his deal than what the team will pay him.
Last year alone, Sale outperformed his contract by $29.85 million. At that pace, you are getting a $90 million ace starter for 5th starter money.
The Dodgers just signed 36 year old Rich Hill to a $48 million, 3 year deal. For the same money, who would not want Sale over Hill?
Last year, Hill had an inflated WAR of 4.1 His career WAR is only 9.5 over 12 seasons (.0.79 = less than AAA replacement value). But by last year's standard, Sale was + 2.5 WAR better than Hill for better value by $14.75 million.
This is why the White Sox are wanting a huge price for Sale. Reports continue to state that the White Sox want at least four quality prospects (Top 10) or a mix of prospects and major league ready players under long term control.
That is why the Astros dangling OF George Springer for Sale is a possibility. Springer is under team control through 2021. He is currently at the league minimum. He hit .261, 29 HR, 82 RBI for Houston in 2016. Last year his WAR was 5.0. A package with Springer and two of Houston's best prospects could swing a Sale deal.
But the White Sox have some time to get other teams hot and bothered by a potential deal. The Nationals continue to be described as the "hottest" team on the Sale trail. But the Nats do not want to part with their two best prospects (SS Turner and OF Robles). But the odds are that some team will be winning to "overpay" for Sale if they believe they are one key player away from a World Series berth.
UPDATE:
Within ten minutes of this post, MLBTR reports Sale has been traded to the Red Sox for four prospects.
The Red Sox and White Sox have agreed to a blockbuster trade that will send Sale from Chicago to Boston in exchange for Yoan Moncada, Michale Kopech and two other prospects, reports Ken Rosenthal of FOX Sports.
Moncada, 21, is the #1 prospect in all Baseball. The Cuban 2B/3B hit .294, 15 HR 62 RBI in A-AA ball last season.
Kopech was the #5 Red Sox prospect (#67 in majors). He is a starting pitcher who was 4-1, 2.08 ERA, 1.101 WHIP in Class A ball.
Sale would be the prize of this off-season.
The reason is simple: he has tremendous locked in value.
He is signed through the next three years at the low price of $48 million.
He has amassed a career 31.1 WAR, an average of 4.44 per season.
Last year WAR was 6.6.
Based on valuation, his contract value WAR is 2.71. His average career performance WAR is 4.44 or a difference of 1.73 WAR at an annual value of $10.21 million. Over the life of the contract, a team is getting a minimum $30.62 million more value from Sale and his deal than what the team will pay him.
Last year alone, Sale outperformed his contract by $29.85 million. At that pace, you are getting a $90 million ace starter for 5th starter money.
The Dodgers just signed 36 year old Rich Hill to a $48 million, 3 year deal. For the same money, who would not want Sale over Hill?
Last year, Hill had an inflated WAR of 4.1 His career WAR is only 9.5 over 12 seasons (.0.79 = less than AAA replacement value). But by last year's standard, Sale was + 2.5 WAR better than Hill for better value by $14.75 million.
This is why the White Sox are wanting a huge price for Sale. Reports continue to state that the White Sox want at least four quality prospects (Top 10) or a mix of prospects and major league ready players under long term control.
That is why the Astros dangling OF George Springer for Sale is a possibility. Springer is under team control through 2021. He is currently at the league minimum. He hit .261, 29 HR, 82 RBI for Houston in 2016. Last year his WAR was 5.0. A package with Springer and two of Houston's best prospects could swing a Sale deal.
But the White Sox have some time to get other teams hot and bothered by a potential deal. The Nationals continue to be described as the "hottest" team on the Sale trail. But the Nats do not want to part with their two best prospects (SS Turner and OF Robles). But the odds are that some team will be winning to "overpay" for Sale if they believe they are one key player away from a World Series berth.
UPDATE:
Within ten minutes of this post, MLBTR reports Sale has been traded to the Red Sox for four prospects.
The Red Sox and White Sox have agreed to a blockbuster trade that will send Sale from Chicago to Boston in exchange for Yoan Moncada, Michale Kopech and two other prospects, reports Ken Rosenthal of FOX Sports.
Moncada, 21, is the #1 prospect in all Baseball. The Cuban 2B/3B hit .294, 15 HR 62 RBI in A-AA ball last season.
Kopech was the #5 Red Sox prospect (#67 in majors). He is a starting pitcher who was 4-1, 2.08 ERA, 1.101 WHIP in Class A ball.
December 13, 2015
PITCHING VALUE
There is still the report that some team has offered Jeff Samardzija $100 million.
No pitcher of Samardzija's value has signed a $100 million contract. Jordan Zimmermann has been worth 16.7 WAR over the past four seasons -- more than double Samardzija's 6.8 -- and just signed for five years and $110 million.
Based on a contract value of $5.7 million per WAR, Zimmermann's past value has been $95.19 million. He received a 15.5 percent premium in his new Tiger deal. This assumes that he will have the same performance going forward.
$38.76 million is the value of Samardzija's past performance, which is 40.7 percent less than Zimmerman's value. $44.77 million is 40.7 percent of Zimmermann's value.
So why is the report so off the current formula?
First, it could be that this is agent talk to goose up the player's market.
Second, it could be that the agent is looking to other factors such as durability, innings pitched and other advanced metrics to compare Samardzija to more valuable starting pitchers.
However, Zimmermann has #1 ace characteristics and is being paid at that level at $22 million AAV.
Samardzija is not a #1 starter now. He fits into a #3 or #4 starter based on last season with the White Sox.
In a market filled with quality starting pitchers, Samardzija is not expected to bring a premium value to a club's final payroll.
Well, the Giants, having lost Greinke to divisional rival Arizona, stepped up and gave the Shark 5 years/$90 million. At $18 million AAV, Samardzija actually made $5 million more than the Cubs deal he turned down 2 years ago (and having a bad season with the White Sox).
The Giants are paying the equivalent of $13.2 million/WAR for Samardzija which is a 233 percent premium over standard value.
The Shark still is a #3 pitcher in San Francisco after Bumgarner and Cain. Bumgarner will be paid this year $9.75 million for his 4.8 WAR in 2015. Cain is going to be paid $21 million for his negative 0.7 WAR in 2015.
If you think pitching valuations make no sense, then the Giants payroll is a good exhibit.
No pitcher of Samardzija's value has signed a $100 million contract. Jordan Zimmermann has been worth 16.7 WAR over the past four seasons -- more than double Samardzija's 6.8 -- and just signed for five years and $110 million.
