There is an old saying that money can buy championships. But that is a myth, possibly born from the frustration of fans who think their team is not doing enough to win.
If one looks at the divisional winners, wild card teams and those just out of this year's races, we have a wide berth in salary, salary increase and making the playoffs. Per Cot's Baseball contracts:
Atlanta won the NL East. Its' payroll went down 3.7 percent to $90 million or approximately $3.1 million per player.
Boston won the AL East. Its' payroll went down 14 percent to $150 million or approximately $5 million per player.
Detroit won the AL Central. Its' payroll went up 11.5% to $148.3 million or approximately $5.7 million per player.
Los Angeles Dodgers won the NL West. Its' payroll jumped 128.6 percent to $223 million or approximately $7.2 million per player.
Oakland won the AL West. Its' payroll went up 14.8 percent to $61.9 million or approximately $2.1 million per player.
Cincinnati is in the playoffs. Its' payroll went up 25.4 percent to $110 million or approximately $4 million per player.
Cleveland made the playoffs. Its' payroll went up 16.6 percent to $77 million or approximately $2.5 million per player.
Pittsburgh made the playoffs. Its' payroll went up 28.6 percent to $66.8 million or approximately $2.2 million per player.
St. Louis is in the playoffs. Its' payroll went up 4.2 percent to $116.5 million or approximately $4 million per player.
Tampa Bay made the playoffs. Its' payroll went down 2.7 percent to $62 million or approximately $2.3 million per player.
Teams that were in contention like Kansas City had its payroll climb 26 percent to $81 million or approximately $3 million per player and Washington had its payroll increase 25 percent to $118 million or approximately $4 million per player.
The lowest 2013 payrolls were:
1. Houston $26 million
2. Miami $38 million
3. TAMPA $62 million
4. OAKLAND $62 million
5. PITTSBURGH $66.8 million
6. San Diego $68.3 million
7. Colorado $74.4 million
8. CLEVELAND $78 million
9. Kansas City $81 million
10. Minnesota $82 million
Forty (40) percent of the lowest payrolls made the playoffs this year.
Of the highest 2013 payrolls:
1. New York Yankees $228 million
2. LOS ANGELES DODGERS $223 million
3. Philadelphia $159.5 million
4. BOSTON $150.6 million
5. DETROIT $148.3 million
6. Los Angeles Angels $141 million
7. San Francisco $136.9 million
8. Toronto $127.7 million
9. Texas $125.3 million
10. Chicago White Sox $118.9 million
Only thirty (30) percent of the highest payrolls made the playoffs this year.
So there is truly no correlation to the total payroll of a team and winning pennants. The assumption has been a team with better players cost more money. But certain teams like Tampa, Oakland and Pittsburgh rely on younger (therefore cheaper) talent.
September 30, 2013
September 29, 2013
HARSH REALITY
The known commodities who should be on the White Sox and Cubs 2-14 rosters are narrowed by the consensus picks above. Even if you combined both sets of players, the Chicago baseball team still would not be able to field a full roster. Both teams need to upgrade at all their positions, but it seems most critical for those labeled with a blue box.
A combined team would have only depth at starting pitching: Sale, Quintana, Samardzija, T. Wood, Danks, E. Jackson. But it would also have some outfielders/platoon guys. There would still be aching infield holes and problematic catching issues. There is no true bullpen with just three guys: Reed, Jones, Strop.
A combined lineup would be also suspect:
1. DeAza cf
2. Castro ss
3. Garcia rf
4. Dunn lf
5. Rizzo 1b
6. Lake 3b?
7. Castillo c
8. Unknown 2b
There is a tremendous amount of off-season work that needs to be done on both sides of town in order to create a major league roster (not another AAAA club team). Besides Sale and Garcia, no one is not expendable in a trade.
September 28, 2013
UNBALANCED
MLB added a second wild card to add some end of year excitement in a few more baseball cities. It was also a solution to a growing concern by some team owners about the unbalanced major league schedule.
In 2013, with the Astros move to the AL West, every division will have the same number of teams, every team will play the same number of intradivision and interleague games, and MLB promised that there will be “at least one Interleague game every day.”
Why that promise is not necessarily a great thing is that historically, divisional games draw the most home field attendance. Interleague is a fad marketing concept to help spark some fan interest, but it may jolt some teams home games every five years or so if the Yankees or Red Sox come to town, but not so much if it is the Mariners or Astros.
This season every team will play exactly 19 games against each of the other four teams in its division (76 total), 6-7 intraleague games against each of the 10 teams in the other two divisions (66 total), and 20 interleague games.
The problem with this schedule for owners in the AL East is that with 49 percent of their games against really good divisional foes, the other divisions such as the AL Central and AL West can coast to better overall records (which the wild card is based upon).
For example, the Rangers are +13 in wins against the Astros. The Rays have no such punching bag in the AL East.
There is a cry for a competitive solution to the unbalanced schedule.
First option is get rid of the 20 interleague games. Let the two leagues play by their different DH rules for an entire season. Let interleague play be post-season only.
Second option is to create a balance schedule within each league. 162 games divided by 14 opponents equals 11.57 games/opponent. But that can be tinkered slightly. 11 games per league opponent equals 154 games (the old season). The remaining 8 additional games can be divided among your divisional opponents, 2 games piece.
Third option is add 6 more games to the schedule (168) and have each team play equal number of games against league opponents (12 games per year). That would be the most balanced solution.
But the season is too long anyway. Owners have balked at shortening the season to 154 games. Marketing managers want to keep the interleague contests as a means of selling season ticket packages in the off-season. Expanding the leagues to add another team to get to 32 is also out of the question because the economy would not support another two franchises (especially when there are current teams that need revenue sharing and luxury tax money in order to survive.)
Baseball is a game of black and white rules clouded at times in the gray of interpretation. The unbalanced schedule is one of those gray areas of unfairness for some teams who happen to be parked in a very competitive division.
In 2013, with the Astros move to the AL West, every division will have the same number of teams, every team will play the same number of intradivision and interleague games, and MLB promised that there will be “at least one Interleague game every day.”
Why that promise is not necessarily a great thing is that historically, divisional games draw the most home field attendance. Interleague is a fad marketing concept to help spark some fan interest, but it may jolt some teams home games every five years or so if the Yankees or Red Sox come to town, but not so much if it is the Mariners or Astros.
This season every team will play exactly 19 games against each of the other four teams in its division (76 total), 6-7 intraleague games against each of the 10 teams in the other two divisions (66 total), and 20 interleague games.
The problem with this schedule for owners in the AL East is that with 49 percent of their games against really good divisional foes, the other divisions such as the AL Central and AL West can coast to better overall records (which the wild card is based upon).