Based on a contract value of $5.7 million per WAR, Zimmermann's past value has been $95.19 million. He received a 15.5 percent premium in his new Tiger deal. This assumes that he will have the same performance going forward.
$38.76 million is the value of Samardzija's past performance, which is 40.7 percent less than Zimmerman's value. $44.77 million is 40.7 percent of Zimmermann's value.
So why is the report so off the current formula?
First, it could be that this is agent talk to goose up the player's market.
Second, it could be that the agent is looking to other factors such as durability, innings pitched and other advanced metrics to compare Samardzija to more valuable starting pitchers.
However, Zimmermann has #1 ace characteristics and is being paid at that level at $22 million AAV.
Samardzija is not a #1 starter now. He fits into a #3 or #4 starter based on last season with the White Sox.
In a market filled with quality starting pitchers, Samardzija is not expected to bring a premium value to a club's final payroll.
Well, the Giants, having lost Greinke to divisional rival Arizona, stepped up and gave the Shark 5 years/$90 million. At $18 million AAV, Samardzija actually made $5 million more than the Cubs deal he turned down 2 years ago (and having a bad season with the White Sox).
The Giants are paying the equivalent of $13.2 million/WAR for Samardzija which is a 233 percent premium over standard value.
The Shark still is a #3 pitcher in San Francisco after Bumgarner and Cain. Bumgarner will be paid this year $9.75 million for his 4.8 WAR in 2015. Cain is going to be paid $21 million for his negative 0.7 WAR in 2015.
If you think pitching valuations make no sense, then the Giants payroll is a good exhibit.
December 10, 2015
HEYWARD'S VALUE
The reason why there is such little activity on Jason Heyward this off season
is that teams cannot get a handle on how to evaluate him.
As one old time front office person says, "we don't pay for defense."
But in the modern advanced metric evaluation systems, defense and WAR
are more complete measuring sticks. By that valuation, Heyward, 26 and
still not in his prime, has averaged a 5.2 WAR during his career (6.5 last year).
Just by his average WAR alone, this equates to $31.2 million per year.
The top hitters in 2015 were paid $24 million (Robinson Cano and Albert Pujols).
But no one compares Heyward to Cano and Pujols in regard to offensive production.
In 2015, Heyward hit /293, 13 HR 60 RBI with .359 OBP.
If you take out the defensive WAR for his career, he is at 21.3 or an annual average of 3.55.
At 3.55, his annual salary would be around $21.3 million/season.
And here is the gulf: $10.00 million per season on a four or five year deal.
Teams and Heyward's people are not in the same universe starting points.
At $24 million per season, teams expect a hitter to be a #3 or #4 power hitter/run producer.
Heyward is not that type of hitter, even though the Cardinals used him in the No. 3 slot
because of injuries to other players, like Matt Holliday.
The whole financial structure of the league could fall off its foundation if a 60 RBI guy
is suddenly the highest paid hitter in the majors. I don't see a team owner getting the
wrath of the other clubs for overpaying Heyward.
is that teams cannot get a handle on how to evaluate him.
As one old time front office person says, "we don't pay for defense."
But in the modern advanced metric evaluation systems, defense and WAR
are more complete measuring sticks. By that valuation, Heyward, 26 and
still not in his prime, has averaged a 5.2 WAR during his career (6.5 last year).
Just by his average WAR alone, this equates to $31.2 million per year.
The top hitters in 2015 were paid $24 million (Robinson Cano and Albert Pujols).
But no one compares Heyward to Cano and Pujols in regard to offensive production.
In 2015, Heyward hit /293, 13 HR 60 RBI with .359 OBP.
If you take out the defensive WAR for his career, he is at 21.3 or an annual average of 3.55.
At 3.55, his annual salary would be around $21.3 million/season.
And here is the gulf: $10.00 million per season on a four or five year deal.
Teams and Heyward's people are not in the same universe starting points.
At $24 million per season, teams expect a hitter to be a #3 or #4 power hitter/run producer.
Heyward is not that type of hitter, even though the Cardinals used him in the No. 3 slot
because of injuries to other players, like Matt Holliday.
The whole financial structure of the league could fall off its foundation if a 60 RBI guy
is suddenly the highest paid hitter in the majors. I don't see a team owner getting the
wrath of the other clubs for overpaying Heyward.
August 12, 2015
HISTORIC ROOKIE CLASS
Jeff Passon at Yahoo Sports writes:
Never before has baseball seen a
group of rookies like the Class of 2015, one so rich in position
players that with two months left in the season it’s on the verge of
being more productive than every previous class in history. The Year of
the Rookie is a real thing, though perhaps its designation is missing a
word, because it’s really more the Year of the Hitting Rookie.
Sometime this week, everyday
rookies are going to surpass every class from the last 100 years in Wins
Above Replacement. Even if it is a flawed metric, this year’s group of
rookies reigning supreme with a third of the season remaining speaks to
just how much talent suffuses it – and how teams are relying on rookie
position players more than anytime since World War II.
This season, rookie position players have accumulated 48.8 WAR, according to FanGraphs.
Every hitter in baseball has a combined WAR of 386.8, meaning 12.61
percent of all offensive and defensive wins have come from rookies. Only
war beget a greater percentage of WAR going to rookie hitters, as
baseball struggled to fill its depleted rosters in 1943 and saw rookies
account for 13.97 percent of offensive WAR.
A look at the three Cubs rookies in this class:
Bryant 3.0 WAR
Russell 1.5 WAR
Schwarber 1.4 WAR
The three Cubs rookies have a combined 5.9 WAR, which is 12.1 percent of the rookie class WAR. Most believe that the three Cubs will get better as the season progresses.
A look at the three Cubs rookies in this class:
Bryant 3.0 WAR
Russell 1.5 WAR
Schwarber 1.4 WAR
The three Cubs rookies have a combined 5.9 WAR, which is 12.1 percent of the rookie class WAR. Most believe that the three Cubs will get better as the season progresses.
March 5, 2015
GOING TO WAR
Depending on what era in history, a general has to count on one element of his army in order to achieve victory.
In baseball, that is the starting rotation. So much emphasis and money is put into five arms.
The Cubs are probably going to war with these five starters: Lester, Arrieta, Hammel, Hendricks and T. Wood.
The Cubs rotation, if they match last year's production, would generate 14 WAR.
Lester: 3.6
Arrieta: 5.3
Hammel: 3.1
Hendricks: 2.9
T. Wood: -0.9
______________
Total: 14.0 WAR
In contrast, the champion Giants starting rotation accumulated 8.1 WAR.
Bumgarten: 4.0
Hudson: 1.5
Vogelsong: 1.2
Peavy: 2.1
Cain: -0.7
______________
Total: 8.1 WAR
The Giants had several starters with injuries so it cobbled together a 6th, 7th and 8th starter. But it was the timely offense that made up the slack in SF's championship run, with a 22.3 oWAR to a pitching staff total 15.2 WAR. The Giants win percentage above average was .505.
It is debatable what is replacement value for a starting pitcher (a .500 record? or more tied to run production .300?) as a factor of team wins. A GM would like a replacement pitcher to win at least half their starts; but realistically a third is probably a better gauge (since the burden falls more to the bullpen).
Each team has 162 games to start. Each rotation pitcher probably, on average, will take the mound around 31 times. So a set rotation covers about 155 games. A replacement team would average around 65 wins. The Giants patched together an 88 win season, meaning the offense carried at least 15 games above pitcher replacement (almost double value than the starters).
The Cubs won 73 games with batting WAR of 7.7 and pitching WAR of 15.7, almost a mirror image of the Giants. The Cubs primary starting five had a collective 7.2 WAR. Again, if one thinks that the 2015 rotation will be much better (by 7 games), this gets the Cubs projected to an 80 win season if the offense remains the same (which may be the case with the young players and league adjustments).
So the Cubs will really have to rely on their starters to carry the team.
In baseball, that is the starting rotation. So much emphasis and money is put into five arms.
The Cubs are probably going to war with these five starters: Lester, Arrieta, Hammel, Hendricks and T. Wood.
The Cubs rotation, if they match last year's production, would generate 14 WAR.
Lester: 3.6
Arrieta: 5.3
Hammel: 3.1
Hendricks: 2.9
T. Wood: -0.9
______________
Total: 14.0 WAR
In contrast, the champion Giants starting rotation accumulated 8.1 WAR.
Bumgarten: 4.0
Hudson: 1.5
Vogelsong: 1.2
Peavy: 2.1
Cain: -0.7
______________
Total: 8.1 WAR
The Giants had several starters with injuries so it cobbled together a 6th, 7th and 8th starter. But it was the timely offense that made up the slack in SF's championship run, with a 22.3 oWAR to a pitching staff total 15.2 WAR. The Giants win percentage above average was .505.
It is debatable what is replacement value for a starting pitcher (a .500 record? or more tied to run production .300?) as a factor of team wins. A GM would like a replacement pitcher to win at least half their starts; but realistically a third is probably a better gauge (since the burden falls more to the bullpen).
Each team has 162 games to start. Each rotation pitcher probably, on average, will take the mound around 31 times. So a set rotation covers about 155 games. A replacement team would average around 65 wins. The Giants patched together an 88 win season, meaning the offense carried at least 15 games above pitcher replacement (almost double value than the starters).
The Cubs won 73 games with batting WAR of 7.7 and pitching WAR of 15.7, almost a mirror image of the Giants. The Cubs primary starting five had a collective 7.2 WAR. Again, if one thinks that the 2015 rotation will be much better (by 7 games), this gets the Cubs projected to an 80 win season if the offense remains the same (which may be the case with the young players and league adjustments).
So the Cubs will really have to rely on their starters to carry the team.
March 6, 2014
LINE UP CONSTRUCTION
Another way to look at lineup construction is WAR (wins above replacement). The 2013 Cubs were a AAA team by the fact the top offensive WAR players were:
1. Castillo, c 4.4
2. Rizzo, 1b 2.6
3. Navarro, c 2.0
4. Valbuena 3b, 1.6
5. DeJesus, cf 1.6
6. Schierholtz, rf, 1.4
7. Murphy, 3b, 1.0
8. Ransom, lf, 0.9
It shows what a mess the Cubs were last year when the third best player is a back up catcher, and a late season off the scrap heap journeyman infielder is your 7th best player.
If one believes WAR path to line up construction, last year's line up would have been:
1. Castillo, c 4.4
2. Rizzo, 1b 2.6
3. Valbuena, 3b 1.6
4. DeJesus, cf 1.6
5. Schierholtz, rf, 1.4
6. Soriano, lf, 0.8
7. Barney, 2b negative 0.5
8. Castro, ss negative 0.6.
1. Castillo, c 4.4
2. Rizzo, 1b 2.6
3. Navarro, c 2.0
4. Valbuena 3b, 1.6
5. DeJesus, cf 1.6
6. Schierholtz, rf, 1.4
7. Murphy, 3b, 1.0
8. Ransom, lf, 0.9
It shows what a mess the Cubs were last year when the third best player is a back up catcher, and a late season off the scrap heap journeyman infielder is your 7th best player.
If one believes WAR path to line up construction, last year's line up would have been:
1. Castillo, c 4.4
2. Rizzo, 1b 2.6
3. Valbuena, 3b 1.6
4. DeJesus, cf 1.6
5. Schierholtz, rf, 1.4
6. Soriano, lf, 0.8
7. Barney, 2b negative 0.5
8. Castro, ss negative 0.6.
March 2, 2014
MOST/LEAST IMPROVED
Fangraphs takes a stab at guessing which team will be the most improved in 2014. It also rates the teams likely to fall the most. It is based upon estimated WAR, and last season success/failure weighs heavily into the rankings.
The ten most-improved teams:
It also speculates that teams not mentioned will remain basically the same, like the Cardinals (division winners) and the Cubs (division bottom feeder).
- Astros, +18 WAR
- Phillies, +12
- Mariners, +11
- Marlins, +8
- Yankees, +8
- Blue Jays, +8
- Padres, +8
- White Sox, +6
- Twins, +5
- Brewers, +4
- Red Sox, -16 WAR
- Tigers, -14
- Rays, -8
- Braves, -8
- Athletics, -8
- Reds, -7
- Rangers, -7
- Royals, -6
- Orioles, -6
- Pirates, -5
It also speculates that teams not mentioned will remain basically the same, like the Cardinals (division winners) and the Cubs (division bottom feeder).
February 17, 2014
WAR ZONES
Spring training is here. Columnists will soak in some sun and make in the next few weeks bold predictions on the success or failure of baseball teams.
In 2013, the Cubs record was 66-96. It's Pythagoean record was calculated (by a formula that takes in account runs scored and runs allowed) to be 71-91, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (15.6) and pitchers (10.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 75.1 wins.