For example, the Rangers are +13 in wins against the Astros. The Rays have no such punching bag in the AL East.
There is a cry for a competitive solution to the unbalanced schedule.
First option is get rid of the 20 interleague games. Let the two leagues play by their different DH rules for an entire season. Let interleague play be post-season only.
Second option is to create a balance schedule within each league. 162 games divided by 14 opponents equals 11.57 games/opponent. But that can be tinkered slightly. 11 games per league opponent equals 154 games (the old season). The remaining 8 additional games can be divided among your divisional opponents, 2 games piece.
Third option is add 6 more games to the schedule (168) and have each team play equal number of games against league opponents (12 games per year). That would be the most balanced solution.
But the season is too long anyway. Owners have balked at shortening the season to 154 games. Marketing managers want to keep the interleague contests as a means of selling season ticket packages in the off-season. Expanding the leagues to add another team to get to 32 is also out of the question because the economy would not support another two franchises (especially when there are current teams that need revenue sharing and luxury tax money in order to survive.)
Baseball is a game of black and white rules clouded at times in the gray of interpretation. The unbalanced schedule is one of those gray areas of unfairness for some teams who happen to be parked in a very competitive division.
September 27, 2013
BY THE NUMBERS
With the emphasis on developing home grown talent to feed the major league roster, general statistics and probabilities make the number of prospects into a commodity calculation.
Approximately 6.25% of minor leaguers make it to the major leagues. This statistic come from the fact that prospects do not pan out; they meet skill level ceilings, they do not develop, they have personal issues, they have injuries and set backs.
The Cubs U.S. minor league system contains approximately 170 players under contract (reserve). After the season, any minor leaguer with six seasons of minor league service become minor league free agents. At best, of the 170 minor leaguers in the Cubs system in 2013, only 10 or 11 will make it to the majors.
The Cubs also have three foreign developmental squads with a total of 105 players under contract. The statistical average for foreign prospects making it to the major leagues is around 3.0%. At best, of these 105 foreign players, only 3 of those prospects may make the majors.
All told, only 14 prospects may make it to the majors (and many may not be with the Cubs as they may be traded or released before their call up).
Put another way, for every Junior Lake who makes it the major leagues, there are 16 other highly touted prospects who do not.
Approximately 6.25% of minor leaguers make it to the major leagues. This statistic come from the fact that prospects do not pan out; they meet skill level ceilings, they do not develop, they have personal issues, they have injuries and set backs.
The Cubs U.S. minor league system contains approximately 170 players under contract (reserve). After the season, any minor leaguer with six seasons of minor league service become minor league free agents. At best, of the 170 minor leaguers in the Cubs system in 2013, only 10 or 11 will make it to the majors.
The Cubs also have three foreign developmental squads with a total of 105 players under contract. The statistical average for foreign prospects making it to the major leagues is around 3.0%. At best, of these 105 foreign players, only 3 of those prospects may make the majors.
All told, only 14 prospects may make it to the majors (and many may not be with the Cubs as they may be traded or released before their call up).
Put another way, for every Junior Lake who makes it the major leagues, there are 16 other highly touted prospects who do not.
September 26, 2013
TWO SIDES TO SAME COIN
At the beginning, the debate was about the Cubs rebuilding Plan. Cubs ownership firmly stated that the Tribune's Cub payroll of $140 million was "unsustainable." This statement shows (a) the Cubs are not as profitable as other big league teams with high payrolls, or (b) new ownership is scared of signing long term dead money free agent deals. As a result, the Cubs payroll has dropped below $99 million (with the prospect of dropping at least $10 million more in 2014). If that was the primary goal of the rebuilding Plan, then that purpose is working well.
But the initial debate on the Plan was the means of talent acquisition. Epstein and Hoyer are firmly entrenched with their idea that the only way to rebuild the Cubs major league roster is to rebuild the minor league system from rookie ball up with prospects. The Cubs have spent club records in amateur talent pool bonuses to sign players. To add to the prospect quantity, the Cubs have traded away their major league veterans (especially starting pitchers) to acquire more prospects.
Critics believed that this is a one-sided approach to building a major league roster. They believed that the Cubs, being a big market team, could have also used the free agent market and trades to field a competitive team while the organization was re-stocking its farm system. They believe that the fielding of a major league team roster and building a farm system are two distinct functions of the front office.
It turned into an academic debate because the Cubs were not changing their direction. The Cubs would not spend money on the major league roster to field a competitive team. Resources would be focused to signing new, young talent and develop those players slowly through the minor league affiliates.
After two seasons of "transparency," the realization is clear. The new Cubs prospects by the new front office are a long way away from making contributions to the major league team. In fact, all the recent call ups (Lake, Rusin, Raley, Grimm, etc.) have been developed by other teams or prior management under Hendry. Epstein-Hoyer regime has yet to produce a home grown major league player for the Cubs.
And this puts the Plan into a different light. Even if one agrees that the Epstein-Hoyer Plan is the right way to go (and the fan base will have to take several seasons of losing), there is no guarantee that Epstein and Hoyer (a) will sign the right players, (b) be able to develop the raw talent into major league contributors, or (c) give those prospects the best opportunity to succeed at the various levels of professional ball.
It is a gamble that many fans do not realize. It is like a gambler putting all his chips (prospects) on Red at the roulette wheel. He may hit it big or he may bust. In the baseball world, statistics bear out that the vast majority of prospects never reach their potential. The Plan is betting on an above average number of prospects becoming major league contributors to feed the major league roster with a consistent pipeline of talent. If it was so simple, every team would be doing it successfully.
So the current question is not whether the Cubs Plan is the right one, but whether the front office of Epstein and Hoyer are the right guys to pull it off.
But the initial debate on the Plan was the means of talent acquisition. Epstein and Hoyer are firmly entrenched with their idea that the only way to rebuild the Cubs major league roster is to rebuild the minor league system from rookie ball up with prospects. The Cubs have spent club records in amateur talent pool bonuses to sign players. To add to the prospect quantity, the Cubs have traded away their major league veterans (especially starting pitchers) to acquire more prospects.
Critics believed that this is a one-sided approach to building a major league roster. They believed that the Cubs, being a big market team, could have also used the free agent market and trades to field a competitive team while the organization was re-stocking its farm system. They believe that the fielding of a major league team roster and building a farm system are two distinct functions of the front office.
It turned into an academic debate because the Cubs were not changing their direction. The Cubs would not spend money on the major league roster to field a competitive team. Resources would be focused to signing new, young talent and develop those players slowly through the minor league affiliates.
After two seasons of "transparency," the realization is clear. The new Cubs prospects by the new front office are a long way away from making contributions to the major league team. In fact, all the recent call ups (Lake, Rusin, Raley, Grimm, etc.) have been developed by other teams or prior management under Hendry. Epstein-Hoyer regime has yet to produce a home grown major league player for the Cubs.
And this puts the Plan into a different light. Even if one agrees that the Epstein-Hoyer Plan is the right way to go (and the fan base will have to take several seasons of losing), there is no guarantee that Epstein and Hoyer (a) will sign the right players, (b) be able to develop the raw talent into major league contributors, or (c) give those prospects the best opportunity to succeed at the various levels of professional ball.
It is a gamble that many fans do not realize. It is like a gambler putting all his chips (prospects) on Red at the roulette wheel. He may hit it big or he may bust. In the baseball world, statistics bear out that the vast majority of prospects never reach their potential. The Plan is betting on an above average number of prospects becoming major league contributors to feed the major league roster with a consistent pipeline of talent. If it was so simple, every team would be doing it successfully.
So the current question is not whether the Cubs Plan is the right one, but whether the front office of Epstein and Hoyer are the right guys to pull it off.
September 25, 2013
100th ANNIVERSARY
In 2014, Wrigley Field turns 100 years old. The Cubs have released an anniversary logo for the event.
However, many fans think this is more appropriate:
However, many fans think this is more appropriate:
September 24, 2013
LOSING
On consecutive days, two teams clinched playoff spots at Wrigley Field. First, it was the Braves. Next, it was the Pirates who are in the post season after a 21 year drought.
Former major league pitcher Jamie Moyer was on a sports cable talk show promoting his new book. When he was asked about his long major league career, he indicated that one of the reasons he lasted so long was that he took "preventative rehab" before he ever got injured. He explained that he did the same type of rehabilitation exercises that a pitcher would have to do to recover from an injury even though he was not injured in any way. It was a means of strengthening the body's weak points.
Moyer never had blazing fast ball stuff. Another reason he lasted so long was that he was not a thrower, but a pitcher. He learned early on how to "set up" batters to make outs, whether it was on a strike out or inducing a ground ball to a fielder.
Moyer spent half his life, 25 years, playing major league baseball. His career record was 269-209, 4.25 ERA, 1.322 WHIP and career 50.2 WAR. No one considers him a Hall of Fame candidate, but his was a durable starting pitcher.
Because of his long experience in the majors, he does have critical insight into the game. One of the most important aspects of the game Moyer said was the mental component. He said that "losing will beat you up." Players don't want to lose but after a long losing time period, losing becomes part of the team culture. Losing wears out players, coaches and managers like Lou Piniella, who had some success with the Cubs, but the pressure of two losing seasons aged him considerably until he retired.
The current Cubs team will have played another lost season. Moyer did not specifically blame Sveum for the plight of the Cubs. Moyer even thought eventually that the Cubs could turn things around like the Pirates have done.
But reading between the lines it is clear that consistent losing does have a negative clubhouse effect on players and coaches. A losing culture wears down players to the point of losing concentration, pulling back on effort or hustle, and studying opponents less and less. Human nature is that if you are probably going to lose, what is the point of trying harder? That negativity is like an anchor around players necks; an unseen but real handicap to team performance. The wear and tear of losing can fray nerves as has been seen in the Cub dugout in the last week.
Moyer believes the mental aspect of professional sports is overlooked. Players concentrate on individual things such as personal stats, hitting home runs . . . . but those are small things compared to understanding the mental aspects of the game and being able to control them (put aside a bad game to be able to start each game as Day One of the season).
The Cubs have fallen back into the downward spiral of habitual losing. The young talent that has been brought up as "core" players for the future have been caught up in the losing tradition. This may be the biggest setback for the franchise going forward.
Former major league pitcher Jamie Moyer was on a sports cable talk show promoting his new book. When he was asked about his long major league career, he indicated that one of the reasons he lasted so long was that he took "preventative rehab" before he ever got injured. He explained that he did the same type of rehabilitation exercises that a pitcher would have to do to recover from an injury even though he was not injured in any way. It was a means of strengthening the body's weak points.
Moyer never had blazing fast ball stuff. Another reason he lasted so long was that he was not a thrower, but a pitcher. He learned early on how to "set up" batters to make outs, whether it was on a strike out or inducing a ground ball to a fielder.
Moyer spent half his life, 25 years, playing major league baseball. His career record was 269-209, 4.25 ERA, 1.322 WHIP and career 50.2 WAR. No one considers him a Hall of Fame candidate, but his was a durable starting pitcher.
Because of his long experience in the majors, he does have critical insight into the game. One of the most important aspects of the game Moyer said was the mental component. He said that "losing will beat you up." Players don't want to lose but after a long losing time period, losing becomes part of the team culture. Losing wears out players, coaches and managers like Lou Piniella, who had some success with the Cubs, but the pressure of two losing seasons aged him considerably until he retired.
The current Cubs team will have played another lost season. Moyer did not specifically blame Sveum for the plight of the Cubs. Moyer even thought eventually that the Cubs could turn things around like the Pirates have done.
But reading between the lines it is clear that consistent losing does have a negative clubhouse effect on players and coaches. A losing culture wears down players to the point of losing concentration, pulling back on effort or hustle, and studying opponents less and less. Human nature is that if you are probably going to lose, what is the point of trying harder? That negativity is like an anchor around players necks; an unseen but real handicap to team performance. The wear and tear of losing can fray nerves as has been seen in the Cub dugout in the last week.
Moyer believes the mental aspect of professional sports is overlooked. Players concentrate on individual things such as personal stats, hitting home runs . . . . but those are small things compared to understanding the mental aspects of the game and being able to control them (put aside a bad game to be able to start each game as Day One of the season).
The Cubs have fallen back into the downward spiral of habitual losing. The young talent that has been brought up as "core" players for the future have been caught up in the losing tradition. This may be the biggest setback for the franchise going forward.
PURISTS
A local columnist brought his son to Wrigley Field in late September not to watch lousy baseball but to have his son experience Wrigley Field before its jumbotronic advertising make-over.
Which leads to an interesting point. How many baseball purists come to Wrigley Field because Wrigley is a time machine to the golden age of baseball a century ago?
It may be more than one thinks.
There was quite the uproar when Ricketts took out the RF seats to create his own "mini-Green Monster" wall and party deck. It still must sting in criticism because if you notice during Cub broadcasts, the cameras do not pan into the RF corner to show this change in architecture.
And that RF project was out of character for the ball park. To some, it is a hideous boil on the face of the franchise.