In 2012, the Cubs record was 61-101. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 65-97, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (13.6) and pitchers (2.3), one would have calculated the Cubs having 64.9 wins.
In 2011, the Cubs record was 71-91. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 70-92, which was only a game off. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (14.0) and pitchers (7.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 70.5 wins.
In 2010, the Cubs record was 75-87. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 73-89, which represents to some that the Cubs overperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (7.4) and pitchers (15.9), one would have calculated the Cubs having 72.3 wins.
In 2009, the Cubs record was 83-78, the last above .500 record. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 84-77, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record by a game. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (10.8) and pitchers (24.2), one would have calculated the Cubs having 84.0 wins.
Charting the win totals:
Real Wins Pyth Wins WAR Wins
66 71 75.1
61 65 64.9
71 70 70.5
75 73 72.3
83 84 84.0
356 363 366.8
It appears that the Pythagoean record is a 2 percent deviation from Real Wins. The WAR win calculation is higher at a 3 percent deviation. A 2 to 3 percent deviation calculates to a difference of 3.24 to 4.86 wins per 162 game season. This number is interesting because it can explain many things. First, the deviation falls within the general discussion of what is the "value" of a manager to the performance of his club. A great manager can improve his team's record by a few games. A bad manager can cost a team a few games. Since the Cubs underperformed by 3 to 5 wins on average, is this proof that bad managers cost even a bad team wins? Second, this could also show that the players themselves did not play well as a team (the sum of their individual parts, i.e. stats was greater than the the team record). This could show a lack of collective baseball IQ, the ability to manufacturer runs or give a team less second chance opportunities to score runs. Bad teams have a tendency to fail in the basic game fundamentals.
If one would want to predict the number of Cubs wins in 2014, I would suggest taking the final 25 man roster, average the last two seasons players' WARs, minus 2.5 percent. That figure should be close to the last five year average track record for the Cubs.
In 2013, the Cubs record was 66-96. It's Pythagoean record was calculated (by a formula that takes in account runs scored and runs allowed) to be 71-91, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (15.6) and pitchers (10.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 75.1 wins.
In 2012, the Cubs record was 61-101. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 65-97, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (13.6) and pitchers (2.3), one would have calculated the Cubs having 64.9 wins.
In 2011, the Cubs record was 71-91. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 70-92, which was only a game off. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (14.0) and pitchers (7.5), one would have calculated the Cubs having 70.5 wins.
In 2010, the Cubs record was 75-87. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 73-89, which represents to some that the Cubs overperformed their projected record. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (7.4) and pitchers (15.9), one would have calculated the Cubs having 72.3 wins.
In 2009, the Cubs record was 83-78, the last above .500 record. It's Pythagoean record was calculated to be 84-77, which represents to some that the Cubs underperformed their projected record by a game. When we look at the WAR for both hitters (10.8) and pitchers (24.2), one would have calculated the Cubs having 84.0 wins.
Charting the win totals:
Real Wins Pyth Wins WAR Wins
66 71 75.1
61 65 64.9
71 70 70.5
75 73 72.3
83 84 84.0
356 363 366.8
It appears that the Pythagoean record is a 2 percent deviation from Real Wins. The WAR win calculation is higher at a 3 percent deviation. A 2 to 3 percent deviation calculates to a difference of 3.24 to 4.86 wins per 162 game season. This number is interesting because it can explain many things. First, the deviation falls within the general discussion of what is the "value" of a manager to the performance of his club. A great manager can improve his team's record by a few games. A bad manager can cost a team a few games. Since the Cubs underperformed by 3 to 5 wins on average, is this proof that bad managers cost even a bad team wins? Second, this could also show that the players themselves did not play well as a team (the sum of their individual parts, i.e. stats was greater than the the team record). This could show a lack of collective baseball IQ, the ability to manufacturer runs or give a team less second chance opportunities to score runs. Bad teams have a tendency to fail in the basic game fundamentals.
If one would want to predict the number of Cubs wins in 2014, I would suggest taking the final 25 man roster, average the last two seasons players' WARs, minus 2.5 percent. That figure should be close to the last five year average track record for the Cubs.
January 6, 2014
EARLY 2014 PROJECTION
A Brewers fan site has projected the 2014 NL Central wins based on current roster WAR values.
NL Central Projected 2014 WAR
|
|||||
| Team | Cardinals | Pirates | Reds | Brewers | Cubs |
|
C
|
4.6
|
3.6
|
2.7
|
3.5
|
3.6
|
|
1B
|
3.3
|
1.8
|
5.1
|
0.2
|
3.7
|
|
2B
|
2.7
|
3.6
|
2.5
|
1.6
|
1.3
|
|
SS
|
3
|
2.5
|
1.9
|
2.7
|
2.8
|
|
3B
|
4
|
3.7
|
3
|
3
|
1.6
|
|
LF
|
4.2
|
3.2
|
0.6
|
4.2
|
1.1
|
|
CF
|
3.3
|
6.7
|
1.3
|
4.3
|
1.9
|
|
RF
|
2.9
|
1.7
|
3
|
0.6
|
1.2
|
|
DH
|
-0.5
|
-0.7
|
-1.4
|
-1.5
|
-1.2
|
|
SP
|
12.8
|
11
|
10.9
|
8.2
|
11
|
|
RP
|
1.2
|
1.8
|
2.1
|
0.7
|
0.9
|
|
Total Wins
|
90
|
87
|
80
|
76
|
76
|
October 6, 2013
ON THE SOUTH SIDE WAR PATH
The White Sox went from 85 wins in 2012 to only 63 in 2013. It was a very disappointing season for South Side fans. But there was one glaring sinkhole for the club: position players failed to hit and field very well.
Baseball Reference WAR statistic is to measure the quality of a player. An 8 plus WAR is an MVP caliber player, 5 plus is an All Star, 2 plus is a starter, 0-2 is a bench player, and below zero is a replacement level (minor league) player.
The White Sox only had 8 players who had a WAR of 1.0 or higher.
On the offense, Alexi Ramirez was the best player at 2.6 WAR. Many people have been on Ramirez all season long, but he was not the problem. His stats indicate he was the only "starter" on the offense. The other Sox player was Alex Rios who had a 1.0 WAR. Rios was traded to the Rangers so he does not fit into next year's team. The White Sox really have to upgrade eight field positions and DH with "starter" material in order to regain competitiveness in the improving AL Central.
What is really galling about the Sox this year was that the team spend $80 million on offensive players who produced a collective negative 0.6 WAR. Jeff Keppinger led the team with a negative 2.0 WAR.
On the bright side, the pitching staff continues to show promise.
Chris Sale had a 6.9 WAR. Carlos Quintana had a 5.4 WAR. Two All-Star pitchers in a rotation is excellent.
Starter Hector Santiago posted a respectable 2.8 WAR.
In the bullpen, Jesse Crain had a 2.4 WAR, Matt Lindstrom had a 1.4 WAR, and closer Addison Reed a 1.2 WAR.
The Sox pitching staff compiled a collective 22.9 WAR at the expense of $30 million in payroll.
Despite the general negativity about the White Sox farm system, the club has another wave of young pitchers who had a taste of the majors this season who will be in position to compete for roster spots in the spring: Andre Rienzo, Erik Johnson, Jake Petricka, Charles Leesman, Daniel Webb and Ramon Troncosco. The White Sox have a surplus of young pitching which may be needed in order to facilitate trades to shore up the team's woeful offense.
Baseball Reference WAR statistic is to measure the quality of a player. An 8 plus WAR is an MVP caliber player, 5 plus is an All Star, 2 plus is a starter, 0-2 is a bench player, and below zero is a replacement level (minor league) player.
The White Sox only had 8 players who had a WAR of 1.0 or higher.
On the offense, Alexi Ramirez was the best player at 2.6 WAR. Many people have been on Ramirez all season long, but he was not the problem. His stats indicate he was the only "starter" on the offense. The other Sox player was Alex Rios who had a 1.0 WAR. Rios was traded to the Rangers so he does not fit into next year's team. The White Sox really have to upgrade eight field positions and DH with "starter" material in order to regain competitiveness in the improving AL Central.
What is really galling about the Sox this year was that the team spend $80 million on offensive players who produced a collective negative 0.6 WAR. Jeff Keppinger led the team with a negative 2.0 WAR.
On the bright side, the pitching staff continues to show promise.
Chris Sale had a 6.9 WAR. Carlos Quintana had a 5.4 WAR. Two All-Star pitchers in a rotation is excellent.
Starter Hector Santiago posted a respectable 2.8 WAR.
In the bullpen, Jesse Crain had a 2.4 WAR, Matt Lindstrom had a 1.4 WAR, and closer Addison Reed a 1.2 WAR.
The Sox pitching staff compiled a collective 22.9 WAR at the expense of $30 million in payroll.
Despite the general negativity about the White Sox farm system, the club has another wave of young pitchers who had a taste of the majors this season who will be in position to compete for roster spots in the spring: Andre Rienzo, Erik Johnson, Jake Petricka, Charles Leesman, Daniel Webb and Ramon Troncosco. The White Sox have a surplus of young pitching which may be needed in order to facilitate trades to shore up the team's woeful offense.
October 3, 2013
ON THE WAR PATH
If the Moneyball stat men in the Cubs front office look objectively at their final season roster, there should be a wood chipper party of roster turnover this off season.
Baseball-Reference.com tells us a full season with 0 to 2 WAR indicates a bench-quality major-league player. A WAR of 2-plus indicates a starter, 5-plus is an All-Star Valuable Player range.
Of the 56 players used by the Cubs last season, only 11 had a season WAR of above 1.0.
The Cubs best position player was Wellington Castillo at 4.4 WAR. And he ended the season with sore knees. Dioner Navarro got more attention for his home runs, and his WAR of 2.0 was good for a back up catcher. As such, free agent Navarro will be a starter on another team next year.
Rizzo was the second best position player at 2.6 WAR. His batting average and sub-par fielding at first base need improvement in order to be considered a "core" building block for the Cubs.
Luis Valbuena was next with a 1.6 WAR. He is a career utility infielder, and his WAR indicates that is what he will be in the future after he was given third base for most of the season.
Nate Schierholtz had a disappointing 1.4 WAR. He was signed to be the full time RF. However, he platooned more often than not. He had a career high in HRs, but overall he reverted to his career mean of being a bench player.
David DeJesus had a 1.6 WAR but he was traded away. Donnie Murphy, picked off the scrap heap, had a lot of early dingers, but finished with a 1.0 WAR. Starlin Castro had a negative 0.6 WAR, which is below AAA replacement talent. To say Castro regressed this season is an understatement.
The best pitcher on the staff was not Jeff Samardzija (1.0 WAR). The Shark got to a career high in innings pitched, but that was about it. He was very inconsistent and annoyed by the Cubs management decisions that past two years. His arbitration hearing this off season will be interesting decision for both sides.
Travis Wood was the best pitcher with a 4.4 WAR. He did have the consistency most of the season (excluding that final dumb one inning disaster which put his season ERA over 3.00). Wood has improved this year and would appear to be a solid rotation starter in the future.
The next best pitcher was Matt Garza (1.5 WAR) but he was traded for prospects. The next best pitcher was long reliever Carlos Villaneuva at 1.4 WAR.
So the Cubs only have these "starters" on their roster:
1. W. Castillo, c
2. T. Wood, sp
3. Rizzo, 1b
Just three players qualify as starting material going forward in roster construction for 2014. In fact, every position could be upgraded in some form. It also shows that 88 percent of last year's roster was filled with bench and AAA level players.
Baseball-Reference.com tells us a full season with 0 to 2 WAR indicates a bench-quality major-league player. A WAR of 2-plus indicates a starter, 5-plus is an All-Star Valuable Player range.
Of the 56 players used by the Cubs last season, only 11 had a season WAR of above 1.0.
The Cubs best position player was Wellington Castillo at 4.4 WAR. And he ended the season with sore knees. Dioner Navarro got more attention for his home runs, and his WAR of 2.0 was good for a back up catcher. As such, free agent Navarro will be a starter on another team next year.
Rizzo was the second best position player at 2.6 WAR. His batting average and sub-par fielding at first base need improvement in order to be considered a "core" building block for the Cubs.
Luis Valbuena was next with a 1.6 WAR. He is a career utility infielder, and his WAR indicates that is what he will be in the future after he was given third base for most of the season.
Nate Schierholtz had a disappointing 1.4 WAR. He was signed to be the full time RF. However, he platooned more often than not. He had a career high in HRs, but overall he reverted to his career mean of being a bench player.
David DeJesus had a 1.6 WAR but he was traded away. Donnie Murphy, picked off the scrap heap, had a lot of early dingers, but finished with a 1.0 WAR. Starlin Castro had a negative 0.6 WAR, which is below AAA replacement talent. To say Castro regressed this season is an understatement.