And now, new signage and a huge electronic scoreboard has been approved for LF and RF. It will be a dramatic change from the current sight lines of most fans in the inner bowl. It will also clash with the iconic manual CF scoreboard (which begs the question, what will it be used for when you have a jumbotron three times larger in LF?)
Ricketts gets quite upset when people criticize his Wrigley rehab plans. "I'm not running a museum," is his favorite counter-punch. But in reality, he is running a museum called Wrigley Field. He sells guided tours before the games. The Cub fan base grew up with the old charm of a historic landmark. Many came to games because they were played at their Wrigley Field.
But that is all about to change.
In the next two years we will find out how much of the Cub ticket buyers were coming out to the park just to go to Wrigley Field for a day to soak up its history rather than watching bad baseball. Attendance declines may accelerate in proportion to the changes inside Wrigley Field.
Ownership claims that it needs these drastic changes into order to get new revenue streams in order to field a competitive team. But after tanking two seasons and gutting the old ball park, the purists may find no reason to return even if the Cubs turn around their losing ways.
Which leads to an interesting point. How many baseball purists come to Wrigley Field because Wrigley is a time machine to the golden age of baseball a century ago?
It may be more than one thinks.
There was quite the uproar when Ricketts took out the RF seats to create his own "mini-Green Monster" wall and party deck. It still must sting in criticism because if you notice during Cub broadcasts, the cameras do not pan into the RF corner to show this change in architecture.
And that RF project was out of character for the ball park. To some, it is a hideous boil on the face of the franchise.
And now, new signage and a huge electronic scoreboard has been approved for LF and RF. It will be a dramatic change from the current sight lines of most fans in the inner bowl. It will also clash with the iconic manual CF scoreboard (which begs the question, what will it be used for when you have a jumbotron three times larger in LF?)
Ricketts gets quite upset when people criticize his Wrigley rehab plans. "I'm not running a museum," is his favorite counter-punch. But in reality, he is running a museum called Wrigley Field. He sells guided tours before the games. The Cub fan base grew up with the old charm of a historic landmark. Many came to games because they were played at their Wrigley Field.
But that is all about to change.
In the next two years we will find out how much of the Cub ticket buyers were coming out to the park just to go to Wrigley Field for a day to soak up its history rather than watching bad baseball. Attendance declines may accelerate in proportion to the changes inside Wrigley Field.
Ownership claims that it needs these drastic changes into order to get new revenue streams in order to field a competitive team. But after tanking two seasons and gutting the old ball park, the purists may find no reason to return even if the Cubs turn around their losing ways.
SKIP THE SKIPPER
There are rumblings that Dale Sveum's status as Cub manager is in doubt. Even though management has said he will not be judged by wins or losses, the media believes there is no clear "vote of confidence" for Sveum.
Except that Sveum is Theo's guy. He survived the insane statistical, theoretical and abstract interview process. The front office knew he was being sent to battle with no troops. Sveum has been a good company man, saying all the right things. So Sveum's job should be safe for next year, which will be a continuation of the morass of this year.
But writers think that there will be a good crop of talented managers coming to market. Joe Girardi's contract is up in New York. The Steinbrenners would be insane to not re-sign him even if the Yankees are going into a rebuilding or re-tweeking mode for the next few seasons. Girardi would command around $7 million to manage, something the Cubs seem unwilling to do when the Ricketts are squeezing dimes for their the real estate projects.
Mike Scioscia signed a 10 year deal with the Angels which runs through 2020. It is highly doubtful that as disappointing the Angels have been with their superstar payroll that the Angels' owner is going to eat seven years of that deal.
Ron Gardenhire of the Twins is another possibility. The Twins have underperformed the last two seasons. However, the Twins have a history of staying the course with their managers. Gardenhire is a old school fundamentalist who gets the most out of his players. The Twins have another wave a young talent that will come up next season, so Gardenhire's past experience of developing talent at the major league level means the Twins will probably keep him in the fold.
The question is whether Sveum is the guy to get the Cubs into the playoffs when the roster talent improves (as The Plan unfolds). Former Bulls GM Jerry Krause explained once that in the early Jordan era, Doug Collins was the right coach for the team, but over time he was not the coach to get the Bulls from point B to point A (championships). That is why Phil Jackson was hired to replace Collins. The Cubs will come to the same point in Sveum's tenure.
So far, Sveum has not been perceived as improving talent. Castro and Rizzo have regressed terribly under his watch. Sveum was a shortstop himself, but he has not communicated his experience onto Castro to get him to improve his defense. People question his lineups, in game decisions and bullpen use. But it seems that under his watch, the Cubs have gone back into the comfort zone of being content with losing (the culture that Epstein was brought in to change.)
Except that Sveum is Theo's guy. He survived the insane statistical, theoretical and abstract interview process. The front office knew he was being sent to battle with no troops. Sveum has been a good company man, saying all the right things. So Sveum's job should be safe for next year, which will be a continuation of the morass of this year.
But writers think that there will be a good crop of talented managers coming to market. Joe Girardi's contract is up in New York. The Steinbrenners would be insane to not re-sign him even if the Yankees are going into a rebuilding or re-tweeking mode for the next few seasons. Girardi would command around $7 million to manage, something the Cubs seem unwilling to do when the Ricketts are squeezing dimes for their the real estate projects.
Mike Scioscia signed a 10 year deal with the Angels which runs through 2020. It is highly doubtful that as disappointing the Angels have been with their superstar payroll that the Angels' owner is going to eat seven years of that deal.
Ron Gardenhire of the Twins is another possibility. The Twins have underperformed the last two seasons. However, the Twins have a history of staying the course with their managers. Gardenhire is a old school fundamentalist who gets the most out of his players. The Twins have another wave a young talent that will come up next season, so Gardenhire's past experience of developing talent at the major league level means the Twins will probably keep him in the fold.
The question is whether Sveum is the guy to get the Cubs into the playoffs when the roster talent improves (as The Plan unfolds). Former Bulls GM Jerry Krause explained once that in the early Jordan era, Doug Collins was the right coach for the team, but over time he was not the coach to get the Bulls from point B to point A (championships). That is why Phil Jackson was hired to replace Collins. The Cubs will come to the same point in Sveum's tenure.
So far, Sveum has not been perceived as improving talent. Castro and Rizzo have regressed terribly under his watch. Sveum was a shortstop himself, but he has not communicated his experience onto Castro to get him to improve his defense. People question his lineups, in game decisions and bullpen use. But it seems that under his watch, the Cubs have gone back into the comfort zone of being content with losing (the culture that Epstein was brought in to change.)
September 23, 2013
September 22, 2013
WINTER PROTECTION
The Cubs will have to make wholesale changes in their 40 man protected roster this winter. There are too many "prospects" in the system that will be unprotected unless shifted to the 40 man.
Eligible Minor Leaguers not put on their 40-man roster could be lost via December's Rule 5 Draft.
Players first signed at age 18 must be added to 40-man rosters within five years or they become eligible to be drafted by other organizations through the Rule 5 process. Players signed at 19 years or older have to be protected within four years. Clubs pay $50,000 to select a player in the Rule 5 Draft. If that player doesn't stay on the 25-man roster for the full season, he must be offered back to his former team for $25,000.
When the Cubs began their 2013 campaign, their 40 man roster consisted of:
RHB 12
LHB 8
SHB 1
RHP 15
LHP 5
AVG HT 6-1
AVG WT 204
AVG AGE 27
Youngest 21
Oldest 37
The roster has been changed over time as the Cubs have used more than 52 players this season.
Presently on the disabled list (and not counted in the 40):
Rafael Dolis, Kyjui Fujikawa, Matt Guerrier, Thomas Neal, Zach Putnam, Arodys Vizcaino.
Those on the 40 man roster but still in the Minors:
Brett Jackson, Trey McNutt, Mike Olt, Neil Ramirez, Jorge Soler, Christian Villanueva, Josh Vitters, Matt Szczur
Veterans on the 40 man roster who will be gone by free agency or release at the end of the season:
Scott Baker, Kevin Gregg, Hector Rondon (to minors), J.C. Boscan, Dioner Navarro, Darnell McDonald
Of those on the DL, only Fujikawa and Vizcaino may be protected, but I would not be surprised that the Cubs don't protect Vizcaino because he has not played in 2 years because of injury.
Of those minor leaguers on the 40 man, I would not be surprised that Jackson, McNutt, Vitters and Szczur are left unprotected to open up space for "Theo's guys."
With the six veterans who will be off the roster, and the net 2 DL/minors moves, the Cubs can probably protect only 6 minor leaguers from this list:
Hunter Ackerman, LHP, Arismendy Alcantara, INF , Gioskar Amaya, INF , Jose Arias, RHP, Frank Batista, RHP, Xavier Batista, OF , Dallas Beeler, RHP, Justin Bour, 1B , Sergio Burruel, C , David Cales, RHP, Esmailin Caridad, RHP, Marcelo Carreno, RHP , Lendy Castillo, RHP, Javier Castro, RHP , Zach Cates, RHP , Hunter Cervenka, LHP , Pin-Chieh Chen, OF , Casey Coleman, RHP, Gerardo Concepcion, LHP , Willson Contreras, C , Wes Darvill, INF , Antonio Encarnacion, RHP , Luis Flores, C , Anthony Giansanti, OF, Micah Gibbs, C , Enyel Gonzalez, RHP , Carlos Gutierrez, RHP , Jae-Hoon Ha, OF, Marco Hernandez, INF , Eric Jokisch, LHP , Dong-Yub Kim, OF , Austin Kirk, LHP, Luis Liria, RHP, Matt Loosen, RHP , Jeff Lorick, LHP , Eric Martinez, RHP , A. J. Morris, RHP, Chad Noble, C , Juan Carlos Paniagua, RHP, Loiger Padron, RHP , Amaury Paulino, RHP , Felix Pena, RHP , Starling Peralta, RHP , Dae-Eun Rhee, RHP , Kevin Rhoderick, RHP , Greg Rohan, INF , Jose Rosario, RHP, Victor Salazar, RHP, Brian Schlitter, RHP, Ryan Searle, RHP , Elliot Soto, INF, Nick Struck, RHP
It also means that the Cubs won't lose that many players from this list since most clubs do not partake in the Rule 5 selection process because it means the selection needs to kept on the 25 man roster for the entire year (like the Cubs did with Lendy Castillo last year and Hector Rondon this year).
Cubs executives have been meeting in Milwaukee which means that they are probably discussing the winter roster moves in secret (away from the office). There are plenty of "old" players who have had their chance who will not be protected (Caridad, Castillo, Cates, Coleman, Schlitter). On the list, there are only a few buzzworthy prospects like Alcantara and Amaya or prospects that we have heard about like Ha, Paniagua, Rhee and Struck.
Eligible Minor Leaguers not put on their 40-man roster could be lost via December's Rule 5 Draft.
Players first signed at age 18 must be added to 40-man rosters within five years or they become eligible to be drafted by other organizations through the Rule 5 process. Players signed at 19 years or older have to be protected within four years. Clubs pay $50,000 to select a player in the Rule 5 Draft. If that player doesn't stay on the 25-man roster for the full season, he must be offered back to his former team for $25,000.
When the Cubs began their 2013 campaign, their 40 man roster consisted of:
RHB 12
LHB 8
SHB 1
RHP 15
LHP 5
AVG HT 6-1
AVG WT 204
AVG AGE 27
Youngest 21
Oldest 37
The roster has been changed over time as the Cubs have used more than 52 players this season.
Presently on the disabled list (and not counted in the 40):
Rafael Dolis, Kyjui Fujikawa, Matt Guerrier, Thomas Neal, Zach Putnam, Arodys Vizcaino.
Those on the 40 man roster but still in the Minors:
Brett Jackson, Trey McNutt, Mike Olt, Neil Ramirez, Jorge Soler, Christian Villanueva, Josh Vitters, Matt Szczur
Veterans on the 40 man roster who will be gone by free agency or release at the end of the season:
Scott Baker, Kevin Gregg, Hector Rondon (to minors), J.C. Boscan, Dioner Navarro, Darnell McDonald
Of those on the DL, only Fujikawa and Vizcaino may be protected, but I would not be surprised that the Cubs don't protect Vizcaino because he has not played in 2 years because of injury.
Of those minor leaguers on the 40 man, I would not be surprised that Jackson, McNutt, Vitters and Szczur are left unprotected to open up space for "Theo's guys."