The best pitcher on the staff was not Jeff Samardzija (1.0 WAR). The Shark got to a career high in innings pitched, but that was about it. He was very inconsistent and annoyed by the Cubs management decisions that past two years. His arbitration hearing this off season will be interesting decision for both sides.
Travis Wood was the best pitcher with a 4.4 WAR. He did have the consistency most of the season (excluding that final dumb one inning disaster which put his season ERA over 3.00). Wood has improved this year and would appear to be a solid rotation starter in the future.
The next best pitcher was Matt Garza (1.5 WAR) but he was traded for prospects. The next best pitcher was long reliever Carlos Villaneuva at 1.4 WAR.
So the Cubs only have these "starters" on their roster:
1. W. Castillo, c
2. T. Wood, sp
3. Rizzo, 1b
Just three players qualify as starting material going forward in roster construction for 2014. In fact, every position could be upgraded in some form. It also shows that 88 percent of last year's roster was filled with bench and AAA level players.
June 21, 2013
ON THE WAR PATH WHITE SOX
The White Sox have fallen to the level of the Cubs. A review of the team's current Wins Over Replacement (WAR) values may be more disappointing than the previous Cubs post.
The White Sox as a team have a NEGATIVE 2.8 WAR on offense. Keppinger himself contributes a NEGATIVE 2.0 WAR. Does that mean he is two times worse than a AAA replacement?
Only two White Sox hitters have a WAR more than 1.0. Neither reaches "starter" level.
Rios (1.8)
Ramirez (1.1)
It is better on the pitching side. The staff has a combined 11.9 WAR. The top pitchers are:
Sale (3.5)
Crain (2.7)
Quintana (1.8)
Alexrod (1.2)
Peavy (1.0)
Santiago (1.0)
There are a few young pitchers on the cusp of becoming long term contributors. And you can see why Crain will be a highly prized trade asset in July.
The White Sox as a team have a NEGATIVE 2.8 WAR on offense. Keppinger himself contributes a NEGATIVE 2.0 WAR. Does that mean he is two times worse than a AAA replacement?
Only two White Sox hitters have a WAR more than 1.0. Neither reaches "starter" level.
Rios (1.8)
Ramirez (1.1)
It is better on the pitching side. The staff has a combined 11.9 WAR. The top pitchers are:
Sale (3.5)
Crain (2.7)
Quintana (1.8)
Alexrod (1.2)
Peavy (1.0)
Santiago (1.0)
There are a few young pitchers on the cusp of becoming long term contributors. And you can see why Crain will be a highly prized trade asset in July.
ON THE WAR PATH
If one looks at the Cubs season so far, it has been disappointing to say the least.
If one tries to find a silver lining in the dark cloud, one will also find disappointment.
The team is so bad that marginal players appear to be playing better.
If one looks at Wins Above Replacement (WAR) as an objective factor on how well individual players are doing, we would find that only ONE Cub player has a WAR of more than 2.0 (which equates to being a major league starter).
Just one.
So far, the team batters have a combined 6.1 WAR. The only players with a 1.0 WAR on the team are:
W. Castillo (1.5)
DeJesus (1.3)
Rizzo (1.2)
Schierholtz (1.2)
Ransom (1.1)
Valbuena (1.0)
This is not surprising since Schierholtz, Ransom, and Valbuena have been career bench-utility players. What is disturbing that the two long term contract "core players," Rizzo and Castro, are below 2.0 WAR.
The pitching staff has a combined 6.4 WAR. Six pitchers have a WAR over 1.0:
T. Wood (2.6)
Samardzija (1.8)
Feldman (1.1)
Gregg (1.1)
Russell (1.1)
Villanueva (1.0)
Only one starting pitcher is of starting caliber. The bullpen is led by three relievers barely above AAA level.
Based on this information, the one Cub All-Star by default would be T. Wood, at 5-6, 2.74 ERA, 1.000 WHIP.
If one tries to find a silver lining in the dark cloud, one will also find disappointment.
The team is so bad that marginal players appear to be playing better.
If one looks at Wins Above Replacement (WAR) as an objective factor on how well individual players are doing, we would find that only ONE Cub player has a WAR of more than 2.0 (which equates to being a major league starter).
Just one.
So far, the team batters have a combined 6.1 WAR. The only players with a 1.0 WAR on the team are:
W. Castillo (1.5)
DeJesus (1.3)
Rizzo (1.2)
Schierholtz (1.2)
Ransom (1.1)
Valbuena (1.0)
This is not surprising since Schierholtz, Ransom, and Valbuena have been career bench-utility players. What is disturbing that the two long term contract "core players," Rizzo and Castro, are below 2.0 WAR.
The pitching staff has a combined 6.4 WAR. Six pitchers have a WAR over 1.0:
T. Wood (2.6)
Samardzija (1.8)
Feldman (1.1)
Gregg (1.1)
Russell (1.1)
Villanueva (1.0)
Only one starting pitcher is of starting caliber. The bullpen is led by three relievers barely above AAA level.
Based on this information, the one Cub All-Star by default would be T. Wood, at 5-6, 2.74 ERA, 1.000 WHIP.
April 4, 2013
THE WAR ROOM
There has been a great range on how many wins the Cubs will have this season. The predictions began in the winter when the Cubs began acquiring starting pitchers and journeymen to the start of opening day. The range is wide: from 52 wins to 78. This is the gulf of expectations between various levels of Cub fans.
If we just take the opening day roster as the starting point, we find that the position players collectively have a 12.7 WAR (wins above replacement). For the pitching staff, they have a collective 8.5 WAR (for pitching alone).
The team projected WAR would be 21.2 if the players did as well as they did last season. Since WAR basically postulates that a AAA team would win 32 percent of the games, or 51.84 wins per season, the Cubs 21.2 projected WAR would equate to 73.04 wins.
The 2012 Cubs were 61-101 (.376 winning percentage).
The 2013 Cubs WAR record is 73-89 (.450 winning percentage).
That is a 12 game improvement from last season. That means this year's Cubs would be 19.7 percent better. How could that be?
WAR is a comparison tool. It is not an absolute indicator or predictor.