With the six veterans who will be off the roster, and the net 2 DL/minors moves, the Cubs can probably protect only 6 minor leaguers from this list:
Hunter Ackerman, LHP, Arismendy Alcantara, INF , Gioskar Amaya, INF , Jose Arias, RHP, Frank Batista, RHP, Xavier Batista, OF , Dallas Beeler, RHP, Justin Bour, 1B , Sergio Burruel, C , David Cales, RHP, Esmailin Caridad, RHP, Marcelo Carreno, RHP , Lendy Castillo, RHP, Javier Castro, RHP , Zach Cates, RHP , Hunter Cervenka, LHP , Pin-Chieh Chen, OF , Casey Coleman, RHP, Gerardo Concepcion, LHP , Willson Contreras, C , Wes Darvill, INF , Antonio Encarnacion, RHP , Luis Flores, C , Anthony Giansanti, OF, Micah Gibbs, C , Enyel Gonzalez, RHP , Carlos Gutierrez, RHP , Jae-Hoon Ha, OF, Marco Hernandez, INF , Eric Jokisch, LHP , Dong-Yub Kim, OF , Austin Kirk, LHP, Luis Liria, RHP, Matt Loosen, RHP , Jeff Lorick, LHP , Eric Martinez, RHP , A. J. Morris, RHP, Chad Noble, C , Juan Carlos Paniagua, RHP, Loiger Padron, RHP , Amaury Paulino, RHP , Felix Pena, RHP , Starling Peralta, RHP , Dae-Eun Rhee, RHP , Kevin Rhoderick, RHP , Greg Rohan, INF , Jose Rosario, RHP, Victor Salazar, RHP, Brian Schlitter, RHP, Ryan Searle, RHP , Elliot Soto, INF, Nick Struck, RHP
It also means that the Cubs won't lose that many players from this list since most clubs do not partake in the Rule 5 selection process because it means the selection needs to kept on the 25 man roster for the entire year (like the Cubs did with Lendy Castillo last year and Hector Rondon this year).
Cubs executives have been meeting in Milwaukee which means that they are probably discussing the winter roster moves in secret (away from the office). There are plenty of "old" players who have had their chance who will not be protected (Caridad, Castillo, Cates, Coleman, Schlitter). On the list, there are only a few buzzworthy prospects like Alcantara and Amaya or prospects that we have heard about like Ha, Paniagua, Rhee and Struck.
September 21, 2013
I WANNA ANOTHER
For the third time in about a week, a Cub player has gone off on the manager.
This time closer Kevin Gregg got into it with Dale Sveum.
Patrick Mooney of CSNChicago writes that the meltdown may have been partly miscommunication by Gregg on the other two pitcher incidents and partly Gregg giving up 4 runs to Atlanta in yesterday's 9th inning. It also boils down to Gregg being threatened by Sveum's comments that he would use Pedro Strop in save situations in September. But after making that statement, Sveum kept Strop in the 8th inning role. So why was really Gregg upset?
Gregg was signed off the scrapheap by the Cubs after the season started; no other team wanted Gregg. After Friday's appearance, Gregg hit a $500,000 contract bonus for appearances. Not bad for a guy who may not have played at all this season. But Gregg, who is 35, has no job guarantee for 2014 so he may have been defensive about his situation.
During his Friday interviews, Gregg made some strong comments to the media.
“A professional courtesy would be nice," he said in response to the question about Strop becoming the new closer. “I expected to be treated a little bit better than this, but they have decisions to make. When they want to go in a new direction, they can treat the players how they want. Unfortunately, we’re under their control. It’s not necessarily how I would have done it.”
Gregg was a former teammate of Strop's in Baltimore. He was asked about Strop's ability to become a closer. “Can Pedro close next year? I don’t know. They’re going to have to take the chance and see. Is September going to be a telltale sign of what’s going on? No, it’s not the same baseball this time of year.”
A follow-up question Mooney reports was: Is your issue with Epstein or Sveum?
“Unfortunately for Dale, I think it’s guilty by association,” Gregg said. “But I think the decision — from what I understand — is from above. And they want to see what they have for next year. And they’re going to use 10 games to figure out if Pedro can close next year.”
Afterward, Gregg was pulled into the manager's office by Epstein who was not happy about Gregg's comments. Epstein told his closer that he felt "disrepected" by his comments, demanded an apology and said he would make a decision on whether to release the pitcher. "Unfortunately, there was miscommunication or Kevin misunderstood. But he ran to the media and that was his decision. I told him, as a man, I didn’t respect that,” Epstein said.
Gregg then started to make some apologies to the media, but it seems clear that Esptein's approach to player issues is to snap back and threaten to release them on the spot ("the Boston way?") Epstein's reaction shows that he may not have a good handle on player relations since he could not recognize that Gregg was upset with his manager's comments that personally affect his job status and livelihood. Epstein took Gregg's actions as being disrespectful to him (personally) which is not how human relations departments deal with high pressure employees.
Gregg and his fellow veteran pitchers are upset with the Cubs and the front office. Epstein has put together another year of a bad roster. It is frustrating for players who want to win to know that they do not have enough resources to win.
But this latest dust-up shows that Epstein is still more focused on his plan and his process than actually solving immediate problems. For example, releasing Gregg with 10 days to go in the season serves no purpose but to signal to other free agent players that the Cubs management does not address player concerns in a rational manner.
Also, if Gregg was not in Epstein's 2014 plans (since he signed Fujikawa to be the closer anyway), why did he trade Gregg to another team by the July deadline? Yes, a 35-year old reliever may not get back much in return, but he was a bona fide closer and contenders would pay something for that insurance. Instead, Gregg remained oddly a Cub for the entire season.
Gregg in 60 games played (50 game finishes), he is 2-5, 3.45 ERA with 32 saves and 1.383 WHIP. Strop, in 34 games played (6 game finishes), he is 2-2-, 2.78 ERA, with 0 saves and 0.928 WHIP.
There is no doubt that an organization should look to the future in meaningless September games. If the Cubs wanted to try out Strop at closer, there is nothing stopping Sveum from doing it. However, professionalism in the locker room would dictate that Sveum should have told Gregg first so he would not learn it from the media (which clearly happened in this case).
This incident is another strike on Sveum's record as well. A manager is supposed to be the communicator in the locker room. Sveum failed to do so in regard to the Gregg situation. It quickly escalated into a media circus and upset Esptein, his boss, who seems more focused on image than results.
The fall out of the incident is that Gregg will not be back in 2014. Strop will be given a try out at closer during spring training. And many potential second tier free agents may question whether Chicago is a good place to land this off season.
This time closer Kevin Gregg got into it with Dale Sveum.
Patrick Mooney of CSNChicago writes that the meltdown may have been partly miscommunication by Gregg on the other two pitcher incidents and partly Gregg giving up 4 runs to Atlanta in yesterday's 9th inning. It also boils down to Gregg being threatened by Sveum's comments that he would use Pedro Strop in save situations in September. But after making that statement, Sveum kept Strop in the 8th inning role. So why was really Gregg upset?
Gregg was signed off the scrapheap by the Cubs after the season started; no other team wanted Gregg. After Friday's appearance, Gregg hit a $500,000 contract bonus for appearances. Not bad for a guy who may not have played at all this season. But Gregg, who is 35, has no job guarantee for 2014 so he may have been defensive about his situation.
During his Friday interviews, Gregg made some strong comments to the media.