This huge increase in competitive play is for a team that lost twenty percentage of its rotation (Baker and Garza) and its starting third baseman (Stewart) may be a statistical mirage. The Cubs bench is filled with .200 hitters, with two of them now starting at third and second base. The bullpen is shaky with Marmol as the closer. Rondon as another Rule 5 flyer is probably over matched from jumping from AA pitching to the majors. The 2013 Cubs look no different than the 2012 club. And as such, one is more likely to see the Cubs repeating a 100 loss season than improving by a dozen victories.
If we just take the opening day roster as the starting point, we find that the position players collectively have a 12.7 WAR (wins above replacement). For the pitching staff, they have a collective 8.5 WAR (for pitching alone).
The team projected WAR would be 21.2 if the players did as well as they did last season. Since WAR basically postulates that a AAA team would win 32 percent of the games, or 51.84 wins per season, the Cubs 21.2 projected WAR would equate to 73.04 wins.
The 2012 Cubs were 61-101 (.376 winning percentage).
The 2013 Cubs WAR record is 73-89 (.450 winning percentage).
That is a 12 game improvement from last season. That means this year's Cubs would be 19.7 percent better. How could that be?
WAR is a comparison tool. It is not an absolute indicator or predictor.
This huge increase in competitive play is for a team that lost twenty percentage of its rotation (Baker and Garza) and its starting third baseman (Stewart) may be a statistical mirage. The Cubs bench is filled with .200 hitters, with two of them now starting at third and second base. The bullpen is shaky with Marmol as the closer. Rondon as another Rule 5 flyer is probably over matched from jumping from AA pitching to the majors. The 2013 Cubs look no different than the 2012 club. And as such, one is more likely to see the Cubs repeating a 100 loss season than improving by a dozen victories.
November 16, 2012
WAR ON STATS
A favorite stat for people to debate the value of baseball players is WAR. WAR stands for Wins Above Replacement. A player's WAR number is supposed to represent the number of team wins the player has added to the team total above that of a AAA-AAAA replacement player. The calculation includes factors for defensive support and value for high leverage or more difficult positions and situations.
The components in the WAR calculation track how much above "average" a player was during a season. But the WAR number itself is Wins Above Replacement. It has been said that the difference between an average player and a replacement level player is about 20 runs during a full season. The runs-to-wins is put through a conversion formula (typically, 10 runs equals 1 win).
This is fine to attempt the judge the value of individual players in an average talent pool. But baseball is still a team sport relying upon individuals to get wins.
Which led me to check on the 2012 season from a team perspective.
The San Francisco Giants won the World Series. The regular season record was 94-68. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers you will find:
28.9 hitter WAR + 5.5 pitcher WAR = 34.4 team WAR.
Then the question, what is an "average" baseball team? In a 162 game season, it is simple. A team that goes .500 (81-81) is average. Two teams ended 2012 at .500: Arizona and Philadelphia.
The Diamondbacks season record was 81-81. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers you will find:
17.7 hitter WAR + 13.3 pitcher WAR = 31.0 team WAR.
The Phils also finished the season 81-81. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers you will find:
15.0 hitter WAR + 10.8 pitcher WAR = 25.8 team WAR.
If we compare the World Series champion Giants to the Diamondbacks and Phils team WARS, the Giants team was +3.4 WAR better than Arizona and +8.6 WAR better than Philadelphia.
Since we have "two" average teams, if we average the team WARs (56.8/2) the average team WAR is 28.4. If you compare the average team WAR of 28.4 to the Giants team 34.4, one can calculate that the Giants as a team were 21 percent better than an average major league team in 2012.
If you compare that to victories, the Giants were +13, or 16 percent above an average .500 team.
Now for the other end of the standings.
The Chicago Cubs had a bad rebuilding season. The team 2012 record was 61-101. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers for the Cubs you will find:
11.8 hitter WAR + (0.1) pitcher WAR = 11.7 team WAR.
If you compare the Cubs team WAR of 11.7 to the Giants team WAR of 34.4, the Cubs are -22.7 WAR. That means the Cubs were 66 percent worse than the Giants.
If you compare the Cubs team WAR of 11.7 to the average .500 club WAR of 28.4 WAR, the Cubs are -16.7. That means the Cubs were 58.8 percent worse than an average team in 2012.
So how far are the Cubs away from being a competitive ball club?
The WAR scale for players indicates that one who is 8.0 WAR plus is an MVP type player; 5.0 WAR plus is an All-Star caliber player; 2.0 WAR plus is a starter; 0-2 WAR is a bench player; and below 0 is replacement level.
The highest WAR player on the roster is Darwin Barney at 4.6, then Starlin Castro at 3.5, then Ryan Dempster at 3.3 (who is no longer on the team) and then Anthony Rizzo at 2.2. Barney's WAR has to be skewed by his defense error less streak. Even so, based on the WAR player scale, the Cubs only have three starters on their 25 man roster, and not one is of All-Star caliber.
In order for the Cubs to competitive, the team needs double digit WAR numbers for hitting and pitching. The team needs to add 11 players of 2.0 WAR and above (6 fielders and 5 starters) just to become an average team in 2013.
The components in the WAR calculation track how much above "average" a player was during a season. But the WAR number itself is Wins Above Replacement. It has been said that the difference between an average player and a replacement level player is about 20 runs during a full season. The runs-to-wins is put through a conversion formula (typically, 10 runs equals 1 win).
This is fine to attempt the judge the value of individual players in an average talent pool. But baseball is still a team sport relying upon individuals to get wins.
Which led me to check on the 2012 season from a team perspective.
The San Francisco Giants won the World Series. The regular season record was 94-68. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers you will find:
28.9 hitter WAR + 5.5 pitcher WAR = 34.4 team WAR.
Then the question, what is an "average" baseball team? In a 162 game season, it is simple. A team that goes .500 (81-81) is average. Two teams ended 2012 at .500: Arizona and Philadelphia.
The Diamondbacks season record was 81-81. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers you will find:
17.7 hitter WAR + 13.3 pitcher WAR = 31.0 team WAR.
The Phils also finished the season 81-81. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers you will find:
15.0 hitter WAR + 10.8 pitcher WAR = 25.8 team WAR.
If we compare the World Series champion Giants to the Diamondbacks and Phils team WARS, the Giants team was +3.4 WAR better than Arizona and +8.6 WAR better than Philadelphia.
Since we have "two" average teams, if we average the team WARs (56.8/2) the average team WAR is 28.4. If you compare the average team WAR of 28.4 to the Giants team 34.4, one can calculate that the Giants as a team were 21 percent better than an average major league team in 2012.
If you compare that to victories, the Giants were +13, or 16 percent above an average .500 team.