“A professional courtesy would be nice," he said in response to the question about Strop becoming the new closer. “I expected to be treated a little bit better than this, but they have decisions to make. When they want to go in a new direction, they can treat the players how they want. Unfortunately, we’re under their control. It’s not necessarily how I would have done it.”
Gregg was a former teammate of Strop's in Baltimore. He was asked about Strop's ability to become a closer. “Can Pedro close next year? I don’t know. They’re going to have to take the chance and see. Is September going to be a telltale sign of what’s going on? No, it’s not the same baseball this time of year.”
A follow-up question Mooney reports was: Is your issue with Epstein or Sveum?
“Unfortunately for Dale, I think it’s guilty by association,” Gregg said. “But I think the decision — from what I understand — is from above. And they want to see what they have for next year. And they’re going to use 10 games to figure out if Pedro can close next year.”
Afterward, Gregg was pulled into the manager's office by Epstein who was not happy about Gregg's comments. Epstein told his closer that he felt "disrepected" by his comments, demanded an apology and said he would make a decision on whether to release the pitcher. "Unfortunately, there was miscommunication or Kevin misunderstood. But he ran to the media and that was his decision. I told him, as a man, I didn’t respect that,” Epstein said.
Gregg then started to make some apologies to the media, but it seems clear that Esptein's approach to player issues is to snap back and threaten to release them on the spot ("the Boston way?") Epstein's reaction shows that he may not have a good handle on player relations since he could not recognize that Gregg was upset with his manager's comments that personally affect his job status and livelihood. Epstein took Gregg's actions as being disrespectful to him (personally) which is not how human relations departments deal with high pressure employees.
Gregg and his fellow veteran pitchers are upset with the Cubs and the front office. Epstein has put together another year of a bad roster. It is frustrating for players who want to win to know that they do not have enough resources to win.
But this latest dust-up shows that Epstein is still more focused on his plan and his process than actually solving immediate problems. For example, releasing Gregg with 10 days to go in the season serves no purpose but to signal to other free agent players that the Cubs management does not address player concerns in a rational manner.
Also, if Gregg was not in Epstein's 2014 plans (since he signed Fujikawa to be the closer anyway), why did he trade Gregg to another team by the July deadline? Yes, a 35-year old reliever may not get back much in return, but he was a bona fide closer and contenders would pay something for that insurance. Instead, Gregg remained oddly a Cub for the entire season.
Gregg in 60 games played (50 game finishes), he is 2-5, 3.45 ERA with 32 saves and 1.383 WHIP. Strop, in 34 games played (6 game finishes), he is 2-2-, 2.78 ERA, with 0 saves and 0.928 WHIP.
There is no doubt that an organization should look to the future in meaningless September games. If the Cubs wanted to try out Strop at closer, there is nothing stopping Sveum from doing it. However, professionalism in the locker room would dictate that Sveum should have told Gregg first so he would not learn it from the media (which clearly happened in this case).
This incident is another strike on Sveum's record as well. A manager is supposed to be the communicator in the locker room. Sveum failed to do so in regard to the Gregg situation. It quickly escalated into a media circus and upset Esptein, his boss, who seems more focused on image than results.
The fall out of the incident is that Gregg will not be back in 2014. Strop will be given a try out at closer during spring training. And many potential second tier free agents may question whether Chicago is a good place to land this off season.
AS GOOD
The Cubs point to the success of High Class A Daytona (which one its league) as a beacon for future Cubs success at the major league level. Winning is important.
But in the same regard, the White Sox Class AA team, Birmingham, won the Southern League. One would think that would infer that the White Sox prospect pipeline is moving along faster than the Cubs.
It appears that the White Sox have several interesting pitching prospects, and a possible replacement for Paul Konerko at first base. The players to watch are SS Marcus Semien, first sackers Dan Black and Andy Wilkins and third baseman Cody Puckett. On the pitching side, three starters had good years: Spencer Arroyo, Scott Snodgrass and Stephen McCray.
Like all teams, there are disappointments in OF Brandon Jacobs, Trayce Thompson and Jared Mitchell who were projected to have breakthrough seasons.
The final team stats:
But in the same regard, the White Sox Class AA team, Birmingham, won the Southern League. One would think that would infer that the White Sox prospect pipeline is moving along faster than the Cubs.
It appears that the White Sox have several interesting pitching prospects, and a possible replacement for Paul Konerko at first base. The players to watch are SS Marcus Semien, first sackers Dan Black and Andy Wilkins and third baseman Cody Puckett. On the pitching side, three starters had good years: Spencer Arroyo, Scott Snodgrass and Stephen McCray.
Like all teams, there are disappointments in OF Brandon Jacobs, Trayce Thompson and Jared Mitchell who were projected to have breakthrough seasons.
The final team stats:
| Individual Stats (Batting) (click column headers to sort) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Player | POS | G | AB | R | H | 2B | 3B | HR | RBI | TB | BB | SO | SB | CS | OBP | SLG | AVG | OPS | E |
| Paul Konerko | 1B | 3 | 10 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | .455 | .400 | .400 | .855 | 0 |
| Joe De Pinto | OF | 5 | 16 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | .524 | .438 | .375 | .961 | 0 |
| Marcus Semien | SS | 105 | 393 | 90 | 114 | 21 | 5 | 15 | 49 | 190 | 84 | 66 | 20 | 5 | .420 | .483 | .290 | .903 | 20 |
| Dan Black | 1B | 133 | 449 | 70 | 130 | 28 | 1 | 17 | 83 | 211 | 91 | 98 | 7 | 2 | .411 | .470 | .290 | .881 | 7 |
| Andy Wilkins | 1B | 67 | 243 | 37 | 70 | 16 | 0 | 10 | 49 | 116 | 38 | 58 | 3 | 0 | .386 | .477 | .288 | .863 | 3 |
| Michael Earley | RF | 66 | 233 | 35 | 64 | 16 | 2 | 4 | 29 | 96 | 19 | 37 | 4 | 2 | .336 | .412 | .275 | .748 | 1 |
| Daniel Wagner | 3B | 87 | 296 | 33 | 81 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 23 | 93 | 19 | 33 | 23 | 7 | .322 | .314 | .274 | .636 | 10 |
| Cody Puckett | 3B | 102 | 349 | 43 | 90 | 16 | 0 | 15 | 50 | 151 | 22 | 47 | 7 | 4 | .301 | .433 | .258 | .734 | 20 |
| David Herbek | 3B | 29 | 83 | 9 | 21 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 25 | 13 | 17 | 2 | 1 | .361 | .301 | .253 | .662 | 3 |
| Miguel Gonzalez | C | 37 | 119 | 12 | 29 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 42 | 10 | 25 | 3 | 1 | .318 | .353 | .244 | .671 | 7 |
| Micah Johnson | 2B | 5 | 21 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | .227 | .238 | .238 | .465 | 0 |
| Brandon Jacobs | OF | 43 | 156 | 13 | 37 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 22 | 51 | 11 | 50 | 2 | 3 | .291 | .327 | .237 | .618 | 0 |
| Tyler Saladino | SS | 118 | 424 | 49 | 97 | 17 | 2 | 5 | 55 | 133 | 51 | 86 | 28 | 8 | .316 | .314 | .229 | .630 | 17 |
| Trayce Thompson | CF | 135 | 507 | 78 | 116 | 23 | 5 | 15 | 73 | 194 | 60 | 139 | 25 | 8 | .321 | .383 | .229 | .704 | 7 |
| Mike Blanke | C | 94 | 332 | 25 | 75 | 15 | 1 | 7 | 43 | 113 | 36 | 75 | 2 | 0 | .302 | .340 | .226 | .642 | 7 |
| Brandon Short | RF | 54 | 160 | 20 | 36 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 17 | 52 | 19 | 26 | 3 | 3 | .314 | .325 | .225 | .639 | 1 |
| Keenyn Walker | CF | 130 | 462 | 77 | 93 | 16 | 5 | 3 | 32 | 128 | 69 | 153 | 38 | 15 | .319 | .277 | .201 | .596 | 11 |
| Chris McMurray | C | 14 | 30 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 1 | 0 | .400 | .333 | .200 | .733 | 1 |
| Jared Mitchell | CF | 76 | 247 | 23 | 43 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 20 | 68 | 41 | 96 | 13 | 5 | .297 | .275 | .174 | .572 | 4 |
| Luis Sierra | C | 5 | 19 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | .227 | .211 | .158 | .438 | |
| Tommy Manzella | 3B | 10 | 34 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 0 | .111 | .059 | .059 | .170 | 3 |
| Jeremy Dowdy | C | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | 0 |
| Individual Stats (Pitching) (click column headers to sort) | |||||||||||||||||||
| Player | W | L | ERA | G | GS | CG | SHO | SV | IP | H | R | ER | HR | HB | BB | SO | WHIP | HLD | GF |
| Spencer Arroyo | 9 | 7 | 3.42 | 26 | 26 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 144.2 | 134 | 68 | 55 | 9 | 7 | 44 | 92 | 1.23 | 0 | 0 |
| Scott Snodgress | 11 | 11 | 4.70 | 26 | 26 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 143.2 | 146 | 90 | 75 | 9 | 4 | 59 | 90 | 1.43 | 0 | 0 |
| Stephen McCray | 10 | 7 | 3.25 | 22 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 119.0 | 107 | 53 | 43 | 8 | 11 | 48 | 70 | 1.30 | 0 | 0 |
| Erik Johnson | 8 | 2 | 2.23 | 14 | 14 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 84.2 | 57 | 22 | 21 | 6 | 2 | 21 | 74 | 0.92 | 0 | 0 |
| Nick McCully | 7 | 3 | 3.08 | 19 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 79.0 | 52 | 32 | 27 | 8 | 5 | 24 | 48 | 0.96 | 0 | 0 |
| Kevin Vance | 2 | 6 | 3.91 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 69.0 | 55 | 31 | 30 | 4 | 1 | 36 | 84 | 1.32 | 6 | 16 |
| Michael Nix | 3 | 4 | 5.64 | 10 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 52.2 | 56 | 33 | 33 | 4 | 1 | 19 | 39 | 1.42 | 0 | 0 |
| Taylor Thompson | 4 | 2 | 2.15 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 50.1 | 34 | 15 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 46 | 0.93 | 0 | 28 |
| Chris Bassitt | 4 | 2 | 2.27 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47.2 | 35 | 16 | 12 | 2 | 4 | 17 | 37 | 1.09 | 0 | 0 |
| Salvador Sanchez | 2 | 4 | 2.74 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 42.2 | 31 | 16 | 13 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 46 | 0.96 | 8 | 9 |
| Jake Petricka | 3 | 0 | 2.06 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39.1 | 36 | 11 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 41 | 1.37 | 3 | 3 |
| Nestor Molina | 1 | 1 | 4.71 | 17 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 36.1 | 44 | 25 | 19 | 2 | 2 | 11 | 29 | 1.51 | 2 | 2 |
| Ryan Kussmaul | 2 | 1 | 2.43 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 33.1 | 24 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 36 | 0.93 | 3 | 14 |
| Dan Remenowsky | 1 | 2 | 3.94 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 29.2 | 30 | 14 | 13 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 28 | 1.21 | 0 | 6 |
| Chris Beck | 2 | 2 | 2.89 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28.0 | 26 | 10 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 22 | 1.04 | 0 | 0 |
| J.R. Ballinger | 1 | 2 | 6.91 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27.1 | 35 | 21 | 21 | 3 | 4 | 14 | 33 | 1.79 | 0 | 15 |
| Scott Carroll | 0 | 2 | 4.32 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25.0 | 25 | 15 | 12 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 1.08 | 0 | 0 |
| David Cales | 1 | 0 | 1.82 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24.2 | 25 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 22 | 1.66 | 3 | 6 |
| Josh Romanski | 1 | 1 | 6.26 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23.0 | 30 | 18 | 16 | 3 | 0 | 11 | 20 | 1.78 | 0 | 6 |
| Santos Rodriguez | 1 | 0 | 2.35 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23.0 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 25 | 1.17 | 4 | 3 |
| Daniel Webb | 0 | 0 | 1.77 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 20.1 | 11 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 21 | 0.79 | 1 | 10 |
| Wes Whisler | 0 | 2 | 7.16 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16.1 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 8 | 1.71 | 0 | 2 |
| Henry Mabee | 1 | 0 | 1.54 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11.2 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 0.94 | 0 | 1 |
| Jarrett Casey | 0 | 1 | 6.94 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11.2 | 18 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 1.71 | 1 | 4 |
| Cody Winiarski | 1 | 0 | 0.00 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 11.0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 18 | 0.64 | 0 | 7 |
| Ryan Buch | 0 | 0 | 4.91 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7.1 | 9 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 2.32 | 0 | 1 |
| John Danks | 1 | 0 | 2.57 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7.0 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.86 | 0 | 0 |
| Jake Peavy | 1 | 0 | 1.80 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5.0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 1.40 | 0 | 0 |
| Myles Jaye | 0 | 1 | 17.18 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.2 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2.73 | 0 | 0 |
| David Herbek | 0 | 0 | 0.00 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.00 | 0 | 1 |
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