Now for the other end of the standings.
The Chicago Cubs had a bad rebuilding season. The team 2012 record was 61-101. If you total up all the hitting and pitching player WAR numbers for the Cubs you will find:
11.8 hitter WAR + (0.1) pitcher WAR = 11.7 team WAR.
If you compare the Cubs team WAR of 11.7 to the Giants team WAR of 34.4, the Cubs are -22.7 WAR. That means the Cubs were 66 percent worse than the Giants.
If you compare the Cubs team WAR of 11.7 to the average .500 club WAR of 28.4 WAR, the Cubs are -16.7. That means the Cubs were 58.8 percent worse than an average team in 2012.
So how far are the Cubs away from being a competitive ball club?
The WAR scale for players indicates that one who is 8.0 WAR plus is an MVP type player; 5.0 WAR plus is an All-Star caliber player; 2.0 WAR plus is a starter; 0-2 WAR is a bench player; and below 0 is replacement level.
The highest WAR player on the roster is Darwin Barney at 4.6, then Starlin Castro at 3.5, then Ryan Dempster at 3.3 (who is no longer on the team) and then Anthony Rizzo at 2.2. Barney's WAR has to be skewed by his defense error less streak. Even so, based on the WAR player scale, the Cubs only have three starters on their 25 man roster, and not one is of All-Star caliber.
In order for the Cubs to competitive, the team needs double digit WAR numbers for hitting and pitching. The team needs to add 11 players of 2.0 WAR and above (6 fielders and 5 starters) just to become an average team in 2013.
August 23, 2012
WAR WITH STATS
WAR (Wins over Average Replacement) is a complex formula comparison statistic used to judge a player's value relative to his peers. The object is to determine how much value a major leaguer has over a "replacement player," i.e. a AAA or AAAA minor leaguer.
How one player during a season affects one win over the collective play of the rest of his team is quite debatable; it is a misnomer to say Player X "wins" a specific game when there were 50 other players which he took no part in that were just as important in determining the outcome of the contest. Only if a pitcher who throws a perfect game could claim he alone was the reason for the victory, if he batted in the game winning run.
So WAR is more esoteric. It tries to compare a major leaguer's production over his potential replacement. Rarely does a minor leaguer come into the majors as an All-Star (however, there are exceptions to that rule like Mike Trout of the Angels this season). Even when a player starts off well in the majors, the league catches up to him.
The WAR scale is fairly simple. An 8 plus means a player is an MVP candidate. A 5 to 8 player is All-Star caliber. A 2-5 player is classified as a starter. A zero to 2 player is classified as a reserve or bench player. A player with a negative WAR is a replacement level player (in reality, if you can't be a reserve player then you are heading for one's release from the team.)
But the WAR stat does not give one an objective view of a player in relation to his peers. Baseball is a stat game with well accepted baseline performance numbers, i.e. a .300 hitter is classified as very good (the goal). Contact with the baseball is a key element of offense.
It may be more useful to actually compare players with their position counterparts to see how they really stack up. For example, we ran a stat screen of the Top Left Fielders in baseball, sorted by batting average. The top 15 LF have a WAR range of 4.4 to -0.4, so that makes that list the control group.
When you total up all the numbers for AB, H, HR, RBI and SB for the control group and divide by 15, you come to the baseline averages for LF players:
.283 BA, 19.67 HR, 68.33 RBI, 9.67 SB
With this baseline stat, you can easily compare it to your team's starting LF to see if he is above or below the norm for his position.
Since these four offensive categories are accepted as basic performance criteria, how many of the Top 15 LF actually exceed the baseline average? 8 players beat in BA; 7 beat in HR, 8 beat in RBI and 6 beat in SB. This confirms that the baseline averages is a good measure of what a quality LF player should be producing at the major league level.
You can further compare the baseline average with each individual player in the list of 15. How many players exceeded the average in all four categories? Only two. How many exceeded the average in three of the four categories? Four. How many exceeded the average in two of the four categories? Four. How many exceeded only one average category? Three. And two players on the list did not exceed any average category. (A 2-4-4-3-2 spread between 15 players again confirms that the baseline average is a viable comparison tool).
How one player during a season affects one win over the collective play of the rest of his team is quite debatable; it is a misnomer to say Player X "wins" a specific game when there were 50 other players which he took no part in that were just as important in determining the outcome of the contest. Only if a pitcher who throws a perfect game could claim he alone was the reason for the victory, if he batted in the game winning run.
So WAR is more esoteric. It tries to compare a major leaguer's production over his potential replacement. Rarely does a minor leaguer come into the majors as an All-Star (however, there are exceptions to that rule like Mike Trout of the Angels this season). Even when a player starts off well in the majors, the league catches up to him.
The WAR scale is fairly simple. An 8 plus means a player is an MVP candidate. A 5 to 8 player is All-Star caliber. A 2-5 player is classified as a starter. A zero to 2 player is classified as a reserve or bench player. A player with a negative WAR is a replacement level player (in reality, if you can't be a reserve player then you are heading for one's release from the team.)
But the WAR stat does not give one an objective view of a player in relation to his peers. Baseball is a stat game with well accepted baseline performance numbers, i.e. a .300 hitter is classified as very good (the goal). Contact with the baseball is a key element of offense.
It may be more useful to actually compare players with their position counterparts to see how they really stack up. For example, we ran a stat screen of the Top Left Fielders in baseball, sorted by batting average. The top 15 LF have a WAR range of 4.4 to -0.4, so that makes that list the control group.
When you total up all the numbers for AB, H, HR, RBI and SB for the control group and divide by 15, you come to the baseline averages for LF players:
.283 BA, 19.67 HR, 68.33 RBI, 9.67 SB
With this baseline stat, you can easily compare it to your team's starting LF to see if he is above or below the norm for his position.
Since these four offensive categories are accepted as basic performance criteria, how many of the Top 15 LF actually exceed the baseline average? 8 players beat in BA; 7 beat in HR, 8 beat in RBI and 6 beat in SB. This confirms that the baseline averages is a good measure of what a quality LF player should be producing at the major league level.
You can further compare the baseline average with each individual player in the list of 15. How many players exceeded the average in all four categories? Only two. How many exceeded the average in three of the four categories? Four. How many exceeded the average in two of the four categories? Four. How many exceeded only one average category? Three. And two players on the list did not exceed any average category. (A 2-4-4-3-2 spread between 15 players again confirms that the baseline average is a viable comparison tool).
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